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# The Structure of Political Attitudes in Hungary and Serbia

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The article presents a comparative examination of the structure of political ideology in two post-communist countries, Serbia and Hungary. A broad set of indicators of specific political attitudes is reduced to a smaller number of latent ideological dimensions via factor analysis. The precise meaning of the dimensions is determined after the analysis of their relationships with authoritarianism, out-group sympathy, prejudices, ideological self-identification, party-preference, and socio-demographic variables. Hungarian mass attitudes vary along dimensions of (1) alienation–socialism and (2) nationalist–antisocialism. Results for Serbia revealed the convergence of nationalist and pro-communist attitudes into a single dimension while another factor joined egalitarianism with social alienation. In both countries, authoritarianism is an important determinant of ideological dimensions, especially of pro-communist nationalism in Serbia and alienation–socialism in Hungary. Socio-demographic background variables are weaker determinants of ideological dimensions in Serbia compared with Hungary. In both countries, attitudinal factors differentiate supporters of the main political parties.

**Keywords:** *ideology; Hungary; political attitudes; Serbia; structure of attitudes*

Political scientists disagree about the best conceptualization of the structure of political attitudes. On one side, political attitudes are seen as unstable, disorganized, inconsistent, and hence, nonideological.<sup>1</sup> On the other side, the rational choice approach typically assumes that preferences are coherent and unidimensional.<sup>2</sup> Between these extreme views, there is a range of uni- or multidimensional empirical models. The most widespread is the socioeconomic left–right model of ideology.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, scholars have introduced additional dimensions, such as, for example, the *old* and *new* left and right,<sup>4</sup> or materialism–postmaterialism.<sup>5</sup> In addition, the social-psychological literature also provides one-dimensional models<sup>6</sup> and various multidimensional models.<sup>7</sup>

Since most of the existing models have been based on studies conducted in economically developed and established democracies, it is not clear to what extent they are applicable to different social, cultural, and political contexts. The problem of cross-cultural validity concerns both the descriptive aspect of the models—the

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number and content of ideological dimension—as well as the proposed explanatory accounts. Therefore, “new democracies” of Eastern Europe provide an attractive ground for the discovery of nonstandard ideological configurations. These countries are, in the global perspective, relatively close to the West in terms of cultural and social features and in their exposure to the main ideological currents and intellectual traditions inspiring them. Yet, the unique differentiating experience of a half a century of the communist monopoly over political discourse has, undoubtedly, left its mark on the way citizens organize and express their basic political views, as argued by a number of authors.<sup>8</sup> The possibility to study the influence of different factors from the initial stages of democratic politics is especially attractive because factors such as party loyalties or group encapsulation are still weak, and thus leave more room for the play of individual attitudinal orientations.

The present research contributes to this debate through a comparative examination of the structure of political ideology in two post-communist countries, Serbia and Hungary. The article will address three related problems. The first problem, mainly descriptive and taxonomic, concerns the question of whether political attitudes are organized and, if so, how. The structure of ideology in this framework refers to the relationships between attitudes toward various social and political objects, including specific issue positions and policy preferences, held by individuals in a certain population.

The second problem pertains to the causal explanation of the observed attitudinal structure. One aspect of this problem is explanation of the obtained structure *per se*, that is, the number and content of the ideological dimensions. For example, the general left–right or liberalism–conservatism dimension has often been explained in reference to the classical socioeconomic cleavage,<sup>9</sup> but also as reflecting basic personality structure.<sup>10</sup> Explanation of individual and group differences in location on the dimensions is another important aspect. The most common practice is examination of socio-demographic determinants.<sup>11</sup> Adorno et al. and McClosky initiated another approach, common in the sociopsychological literature, which explains differential attraction to competing ideologies by reference to personality traits.<sup>12</sup> Wilson, for example, proposed that the psychological basis of conservatism is “fear of uncertainty.”<sup>13</sup>

Finally, the third task is to examine the utility of the findings about the structure of political attitudes for understanding political action.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, it will be examined to what extent the isolated attitudinal dimensions help in predicting political party preferences.

## Post-Communist Context

Extrapolation to the post-communist context on the basis of the Western models is not straightforward. For example, one’s position on economic issues may be related not only to one’s socioeconomic position (or interests) but also to individual

evaluation of the former regime. Based on Mair's arguments about post-communist conditions, one should expect evidence of ideological instability, that is, fluctuating or changing attitudinal content of the main political divisions, strong polarization in the main divisive ideological dimensions, and relatively weak and unstable connections between party preferences and ideological orientations among the voters.<sup>15</sup>

Kitschelt argued that, instead of reproducing the familiar pro-market authoritarian–antimarket libertarian opposition, the post-communist East differs from the West by having the main political cleavage between pro-market libertarians and antimarket authoritarians.<sup>16</sup> In this view, those well equipped for newly emerging market competition are supposed to be in favor of pro-market and pro-democratization reforms. At the same time, their other characteristics, such as youth, education, and urbanization, should favor adoption of libertarian value orientation. Empirically based models, however, revealed more complex, multidimensional attitude structures.<sup>17</sup>

Following the sociopsychological models, it could be hypothesized that political expression of psychological dispositions (e.g., fear of uncertainty, authoritarianism) is context-dependent. Psychological uncertainty, induced by the social changes at the beginning of 1990s in the former socialist countries, and consequent psychological conservatism, could be expressed through different attitudes. For instance, instead of the religious component, conservatism could contain adherence to aspects of the state-socialist ideology and regret for the old regime.<sup>18</sup> Likewise, authoritarianism is expected to be related with the support for state socialist ideology,<sup>19</sup> since, in this context, certain aspects of socialism actually represent a conservative ideology. Yet, some of the relationships documented in the West should remain invariant across different contexts. For example, authoritarianism should be associated with nationalist and prejudiced attitudes regardless of the context.

## Comparing Hungary and Serbia

Regardless of the arguments suggesting commonality among the post-communist countries, there are reasons to expect variations in the attitudinal structure across cases. In particular, comparison of Serbia and Hungary is theoretically relevant for several reasons. First, they have cultural and historical similarities sufficient to make their comparisons meaningful and useful in detecting the role of specific factors that differentiate the cases.<sup>20</sup> At the same time, there are also important differences in their historical backgrounds, modes of communist rule, experiences in the period of transition to a multi-party regime, and in political divisions in the early 1990s.

