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## 14. Serbia

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Politics in Serbia has often been described as an epic struggle between the good and the evil, or the evil and the somewhat lesser evil. This simplistic image has its roots, among other factors, in the conspicuous absence of serious academic investigation into the political processes in this country. Tucker's (2002) review, for example, shows that Yugoslavia/Serbia is among the least studied post-communist countries in terms of voting and elections.<sup>1</sup>

The particularly painful transition makes Serbia unique, but the integration of this case into the general scholarship on post-communist politics is nevertheless both necessary and feasible. The country experienced a number of competitive elections which, though neither fair nor completely free, reflected the political preferences of the citizens. Academic studies and public opinion surveys have been carried out regularly, generally at an appropriate professional level. These two kinds of sources of information provide the researchers with sufficient data for assessing the profile of the main political blocs. The present chapter intends in part to fill this gap of knowledge about Serbia, relying on the aforementioned databases. The focus is on the existence, character and role of socio-political cleavages.

Cleavage politics is often associated with political stability (Whitefield 2002). The presumed intricate link between the two phenomena suggests that in a country that experienced such a degree of instability as Serbia, cleavage politics can play only a marginal role. One rather expects a scene where charismatic and populist leaders are the dominant actors. And indeed, most parties in Serbia are better recognized for their leaders than for their political programmes. Among literally hundreds of parties which tested their luck over the last dozen years, responsible programmatic parties have certainly been a rarity. This chapter, however, argues that there is a system in this apparent political chaos.

The *political system* – but not *society* at large – did display some features of stability. The fact that it took ten years for the first crucial political

change to materialize testifies to the underlying political stability, which kept producing a party system with few electorally relevant actors. The chapter sets out to demonstrate that the ensuing political immobilism was an expression of a particularly deep political divide based on different socio-structural categories, and different values and world-views.

The chapter is divided into three major parts. The first one is a review of political developments in Serbia since the introduction of the multiparty system. Here, the focus is put on the evolution of the party system, and on the issues over which the parties conflicted. This largely qualitative approach will primarily consider elite politics. Although the paper deals with Serbia, equal attention is paid to Yugoslav (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro) federal (parliamentary and presidential in 2000) elections, since first, they are equally valid tests of popular political preferences, and second, their consequences were relevant for Serbia.<sup>2</sup> The second part of the chapter contains empirical analysis of socio-structural bases of party preferences. The analysis of the influence of sociological variables such as age, ethnicity, and rural-urban residence will take place in conjunction with the examination of specific ideological orientations, and general value orientations or world-views, such as authoritarianism. The final section integrates the findings from the first two sections, and discusses the character and the role of socio-political cleavages in Serbian politics.

### **Elections, Parties, and Issues: Development of the Party System**

Political pluralism was introduced in Serbia more as a reaction to external processes and events than as a result of the internal pressure coming from popular democratizing forces (Vukomanović 1998, 35). There was certainly no such strong popular anti-communist opposition as in Hungary, Poland, or the Czech Republic; nor was there a strong nationalist opposition of the kind found in Croatia and Slovenia. On 15 December 1989, the ruling communist party has simply declared the introduction of political pluralism.

Two factors are crucial for the understanding of the initial transition to pluralist politics in Serbia: the destruction of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo problem. Studies from the communist period show strong support for the system of self-management, and widespread identification of democracy with socialism (e.g. Rot and Havelka 1973; cf. Goati 1998, 16). Part of the explanation can be found in the fact that the Yugoslav version of socialism was rather liberal and comfortable for the masses compared to the countries from the Warsaw Pact. In addition, Serbs have identified with the Yugoslav state because they saw it as the only possible solution to the 'national question', i.e. the inclusion of all Serbs into one state. Thus, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the secession of the other republics re-opened the Serbian national question, at a time when marketization threatened the widely accepted social and economic order.

Even before the collapse of the Yugoslav state, the ethnic conflicts in Kosovo had already prepared the public for a nationalist course. In fact, Milošević came to power in the late 1980s with the programme to reverse the alleged injustices by previous non-national communists who had 'betrayed' Serbian national interests. Since both Kosovo and the break-up of Yugoslavia are linked to the Serbian national question, it is not surprising that the national question dominated the first elections, or that it remained a dominant issue throughout the 1990s (Sekelj 2000). These two factors, thus, can go far in explaining the initial appeal of the ideological blend of nationalism and redistributive economy provided by the quasi-reformed communists.

### **The first pluralist elections for the Serbian Parliament, December 1990**

Since the Serbian communists were neither overthrown nor seriously threatened by a popular anti-communist movement, they were able to adapt to political pluralism with relatively mild reforms, and to inherit the assets of the dissolved League of Communists of Serbia (SKS) and some other related organizations (Vukomanović 1998). In July 1990, SKS merged with other related communist organizations and formed the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) under the firm leadership of Slobodan Milošević. Being in control of the inherited infrastructure, electronic media, and the state, it was easy for the party to refuse round-table talks, which might have secured more equal status for all competitors.

Thus, when the first multiparty elections came the Socialist party had huge infrastructural advantages, and felt no need for major ideological changes. The Socialists promised a large degree of continuity with socialist Yugoslavia, a solution to the Kosovo problem, and moderate reforms in economy. They faced a highly fragmented opposition – and won easily, obtaining 194 (77.6 per cent) out of 250 seats with just 46.1 per cent of the votes cast (thanks to the majoritarian two-round electoral system). The rest of the 56 seats were divided among thirteen parties and coalitions and eight independent candidates. Among these, only some proved viable and deserve to be mentioned here.

The strongest opposition party was the Serbian Renewal Movement (*Srpski pokret obnove*, SPO), headed by a well-known writer Vuk Drašković, winning 15.8 per cent of the ballots cast (19 seats). This party, and some subsequent party formations within the nationalist bloc, has its roots in various non-political nationalist organizations, which had been engaged in revising the history of the Second World War, particularly the role of the Chetniks (troops loyal to the exiled King Peter), and their leader, Draža Mihailović.

The Democratic Party (DS), at the time headed by Dragoljub Mićunović, offered a liberal-democratic perspective and adopted a moderate position on the national issue. DS won seven seats in the Parliament, with about seven

per cent of the votes. Another important bloc consisted of parties representing national minorities. The party of ethnic Hungarians (DZVM) entered the first Serbian pluralist parliament as the third strongest party with eight elected representatives. The Party of Democratic Action (SDA), representing the Muslim minority from Sandžak, also participated and won three seats.

The Serbian Presidential elections, held at the same time, clearly show the balance of power between the Socialists and the opposition: Milošević won approximately four times more votes than the main challenger, Vuk Drašković. However, the socialists' hold on power was not absolute. In local elections, the opposition parties took power in localities where national minorities were in absolute or relative numerical majority, often in coalition with the parties of democratic opposition.

These initial pluralist elections were not simply about communists and anti-communists. The central theme of the election was the national issue, but more as a valence issue, since all parties but those of national minorities claimed to be fighting for supposedly threatened national interests. In 1990, the opposition, especially the SPO, was more nationalist than the socialists (Slavujević 1998, 89; cf. *Table 14.1*). However, it was difficult to beat Milošević on the nationalist ground, since he was already perceived as a statesman (i.e. not only a 'politician') defending the Serbian state and the national interests (Goati 1998).

The central role of the national issue is not surprising. The ongoing secession of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina meant that some 25 per cent Serbs would remain outside of Serbia, while Kosovo – a hot problem since the early 1980s – galvanized the Serbian public with almost daily reports about the exodus of Serbs from that 'heartland' of medieval Serbia and the place of the most important religious sites of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Albanians, for their part, firmly pursued the secessionist strategy from the very beginning, and never showed any interest in participating in the Serbian political system (Goati 1998).<sup>3</sup>

SPO, the main opposition party, pursued a strongly nationalist and anti-communist rhetoric, largely neglecting the issues of economy and democratization. However, frequent references to the potential restoration of monarchy, and occasional clericalism were not appealing to the highly secularized masses attached more to socialism than to the former Karađorđević dynasty.

The strength of the SPS was in its ability to appeal to voters in several different ways – by promising a degree of continuity with the former socialist regime while at the same time distancing itself from the 'anti-Serb' rhetoric of non-national communists, by presenting itself as a true defender of Serbian national interests especially concerning the Kosovo problem, and by promising moderate economic reforms which were supposed to increase living standard without the risks associated with quick marketization.

