

Structure versus culture again: Corporatism and the ‘new politics’ in 16 Western European countries

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Abstract. Various authors have hypothesized that corporatist institutional arrangements favor the development of ‘new politics’: new social movements, concern for issues such as peace and ecology, postmaterialist orientation and voting for left-libertarian parties. This article analyzes the relationships between corporatism and ‘new politics’ using Siaroff’s (1999) corporatism scores for 16 West European countries and data from Inglehart et al.’s (1998) World Value Survey. The results of the analysis show that corporatism is related to higher membership in peace movements and also to belief in the urgency of ecological problems. However, it is unrelated to postmaterialist values, votes for ‘new parties’, approval of the environmentalist and feminist movements, and willingness to contribute financially to environmental protection. The relationships between corporatism and ‘new politics’ is shown to be somewhat mediated by economic factors, while the hypothesis that postmaterialism is a principal factor behind the popularity of the new social movements is not substantiated.

Introduction

There exists a widely felt need for more studies linking micro and macro levels in comparative politics, as well as for a more systematic analysis of the relationships between ‘structure’ and ‘culture’. This article represents an attempt to connect the macro and structural levels of political systems with the micro and cultural levels. The macro level is represented here by the corporatist nature of national states, the micro level by aspects of political culture such as the attitudes and behavior of individuals. Cultural-attitudinal elements will be the dependent variables, while corporatism will be treated as the main explanatory variable. Corporatism is understood as ‘the coordinated, cooperative, and systematic management of the national economy by the state, centralized unions, and employers’ (Siaroff 1999: 177). Attitudinal and behavioral variables include postmaterialist values (Inglehart 1977, 1990a), support for the so-called ‘new social movements’ (NSMs), participation in such movements, the embracing of ‘new politics’ concerns and votes for ‘new politics’ parties.

Support for new social movements and for postmaterialist values is commonly associated with increased economic security, the expansion of education and the spread of cognitive skills in the population. According to Dalton (1988: 6–7), for example, factors that contributed to change in West European politics over the last several decades include ‘the unprecedented expansion of economic well being’, increased governmental involvement in society, ‘restructuring of the labor force’, expanded educational opportunities and ‘increases in informational resources’. These factors influenced changes in ‘life conditions and life styles’, and led to ‘a growth of political skills and resources, producing the most sophisticated public in the history of democracies’ (Dalton 1988: 7–8). In the political sphere, these changes are reflected in increased political participation, the appearance of new issues and new modes of participation. ‘The political conflicts in advanced industrial societies have created a new dimension of cleavage in recent years. This New Politics dimension involves conflict over a new set of issues – environmental quality, alternative life styles, minority rights, participation, and social equality’ (Dalton 1988: 133–134).

Inglehart’s (1977, 1990a) original thesis on postmaterialist ‘cultural shift’ is primarily concerned with changes in values and attitudes. According to his findings, the ‘silent revolution’ of values started in the most modernized societies in the second half of the twentieth century, but has now reached all around the world. This revolution consists of a decreasing appreciation of such modern core values as material standard of living, public order, national security and military strength. Increasingly popular values are, for example, protection of the environment, intellectual and aesthetic satisfaction (self-actualization needs) and civil liberties for different minorities (ethnic or life style). The former set of values are labeled by Inglehart as ‘materialist’, while the latter are referred to as ‘postmaterialist’. Drawing on Maslow’s hierarchical model of human needs, Inglehart hypothesized that due to the increased material standard of living in their formative years, the post World War II generations became more interested in ‘higher’ human needs. A parallel justification is derived from the economic ‘diminishing marginal utility’ theorem.

Individuals expressing postmaterialist value patterns are also supposed to be more supportive of anti-war, anti-nuclear power, feminist and ecology movements. Moreover, the new value pattern is supposed to be causally related to political behavior: ‘The presence of materialist or postmaterialist values proves to be the most important single influence on whether a given individual will support new social movements’ (Inglehart 1990b: 64–65).

Instead of regarding economic conditions during the youth of individuals as the determinant factor, Kitschelt emphasizes the role of occupational expe-

rience. Routine, object-processing jobs engender authoritarian values, while interactive, creative occupations foster libertarian, postmaterialist orientation and a preference for new politics (new left, green) parties. Higher skills, especially the skills needed to manipulate political abstractions (Inglehart 1977: 295), are associated with more libertarian attitudes since they equip citizens for self-governance and meaningful participation (Kitschelt 1994).