This comparison is especially relevant for studying the role of historic legacies, as emphasized by a number of scholars.<sup>21</sup> According to the path dependency model of Kitschelt et al.,<sup>22</sup> different modes of communist rule are contingent on different pre-communist legacies, and consequential for both the modes of transition from communist rule as well as the configuration of political-ideological issues in a

post-communist period. In their view, economic issues have a relatively small chance of achieving primacy after *national-accommodative regimes*, such as in Hungary, since reformed communists often tend to “accept essentials of liberal market reform and convert themselves into ‘center-left’ new social democratic parties.”<sup>23</sup> Hence, sociocultural, national, or ethnic divides are more likely to achieve political centrality, resulting in a “tripolar political divide between a secular, libertarian and market-liberal camp, an equally secular and libertarian post-communist libertarian, and a national-authoritarian camp endorsing rather mixed economic positions.”<sup>24</sup>

Kitschelt et al. categorize Serbia as a case in-between patrimonial and national-accommodative communism, where coherent ideological articulation on the mass level is not very likely. One reason being that heritage of patrimonial communism is not favorable for the growth of market-liberal forces. In their view, the typically strong semi-reformed communists face the often disunited heterogeneous opposition, so the regime divide tends to persist as a major political division. As a result, other potentially salient issues, such as ethnic divisions and sociocultural authoritarianism, tend to covary with the regime divide, toward “the super-dimension of left-authoritarian versus right-libertarian politics.”<sup>25</sup>

More concrete configurations of political divisions in the early phases of political transition may also be relevant for the structuration of political attitudes. In both countries, in the first pluralist elections, the former communists were challenged by both nationalists and liberals. However, in Hungary, they were initially allied, united by their anti-communist stance. In contrast, in Serbia, there was certainly no such strong popular anti-communist opposition as in Hungary, Poland, or the Czech Republic; nor was there a strong nationalist opposition of the kind found in Croatia and Slovenia. Moreover, the division between the early nationalist opposition (represented by the Serbian Renewal Movement and the Serbian Radical Party) and liberal-democratic opposition (Democratic Party at the time) was probably as deep as that which divided each of them from the former communists.<sup>26</sup> Dissolution of the former Yugoslavia enabled the ruling Socialist Party to appropriate the nationalist issue. History of their close cooperation with the extreme nationalist Radical Party (SRS) should additionally favor covariation of socialist and nationalist ideological elements.

Hungary is more likely to exhibit ideological structures similar to Western patterns, especially since Hungarian nationalists have been, at the same time, fierce anti-communists. What is more specific for Hungary is that the culturally leftist parties are characterized by traditionally more rightist economic policies than the culturally rightist ones, this revealing a kind of disassociation between cultural and economic aspects of ideology.<sup>27</sup> The content of the cultural issue dimension is based on issues such as nationalism and libertarianism. It is much more decisive from the point of view of coalition-making and party competition than the economic issue dimension.<sup>28</sup> While the combination of anti-communist, clerical, nationalist, and authoritarian values has been present from the first days of the political transition, a different, non-rightist authoritarianism is also observable. Discontent with the

emerging inequalities and nostalgia for a more secure, though less democratic world, form a solid basis for leftist conservatism.

While the research in Hungary revealed the complexity of the problem, Serbia received much less attention in this regard. In general, especially by local scholars, politics in Serbia has been represented in moralistic terms as a struggle between good and evil. Analytic writers have tended to see the primacy of the nationalist issue over all other concerns.<sup>29</sup> Following Evans and Whitefield,<sup>30</sup> since ethnicity and nationalism played a more significant political role in Serbia, their effect on the structure of ideology is expected to be stronger than in Hungary. More specifically, since, in Serbia, nationalism was related both to the support for the state socialist ideology *and* to the support for radical right-wing parties, nationalist issues should be related to both the right and left wings. Additionally, this tendency should be reinforced by the constellation of the principal political division in Serbia throughout the 1990s: on one side was the so-called “red-brown coalition,” while on the other side were liberal, pro-democratic, and reform forces.

To reach more comprehensive explanations of the structure of ideology, as well as to examine its explanatory utility more completely, detailed case studies that can provide insight into the interplay of relevant micro and macro factors are necessary. In addition to addressing the general questions about the organization of political attitudes, this study is supposed to be useful for a better and deeper understanding of both Hungarian and Serbian politics. The present analysis is, therefore, comparative in two regards: implicitly the cases are compared against the “West”; explicitly Hungary and Serbia are compared with each other.

## Method

The present research is based on the analysis of two data sets: one from Serbia (1998) and one from Hungary (1994). The two surveys used comparable measures of political attitudes and included the key independent and criterial variables. Each data set was analyzed in three steps. The first involved factor-analytic examination of the structure of political attitudes. The extracted factors represent latent ideological dimensions responsible for the observed covariations of the manifest attitudes. The second examined the explanatory role of relevant variables, such as socioeconomic background, authoritarianism, prejudice, and ideological self-identification. Finally, the relationship between ideological dimensions and party preferences were analyzed.

## Surveys and Samples

The Hungarian sample, a national random route sample of 1,000 Hungarian citizens aged eighteen and over, was interviewed in the spring of 1994.<sup>31</sup> The data file was weighted to be representative of the adult Hungarian population in terms of age, gender,

and education. The Serbian sample consisted of 120 respondents, primarily students from the University in Novi Sad, Serbia. Data were collected in May and June 1998. Questionnaires were administered in group settings. The sample was balanced according to gender, while median age of the respondents was twenty-three. The sample was ethnically heterogeneous, but does not fully reflect ethnic composition of the province of Vojvodina. In the sample, 64 percent of the respondents were ethnic Serbs while an additional 16 percent declared themselves as Yugoslavs. The remaining 20 percent include those who did not declare any ethnic background, as well as respondents declaring as Montenegrin, Romanian, Serb-Croat, Ruthenian, and so forth. The largest of these groups were Croats, with ten respondents. Hungarians are largely underrepresented in the sample (two respondents). Since ethnic majority and minorities may differ in various aspects of political attitudes, all the reported analyses were performed on a subsample consisting of Serbs and Yugoslavs, but no substantive differences were observed.

Since the Serbian sample was nonrandom, direct comparisons of sample statistics with the Hungarian results were not made. The goal of this research was not the estimation of population parameters, but rather, the structure of the relationships between the analyzed variables.

## Measures

*Political Attitudes.* Political attitudes were examined via an attitude scale consisting of seventeen items, applied in both the Serbian and Hungarian surveys. Respondents were asked to express their agreement with each of the statements in four degrees, from *strongly disagree* (score 1), to *strongly agree* (score 4). The statements in the scale, listed in Table 1, were selected because of their representation of various political attitudes, relevant for constructing more general ideological orientations. Items in the scale contained both abstract and more concrete attitudes relevant for post-communist ideological controversies.

*Explanatory and Criterial Variables.* To enhance interpretation of the ideological dimensions and to examine their utility for understanding political behavior, a number of relevant criterial variables were introduced into the analysis. These variables included authoritarianism, ideological self-identification, party preferences, and ethnic prejudice scales.

*Authoritarianism.* The present analysis uses a shortened authoritarianism scale, consisting of nine items that were included in both surveys. The scale was built on items from the F-scale<sup>32</sup> and RWA scale,<sup>33</sup> together with a few newly worded ones. All items were presented in the same format as the political attitudes (four degrees of dis/agreement, higher number indicating stronger agreement). The following are two sample items: "The most important virtues a child has to learn are obedience and respect for authority." "Most of our social problems would be solved if we got rid of

immoral and perverted people.” In subsequent analyses, authoritarianism was operationalized as the average score on the nine-item scale.<sup>34</sup>

*Ideological Self-Identification.* Each of the surveys asked respondents for left–right ideological self-identifications via the standard ten-point Left–Right self-identification scale (ten denoting the right-most identification).