### **The formation of the authoritarian – democratic division**

After the first pluralist elections, SPS and Milošević continued to ignore all demands for substantive democratization. This resulted in massive demonstrations in Belgrade on 9 March 1991, led by Vuk Drašković and SPS. The opposition demanded – with rather limited success – a new, democratically based constitution, a new election law, and liberation of mass media from partisan control.

The new constitution of April 1992, though not of Serbia but of Yugoslavia, was written without consultations with the opposition parties. Yugoslavia was defined as a federal republic consisting of Serbia and Montenegro. Simultaneously, a new electoral law was announced, which replaced the majoritarian system with a proportional one.

On the party scene, this was a year of further diversification of the opposition bloc. Two new important actors appeared there: the Citizens' Alliance of Serbia (*Građanski Savez Srbije*, GSS) representing the most pro-western, anti-nationalist, liberal and libertarian orientation, and the Democratic Party of Serbia (*Demokratska stranka Srbije*, DSS) combining a commitment to democracy with a concern for national interests and tradition. The leader of the DSS, Vojislav Koštunica, left the DS in 1991 after disagreements concerning the cooperation of DS with the regime (Vukomanović 1998).

This was also a year of elections in Serbia: Federal parliamentary elections were held in May and again in December, now together with the Serbian presidential and parliamentary elections. The federal parliamentary elections of 31 May 1992 were boycotted by the democratic opposition<sup>4</sup> as a sign of protest for not being consulted in creating the electoral law, and generally against the unfair conditions with the media representation. However, this boycott was ineffective since the party of the Hungarian minority (DZVM) and the extreme nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS) took part in the elections. Milan Panić, a Serbian-born US businessman, was appointed Federal Prime Minister by the Socialists soon to become their main opponent in the issues of cooperation with the international community and the liberalization of the economy. He scheduled extraordinary Federal Parliamentary elections for December 1992, and was soon dismissed.<sup>5</sup>

Meanwhile, the democratic opposition managed to form a loose coalition named DEPOS, within in the framework of which some smaller parties joined the SPO. Altogether fourteen parties participated in this new formation. The results of the extraordinary elections for the Federal parliament in December 1992 revealed that the communist heirs in Serbia and Montenegro could not win an absolute majority against the relatively united opposition. In Serbia, SPS won 44 per cent of the seats, SRS won 28 per cent, DEPOS managed to win 20 per cent of the seats, the DS participated on its

own and won five seats, while the Magyar party (DZVM) took three seats. These results made the Radicals a necessary partner for securing a comfortable majority, thus marking the beginning of the so-called 'red-brown coalition', though with changing agreement between the partners over the next ten years. The other side of the barricade was occupied by the democratic opposition, still headed by the SPO and joined by parties of the national minorities. This conflict between parties of authoritarian and democratic orientation was to be the central divide in Serbia for the rest of the 1990s.

In the elections for the Serbian parliament DEPOS did not participate as an integral coalition. Instead, SPO and DSS formed a mini-coalition, and won 50 seats (20 per cent). SPS remained the strongest single party with 40 per cent of the seats (101), while the Radicals came in second with 73 seats (nearly 30 per cent). The Hungarian minority defended its position and obtained nine representatives.<sup>6</sup> The Democratic Party was reduced to six MPs.

Although SPS remained the strongest single party, it obtained about one million votes less than in the 1990 elections (now they won 1.3 million of votes, which was about 29 per cent of the votes cast). Obviously, an increasing number of voters felt that the country was heading in the wrong direction. Yet, many of them opted for the Radicals and the effective nationalist-populist rhetoric of their charismatic leader, Vojislav Šešelj. Nevertheless, the support for the opposition was still too weak to seriously challenge the Socialists' rule. In the direct electoral clash between Milošević and Panić, the opposition's candidate for the Serbian presidency, Milošević obtained approximately one million votes more than his opponent.

### **War and peace**

While the tone for the 1990 elections was set by the secession of the former Yugoslav republics and the gradual escalation of the Kosovo problem, the elections of 1992 were framed by the war in Croatia, and by the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council in 1992. The national and state issue was still on the top of the agenda, but now it was filtered through the attitude towards the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and consequently the attitude towards the sanctions and the 'international community'.

The Socialists appealed to the voters by presenting themselves as fighting for the 'salvation' of Yugoslavia. In cooperation with SRS, they pursued an aggressive campaign that pictured the entire opposition as 'traitors' of the national interests. The SPS-controlled media promulgated the idea of a worldwide conspiracy against the Serbs, not that difficult task given the objective situation. The attitude towards the international community became one of the central political issues, dividing those who preferred isolationism and/or friendship with Russia from those who were in favour of cooperation with the 'West'. This division largely coincided with the

authoritarian-democratic divide.

On the opposition side, there were important ideological changes. The SPO abandoned its romantic-nationalist rhetoric, and started campaigning against the on-going wars. At the time, most of the opposition still believed that Serbs should be given the right to stay in one state (Slavujević 1998, 94). Yet generally, the opposition remained fragmented and deeply divided ideologically, as clashes between republicans and royalists, and nationalists and cosmopolitans exemplified.

During the campaign for the December elections SPS and SRS have intensified their nationalistic rhetoric, while DEPOS started insisting on democratization and reduced its earlier heavy nationalist tone (Slavujević 1998). The main issue dimension was defined on the one side by hyper-patriotism and full support for the Serbs abroad, while the other side argued for yielding to the pressure of the international community, democratization, and economic reforms.

Although the DS tried to emphasize economic issues in their campaign, this was a topic rarely addressed by both camps, despite the sharply deteriorating economy (Slavujević 1998, 97). In practice, by the introduction of the new privatization law the Socialists actually slowed down the process of privatization, while the state assumed a strong redistributive role. Various policies were introduced aiming on the one side to retain the control of economy in the hands of the ruling party, and on the other to secure basic survival for the population under the conditions of the UN sanctions. Printing money mostly financed the new welfare programmes and the support for the Bosnian and Croat Serbs. The result was hyperinflation, especially in 1993.

On 20 October 1993, President Milošević dissolved the Serbian parliament, since the SPS lost the parliamentary majority due to conflicts with SRS over policy towards Bosnian Serbs (SPS decided to accept the Vance-Owen Plan). In the third Serbian parliamentary elections, held on 23 December 1993 and 5 January 1994, the SPS won 123 seats (49 per cent) with somewhat larger share of votes than in the 1992 elections. But without the support of the SRS, they were three seats short of an absolute majority. DEPOS, again headed by Vuk Drašković, obtained 45 seats (18 per cent), Šešelj's radicals won 39 seats, DS had 29 MPs, and DSS seven; the Magyar party won five seats, and the Muslims of Sandžak had two representatives. After the elections, in a surprise move, New Democracy (ND) left the DEPOS coalition and its six MPs joined the SPS to form the government.<sup>7</sup>

The SPS 'repositioned itself as a party advocating peace' (Slavujević 1998, 101). Since Milošević accepted the Vance-Owen Plan for Bosnia, the socialists attempted to present it as a success for the Serbian side. The nationalist rhetoric was calmed down, while topics such as peace, social and economic recovery, and fight against crime were emphasized (Slavujević 1998, 101). The changes advocated were moderate and slow, particularly

within sphere of economics.

The opposition bloc now consisted of radical nationalists (SRS), the more democratically oriented DEPOS, DS and DSS, and ethnic minority parties. Under the influence of the SPO, DEPOS kept insisting on anti-communism. The Radicals continued their aggressive nationalist-populist rhetoric, but now also directed their attacks against the SPS and Milošević, blaming them for corruption and links with organized crime. The democratic opposition again had problems with building a coalition: two important parties, DS and DSS, remained outside of DEPOS. They expected to benefit from public discontent, and therefore emphasized the scale of the problems and their own ability to solve them (e.g. lifting of the sanctions).

The fight between the opposition and the regime party was bitter, but conflicts among the opposition parties and leaders were not much friendlier. This is one of the reasons that accounts for the continued weak electoral support for the opposition, despite the country's deteriorating conditions. Further splits in the opposition parties were inevitable. The most important event was Đinđić's 'ex-communication' of Mićunović from the DS in 1994, apparently because of personal conflicts (Vukomanović 1998, 38). Mićunović had been one of the main figures within the democratic opposition since 1990. He soon formed his own party, the Democratic Center (DC).