These views represent sociological and social-psychological explanations of the emergence of the new politics issues. Essentially, they argue that increased wealth and economic security, accompanied by greater 'cognitive mobilization', are the responsible factors. However, it has been suggested that corporatist politico-economic arrangements have also helped increase the popularity of various aspects of the new politics (Kitschelt 1990). Hence, this article examines whether there is a need to expand the explanatory hypotheses behind the rise in postmaterialist values, new social movements and left-libertarian voting. The question to be answered is whether, in addition to economic and socio-psychological factors, an additional, genuine political system variable is needed for the explanation of cross-national differences.

According to Kitschelt (1990: 180): 'the literature on social movements has given little consideration to the institutional fabric in which movements are enmeshed'. He claims that corporatism is responsible for giving fuel to new social movements:

Particularly where institutional fabric furthers neo-corporatist bargaining among organized producers (business and labor), activists in new social movements are likely to create or at least vote for emerging Left-libertarian parties. (Kitschelt 1990: 180)

On the one hand, 'corporatist welfare states are especially conducive to the rise of Left-libertarian preferences', on the other, 'their channels of interest intermediation offer few opportunities for communicating these new demands into the political process' (Kitschelt 1990: 182). Kitschelt thus presents a hydraulic model: new preferences emerge and create pressure, but since the routinized system of political and economic bargaining between the established and more powerful political actors within a corporatist arrangement is not able and/or willing to respond to them, instability is created and new movements and parties emerge. Since the 'old players' are not responsive to the new demands, such new parties and movements are likely to 'garner a substantial following' (Kitschelt 1990: 182). Kitschelt thus suggests that in corporatist countries such new political preferences should be more widespread, and that parties and movements promoting them should have more supporters.

Kitschelt provided empirical evidence for his claims by analyzing the number of votes for left-libertarian parties in various West European countries between 1980 and 1988. However, the electoral success of 'new politics' parties is only one aspect of the relationship between corporatism and new social movements. The act of voting, particularly for relatively new and small parties, depends on many different factors, such as electoral laws, and not only on the existence of preferences that match the programs of such parties. Therefore, the variables analyzed by Kitschelt can provide only limited evidence for the influence of corporatism on the new politics.

Wilson (1990) investigated whether corporatism is related to the support for, and membership of, various new social movements (NSMs), such as anti-nuclear, pacifist, feminist and environmental groups, and to the acceptance of unconventional political action. Like Kitschelt, he hypothesized that neo-corporatist institutional patterns are 'fostering the emergence of new social movements' (Wilson 1990: 67) through the lack of responsiveness of the established interest groups to represent the new political issues. In the neo-corporatist arrangement, according to Wilson (1990: 70), political space is 'closed' to new actors, and such leadership tends to become rigid and unresponsive to grassroots membership. In this way, corporatism tends to displace conflicts towards the micro level or membership base, rather than to solve them (cf. Wassenberg 1982).

Wilson compared two groups of countries, classified as either strongly corporatist or medium and non-corporatist. Concerning the approval of NSMs, he found no important differences. For example, both the strongest and the weakest level of approval of the ecological movement was found in the corporatist group of countries (the Netherlands and Germany, respectively). Neither did the inclination to join an NSM depend on the degree of corporatism. Concerning the readiness to use non-conventional political tactics, Wilson (1990: 74) concluded that there was 'little if any association between the level of corporatism and willingness to engage in unconventional political action'. For example, the Swiss (moderately corporatist) and the French (non-corporatist) were the most ready to 'occupy buildings'.

This article attempts to improve on the existing research in both theoretical and methodological terms. First, earlier researchers did not disentangle the influence of corporatism and wealth. They hypothesized that two mechanisms were at work: a corporatist welfare state fostering the development of new preferences and the unresponsiveness of a corporatist political system mobilizing the supporters of these new values. The first mechanism suggests an indirect relationship: corporatism is not relevant *per se* but rather one among many other possible factors that contribute to national economic wealth and security. The second mechanism concerns political institutions specifically, and

implies that corporatism is directly related to new politics by constraining the expression and satisfaction of new preferences. This theoretically important distinction is addressed here by examining first a direct connection between corporatism and new politics, and then by controlling for the influence of material well being. In order to assess the relative strength of these relationships, we compare the results with the connection between corporatism and left-right self-identification.

This article includes some additional methodological improvements. First, a larger number ($N = 16$) of countries is included than in the studies discussed above. Yet, the pool of countries will be limited to Western Europe. The relationship between corporatism and new politics is supposed to have a global relevance. Yet within Western Europe we find a large enough variance concerning the included variables, while the relative similarity in cultural background, in political and legal traditions and the recent convergence of political institutional structures narrow the scope for spurious correlations due to unaccounted external factors.