*Party Preferences.* The Serbian sample included an open-ended hypothetical vote-choice question and five-point like–dislike scales asking for the positive or negative evaluation of the then eight major political parties in Serbia. The vote choice question resulted in very low frequencies (almost 60 percent of respondents did not choose any party) so the analysis in the case of Serbia relies on the like–dislike ratings. The Hungarian survey included a vote-choice question, asking respondents for which party would a respondent vote if elections were to be held next week. Like–dislike scales were not included in the Hungarian survey.

*Prejudice Scales.* In the Serbian survey, the anti-Jewish prejudice (AS) scale consisted of thirteen items, with four degrees of dis/agreement. An example of a scale item is the following: “Economy and politics are under the strong influence of a secret Jewish conspiracy.” The scale is balanced—five items in the scale are formulated in the opposite direction of anti-Semitism (and reversed for calculation of the scale average). The anti-Gypsy prejudice scale consisted of nine items in the same format as the anti-Jewish prejudice scale. A sample item includes: “The inclination to commit crimes is inborn in Gypsies.”

The Hungarian survey included similar prejudice scales as in the Serbian study. The anti-Jewish prejudice scale consisted of twenty-one items and included most of the items in the corresponding scale applied in Serbia. The ten-item anti-Gypsy prejudice scale included all nine items from the Serbian scale. All prejudice measures were applied as summarized averaged scale scores.<sup>35</sup>

An extensive GATO scale (General Attitude Toward Out-groups) was included, consisting of items asking for respondents’ general sympathy/antipathy toward a large range of out-groups, from Turks and skinheads to Germans and Montenegrin. The scale applied in Serbia comprised twenty-one such items. Factor analysis revealed three factors, accounting for 52.1 percent of the scale variance. The *Friends* factor was defined by positive evaluations of groups such as Russians, Greeks, Montenegrins, Chinese, and Serbs. The *Lifestyle out-groups* factor was defined by evaluation of groups such as homosexuals, drug addicts, punks, beggars, and skinheads. The *Enemies* factor was defined by attitude toward groups that were perceived as Serbian enemies or as supporters of Serbian enemies in recent conflicts (e.g., Germans, Americans, Bosnian Muslims, Croats, Albanians, English, Turks, and Slovenes).

The Hungarian version of the GATO scale consisted of nineteen items, similar to those in the Serbian survey. On the basis of factor analysis, the scale was decomposed

into three separate measures. The *Ethnic groups* scale measured attitude toward different ethnic groups, such as Poles, Chinese, Gypsies, Arabs, Blacks, Rumanians, and Jews. The higher score indicates a more positive view of these groups. The second scale measured the attitude toward *lifestyle out-groups*, such as drug addicts, people with AIDS, skinheads, homosexuals, members of various religious sects, cosmopolitans, and atheists. Finally, the third scale consisted of two items, and measured attitudes toward “extreme left people” and “extreme right people” (i.e., the scale can be seen as representing the attitude toward political extremists).<sup>36</sup>

A number of variables dealing with socio-demographic status were also measured. These include age, religiosity, income, and education.

## Results

Specific items of the political attitude scale are conceived here as manifest attitudes, while the relationships between them can be seen as revealing the existence of more general latent attitudinal, or ideological, dimensions. Hence, factor analysis is used to define and analyze general political attitudes.

### Structure of Political Attitudes in Serbia and Hungary

In both countries, factor analysis of the political attitudes scale resulted in two factors.<sup>37</sup> Table 1 shows the structure of political attitudes factors (correlations between variables and factors).

*Hungary.* In the Hungarian sample, items with the highest projections on the first factor express a negative perception of the “rich” and “powerful.” Such findings could be interpreted as social frustration and social alienation (items 12, 13, 14, and 17). This attitude is joined by a certain kind of compulsive egalitarianism (items 10, 11, 15), the rejection of privatization (item 16), and the positive evaluation of the former communist regime and its policies (items 2, 3, 4). Two items may indicate a nationalist orientation (items 7 and 8). Their meaning, however, is ambiguous. Since they both refer to Hungary’s relationship with the Western world, their political interpretation can differ depending on whether one comes from the left or right. Former communists may be critical toward the West because it contributed to the downfall of the former regime, while the nationalist right may see the West as endangering national traditions. The fact that the more explicitly nationalist item 9 does not load the same factor with these items suggests that responses to items 7 and 8 were motivated more by attitudes toward the communist past than by nationalism of the current political right. It also suggests that Hungarian communists were successful in appropriating some nationalist sentiments. Thus, the first factor, which primarily unites social alienation, egalitarianism, and pro-communist orientation, could be labeled as the *alienation–socialism* factor.

**Table 1**  
**The Factor Structure of the Political Attitudes Scales in Serbia and Hungary**

	Hungary		Serbia	
	F1	F2	F1	F2
1. Increase the proportion of private property.		.55	-.50	
2. Agriculture should remain based on cooperatives.	.51	-.35	.52	
3. Former communist leaders paid more attention to the people.	.55	-.35	.53	
4. Under socialism people had more trust in future.	.53	-.48	.18	
5. The role of the Church should be increased in managing the country's matters.		.51	.33	
6. Hungary: Since 1990, people can influence the fate of the country. Serbia: After the introduction of multiparty system, ordinary people cannot influence the fate of the country anymore*.	-.35	.54	.43	
7. Hungary: Hungary should follow its own way, not caring about the expectations of the West. Serbia: Serbia should follow its own way.	.43		.47	
8. Hungary: The West abandoned Hungary again. Serbia: The West is again against Serbia.	.50		.34	.62
9. Hungary: Hungary should try to change its present borders. Serbia: Serbia should try to change (expand) its present borders.	.49		.63	
10. The state should provide jobs to everybody who wants to work.	.56		.20	
11. The state should decrease income differences.	.62		.43	.31
12. In this country only dishonest people get rich.	.68		.68	
13. Those who have some power look down on others.	.66		.69	
14. Highly qualified people look down on others.	.59		.38	
15. It is alright that some earn millions.	-.58		-.56	
16. Privatization is equal to robbery.	.62		.49	
17. Rich people usually look down on others.	.68		.75	

Notes: Oblimin rotated factor structure matrices. table entries: correlations between variables and factors. Coefficients above .30 shown except when the highest loading in a row is of lower magnitude.

\*The Serbian and Hungarian items were formulated in opposite directions.