### **Nationalism is out of fashion: Elections from 1995 to 1997**

The events of 1995 had a particularly strong impact on Serbian politics. The wars in Bosnia and Croatia ended as a result of direct and indirect military intervention by NATO. The Dayton and Erdut agreements were signed, but some half a million Serbs fled from Croatia to Serbia. The dream of all Serbs in one state seemed increasingly hopeless. Milošević's position on the national issue weakened, and now not only nationalists blamed him for abandoning and betraying the Krajina Serbs.

In order to contest the third Federal parliamentary elections on 3 November 1996, the opposition formed a coalition, known as *Zajedno* ('Together'). At the same time, SPS formed a coalition with JUL (Yugoslav United Left, Milošević's wife party), and ND. The Radicals, the party of the Magyar minority (SVM), and a coalition of regionalist parties from Vojvodina ran in their own right.

The regime parties again won, with about 43 per cent of the votes (64 seats), while the *Zajedno* coalition polled some 22 per cent of the votes (22 seats). Šešelj's radicals won about 18 per cent of the vote, or 16 seats, somewhat less than previously. The party of the Magyar minority (DZVM had been replaced by the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians, SVM) obtained three representatives, Coalition Vojvodina two, and Coalition Sandžak (Muslim minority) ended up with a single representative.

Throughout 1996, and especially during the electoral campaign, the SPS

presented the events of 1995 as a triumph of their ‘peace-making politics’, arguing that the interests of Bosnian Serbs had been well preserved and protected by the signed agreements. The emphasis switched from the national issue to the issue of economic recovery (as a result of the Dayton accord, the sanctions had been partially lifted). With the notable exception of the SRS, the opposition parties followed suit and reduced the nationalist rhetoric despite the massive exodus of the Krajina Serbs. The opposing blocs again competed on the valence issue of economic recovery and reintegration into international institutions.

Politically, the local elections held simultaneously with the elections for the federal parliament were the most consequential event in 1996. The *Zajedno* coalition was victorious in most of the major cities including Belgrade. The government attempted to annul the results of these elections, but under the pressure of massive public demonstrations and the OSCE, the initial results were finally acknowledged. With this victory, the democratic opposition gained control over some local media and access to additional financial resources. These results also demonstrate the importance of the urban-rural cleavage.

Milošević’s monopoly on political power suffered several additional blows in 1997. In this year, the communist heirs in Montenegro (DPS) split into two wings. The stronger one, led by Đukanović, switched from collaboration towards increasingly open confrontation with the SPS and Milošević. In addition, the socialists suffered a defeat in presidential elections for the first time. In the second round of elections for the Serbian president in September 1997, Šešelj won against the socialist candidate Zoran Lilić. However, since the turnout was below the required 50 per cent, the elections were not valid. Repeated elections were held in December, but this time the socialist candidate, Milan Milutinović, was victorious (Milutinović 59.23 per cent, Šešelj 37.57 per cent).

On 15 July 1997, Milošević switched from being Serbian President to becoming President of the FRY, since his second term in the previous post was expiring.<sup>8</sup> The new position was largely symbolic, but he was able to control the political system through informal channels.

The fourth Serbian parliamentary elections were held in the same year, together with the presidential elections. Once again, the opposition parties had serious problems in forming a coalition. Despite the existing agreement within the democratic opposition to support Drašković for the Serbian presidency, the rest of the opposition decided to boycott the elections. Although some 12 parties participated in the boycott, the turnout was hardly affected. The so-called ‘left coalition’, consisting of SPS, JUL and ND, won the relative majority (some 34 per cent of the votes cast). The Radicals came in second with nearly 30 per cent, and the SPO third with about 20 per cent of the votes. The relatively clear trend of decreasing support for the SPS thus continued.

These elections were a triumph for Šešelj, since the number of votes for the Radicals increased by about 400.000. The democratic opposition was the main loser. The boycott clearly failed, and Drašković did not even get into the second round of the presidential elections. Only the SPO was in the parliament, yet too weak to exhibit any influence and open for charges of collaboration with Milošević. The main issue dimensions remained largely unchanged since the 1996 elections: the national issue, economic recovery, and the demands for democratization (Sekelj 2000). Only the emphasis changed somewhat: the wars were lost, and only the Radicals heavily exploited the national issue.

### **Kosovo and NATO**

1998 marks the transformation of the Serbian political system from a semi-democratic into an increasingly authoritarian system. Goati (2001a) divides the rule of the socialists into two periods: the period of 'pseudodemocracy' between 1990 and 1998, when certain minimal rules of democracy were observed, and the period between 1998 and 2000 when the regime became increasingly authoritarian. The coalition government – formed on 24 March 1998 by the rightwing parties (SPS, JUL and SRS) – passed a number of openly undemocratic laws, such as the Law on Public Information, the Law on Universities, and the law regulating local self-government. Instances of open repression of the opposition had become increasingly frequent. And on 31 May 1998, the relationship between Serbian and Montenegrin institutions were almost entirely broken.

These events took place against the background of increasingly violent conflicts in Kosovo. Between 1991 and 1998, Albanian rebels in Kosovo killed 128 policemen and 199 civilians in 2,018 incidents.<sup>9</sup> In the beginning of 1998, Kosovo Albanians started an open armed rebellion under the leadership of the Kosovo Liberation Army (*Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës*), and soon Serbia lost control over more than a third of the province's territory (Antonić 1999). The increasingly repressive measures – to which Serbia resorted in its attempts to regain control – finally provoked a military intervention by NATO. After 78 days of NATO bombing, which started on 24 March 1999, and in which, all neighbouring countries more or less actively participated, Kosovo was placed under the protection of the UN (UN Resolution 1244, of June 10, 1999).

Internal politics in Serbia started taking on an increasingly bizarre shape. The ruling SPS claimed victory in this war<sup>10</sup>, and promised extremely fast reconstruction of the devastated country without external assistance.<sup>11</sup> The reconstruction work actually went on at a rather fast pace, further exhausting already weak resources.

### **The first regime change**

Milošević's claim that Serbia had won the war, despite the loss of Kosovo

and vast human and material losses, was perhaps too much even for his most faithful supporters. His popularity and that of his party and its coalition partners dropped sharply in the opinion polls, to the advantage of the opposition. The SPS-JUL leadership was not yet ready to recognize that *their* war was lost. Political repression marked the following period, featuring two aborted assassination attempts on Vuk Drašković (in October and June 2000 respectively). The efforts of the opposition were coordinated by a loose coalition known as the Alliance for Changes (*Savez za promene*), which was later transformed into the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS). In the autumn 1999, the coalition organized mass demonstrations against the regime.

On 6 July 2000, the federal government loyal to Milošević introduced two constitutional amendments, which instituted popular election of the federal president and of the second chamber of the federal parliament. The rationale was to give Milošević additional terms in power.<sup>12</sup>

The elections were held in September 2000. The opposition formed a broad coalition, the DOS, consisting of 18 parties (including ethnic minority parties and a syndicate). The joint list was headed by Vojislav Koštunica, the leader of the DSS and the opposition politician with the highest rating in the opinion polls. However, the SPO could not reach agreement with the rest of the opposition and remained outside of the coalition. In addition, strong explicit support came from non-political organizations, such as the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences. An exceptionally important role was played by various NGOs, such as *Otpor* ('Resistance'), which organized a number of creative and provocative actions.<sup>13</sup> There was a general feeling that broad social consensus had been reached on regime change. And that was essentially the 'programme' of the DOS, as brought out by popular slogans like 'He is finished'. The governing parties, on the other hand, presented an extremely anti-West campaign, branding all opposition parties and leaders as 'servants of the West and NATO' (Matić 2002).

The federal presidential elections took the shape of a referendum for- or against Milošević. As the results were counted, it became obvious not only that Milošević obtained considerably less votes than his challenger, but also that Koštunica was about to win the first round. The Federal Election Commission decided that a second round must be organized, while the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the election was invalid. Koštunica, however, relying on independent counting, proclaimed victory in the first round and decided not to participate in the second round, nor, for that matter, in new elections. A series of demonstrations ensued throughout the country, which culminated in the storming of the Federal Parliament and the building of the national TV, on October 5 2000 (the so called 'bulldozer revolution'). Milošević finally stepped down and congratulated Koštunica on his victory.