The measurement of the independent variable is also improved. Instead of a dichotomous measure used by Wilson (1990), we use an elaborated quasi-interval measure of corporatism provided by Siaroff (1999). As well as the averaged index of corporatism, we also use his newly developed measure termed 'integration'. Since he provides estimates of integration for the last four decades of the twentieth century, it allows us to take a diachronic perspective. In this way, we are able to check whether corporatism's effect on new politics is time-lagged. Finally, we use a more complete set of dependent variables, including both attitudinal and behavioral indicators. This is largely possible thanks to Inglehart et al.'s (1998) publication of the World Value Survey data.

Method

Data on the *independent variable*, the degree of corporatism, is taken from Siaroff (1999: 198, Table 5). He provides averaged corporatism scores for Western industrialized countries based on previously published sources. He also adds his alternative measure for corporatism, named 'integration', for four time periods (the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s). He defines 'integration' as 'a long-term cooperative pattern of shared economic management involving the social partners and existing at various levels such as plant-level management, sectoral wage bargaining, and joint shaping of national policies in competitiveness-related matters (education, social policy, etc.)' (Siaroff 1999: 189).

The *dependent variables*, the attitudinal and behavioral aspects of 'new politics', are taken from Inglehart et al.'s sourcebook (1998) and from Gallagher et al.'s handbook on European politics (2001: 209–210, Tables 8.3, 8.4). The set of selected dependent and control variables is shown in Table 1.

Materialist/postmaterialist values, the attitude towards the urgency of ecological problems, and approval of ecology and women's movements represent the attitudinal or value dimension of 'new politics'. The willingness to pay taxes and part of one's income for environmental causes come close to behavioral aspects. Belonging to new social movements, in this case ecology and peace movements, and voting for left-libertarian parties stand for political behavior. Purchasing power per capita (PPC) is introduced in order to control for the effect of economic wealth. The inclusion of left-right self-placement

Table 1. Dependent and control variables used in the analysis*

Code name	Variable and source table in Inglehart et al. (1998)
PPC	Purchasing power per capita, in US dollars (Inglehart et al. 1998: 4)
PMAT_PC	Percentage of post-materialists in society (V405)
MAT_PERC	Percentage of materialists (V405)
ENV_INC	Willingness to contribute part of income for environmental cause (V12)
ENV_TAX	Willingness to contribute additional tax for environmental cause (V13)
ENV_NURG	Opinion that environmental problems are not urgent (V17)
ENV_BELO	Percentage of population belonging to environmental organizations (V26)
PACE_BEL	Percentage of population belonging to peace organizations (V31)
LEFT_SP	Left-Right self-placement (percentage on the Left) (V248)
RIGHT_SP	Left-Right self-placement (percentage on the Right) (V248)
ECOL_APP	Approval of ecology movements (V290)
WOMEN_APP	Approval of women's movements (V294)
GREEN 80's	Average vote for Green parties in 1980s
GREEN 90's	Average vote for Green parties in 1990s
NEW LEFT 90's	Average vote for New Left parties in 1990s
NEW PARTIES 90's	Vote for New Left and Green parties in 1990s added

* For more details on the variables, see Inglehart et al. (1998); Gallagher et al. (2001).

allows us to see in perspective the size and relevance of the above discussed relationships.

The analysis concentrates on 16 West European countries for which data are available in Inglehart et al. (1998). Most country samples are between 1,000 and 2,000 respondents. Finland and Iceland are the only countries represented by samples below 1,000 respondents, while the largest sample (4,147) comes from Spain.

Results and discussion

The initial results and the database for further analyses are given in Tables 2 and 3. A cursory look at the tables reveals that corporatism is related to various dependent variables. However, it is also clear that PPC is also related to corporatism and to various indicators of 'new politics', which justifies its inclusion as a control variable.