The second factor unites antisocialist attitudes, expressed in the support for the regime change (item 6), rejection of the former regime and its policies (items 2, 3, 4), support for privatization (item 1), clericalism (item 5), and nationalism (items 9). These comprise the key components of general Western conservatism (as conceptualized by Wilson 1973). Therefore, the factor can be interpreted as right-wing conservatism or, more specifically, as *nationalist antisocialism*. The two factors were weakly negatively correlated ( $r = -.07, p < .05$ ).

*Serbia.* The first factor in the Serbian sample was primarily defined by two groups of items. Similar to its Hungarian counterpart, high-loading items concerned social alienation and were accompanied by egalitarian preferences, especially the request

that the state should promote such policies (items 11, 15, and 17). The Serbian factor was, however, quite simpler in structure, as there are basically no other significantly correlated items. It seems that this factor is based on social frustration and negative experiences with the political transformations of the post-communist period. The factor is, therefore, labeled as *alienation–egalitarianism*. In Hungary, social alienation seems to be more clearly integrated with political leaning (e.g., the socialist preferences) while, in Serbia, alienation is more of an independent dimension.

The second factor also contains two groups of related items. Nationalist attitudes have the highest loadings (especially items 8 and 9). Most of the other items express positive evaluation of the former socialist regime and communist policies (e.g., belief in agricultural cooperatives and negative attitudes toward privatization). Thus, this factor joins attitudes that would, in the Western context, be regarded as belonging to the opposite sides of the left–right political spectrum. In this respect, Serbia does not differ only from the West but from Hungary, as well. In Serbia, the nationalist attitudes go together with pro-socialist, anti-privatization attitudes, while, in Hungary, these attitudes are on the opposite poles of the same dimension. Also, in Serbia the three nationalist items (8, 9, and 10) clearly converge, suggesting that the negative view of the West is a more integral part of the nationalist orientation in Serbia than in Hungary.<sup>38</sup> Thus, the factor could be interpreted as the *pro-communist nationalism* dimension. The *alienation–egalitarianism* and *pro-communist nationalism* factors are slightly positively correlated ( $r = .17, p = .06$ ).

## Ideological Dimensions and Sociopsychological Variables

*Hungary.* The sociopsychological variables are strongly related with the ideological dimensions in Hungary (Table 2). The first ideological factor, which combines social alienation with pro-socialist orientation is, predictably, related to leftist identification, though the degree of association is modest ( $r = -.14, p < .001$ ). Variables measuring various attitudes toward out-groups are stronger correlates of the alienation factor. “Lifestyle out-groups,” Gypsies, and Jews seem to be especially targeted by those experiencing social alienation. However, not all out-groups are disliked. This ideological orientation is positively associated with the *liking* of political extremists, both on the left and right. ( $r = .21, p < .001$ ). The explanation for these associations is perhaps revealed by the strongest correlation coefficient—the one with authoritarianism ( $r = .51, p < .001$ ). The authoritarian worldview seems to be at the roots of the association between social alienation, nostalgia for the former regime, and prejudice toward various groups. Authoritarianism, alienation, and frustration seem to lead to preference for political extremes. In 1994 Hungary, these tendencies were especially evident on the left wing. The evidence also indicates the existence of left-wing authoritarianism and corroborates the often observed connection between frustration, perceived threats, authoritarianism, and prejudice.<sup>39</sup>

**Table 2**  
**Correlations of Political Attitudes Factors with Social-Psychological Variables**

	Hungary		Serbia	
	F1 Alienation– socialism	F2 Nationalist Antisocialism	F1 Alienation– egalitarianism	F2 Pro-communist nationalism
Left–Right self-identification	-.14***	.30***	-.05	.25**
Authoritarianism	.51***	.20***	.26	.46***
Anti-Gypsy prejudice	.34***	.18***	.08	.04
Anti-Jewish prejudice	.32***	.34***	.04	.22*
GATO <sup>a</sup> : Ethnic groups	-.23***	-.12***		
GATO: Lifestyle out-groups	-.35***	-.10**	-.31***	.02
GATO: Political extremists	.21***	-.10**		
GATO: <i>Friends</i> factor			-.01	.22*
GATO: <i>Enemies</i> factor			-.12	-.20*

<sup>a</sup> GATO—general attitude toward out-groups scale; higher score indicates more positive attitude.  
 \*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \* $p < .05$ .

The second attitudinal factor, the nationalist antisocialism (or, in other words, the *right-wing conservatism*), also has strong sociopsychological roots. The association with the right-wing is stronger than the first factor's association with the left wing ( $r = .30$ ,  $p < .001$ ). It is also associated with authoritarianism ( $r = .20$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and with prejudice, but the coefficients are generally lower in magnitude. While the correlates of the first factor suggested general dislike of various out-groups, something akin to Adorno et al.'s conception of ethnocentrism, the second ideological factor is more distinctively associated with anti-Jewish prejudice ( $r = .34$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

*Serbia.* Correlations obtained in Serbia were generally lower in magnitude. The social alienation factor in Serbia was neither related with the left–right scale nor with any of the ethnic prejudice measures. It was, however, associated with the dislike of “lifestyle out-groups” ( $r = -.31$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and authoritarianism ( $r = .26$ ,  $p < .01$ ). In these two aspects, the two social alienation attitudinal factors are similar. Specifically, in both Hungary and Serbia, social alienation is associated with authoritarianism and dislike of “lifestyle out-groups.” It is remarkable that the social alienation factor, which contains a strong component of economic egalitarianism, was not translated into the left–right ideology by the Serbian respondents, nor did it particularly influence party preferences.

The pro-communist nationalism factor was associated with a right-wing self-identification ( $r = .25$ ,  $p < .01$ ). It is an expected finding given that nationalism is a

strong component in this attitudinal dimension. Yet, it is surprising given that the pro-communist items also loaded high on this factor. This may reflect identification of the political right with nationalism.<sup>40</sup> At the same time, the factor was quite strongly correlated with authoritarianism ( $r = .46, p < .001$ ). These findings indicate that this ideological orientation is a mixture of leftist and rightist antiliberal views.

The fact that anti-Gypsy prejudice is unrelated to the ideological dimensions probably reflects low salience of the “Gypsy problem” in Serbia, compared with other countries in the region. Anti-Semitism has also been an issue with low political salience, though it is correlated with the pro-communist nationalism factor. Most likely, this is a consequence of higher general prejudice among those high scoring on the pro-communist nationalism. It is positively correlated with the *Friends* GATO scale and negatively with the *Enemies* subscale. Thus, these individuals are either disproportionately positive or negative toward groups conventionally perceived as national enemies and friends.

### Ideological Dimensions and Socio-Demographic Variables

*Serbia.* The combination of social alienation and egalitarianism seems to represent the ideological outlook of potential (or real) “losers of transition” in Serbia. The first factor is clearly rooted in relatively disadvantaged economic conditions, as indicated by its association with lower family income, lower levels of parents’ education, lower self-ascribed social class, and lower economic standards (Table 3). The association with older age did not reach statistical significance ( $r = .16, p > .05$ ), which is not surprising in a predominantly student sample.