The elections to the federal parliament provided the opposition with a convincing victory, particularly considering the high voter turnout (74 per cent). The DOS coalition won 53 per cent of the seats. SPS and JUL ended up with about 41 per cent of the seats, while the election spelled defeat for the Radicals (five representatives).

After the inauguration, President Koštunica signed the so-called 'Political Agreement' with the socialists, which included extraordinary elections for the Serbian parliament. These elections were held on 23 December 2000. DOS won an even larger majority (70.4 per cent of the seats), the Socialists and the Radicals together won only 24 per cent of the mandates (14.8 and 9.2 respectively) while the JUL and SPO remained without a single MP. A new party, known as the Party of Serbian Unity (SSJ), programmatically close to the Radicals, won 14 seats (5.6 per cent).

National and state issues dominated the elections of 2000 as well, though the main themes had to be different after the disastrous events of 1999. The incumbents emphasized the importance of economic reconstruction and of not giving in to international pressure. The opposition claimed that it was in Serbia's best interest to get rid of a regime that had brought disaster and isolation upon the country. Thus, after the war against NATO and the loss of Kosovo, the opposition now took the opportunity to market itself as a reliable defender of Serbian national interests. Nationalists were angered by the loss of Kosovo, while the need for cooperation with the international community was appealing to those in the liberal segment of the political spectrum. The supply offered by the opposition elites was well matched by the demand of the population. By the end of 1999 and beginning of 2000, public opinions surveys were showing a marked decrease in nationalist attitudes and an increasing concern for the declining standard of living (Mihailović 2001, 67).

### **Two years in democracy: Split within the democratic bloc**

The elections of 2000 spelled the transition to a more genuinely democratic politics in Serbia, the gradual removal of UN sanctions, and the reintegration of the country into international institutions. The division of power agreed upon among the DOS members stated that since Koštunica was supported in the presidential campaign, the position of the Serbian prime minister was reserved for the leader of the second largest opposition party – DS and Zoran Đinđić. Soon after the two occupied their places, a series of clashes within DOS started. On the level of rhetoric, the division was revolved around the relative priority of economic reform and cooperation with international organizations, such as ICTY, and IMF versus building of democratic institutions. The government, headed by Đinđić, emphasized the former, while the DSS emphasized the need for constitutional reform, and for establishing other institutional prerequisites of democratic consolidation. In addition, DS has been promoting a self-image of a strongly pro-European

and liberal party, while DSS was perceived as more nationalist and traditionalist.

The increasing polarization between the DS and the DSS is evident if we compare correlation coefficients between respondents' perceived distance to these parties. In 1996, correlation coefficient was  $r=.78$  ( $p<.001$ ), while in 2002 the correlation disappeared ( $r=-.05$ ,  $p>.05$ ). Likewise, the loss of power brought voters of the SPS and SRS closer to each other. In 1996, this correlation was negative  $r=-.15$  ( $p<.01$ ), while in 2002 it increased to  $r=.64$  ( $p<.01$ ).<sup>14</sup>

The division between these two key players in the post-Milošević period dominated the political agenda throughout 2001 and 2002. The test of their public support came in September – October 2002, when Serbian presidential elections were held. The three main candidates were Koštunica, representing DSS, Šešelj as the candidate of the Radicals, and Miroljub Labus, a member of DS, supported by the government parties. The socialists could not agree on a candidate, although Milošević advised them from the Hague prison to support Šešelj. Koštunica won approximately twice as many votes as Labus in the second round, but the turnout was below 50 per cent, and new elections had to be organized. DOS-without-DSS decided not to have a candidate for the new elections, since public opinion surveys and the just failed elections showed that their candidate is determined to lose against Koštunica (e.g. Goati, 2001b). Before the new elections some of the DOS member-parties openly called for boycott.

An amendment to the electoral law removed the fifty per cent turnout requirement for the second round, but preserved it for the first round of elections. With a turnout of some 45 per cent, the new elections clearly did not live up to this requirement. Koštunica was not elected President of Serbia in spite of his convincing performance at the polls (58 per cent of the votes cast). The Chairman of the Parliament, Nataša Mičić (DS), was appointed caretaker president, and new elections were postponed pending the adoption of a new constitution. Serbia will thus have to do without an elected president for quite some time yet.

On 12 March 2003, Serbia suffered another shock when a criminal clan assassinated Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić in collusion with members of certain special security forces. The assassins were apparently motivated by the desire to obstruct democratic reforms, and to stop further extraditions to the Hague tribunal. Vice president of the DS, Zoran Živković, who was appointed new Prime Minister, pledged to continue the policies of his predecessor. The tragic death of Zoran Đinđić and the following clampdown on organized crime, when hundreds of members of various criminal gangs were arrested, contributed to the upsurge in sympathy for the assassinated Prime Minister and his party. Public opinion polls from April 2003 list the DS as the most popular party in the country, with the DSS, the newly formed G17<sup>15</sup>, and SRS as its major rivals.

It remains to be seen how the latest developments will reflect on the party scene in Serbia, particularly considering that the ruling coalition has not always managed to resist the temptation to use the situation offered by the extraordinary measures to discredit its competitors. The DSS remain without any institutional levers of power, while the Radicals are considerably weakened since their charismatic leader Vojislav Šešelj joined Slobodan Milošević in the Hague. We should thus expect the Serbian political landscape to be dominated by the two opposing blocs – on the one hand, economically neo-liberal, and culturally relatively libertarian and elitist DS and affiliated smaller parties, and, on the other hand, the DSS and other parties tending to embrace a more conservative, traditionalist, or even populist worldview.

### **Resume: political transformations on the level of elite politics**

The purpose of this qualitative review of the development of the party system in Serbia is to provide ground for understanding political conflicts primarily on the level of political elites. We can differentiate three stages in the development of the Serbian party system. Political pluralism started with the opposition between the former communists and anti-communist nationalists, just as in other countries in the region. The Serbian peculiarity was that the anti-communist side was far too weak and fragmented to seriously challenge the semi-reformed communists, partly because the communists had earned a strong nationalist reputation.

Since this unequal balance meant bleak prospects in the long term, the opposition reframed the divide as the conflict between authoritarianism and democracy. This marks the second phase, which lasted throughout most of the 1990s. Socialists and radical nationalists laid claim to the authoritarian part of the spectrum; the democratic opposition was ideologically rather heterogeneous, united by the desire to remove Slobodan Milošević from power.

In the third phase, after the ‘bulldozer revolution’, it seems that two central divisions are consolidating. One is the emerging opposition within the democratic camp between the nationalist and conservative perspective represented by the DSS, and the economically liberal and culturally libertarian option promoted by the DS and some smaller affiliated parties from the DOS coalition. The second division is continuing the divide between authoritarianism and extreme nationalism (represented by the Radicals and the remains of the SPS), and liberal democracy.

The regime change in 2000 represents the main change on the political scene since political pluralism was introduced. It produced several major consequences for the party system. The Socialists lost a huge number of voters. For example, their candidate in the first round of the 2002 presidential elections won only slightly more than 100,000 votes. Moreover, they seem to be in a prolonged crisis, and have already suffered several

splits. SRS initially seemed weakened too, but their recovery was fast: Šešelj was able to win about one million votes in the unsuccessful December 2002 presidential elections. However, he will have difficulties in leading the party from the Hague. Although the extreme nationalist bloc obtained another party in the parliament, namely the SSJ, this orientation, at least temporarily, lost popularity after the Đinđić assassination. The SPO and Vuk Drašković are also on the losing side. Drašković fared rather poorly as a presidential candidate in October 2002, and the SPO remained without a single representative in the Serbian parliament. Thus, once the main leader of the democratic opposition, he seems to be on the way out of the political stage in Serbia. Perhaps, there remained little room for this 'romantic' brand of nationalism between the discredited extremists associated with the Radicals, and the conservative traditionalists who are now closer to Koštunica.


The former democratic opposition remains divided into two main blocs. The DSS has built an image of a party firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, and committed to pursuing vital national interests. Culturally, they are more traditionalist and conservative. The DS, with particularly firm roots in elite circles of the capital, is ideologically liberal, oriented towards market reforms and European integration.<sup>16</sup> Among the other parties from the DOS coalition, there is an ongoing differentiation according to their proximity to DSS or DS, since most of them are too small for independent electoral competition.