Part of the correlation matrix based on the data in Tables 2 and 3 is given in Table 4. First, we examine zero-order correlation of corporatism and integration with new politics indicators (first five columns of the coefficients). Citizens of corporatist countries are more likely to belong to peace movements ($r = 0.65, p < 0.01$) and they are less likely to believe that ecological problems are not urgent ($r = -0.61, p < 0.05$).¹ There is also a tendency, though below statistical significance, of corporatist countries having more citizens in ecological organizations ($r = 0.45, p < 0.08$). These results, as well as the negative correlation between corporatism and materialism, are in accordance with the main hypothesis. The approval of ecological and women's movements, the willingness to spend part of income and tax on environmental protection, postmaterialist value orientation and voting for new politics parties are all unrelated to corporatism, contrary to the main hypothesis. Due to the small number of cases, the simple lack of significant relationships does not allow us to discard unequivocally relationships between the analyzed variables. This is the case, for example, between the relationship of corporatism with new left and green parties and membership in environmentalist organizations. However, in the case of postmaterialist values, the willingness to support financially environmentalist causes and approval of feminist and ecological movements, the correlation coefficients are so close to zero that these variables are rightly perceived as being independent of the degree of corporatism.

Siaroff's integration coefficients for the four time periods produced rather similar results to the corporatism scores. The main difference is that coefficients for earlier decades (the 1960s and 1970s) are generally lower than the

Table 2. Corporatism and indicators of New Politics in West European countries

	Corpora- tism	Integration 1990s	Integration 1980s	Integration 1970s	Integration 1960s	PPC	Pmat %	Mat %	Env Inc	Env tax	Env Nurg	Env bel	Peace bel	Left SP %	Right SP %	Eco app	Women app
Austria	5.00	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	17690	25	14	60	52	19	3	1	11	41	73	34
Norway	4.86	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	17170	10	29	80	73	16	4	2	27	34	47	20
Sweden	4.67	4.63	4.63	4.75	4.75	17490	23	14	82	77	16	11	3	28	35	41	21
Netherlands	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.88	4.25	16820	36	10	83	69	17	24	3	33	30	54	18
Denmark	3.55	4.25	3.88	4.38	4.38	17880	16	16	84	70	18	13	2	24	35	30	12
Germany	3.54	4.13	4.13	4.13	4.13	19770	28	15	52	57	12	5	2	29	23	70	22
Switzerland	3.38	4.13	4.13	4.13	4.13	21780	24	14				11		23	30	53	20
Finland	3.30	4.38	4.25	4.25	3.50	16130	29	6	67	56	13	5	2	21	43	28	16
Iceland	3.00	2.88	2.75	2.75	2.75		11	25	78	60	15	5	1	30	36	37	23
Belgium	2.84	3.75	3.63	4.13	4.13	17510	24	22	56	41	19	8	2	27	31	49	24
Ireland	2.00	2.63	2.38	2.25	2.25	11430	19	24	69	51	26	2	1	12	33	50	37
France	1.67	2.25	2.25	1.88	1.88	18430	25	21	61	54	19	2	1	42	20	50	23
Britain	1.65	2.00	1.75	2.13	2.00	16340	20	20	68	70	22	6	1	24	27	47	19
Portugal	1.50	2.38	2.38			9450	12	34	84	65	24	1	1	23	31	76	24
Italy	1.48	3.00	2.75	2.13	2.00	17040	22	25	68	54	18	3	1	41	18	50	13
Spain	1.25	2.00	1.88			12670	21	30	72	60	25	1	1	50	17	73	36

Sources: Inglehart et al. 1998; Siaroff 1999.

Table 3. Corporatism and vote for Green and New Left parties in West European countries

	Green 1980s	Green 1990s	New Left 1990s	New parties 1990s
Austria	4.10	6.60		6.60
Norway	0.10	0.10	8.40	8.50
Sweden	2.90	4.30		4.30
Netherlands	1.10	5.60	2.40	8.00
Denmark	0.70	2.20	7.70	9.90
Germany	5.10	6.40		6.40
Switzerland	5.00	6.30	0.30	6.60
Finland	2.70	7.00		7.00
Iceland		3.10	7.40	10.50
Belgium	6.00	10.90		10.90
Ireland	0.40	2.10	3.20	5.30
France	0.90	8.40		8.40
Britain	0.30	0.30		0.30
Portugal		0.30		0.30
Italy	1.30	2.70	4.00	6.70
Spain		1.00		1.00

Source: Gallagher et al. 2001.

coefficients for the more recent decades. Thus it seems that one should concentrate further analysis on the effect of the contemporary degree of corporatism.

Corporatism is unrelated to the percentage of postmaterialists, but is significantly and negatively related to materialism ($r = -0.63, p < 0.05$; coefficients for integration in the 1980s and 1990s are even higher). Apparently, corporatism does not so much increase postmaterialist value acceptance, as it decreases materialist values. However, this could be mediated by the wealth of a country, since both corporatism/integration and materialism are related to PPC.