Although the *pro-communist nationalism* factor is correlated with socio-psychological variables, it is unrelated with the socio-demographic variables. Thus, the factor seems to be more based on psychological dispositions.

*Hungary.* The socio-demographic profile of Hungarian respondents high in social alienation and egalitarianism (socialism) is similar to the one obtained in Serbia but even more pronounced. The *Alienation–socialism* factor is strongly negatively associated with education level ( $r = -.41, p < .001$ ), self-ascribed social class ( $r = -.40, p < .001$ ), material standard ( $r = -.36, P < .001$ ), lower income ( $r = -.28, p < .001$ ), and older age ( $r = .22, p < .001$ ). This factor is also more widespread among those who live in rural areas and the religious, though these associations are lower in magnitude.

Nationalist antisocialism, interestingly, has similar correlates, though the profile of the socioeconomically disadvantaged is less pronounced. The strongest associations were with religiosity indicators and former membership in the Communist Party (positive and negative correlation, respectively). Thus, the symbolic group associations (i.e., the Church or Party) seem to be the main differentiating factors that determine whether having a disadvantaged social background pushes one toward the left or the right.

**Table 3**  
**Correlations Between Ideological Dimensions and Selected**  
**Socio-Demographic Variables**

	Hungary		Serbia	
	F1 Alienation– socialism	F2 Nationalist Antisocialism	F1 Alienation– egalitarianism	F2 Pro-communist nationalism
Age	.22***	.14***	.16	–.16
Family income	–.28***	–.08*	–.22*	–.16
(Father's) Education <sup>a</sup>	–.41***	–.16***	–.30***	–.03
Church attendance <sup>b</sup>	.03	.27***	.07	–.03
Religiosity	.09**	.25***		
Urbanization	–.16***	–.06		
Social class <sup>c</sup>	–.40***	.02	–.32***	.03
Material standard <sup>d</sup>	–.36***	–.11***	–.21*	.01
Member of Communist Party	.05	–.21***		

<sup>a</sup> Hungary: 7-point scale, higher score meaning higher educational level. Serbia: 6-point scale, asked father's education level.

<sup>b</sup> 7-point scale, from 0–*never goes to church* to 6–*goes to church every day* (6-point scale in Serbia).

<sup>c</sup> Hungary: Self-categorization on a 6-point scale, from 1 (Lower class) to 6 (Upper class). Serbia: 3-point self-assessment of family material standard (from below average to above average).

<sup>d</sup> Hungary: Summarized 8-item scale (Serbia: 9-items) asking for possession of things such as telephone, computer, and a car.

\*\*\* $p < .01$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \* $p < .05$ .

The other side of the observed relationships is that respondents who were better off did not experience social alienation. Moreover, they seem opposed to both socialist egalitarianism and the extremes of nationalist conservatism. These findings, therefore, corroborate the evidence of the influence of socioeconomic factors on political ideology and preferences in Hungary.<sup>41</sup>

## Ideological Factors and Political Parties

*Serbia.* The pattern of positive and negative correlations between party evaluations and attitudinal dimensions, displayed in Table 4, proves the usefulness of the ideological dimension in explaining party preferences. In Serbia, the *alienation–egalitarianism* factor was related only to preferences for the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) ( $r = .22$ ,  $p < .05$ ). Taking into account the populist turn in this party's rhetoric around the mid-1990s, the connection seems reasonable. It shows that this party did not build its support exclusively on jingoist nationalism but that SRS attracted those sections of the population with greatest economic difficulties.

The *pro-communist nationalism* factor was more politically consequential. It was positively associated with preferences for parties with nationalist and pro-communist

**Table 4**  
**Correlations Between Party Preferences and Political Attitudes**  
**Factors in Serbia**

Parties (Leaders)	F1 Alienation– egalitarianism	F2 Pro-communist nationalism
SPS–Socialist Party of Serbia (Milošević)	.13	.24**
SPO–Serbian Renewal Movement (Drašković)	–.08	–.05
SRS–Serbian Radical Party (Šešelj)	.22*	.43***
DSS–Democratic Party of Serbia (Koštunica)	–.01	–.11
JUL–Yugoslav United Left (Mirjana Milošević)	.18	.19*
DS–Democratic Party (Đinđić)	–.06	–.20*
GSS–Citizens’ Alliance of Serbia (Svilanović)	–.10	–.30***
SVM–Alliance of Hungarians of Vojvodina	–.04	–.23*
LSV–League of Socialdemocrats of Vojvodina	–.11	–.35***

\*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \* $p < .05$ .

background—the Serbian Radical Party ( $r = .43, p < .001$ ), the Serbian Socialist Party (SPS,  $r = .24, p < .01$ ), and the Yugoslav United Left (JUL;  $r = .19, p < .05$ ). Negatively associated with this factor were preference for pro-change and pro-democratic, pro-minority parties: LSV ( $r = -.35, p < .01$ ), GSS ( $r = -.30, p < .01$ ), SVM ( $r = -.23, p < .05$ ), and DS ( $r = -.20, p < .05$ ). Interestingly, the two nonsignificant coefficients belonged to parties with a nationalist reputation—the Serbian Renewal Movement and the Democratic Party of Serbia. These findings indicate that both nationalism and pro-communist orientations were important elements of this orientation. Thus, parties could be differentiated solely on the basis of the nationalist component.

*Hungary.* The ideological dimensions extracted in Hungary were also powerful in distinguishing voters of different political parties. Table 5 shows the average attitudinal scores of different parties’ voters. To differentiate the extremist MIÉP, the table includes results for the anti-Jewish scale. In both attitudinal factors, the differences between parties were highly significant (ANOVA F tests  $p < .0001$ ).

The *Alienation–socialism* factor was the ideological dimension most accepted among voters of the unreformed heirs of the old communists (i.e., *Munkáspárt*) and, to a smaller degree, among voters of the reformed socialists (MSZP). Liberal, center, and right-wing parties generally rejected this attitude. Voters of the Smallholders Party (FKgP), however, obviously built their appeal on social alienation rather than on socialist orientation.

The moderate right-wing parties (MDF, KDNP, FKgP) attracted *right-wing conservative* voters, that is, voters endorsing nationalist and antisocialist attitudes. On the other extreme of the right-wing conservatism factor are the left-wing parties, especially MSZP. The liberal parties (at the time Fidesz and SZDSZ) were between the left- and right-wing camps, though they obtained significantly lower scores than the right-wing parties. Fidesz supporters maintained a liberal outlook in 1994, which is about when the party leadership launched its sharp right-wing turn.<sup>42</sup>

**Table 5**  
**Mean Voters' Scores on the Ideological Dimensions and the**  
**Anti-Jewish Prejudice Scale, Hungarian Data**

Party	F1 Alienation- socialism	F2 Nationalist Antisocialism	Anti-Jewish prejudice
Munkáspárt–Workers' Party	1.00	-.30	2.07
MSZP–Hungarian Socialist Party	.37	-.60	2.20
SZDSZ–Alliance of Free Democrats	-.28	.02	2.10
Fidesz–Alliance of Young Democrats	-.31	.03	2.20
MDF–Hungarian Democratic Forum	-.42	.76	2.35
KDNP–Christian-Democratic Peoples Party	-.14	.58	2.38
FKgP–Independent Smallholders Party	.27	.48	2.48
MIÉP–Party of Hungarian Justice and Life	-.28	.16	2.67
Significance (ANOVA F test)	.0001 <sup>a</sup>	.0001 <sup>b</sup>	.001 <sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> MSZP and Munkáspárt were higher than the rest except for FKgP; FKgP was higher than Fidesz, SZDSZ, and MDF (Tukey's HSD test).