### **Determinants of mass level political preferences**

This section presents empirical analyses of the connection between social structure, ideology and party preferences. Most of the data presented come from Serbian and Yugoslav election studies, provided by the Central Archive in Cologne (*Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung*), hereafter referred to as ZA Studies.<sup>17</sup> The second main source of data is the present author's survey of random sample of Belgrade residents ( $N=502$ ), conducted in the spring of 2002.

First the role of the basic socio-demographic characteristics, such as age, residence, occupation and education will be analysed. These are not necessarily 'cleavage variables' in the traditional sense, but they reveal social groups that differ politically. The next section presents a multivariate analysis of party preferences, including socio-structural and ideological variables. The analysis focuses on the five most influential parties, with the strongest electoral base and continuity over time: SPS, SRS, DS, DSS and SPO.

*Figure 14.1: Relationship between age and party preferences over time*<sup>18</sup>



Note: Age categories: 2 (30–39 years); 3 (40–49 years); 4 (50–59 years).

Source: Recalculated on the basis of Slavujević (2002).


### Social structure: Bi-variate relationships

*Age* In the post-communist countries older generations are more likely to support parties of the former communists, and Serbia is no exception to this. As Figure 14.1 clearly shows, SPS supporters are considerably older than the voters of the other parties. This trend spans the whole decade, and if anything, it has become more pronounced over time. As the SPS was losing its support, mostly the older generations remained faithful. Thus, in the late 1990s, the average SPS voter was approximately in his/her fifties. Age differences between the other parties' supporters do not show a clear pattern. SPO had occasionally particularly young supporters, but it seems that DS recruits voters consistently from the youngest cohorts. DSS displays a pattern similar to the DS, but with the increasing popularity of the party DSS supporters are now approaching the average age. It is clear that this 'generation gap' does not coincide with the authoritarianism-democracy dimension, since supporters of the Radicals do not differ from the more liberal and democratic parties. Age differentiates primarily communists from anti-communists.

*Urban-rural residence:* Urban versus rural residence has important consequences for voting patterns, as shown by Figure 14.2. Socialist and Radical parties attracted a disproportionate share of voters from rural environments, while DS and DSS were clearly more urban parties, at least until 1996. The SPO and the DEPOS coalition it headed were also disproportionately urban parties in the early 1990s, but in mid-1990s SPO

occupied an intermediate positions. The differences, though significant as the presented contingency coefficients show, are not large enough to allow us to talk about ‘two Serbias’ – one rural and authoritarian and the other one urban and democratic (e.g. Goati 1998, 29).


Figure 14.2: Party preferences and urban/rural divide.



Source: ZA Election studies.

Predictably, the profile of the DSS changed somewhat after the 2000 elections, when its support became evenly distributed (*Figure 14.3*). In 2002, the urban/rural cleavage was relevant for the SPS and DS. The former remained predominantly popular in rural, and the latter in urban settings.

Figure 14.3: Urban-rural divide and party support, August 2002




Source: Recalculated on the basis of Slavujević (2002).

*Occupation:* Occupation also exhibits significant bi-variate relationships with party preferences. Peasants and, somewhat less consistently, blue-collar workers disproportionately supported the SPS (Antonić 1998; Mihailović 2000). Throughout the last decade the parties of the democratic bloc have attracted disproportionately many white-collar workers. In 1990 the Socialists and the SPO had relatively more white-collar workers than the DS, but since then the DS is continuously the most white-collar party in Serbia (Slavujević 2002). Blue-collar workers tend to be relatively more attracted to nationalist parties (SRS, SPO, and recently DSS). Socialists were popular in this occupational category in the early 1990s, but especially since the regime change, the proportion of SPS voters who are blue-collar workers is as low as for the DS (Slavujević 2002; Mihailović 2000). There are, however, occupational categories that exhibit clearer voting patterns, but they tend to coincide with some other social categories. For example, the category of peasants/farmers largely coincides with the urban/rural division. Although pensioners are perhaps the most uniform category in terms of voting, this category strongly coincides with age.

*Education:* Education is doubtlessly one of the major factors influencing party choice. As Figure 14.4 shows, the authoritarian-democratic division of parties correlates with the education of voters. Parties of the authoritarian orientation, i.e. SPS and SRS, attract less educated voters, while parties more committed to liberal-democratic values are hardly popular among citizens

with elementary education. SPO is somewhere between the SPS and DS. The increasing proportion of less educated among the DSS voters of 2000 is a logical consequence of the party's rise to electoral prominence.

Figure 14.4: Education and party preferences



Source: Recalculated on the basis of Slavujević (2002).

*Religion*: One of the two main cleavages emanating from the process of nation building in the West, according to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), is the state versus church cleavage. In Serbia, however, differences in the degree of religiosity are not associated with relevant political divisions. In 1992, for example, religiosity did not correlate with preferences for any of the most important political leaders of the time. Correlation between religiosity and opinion about leaders including Milošević, Drašković, Panić, and Ćosić (four-point positive-negative scale), was not different from zero.<sup>19</sup> One year later, the religious were more sympathetic towards Šešelj ( $r=.17$ ,  $p<.01$ ).<sup>20</sup> In 1995, the only significant correlation of religiosity was with *sympathy* for a socialist candidate Zoran Lilić ( $r=.10$ ,  $p<.01$ ).<sup>21</sup> In 2002 church attendance and religiosity correlated only with preference for SPO and SRS, and even with these parties rather weakly (coefficients were about .10).<sup>22</sup> National state formation may very well be an unfinished project in Serbia, but the heavily secularized context seems to deprive the religious factor of its political power.

The presented bi-variate analyses show that age and residence primarily differentiate voters of the SPS who tend to be older and rural. These variables do not coincide with authoritarian-democratic dimension since in this respect the Radical voters appear closer to the parties of democratic orientation. Voters of the SPS and SRS are, however, close to each other when occupational categories, and especially education are examined.


In general, underprivileged strata, with poorer chances in competitive

economy, have been less attracted to the parties of democratic opposition. This tendency is also revealed by economic attitudes. For example, support for privatization correlates negatively with preference for the Socialist party and candidates. In 1995, support for privatization correlated negatively with sympathy towards Milošević ( $r=-.32$ ,  $p<.01$ ), while the coefficient was positive, though lower, for Đinđić ( $r=.20$ ,  $p<.01$ ).<sup>23</sup> Contrary to their 'objective' economic situation, however, supporters of Milošević tended to express satisfaction with the state of economy. Satisfaction with 'economic situation in FRY' ( $r=.56$ ,  $p<.01$ ) correlated positively with preference for Milošević and negatively but weakly with preference for Đinđić, Šešelj, and Koštunica. The popularity of the then most important opposition leader Vuk Drašković was entirely unrelated to these variables. Thus, the opposition leaders did not manage to extract stronger support from the dissatisfied.

Although the public has regarded the issue of economy as the most pressing one,<sup>24</sup> it is clear some other forces are behind the underprivileged SPS voters' satisfaction with economy. The explanation lies perhaps in their ideological commitments. Figure 14.5 clearly shows that SPS is the only party with voters who strongly disagree that 'the country would have been better if communist had never been in power'. At the same time, they are the only voters who believed that 'socialism had future prospects'. Likewise, in 1990, 47.7 per cent of the SPS voters said that they had never been members of the SKJ, while approximately three quarters of all SPO voters said the same. Supporters of the DS were close to the SPO.<sup>25</sup> Hence, the communist/anti-communist divide separated the SPS voters from all other relevant parties. The Radicals were closer to the rest of the opposition than to their occasional coalition partners.

During the 1990s, lower strata supported the socialists and radicals, depending on their attitude towards communism. After the decline of the SPS, the DSS seems to be taking over the representation of part of these strata. It seems that the regime change in 2000 was possible only when the underprivileged realized that there was a party acceptable to them also within the democratic bloc.

*Figure 14.5: Opinion about socialism and vote preference in 1995.*



Source: ZA Study 2910, 1995.

### Multivariate models, 1996 and 2002

The established bi-variate connections do not necessarily imply that each relationship represents a separate cleavage. Age, residence, education, and related variables may exhibit both direct and indirect effects. Therefore, we now present an attempt to construct a causal model of party support that does include socio-structural variables, ideological dimensions, and intermediary variables.