The results provide relatively little ground for the argument that postmaterialist values explain cross-national differences in the popularity of 'new politics'. Postmaterialism appears to be a surprisingly weak predictor of attitudinal or value variables. We found stronger and significant relationships with the behavioral variables, such as membership in environmentalist organizations and the vote for green parties.

Citizens of corporatist countries seem to enjoy higher economic standards. Correlations between integration coefficients for 1980s and 1990s and purchasing power per capita are significant ($r = 0.56$ and $r = 0.57, p < 0.05$,

Table 4. Correlation coefficients between corporatism and indicators of New Politics

	Corporatism	Integration 1990s	Integration 1980s	Integration 1970s	Integration 1960s	PPC	PMAT %	MAT %
PPC	0.50	0.57*	0.56*	0.38	0.40	1.00	0.41	-0.60*
PMAT_PC	0.15	0.25	0.27	0.13	0.13	0.41	1.00	-0.49*
MAT_PERC	-0.53*	-0.62*	-0.60*	-0.47	-0.41	-0.60*	-0.49*	1.00
ENV_INC	0.13	0.04	0.03	0.18	0.22	-0.39	-0.42	0.11
ENV_TAX	0.28	0.13	0.13	0.22	0.26	-0.07	-0.28	0.00
ENV_NURG	-0.61*	-0.69***	-0.70***	-0.52	-0.46	-0.78***	-0.35	0.08
ENV_BEL	0.45	0.45	0.44	0.38	0.47	0.39	0.51*	-0.39
PEACE_BEL	0.65***	0.71**	0.72**	0.70**	0.72**	0.42	0.47	-0.36
LEFT_PCT	-0.43	-0.41	-0.39	-0.36	-0.32	0.04	0.18	0.45
RIGHT_PC	0.65***	0.60*	0.58*	0.60*	0.52	0.01	-0.12	-0.40
ECOL_APP	-0.18	-0.25	-0.19	0.05	0.14	-0.30	0.13	0.43
WOMEN_APP	0.14	0.31	0.27	0.09	0.05	0.46	0.03	0.36
GREEN 80's	0.27	0.43	0.46	0.48	0.46	0.55*	0.39	-0.35
GREEN 90's	0.24	0.36	0.38	0.22	0.20	0.55*	0.65*	-0.56*
NEW LEFT 90's	0.33	0.17	0.10	0.21	0.16	-0.17	-0.77*	0.57
NEW PARTIES 90's	0.27	0.15	0.20	0.02	0.08	0.12	0.16	-0.25

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05, two-tailed.

respectively), while the coefficient for the corporatism index is on the border of statistical significance ($r = 0.50, p < 0.06$). Since PPC is, much like corporatism itself, related to other variables, in addition to examining zero-order correlations it is necessary to investigate whether corporatism preserves its influence on the popularity of the new politics if we control for PPC. Table 5 presents a set of partial correlations, including both corporatism and integration scores for the 1990s.

Controlling for PPC only modestly influenced the relationships between corporatism/integration and the new politics variables. Coefficients for the approval of environmental and women's movements remained at the zero level.² Coefficients for membership variables and for belief in urgency of ecological problems decreased, in some cases below the statistical significance level. The link between corporatism and materialism/postmaterialism also appears to be mediated by the economic wealth, since both coefficients dropped considerably. Coefficients for the vote for new parties, though already insignificant, decreased further. Thus, corporatism influences these variables partly through the wealth of the respective countries.

There is also a tendency for corporatism to favor the willingness to pay for environmental protection from income and taxes when the effect of the wealth

Table 5. Partial correlation coefficients between corporatism and New Politics variables

	Corporatism zero-order	Corporatism (PPC)	Integration zero-order	Integration 1990s (PPC)
PMAT_PC	0.15	-0.07	0.25	0.03
MAT_PERC	-0.53*	-0.33	-0.62*	-0.42
ENV_INC	0.13	0.41	0.04	0.34
ENV_TAX	0.28	0.36	0.13	0.21
ENV_NURG	-0.61*	-0.40	-0.69**	-0.49
ENV_BEL	0.45	0.32	0.45	0.30
PEACE_BEL	0.65**	0.56*	0.71**	0.63*
LEFT_PCT	-0.43	-0.53*	-0.41	-0.52
RIGHT_PC	0.65**	0.74**	0.60*	0.72**
ECOL_APP	-0.18	-0.04	-0.25	-0.11
WOMEN_APP	-0.14	0.12	-0.31	-0.07
GREEN 80's	0.27	-0.01	0.43	0.17
GREEN 90's	0.24	-0.04	0.36	0.07
NEW PARTIES 90's	0.27	0.25	0.15	0.10

Note: Variables controlled for are in brackets. ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$, two-tailed. Pairwise treatment of missing values. New Left vote in 1990s not displayed because it contained too few valid cases.

is apportioned out – the coefficients increased from 0.13 to 0.41 and from 0.28 to 0.36 respectively, though they did not reach statistical significance. Perhaps, contrary to the marginal utility theorem, the more money people have the more attached to it they become, at least when they are asked to contribute towards environmental protection.