<sup>b</sup> FKgP, MDF and KDNP were higher than MSZP, Fidesz, and SZDSZ. MSZP was lower than all other parties except for Munkáspárt. MIÉP differed only from MSZP.

<sup>c</sup> MIÉP and FKgP were more anti-Semitic than SZDSZ.

Slightly curvilinear relationship of the *alienation* factor explains why it weakly correlated with left–right identification: voters of the more extreme parties score higher in this dimension than the moderate parties. Social alienation and a kind of rigid egalitarianism seem to represent the common ground between left- and right-wing authoritarianism.

Voters of the extreme right-wing MIÉP scored around average on the two ideological dimensions. Moreover they seemed to be less nationalist and anticommunist than virtually the entire moderate right (though MIÉP voters statistically significantly differ only from MSZP). MIÉP voters are also not distinctive according to their level of *social alienation*, which is interesting taking into account standard explanations of right-wing extremism. Yet, anti-Semitism is an issue that differentiates MIÉP voters from the others, though one can note the generally increasing trend from the left to the right side. In general, the curvilinearity of these relationships helps explain the relatively low correlations between attitudinal dimensions and left–right self-identification.

## Discussion and Conclusions

The present investigation began with the analysis of the interrelationships between specific attitudes. The obtained factors, representing relatively independent ideological dimensions, proved interpretable and theoretically meaningful. Kitschelt

et al.'s hypothesis that polities following patrimonial and national-accommodative communist regimes should differ in the degree of attitude organization is, therefore, not supported. Serbia does not seem to differ from Hungary in terms of the *degree* of ideological structuration.<sup>43</sup>

The two extracted ideological factors in Serbia were interpreted as alienation–egalitarianism and pro-communist nationalism. The former expressed social alienation and, secondarily, the preference for the redistributive role of the state. The latter joined pro-communist and nationalist attitudes. The structure of the second factor is particularly interesting for it contains the usually separate or even opposed attitudes. Perhaps it reflects the political reality at the time of the survey, characterized by a more or less open coalition between SPS and SRS (i.e., the unreformed socialists and nationalist-populists). However, there is probably more to it than just the reflection of temporary political alliances. Structure of the political space in Serbia could be interpreted as a particular perspective on solving the nation-building question, via economic redistribution and nationalism, especially in the face of prolonged extreme economic sanctions against Serbia during the 1990s, the fate of the co-nationals in the seceded former Yugoslav republics, and the continuing struggle in Kosovo. Thus, Evans and Whitefield's argument that in countries with weakly defined status, the nation-building issues should be at the forefront of political-ideological struggle, is supported here.<sup>44</sup>

Historical legacy also has its role, as shown by notable similarities of Serbia with another post-patrimonial case, Bulgaria. Markowski blamed the “incomplete ‘reformation’ of the Bulgarian Communist Party” for the observed combination of authoritarianism and post-communist economic populism.<sup>45</sup> Kitschelt et al.'s explanation, however, is less agency-based. They contend that the association of post-communists with authoritarianism and nationalism is because of the reinforcement or coincidence of regime and economic divides after patrimonial communism.<sup>46</sup> The Serbian case, as well as their own Bulgarian findings, accord with their claim that the overarching left-authoritarian dimension in post-patrimonial conditions is the crucial ideological division, although, it should be added, there is no clear evidence that the other pole is necessarily “right-libertarian.”

There are additional factors that may have contributed to the convergence of nationalist and pro-communist attitudes in Serbia. For instance, in Serbia, the “socialist revolution” has been largely perceived as authentic (unlike in Hungary where the communist ideology was more associated with Soviet domination) and, therefore, not incompatible with nationalist sentiments. Moreover, media and educational curricula in the communist period often made connections between the antifascist partisan movement, socialist revolution, and the Serbian liberation wars and movements from 1804 to 1914, thus integrating them into a common narrative with nationalistic overtones.

These two ideological dimensions have specific relationships with the social and psychological variables. The *alienation–egalitarianism* dimension is not associated with the left–right divide but it is related to authoritarianism and with negative

attitude toward the “lifestyle out-groups” (though it is not associated with attitudes toward national and ethnic out-groups). It seems as if frustration, implicit in the alienation items, was less converted into ethnic and national prejudice in Serbia than in Hungary. At the same time, this dimension reflects underprivileged socioeconomic background. The *pro-communist nationalism* factor, on the other hand, is related to right-wing identification, strongly with authoritarianism, and moderately with prejudice. Individuals scoring high on this factor tend to reject the out-groups commonly regarded as Serbian “national enemies” and approve groups regarded as “friends.” It appears that this factor is more based on nationalism while positive views of the communist rule are secondary. Pro-communist nationalism proved unrelated to any of the socio-demographic variables. Individual differences in this dimension, therefore, seem to be part of different world-views rather than stemming directly from socioeconomic factors.<sup>47</sup>

Both ideological dimensions isolated in Serbia were related with party preferences in the expected direction, though the alienation–egalitarianism factor correlated significantly only with support for the populist right-wing Radical Party. The nationalism–communism dimension proved more relevant politically. Specifically, it differentiated support for the socialists and radicals from preference for parties favoring pro-democratic change, economic liberalization, and regional decentralization.

In Hungary, social alienation items were associated with virtually all indicators of socialist and egalitarian orientations. As a result, the alienation–socialism factor can be interpreted in a broader sense. In Serbia, alienation was accompanied by the egalitarian component, while socialist attitudes converged with the second factor—nationalism. Keeping in mind that the Serbian factor was very weakly associated with party preferences, this factor indicates a type of social alienation that is less politicized. In contrast, the Hungarian factor is clearly based on nostalgia for the former regime. This nostalgia is prevalent among the supporters of the non-reformed communist of Munkáspárt. However, social alienation can be detected also among some of the supporters of the populist-right (FKgP), thus blurring the association of this factor with the left–right dimension.