Instead of analysing single items, we now set out to construct relatively reliable multi-item measures of some of the key ideological dimensions relevant for political behaviour. The data sets from 1996 and 2002 contain a sufficient number of items for this objective. In both sets, items were first grouped according to their ideological content, and then re-scaled according to their first principal component. Items composing these ideological scales, and corresponding Alpha reliability coefficients are given in Appendix 14.1.

### Causal modeling of party preferences

In order to examine how socio-structural characteristics are integrated with ideological orientations and party support a series of regression analyses is performed. Support for political parties (now operationalized not as a vote choice, but as proximity towards each political party)<sup>26</sup> is regressed on the scales of ideological orientation, and on basic socio-demographic indicators. The complete model is constructed in the following way: first, the principal dependent variable is regressed on all independent variables, then, relevant ideological variables are regressed on so called mediating variables, which in the present case are authoritarianism and left-right ideological orientation, and the background variables. Authoritarianism and left-right identification are conceived as explanatory variables to the ideological

orientations, since they represent more general orientations, or world-views, rather than concrete political attitudes.<sup>27</sup> Finally, authoritarianism and left-right self-identification are regressed on socio-demographic indicators. In this way, it should be possible to establish the main paths of influence, starting from the social structure, via more general world-views to concrete ideological dimensions, and party preferences.

### **Causal model, 1996**

Multivariate models of party support explanation are presented in Table 14.1. Although each equation is statistically significant, the amount of explained variance varies greatly, from the relatively modest  $R^2=.19$  in the case of the DS, to a respectable 52 per cent of variance in the case of the socialists. There are several features common for all examined parties. Socio-demographic variables display very weak direct influence. Basically only age matters - it increases sympathies for the SPS and decreases for the Radicals and SPO. Mediating variables, i.e. authoritarianism and left-right ideology, are much more influential. Authoritarianism increases support for the SPS and decreases for parties of the democratic opposition. Preference for the SPS is related with left-wing identification, while the relationship is reversed for all other parties.

Different ideological dimensions matter for different particular parties. The Socialist sympathizers are distinguished by lower liberalism (this factor includes elements of economic liberalism too) and support for media control. Support for the DS and for the DSS is related with endorsement of democratic orientation, though the coefficients are modest. The radicals appear to have clearer ideological roots than the other parties: support for the SRS is explained by strong nationalism, rejection of international integration, and support for media freedom. Support for the SPO, still the main opposition party at the time, is marked by support for international integration and rejection of media censorship. The socialist party supporters were not in the isolationist bloc probably because after the Dayton accord the Socialists were emphasizing the need for international re-integration.

*Table 14.1: Multivariate model of party preferences, 1996. Table entries: statistically significant ( $p<.05$ ) standardized regression coefficients (beta)*

	SPS	DS	DSS	SRS	SPO
Age	.09			-.16	-.18

Education					
Self-assessment of class					
Religiosity					
Authoritarianism	.23	-.16	-.18		-.23
Left-right self-placement	-.39	.21	.28	.30	.19
Liberalism	-.07				
Democratic orientation		.10	.10		
Nationalism				.29	
International integration				-.12	.10
Media censorship	.20			-.10	-.09
R <sup>2</sup>	.52	.19	.25	.32	.27

Data source: ZA Study 2911, 1996.

The findings are generally in line with the image of the parties, but it is somewhat surprising that SPO support was not related with nationalism in 1996, although nationalism was the principal ideology of this party some years earlier. The general impression is that specific ideological dimensions matter less than one would expect, while more general orientations, represented by the left-right dimension and by authoritarianism, exhibit surprisingly wide and strong effect.

When the second and third steps in the modeling analysis are examined, we can observe that some of the specific ideological dimensions can be fairly well explained by the model (*Table 14.2*). This applies primarily to the attitude towards media censorship (33 per cent of variance explained) and liberalism (23 per cent of variance), that is, for dimensions closely related to the more general conflict between authoritarianism and democracy. The other three specific ideological dimensions are somewhat less successfully explained but the relationships are statistically significant.

Concerning the explanatory variables in this stage, it is clear that authoritarianism and left-right ideology are both strong determinants, but this is especially true for the former. The effect of authoritarianism is strong for each of the concrete ideological dimensions, and even for the left-right identification.<sup>28</sup> Authoritarianism shows especially strong effect on pro-censorship attitude, nationalism (positive effect), and liberalism (negative effect).

*Table 14.2: Multivariate model of ideological and mediating variables, 1996. Table entries: standardized regression coefficients (significant coefficients shown)*

	Authoritarianism	Left-right	Media censorship	Nationalism	Liberalism	International integration	Democratic orientation
Age	.18	-.14	.11	-.10			
Education	-.24	-.13		-.17			.21
Self-assessment of class				-.10	.08		-.09
Religiosity							
Authoritarianism	-	-.31	.43	.29	-.40	-.11	-.22
Left-right self-placement	-	-	-.18	.27	.17	-.12	
R <sup>2</sup>	.13	.13	.33	.15	.23	.03	.08

Source: ZA Study 2911, 1996.

Demographic variables have varied effects on different ideological dimensions, but coefficients are rarely high. Education has a relatively broad effect, influencing nationalism (negatively) and democratic orientation (positively); it also reduces authoritarianism and right-wing identification.<sup>29</sup> Age increases authoritarianism, left-wing identification, and preference for media control, but older respondents, other things being equal, tend to be less nationalistic. Self-assessed class position has small and somewhat inconsistent negative influence on nationalism and democratic orientation, and positive on liberalism (higher class – more liberal orientation). Mediating variables are both related to age and education, the effect of education on authoritarianism being the largest one among any of the demographic variables showed.

Even without attempting to graphically present the model, certain conclusions seem to be clear. According to the 1996 data, party preferences are determined by specific ideological orientations and general world-views more than directly by socio-demographic variables. Concrete ideological dimensions are in turn influenced by more general world-views, i.e. authoritarianism and left-right ideology, but also to a certain extent by socio-demographic variables. I would like to emphasize the particular role of authoritarianism and left-right identification (but especially the former): these variables exhibit direct and (via concrete ideological dimensions) indirect effects on party support, and they transfer the influence of the background variables. Thus, taking into account both the role of specific ideological dimensions and the role of authoritarianism, the most general finding is that in 1996 those variables were the most relevant for mass party preferences in Serbia which were - in one way or another - indicative of the authoritarianism-democracy opposition. It appears that the fight was much

more about general principles than about concrete policies.

### Causal model, 2002

The model for 2002 includes a somewhat broader set of variables, but this fact did not help much in increasing the explained variance. The model explains about one third of variance in the preferences for the included parties, apart of the DSS where the explained variance is approximately half of that (*Table 14.3*).

*Table 14.3: Multivariate model of party preferences, 2002. Table entries: statistically significant ( $p < .05$ ) standardized regression coefficients (beta)*

	SPS	SRS	DOS	DS	DSS
Age	.09				
Education		-.08			
Church attendance					
Religiosity					
Subjective economic well being					
Family income					
Authoritarianism	.12				
Left-right self-placement	-.21	-.09	.16	.13	.15
International integration	-.20	-.32	.35	.38	.17
Punitiveness					
Traditionalism		-.16			
Feminism					
Militarism					
Clericalism					
Elitism					
Nationalism	.30	.30	-.35	-.29	.20
Socialism				-.10	
Environmentalism					-.15
Economic liberalism					
R <sup>2</sup>	.37	.32	.30	.34	.17

Data source: Author's survey, Spring 2002.

However, the findings seem to be simpler to interpret. Basically two ideological dimensions are worth discussing in 2002: the attitude towards international integration and nationalism. The former correlates positively with the preference for the DOS, DS and DSS, and negatively with the preference for the SPS and SRS. The division reflects the positions of the conflicting political elites perfectly.

Nationalism shows a more interesting pattern. It correlates positively

with the preference for the Socialist and Radical parties, but also for Koštunica's DSS. These three parties seem to be the nationalist bloc presently, since the SPO is not on the scene for the time being.