In general, corporatism proved to be rather consistently related to certain behavioral aspects of new politics, such as belonging to peace and ecology organizations and the belief in the urgency of ecological problems. A moderate though statistically insignificant correlation was found between corporatism and voting for new parties, and this association was even weaker after controlling for wealth. Thus, we obtained findings contradicting Kitschelt (1990). The coefficients for the willingness to contribute part of income and taxes towards environmental protection also approach statistical significance in the expected direction when we control for the wealth of a country. Approval of women's and ecology movements are, however, consistently unrelated to corporatism/integration, which echoes Wilson's (1990) findings. A postmaterialist value orientation also failed to correlate with corporatism. There are fewer materialists in corporatist countries, but this connection seems to be mainly due to economic factors.

Although the Kitschelt-Wilson hypothesis specifically expects a convergence of attitudes and behavior, the findings here suggest a stronger relationship between corporatism and some of the behavioral variables, such as membership in peace organizations. It could be argued that this confirms the hypothesis that corporatism is a conflict generator. However, it must be kept in mind that belonging to new social movements is an atypical phenomenon. Thus, it seems that the political-behavioral consequences of corporatism are limited to a tiny layer of the population, and that they basically do not find expression in voting behavior. When respondents are asked about those aspects of the new politics that are relevant for larger segments of the population, the effect of corporatism diminishes.

Finally a note concerning left-right self-placement is in order. Although we lack an elaborate theory of how this variable should be related to corporatism, we found significant correlations: corporatist countries have a more right leaning population. Moreover, corporatism seems to be directly related to left-right ideological identification since these two coefficients increased in magnitude after controlling for PPC (see Table 5). It is possible that non-corporatist countries fail to represent working class interests in a satisfactory way, which then results in increased left-wing identification. Alternatively, a high degree of corporatism may instigate a right-wing backlash in the society, skewing the public mood towards a desire for less regulation.

Conclusion

This research corroborated the relationship between corporatism and some of the behavioral indicators of 'new politics', such as membership in NSMs. Corporatism also consistently correlates with the belief that environmental issues are urgent, though the coefficient decreases after controlling for PPC. The approval of women's and ecology movements, and the percentage of postmaterialists in the population, are variables consistently unrelated to corporatism. Most of these relationships are only partly based on the covariance of wealth and corporatism since the coefficients generally decrease, but do not disappear, after controlling for purchasing power per capita. The coefficients for the willingness to contribute financially towards environmental protection and vote for new parties actually increase after controlling for PPC.

Postmaterialism is a particularly weak predictor of the attitudinal or value variables examined here, but it is relevant for the behavioral variables, such as membership in environmentalist organizations and voting for green parties. Inglehart's hypothesis was thus confirmed only to a limited degree. The analysis has also shown that the structural feature examined here has only a limited impact on attitudes and behavior. The Kitschelt-Wilson hypothesis that NSMs are favored by corporatist institutional arrangement is modestly supported – primarily as far as membership in peace organizations is concerned. However, it was also found that corporatism has an unexpected consequence: it fosters right-wing orientation in the public. Thus, corporatism seems to be relevant also for the 'old politics'. Moreover, the results indicate that 'new politics' phenomena are at least as much influenced by institutional design as by average levels of postmaterialism, in spite of the fact that postmaterialism is supposed to be much more directly linked to left-libertarian preferences.

Notes

1. The highest proportions of citizens who think that environmental pollution is *not* a serious problem come from Ireland, Portugal and Spain. In such a small sample, these cases quite substantively influenced the obtained coefficient. The point is that pollution may in fact be a less serious problem in those countries.
2. For illustration, Spain and Italy are among the least corporatist countries, and they are at the top and bottom of the approval of women's movements, respectively. Similarly, Austria and Denmark are among the most corporatist countries and still occupy places at the top and bottom of women's movement approval, respectively.

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