Given the strong association of the alienation–socialism factor with authoritarianism, prejudice, and lower socioeconomic status, along with the fact that it discriminated centrist parties from those more toward the extremes (though not the extreme right), it seems that it is best interpreted as a more psychological than ideological dimension, probably facilitating adoption of more radical ideological preferences. This dimension also includes some of the “old versus new regime” cleavages (e.g., it pits MSZP and Munkáspárt against basically all the other parties). In addition, many correlates often associated with conservatism in the Western countries are associated with the first Hungarian factor making it interpretable as “socialist conservatism.”<sup>48</sup>

The second factor extracted from the Hungarian survey was close to traditional right-wing conservatism. Given its strong nationalist component, it was interpreted here as nationalist antisocialism. This factor was related with right-wing identification,

prejudice, and authoritarianism. It is also firmly rooted in deprived socioeconomic conditions. This dimension makes Hungarian respondents similar to their Western counterparts, but it is also sharply different from the Serbian attitudinal counterpart, where socialist and nationalist orientations converged. Partywise, the nationalist anti-communism dimension strongly differentiated nationalist right-wing parties from the liberal and left parties (MIÉP voters, however, obtained scores close to the overall average).<sup>49</sup>

While the two Hungarian ideological factors were about equally relevant for party preferences,<sup>50</sup> in Serbia, however, the alienation–egalitarianism factor was only marginally politically relevant. Rather, the national issue proved crucial for party preference. Hence, on the ideological level, at the time, party competition was bipolar and unidimensional, despite the fragmentation of the Serbian party system.<sup>51</sup>

To the extent that authoritarianism can be considered an indicator of the fear of uncertainty, the obtained findings support Wilson's argument about psychological roots of conservatism.<sup>52</sup> The Hungarian case seems especially interesting since both left and right conservatisms are positively associated with authoritarianism. In addition, both the socialist and right-wing conservatives have a similar social profile: they are economically worse off, less educated, and older. Individuals of this profile are the likely losers of transition. Those who have lost in the transition process may feel nostalgia for the old system (i.e., socialist conservatives), unless they have strong symbolic motivation to accept and be positive about the new system (i.e., right-wing conservatives). This motivation may include religious comfort, yet nationalism and prejudice are also familiar as handy outlets for social frustration. What *kind* of conservatism one opts for, the socialist or nationalist-religious one, is decided by religiosity, as indicated by the church-attendance item. While the *direction* of one's ideological orientation seems to be linked to social identity, the *intensity* of one's ideological commitment seems to be more rooted in psychological dispositions.

Finally, one may justly wonder to what extent the obtained results are period-specific and, especially in Serbia, sample-specific. Using a comparable Hungarian national sample surveyed in 2002 and a wider set of attitudinal and value indicators, Enyedi and Todosijević obtained four ideological factors.<sup>53</sup> A factor interpreted as socialist conservatism contained very similar indicators as the present alienation–socialism factor. It was also strongly correlated with authoritarianism, prejudice, age, and lower socioeconomic status. Additionally, Munkáspárt supporters obtained the highest scores. The right-wing conservatism factor from 2002 closely corresponds to the present factor, nationalist–anticommunism. It was also defined by nationalist, clericalist, and antisocialist views. Their correlates are also similar: the 2002 right-wing conservatism was also associated with authoritarianism, anti-Semitism, religiosity, and lower socioeconomic status. In fact, the association with lower SES was weaker than in the case of the socialist conservatism, just as in the present research. High average scores on this factor were found among voters of the moderate right-wing parties, KDNP, MDF, FKgP, and the ideologically transformed Fidesz.

Todosijević reported results of an extensive analysis of the structure of political attitudes in Serbia.<sup>54</sup> The survey conducted in 2002 used a much broader set of attitudes (approximately seventy attitude items) and was conducted on a random sample of Belgrade residents. The pro-communist nationalism factor from the present study closely corresponds to the socialist conservatism factor from the 2002 dataset. Primary factors building socialist conservatism in 2002 data included nationalism, socialist economy, militarism, collectivism, rejection of the international community, and preference for the socialist regime. It was also associated with authoritarianism, prejudice, older age, and lower socioeconomic status, and was, by far, the most important for differentiating political parties in Serbia in 2002. Socialist and radical voters obtained the highest scores, while parties from the so-called “democratic opposition” obtained low scores. Thus, this configuration of attitudes seems to be a robust phenomenon of the Serbian political culture, not limited to students or respondents from Vojvodina.

Nonetheless, it would be unrealistic to ignore a dynamic character of ideological dimensions, particularly the association between nationalism and socialist orientations in Serbia. In 1990, the most nationalist attitudes were found not among the Milošević supporters, but among the nationalist opposition (voters of SPO and the Radicals). Using several studies conducted by the Belgrade Institute for Social Sciences, and the aforementioned 2002 study of Belgrade residents,<sup>55</sup> it is possible to trace some of the changes over time.<sup>56</sup> Namely, some of the studies contained items that could be used to construct attitude scales for measuring nationalist and pro-socialist attitudes.<sup>57</sup> Correlation between nationalist and socialist attitudes was negative in 1990 ( $r = -.11$ ,  $p < .001$ ); in 1996 it was still negative but barely different from zero ( $r = -.06$ ,  $p < .05$ ); while in 2002, these attitudes were strongly positively correlated ( $r = .46$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Thus, the findings reported in the present research fit nicely in this longer term trend of convergence between the two attitudes.

The overall findings suggest a strong degree of continuity in the main political-ideological cleavages, both in Serbia and Hungary, but also in their dynamic character. The convergence of the results from different studies is all the more remarkable because it is based on studies from different time periods, using quite different attitude measures, samples, and methods of analysis. These findings counter Mair's<sup>58</sup> expectations of both ideological instability and disjunction between party preferences and ideological orientations in post-communist countries.

## Notes

1. See, for example, Philip E. Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” in D. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. (New York: Free Press, 1964), 206–61; or John R. Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

2. According to Downs, “each party takes stands on many issues, and each stand can be assigned a position on our left–right scale” (Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), 132).

3. For example, Oddbjørn Knutsen, "Left–Right Materialist Value Orientations," in J. W. Van Deth and E. Scarbrough, eds., *The Impact of Values*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 160–196. John D. Huber, and Ronald Inglehart, "Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies," *Party Politics* 1 (1995): 73–111. Dieter Fuchs and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, "The Left–Right Schema," in M. K. Jennings and J. W. van Deth et al., eds., *Continuities in Political Action* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990), 203–34.

4. Russel J. Dalton, *Citizen Politics in Western Democracies* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1988).

5. Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

6. Glenn D. Wilson, *The Psychology of Conservatism* (New York: Academic Press, 1973).

7. For example, Hans J. Eysenck, "The Structure of Social Attitudes," *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology* 14 (1975): 323–331. Cees P. Middendorp, "Left–Right Self-identification and (Post)materialism in the Ideological Space; Their Effect on the Vote in the Netherlands," *Electoral Studies* 11 (1992): 249–260. Fred N Kerlinger, *Liberalism and Conservatism: The Nature and Structure of Social Attitudes* (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1984).