There are only few additional significant effects of the ideological variables. Radical supporters tend to have fewer traditionalists than the average. Supporters of the DS are negatively disposed towards socialist ideology, while DSS supporters tend to reject environmentalism for some reason.<sup>30</sup>

This time, authoritarianism does not have a direct impact on party preferences, except in the case of the socialists.<sup>31</sup> The left-right ideology, on the other hand, is still directly influential. An interesting difference is that the preference for the Radical party was related to right-wing identification in 1996, while in 2002 the coefficients suggest relatively leftist identification. Socio-demographic variables remain poor direct predictors of party preferences.

*Table 14.4: Multivariate model of ideological and mediating variables, 2002. Significant coefficients shown ( $p < .05$ ).*

	Authoritarianism	Left-right identification	International integration	Nationalism
Age	.26	-.13		
Education	-.29		.10	-.12
Subjective economic well being				-.08
Family income	-.16			
Church attendance				
Religiosity		.11		
Authoritarianism	-		-.20	.56
Left-right self-placement	-	-		
R <sup>2</sup>	.21	.03	.09	.41

Data source: Author's survey, spring 2002.

The explanation of the ideological orientations repeats the general findings from 1996 (*Table 14.4*). The model accounts for no more than nine per cent of the variance in the support for international integration, the most relevant predictors being authoritarianism and education. Thus, although this factor is a stronger predictor of political preferences than in 1996, the background model can explain only a small portion of the individual differences along this variable, just as in 1996.

Nationalism can be explained better (41 per cent of variance), again by the strong influence of authoritarianism, and by education and subjective economic well-being. Authoritarianism itself can be relatively well

explained by the background variables, especially the effects of age and education are strong, but low income is also influential. Only a rather small percentage of variance in left-right ideology may be attributed to age and religiosity (the older are more left-wing, while the religious are more right-wing, as expected).

Thus, in 2002 the voters' party preferences are determined directly by the attitude towards the international community, by nationalism, and by left-right orientation. Authoritarianism strongly influences the two specific ideological orientations, especially nationalism. It also largely mediates the influence of background variables, especially age and education. The main cleavage does not seem to run between the general principles of authoritarian or democratic rule. The basic ideological markers of the opposing political camps are now two closely related issues – nationalism and international integration. But, the parties are not simply divided in the same two blocs on both issues. The issue of international integration divides parties into an authoritarian and a democratic bloc, but nationalists are divided into supporters of the Radicals and Socialists, and democratically oriented supporters of the DSS. This may be a positive sign that nationalism in Serbia does not necessarily have to be undemocratically oriented.

From the theoretical point of view, the most interesting result is that social-structure does not directly transfer into party preferences. Their influence, according to the Serbian evidence, works via more general world-views. As Gabennesch (1972) argued, authoritarianism is a psychological reflection of particular social conditions marked by material and – especially – educational deprivation. The role of what here is termed 'mediating variables' is perhaps particularly strong in contexts where social structure is still not crystallized, and where it is not easy to establish clear connections between particular economic interests, political actors, and policies.

## **Discussion**

At the initial stage of political pluralism in Serbia, communist heirs faced anti-communist nationalists. The situation was therefore similar to most of the other countries in the region. Social-structural roots were not exceptional: former *nomenklatura*, i.e. elites whose privileges were in various way tied with the communist rule, and older, less educated, and rural segments were pitted against younger, better educated, urban and pro-West oriented segments of the population. These tendencies were still quite modest in 1990. The anti-communist side was too weak and disunited in Serbia.

The early conflict between SPS and SPO testifies to the presence of this cleavage. In subsequent elections, the SPO continued insisting on the anti-communist rhetoric, but with evidently limited public response. After all, most of the anti-communist politicians and MPs were members of the

Communist Party, and many of them held important offices. Thus, despite its relative depth, this cleavage did not prove strong enough to mobilize voters for the initial regime change. In Kitschelt's early model (1992), the strength of the libertarian-pro-market camp is dependent on economic development, but Serbia's relative economic backwardness is only part of the story. Another part lies in the popular attachment to self-management socialism. Finally, it is difficult to overemphasize the importance of the then contemporary political processes. The dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia and the secession of the other Yugoslav republics forced the national and state issue to the foreground, and decreased the salience of the communist-anticommunist cleavage. This proved to be, then, a short-term transitional cleavage. Unlike the other countries of the region, this cleavage faded away without provoking regime change.

The dual issue of state and nation has been on the surface of virtually all political controversies in Serbia during the 1990s. It is perhaps the most important *theme* or style of framing concrete issues, rather than a cleavage that strongly divides parties and reflects distinct social categories. However, the parties are distinguishable according to the *kind* of nationalism they represent. Radicals and Socialists represent a more extreme, expansionist and populist nationalism, although it is difficult to exactly interpret the nationalism of the socialists and to determine to what extent their particular policies were motivated by sincere nationalism or by simple desire to retain power. Drašković's nationalism could be termed romantic and anti-communist. Koštunica has integrated a kind of traditionalist nationalism with commitment to the rules of democracy, and the DS has recently distanced itself from its more nationalist past. Thus, we can refer to indications of the nationalism-cosmopolitanism conflict.

The attitude towards the international community, which has played an extraordinarily important role in Serbia for obvious reasons, is very close to, though not identical with, the nationalism-cosmopolitanism dimension. The parties within the authoritarian bloc have been particularly negatively oriented towards cooperation with the international community (except with countries perceived as 'friends', such as Russia or Greece), while liberal parties within the democratic opposition have been outspokenly pro-Western. The empirical analyses we have carried out clearly show the relevance of this issue for party preferences.

The exceptional salience of these two issues, nationalism and attitude towards the international community, is probably a transitional phenomenon, too, related to a decade of border disputes and conflictual relations with the outside world. These issues could perhaps be interpreted as value cleavages, rather than social cleavages in the classical sense, regardless of their correlation with certain socio-economic indicators.

Throughout the 1990s, the deepest division on the party scene in Serbia has been that between authoritarianism and democracy, often represented by

the parties involved as the struggle between good and evil. The authoritarian parties were part of the 'red-brown' coalition of the socialists, radicals and the JUL, while SSJ joined the camp more recently. The main players in the democratically oriented bloc have been SPO, DS, DSS, and their numerous coalitions and coalition partners. Despite the party leadership, the radical supporters were often closer ideologically to the other opposition parties. The controversy essentially revolved around the respect for the rules of the democratic game, as manifested by the reactions to the attempts by the SPS to control the mass media and the economy, and especially the police and the army. In many respects, this ties in well with Kitschelt's early model of cleavages in post-communist Eastern Europe (1992, 1995), where pro-market libertarians are opposed to anti-market authoritarians, though with less emphasis on market attitudes. This cleavage has a long history in Serbian politics, but its contemporary manifestation could also be interpreted as a prolonged transitional cleavage (Karasimeonov 1998, 2004), which replaced the original pro- and anti-communist division. On the one side of this divide we find communist heirs, and on the other a heterogeneous set of parties and organizations united by the desire to remove the former from power.

Multivariate analyses of party preferences in 1996 and 2002 showed that preference for authoritarian *political* options was tied to authoritarianism as an individual difference variable. Authoritarianism conceived as a personality or attitudinal dimension has frequently been used for explaining anti-democratic political preferences (e.g. Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1988). Already the first studies of multipartism in Serbia showed significant differences in the degree of authoritarianism between supporters of different parties (e.g. Mihailović 1991). Authoritarianism, presently conceived as a general worldview in line with Gabennesch (1972), proved a very influential variable, both directly on political preferences, and indirectly via specific ideological orientations. Authoritarianism was a key determinant of the two most relevant ideological orientations – nationalism and international integration, especially in 2002. Although the socio-economic indicators exhibited their influence largely through authoritarianism, it seems that the authoritarianism-democracy cleavage is still based more on values and worldviews than on conflicting interests of different social categories. Thus, in the context of 'flattened societies' (Wessels and Klingemann, 1994), the formation of politically relevant groups may be based more on values and worldviews than on social categories, even though there is a strong connection between them. It seems that social structure exhibits its influence more implicitly, through particular worldviews, rather than explicitly through ideologies expressing group interests.

The divide between the authoritarian and democratic blocs was thus not only political and ideological, but also psychological and cultural. Political immobilism in Serbia during the 1990s can at least partly be explained by

the depth of this division and by the impossibility – both for voters and politicians – to cross the border between the two positions.