8. Sten Berglund, Joakim Ekman, and Frank H. Aarebrot, eds. *The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe*, 2nd ed. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004). Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, "Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe," *British Journal of Political Science* 23 (1993): 521–548. Herbert Kitschelt, "The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe," *Politics and Society* 20 (1992): 7–50. Herbert Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party System: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

9. For example, Knutsen, "Left–Right"; Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Introduction," in S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 1–64.

10. For example, Wilson, *Psychology of Conservatism*.

11. For example, Harrison Himmelweit et al., *How Voters Decide: A Longitudinal Study of Political Attitudes and Voting Extending over Fifteen Years* (London: Academic Press, 1981); Middendorp, "Left–Right Self-Identification."

12. Theodor W. Adorno et al., *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper and Row, 1950). Herbert McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," *American Political Science Review* 52 (1958): 27–45.

13. Wilson, *Psychology of Conservatism*.

14. For example, Middendorp, "Left–Right Self-Identification."

15. Peter Mair, "What is Different about Post-Communist Party Systems?" in Peter Mair, ed., *Party System Change. Approaches and Interpretations*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 175–98.

16. For example, Kitschelt, "The Formation of Party Systems"; Herbert Kitschelt, "The Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies," *Party Politics* 1:4 (1995): 447–72.

17. For example, Radoslaw Markowski, "Political Parties and Ideological Spaces in East Central Europe," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 30 (1997): 221–54; Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party System*; Zsolt Enyedi and Bojan Todossijević, "Organization of Mass Political Attitudes in Hungary," *Polish Psychological Bulletin* 34:1 (2003): 15–26.

18. Enyedi and Todossijević, "Organization."

19. See Sam McFarland, V. S. Ageyev, and N. Djintcharadze, "Russian Authoritarianism Two Years After Communism," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 22:2 (1996): 210–27.

20. The Serbian survey was conducted in Novi Sad, capital of the province of Vojvodina, which was part of Austro–Hungary until 1918.

21. For example, Evans and Whitefield, "Identifying the Bases"; Steven D. Roper and Florin Fesnic, "Historical Legacies and Their Impact on Post-Communist Voting Behaviour," *Europe-Asia Studies* 55 (2003): 119–31; Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party System*.

22. Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party System*.
23. Ibid., 81.
24. Ibid., 83.
25. Ibid., 86.
26. For example, Bojan Todosijević, *Structure, Determinants and Political Consequences of Political Attitudes: Evidence from Serbia* (Doctoral dissertation, Political Science Department, CEU, Budapest, 2005).
27. Zsolt Enyedi, "The Survival of the Fittest: Party System Concentration in Hungary," in Susanne Jungerstam-Mulders, ed., *Post-Communist EU Member States: Parties and Party Systems* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006), 177–202.
28. Zsolt Enyedi, "The Role of Agency in Cleavage Formation," *European Journal of Political Research* 44 (2005): 1–25. Along the same lines, Evans and Whitefield found that "the Hungarian party system is shown to be structured mainly by issues of social liberalism, prejudice, and attitudes towards the position of Hungarians abroad. Distributive questions along with nationalism comprise a secondary dimension." (Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, "Social and Ideological Cleavage Formation in Post-Communist Hungary," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47 (1995): 1178–203, 1179–80).
29. For example, Laslo Sekelj, "Parties and Elections: The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—Change Without Transformation," *Europe-Asia Studies* 52:1 (2000): 57–75.
30. Evans and Whitefield, "Identifying the Bases."
31. For the documentation of the survey and the data available in the Hungarian data archive of the Social Research Informatics Centre (TARKI) see the website at <http://www.tarki.hu>.
32. Adorno et al., *The Authoritarian Personality*.
33. Bob Altemeyer, *Enemies of Freedom: Understanding Right-Wing Authoritarianism* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988).
34. Coefficients of reliability (Alpha) were  $\alpha=.77$  (average item-total correlation was .45) in the Serbian sample and  $\alpha=.72$  in the Hungarian national sample (average item-total correlation was .40). Mean and standard deviation was 2.51 and .58, respectively, in the Serbian sample and 2.95 and .59 in the Hungarian sample.
35. Metric characteristics of the prejudice scales: In Serbia: AS scale:  $\alpha=.76$ ,  $M=1.3$ ,  $SD=.41$ ; AG scale:  $\alpha=.78$ ,  $M=2.0$ ,  $SD=.51$ . In Hungary: AS scale:  $\alpha=.92$ ,  $M=2.24$ ,  $SD=.66$ ; AG scale:  $\alpha=.76$ ,  $M=2.87$ ,  $SD=.59$ .
36. Reliability coefficients of the three scales were  $\alpha=.73$ ,  $\alpha=.67$ , and  $\alpha=.67$ , respectively.
37. Number of factors determined according to the Scree test. The two extracted factors explain 38.12 percent and 27.92 percent of the total variance in Hungary and Serbia, respectively.
38. Todosijević, *Structure*.
39. Richard M. Doty, Bill E. Peterson, and David G. Winter, "Threat and Authoritarianism in the United States, 1978-1987," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 61 (1991): 629–40.
40. Analysis, not presented here, revealed curvilinear associations between both ideological dimensions and left–right identifications. Alienation scores were higher at the extremes of the left–right dimension, while pro-communist nationalism scores were the highest on the right wing and lowest on the moderate left wing.
41. Evans and Whitefield, "Social and Ideological Cleavage Formation."
42. For example, Csilla Kiss, "From Liberalism to Conservatism: The Federation of Young Democrats in Post-Communist Hungary," *East European Politics and Societies* 16:3 (2002): 739–63; Enyedi, "The Role of Agency."
43. Just as their analysis of the Bulgarian sample failed to support the aforementioned hypothesis (Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party System*).
44. Evans and Whitefield, "Identifying the Bases."
45. Markowski, "Political Parties," 243.
46. Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party System*, 237–8.

47. See, for example, Radojica Bojanović, *Autoritarni pogled na svet*. (Beograd: Centar za primenjenu psihologiju, 2004). Bojan Todosijević, "Politics in Serbia 1990–2002: A cleavage of world views," *Psihologija* 39:2 (2006).

48. See also Enyedi and Todosijević, "Organization."

49. The isolated dimensions failed to outline the ideological profile of the extremist right-wing MIÉP. Additional analyses showed that it is not so much nationalism as it is anti-Jewish prejudice that differentiates this party.

50. See also Enyedi and Todosijević, "Organization."

51. See also Todosijević, *Structure*.

52. Wilson, *Psychology of Conservatism*.

53. Enyedi and Todosijević, "Organization."

54. Todosijević, *Structure*.

55. *Ibid.*

56. Surveys from 1990 and 1996 (ZA Studies 2901 and 2911) were conducted by the Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade. The data are made available by the Zentralarchiv Fuer Empirische Sozialforschung, Koeln. Neither the original collectors nor the Zentralarchiv, Koeln, bears any responsibility for the analysis or the interpretation presented here.

57. More details about the scales and data sources can be found in Todosijević, "Politics in Serbia."

58. Mair, "What is Different."

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