The strength of the division, or the extreme political polarization, was reinforced by the fact that it mostly coincided with a number of basic socio-structural categories such as age and education, and with most of the important specific ideological dimensions, such as nationalism or the attitude towards the international actors. Especially in 2002, the model explaining party support was very simple: the same predictors were valid for authoritarian and liber-democratic parties; only the signs of the coefficients were different.

The ethnic cleavage is perhaps the cleavage that comes closest to Rokkan's cleavage concept, including clear group borders, institutional encapsulation, and distinct group identity. Its importance in Serbia has been clear from the beginning. Even if we disregard Kosovo, which is a case of secession, ethnic divisions still play a significant role in Serbian politics. Parties of national minorities do exist in Serbia; they have representatives in the parliament, and control virtually all votes in their subgroups (cf. Todosijević, 2002). On the local level, the minority parties are typically in control of self-governments in regions where they are concentrated. In Serbian and Federal parliaments they have typically been in coalition with parties of the democratic bloc. Beyond that, their role in structuring the national party system is modest, since the two most relevant minorities, i.e. Magyars and Muslims of Sandžak, are numerically relatively small, and none of the major Serbian parties obtains any significant proportion of votes from the minorities (Goati 1996, 131).

This issue, however, extends into several other manifestations of the centre-periphery cleavage. One concerns the issue of state centralization. The Socialists and the Radicals are on the one side of this issue, favouring state centralization, while minority parties and regionalist parties, especially from Vojvodina, have been strongly in favour of decentralization, and more extensive territorial autonomies. The other major parties are in-between these extremes. SPO and perhaps DSS are for more centralization, while DS is for less. Regionalist parties managed to receive some electoral support in their own right, not only through broader opposition coalitions.<sup>32</sup> Regional differences are observable in general patterns of voting as well. Throughout the 1990s, the socialists were more popular in central and southern Serbia than in Vojvodina. This line of division coincides to a certain extent with the rural-urban division, and with the ethnic composition of the population. In regions, where national minorities are concentrated, the DS candidate Miroslav Labus won a majority of the votes in the first round of the presidential elections on 29 September 2002. For example, in Kanjiža where Magyars have an absolute majority, Labus won more than 80 per cent of the votes, while his national result was about 27 per cent.<sup>33</sup> In regions populated by Serbs who experienced more open ethnic conflicts, such as regions

bordering on Kosovo, or Srem in Vojvodina, the extreme nationalist candidate Šešelj received the strongest support.

The definition and measurement of the socio-economic cleavage is always a complex task in the post-communist context. In Serbia this divide is not manifested in the classical shape as the conflict between capital and labour.<sup>34</sup> It is more manifest on the ideological level, in the shape of different economic philosophies, such as attitudes towards privatization or protectionism.<sup>35</sup> It is clear that the Socialists and the Radicals favour protectionist policies, while the democratic opposition has been for economic reform and privatization. Under the Socialist government, the state played a very extensive redistributive role, as most of the large firms were under direct state control. The economy was probably more centralized than during the times of socialist self-management.<sup>36</sup> In this way, the controlled economy served as an efficient clientilistic network (Antonić 2000, 609). If the Radicals disagreed, it was because they demanded more egalitarian and less corrupt redistribution.

Concerning the other parties, nationalists of various shades seem to be closer to the protectionist economic philosophy. Recently it has become clear that economic neo-liberalism can be associated with the Democratic Party, and to some degree with some other liberaldemocratic parties as well (e.g. GSS). DSS is nominally in favour of privatization and marketization too, but advocates slower pace. On the level of rhetoric, however, the economic issue has been mainly framed as a valence issue – who is better able to provide the expected economic benefits for the society. The near future will probably clarify the economic interests of the different strata and then transfer them into the realm of politics.

The socio-economic cleavage is also manifested in recurrent patterns of voting preferences in different socio-economic categories. As demonstrated by the empirical analyses, variables such as age, education, rural residence, occupation, or income, clearly matter when it comes to voting. It is clear that potential ‘losers of transition’ have been more ready to vote for the Radicals and the Socialists. On the other hand, those with greater social and cultural capital seem to be more open towards the economic reform, and support parties such as DS and GSS. In this sense, the socio-economic cleavage is certainly relevant in Serbia (cf. Kitschelt et al. 1995).

Finally, it is worth mentioning the cleavages that appear *not* to be relevant in Serbia. This applies to the rural-urban aspect of the economic cleavage, for example. Although there have existed several parties that tried to appeal to the agrarian interests, they remained basically irrelevant as political actors on their own. This does not mean that there are no clear urban-rural differences in voting patterns – it was found in a number of studies that peasants/farmers disproportionately supported the SPS (Antonić 1998; Mihailović 2000). After all, the democratic opposition was for the first time victorious in the largest urban centres in the local elections of

1996. This only means that no influential party builds its support on a successful appeal to agrarian interests. Similarly, the state-church, or religious-secular cleavage has not played any significant role in party politics in Serbia.

### **Parties and cleavages in historical perspective**

An important question is to what extent there is historical continuity of cleavages in Serbia, either in terms of the connection between contemporary and historical political parties, or in terms of relevant issue dimensions.

There is of course continuity between the communists prior to the Second World War and contemporary SPS, but the difference between the small, often illegal revolutionary party and its distant offspring in the 1990s is huge. Perhaps, the connection is more historical and symbolic rather than institutional or even ideological.

The Democratic and Radical parties also have predecessors in earlier periods of pluralist politics in Serbia. However, none of them have exploited the connection much, although the Radicals occasionally stressed their ideological affinity with the Radical Party of Nikola Pašić.<sup>37</sup> Despite the lack of the institutional continuity, the DS and the SRS are both surprisingly close to their historical namesakes. The old Radical Party – while playing an important democratizing role in Serbia – was nationalist and populist, just its modern successor (cf. Stokes 1990). The Democratic Party was liberal, elitist and urban also before the Second World War.

Continuity of cleavages is perhaps more interesting than institutional continuity. First of all, state and nation have been on the agenda in Serbia for nearly than two centuries. In brief periods of democratic rule, the issue has been politicized in a way reminiscent of the 1990s. The conflict between the authoritarian and democratic blocs is by no means new to the 1990s; it was equally dominant and salient in the 1920s (Antonić 1998). The social forces mobilized by the opposing camps also testify to a high degree of continuity. The authoritarian parties of the inter-war era could thus rely on support from the ruling political elite, the capitalist elite connected with the state through concessions and other privileges, the military elite, parts of the administrative and academic elites, and lower social strata with negative attitudes towards marketization such as smallholders, unqualified workers and the upper-age brackets (Antonić 1998).

Ethnic cleavages have characterized Serbia since it became a multinational state, i.e. after the Balkan Wars, and even more since the First World War.<sup>38</sup> National minorities gained parliamentary representation in the 1920s just as in the 1990s.

But there are also some structural differences between the two time periods well worth highlighting. Most notably, in the 1920s all major parties had to rely on peasant votes, since peasants constituted a vast majority

(around 90 per cent) of the population. There were very few large landowners, only some four per cent of land was in estates of 100 hectares or more.<sup>39</sup> The situation was thus more favourable for populist politics than for the development of strong agrarian cleavage.

In the 1990s, the social structure is more differentiated, and in a way favourable to the liberal-democratic bloc (a high level of education, a large service sector, and a relatively small agricultural sector.<sup>40</sup> On the other hand, the time is not yet ripe for the emergence of the classical capital/labour, left-right cleavage, in spite of the growing number of industrial workers. In the 1920s, the working class was a rather insignificant social force; and in the 1990s workers were employed by the state more often than by private owners.

## Conclusion

The utility of the narrowly defined concept of cleavage may be legitimately questioned. In the last decades, cleavage-politics has been declared irrelevant for Western Europe on numerous occasions. In other parts of the world, like in Northern America, models other than Lipset and Rokkan's have been called upon to describe mass political behaviour. Finally, post-Communist Europe is characterized by contradictory tendencies such as the re-emergence of community-based conflicts, on the one hand, and high-scale electoral volatility driven by the influence of mass media and by the fragility of party organizations, on the other.

The evidence presented here shows that a certain part of the variance in voting behaviour may be explained with reference to basic socio-economic categories. Supporters of different parties tend to come from somewhat different socio-economic and socio-cultural groups, and to hold different political attitudes. The central political divide throughout the 1990s – that between authoritarianism and democracy – is well reflected on the level of party and voter characteristics. The less educated, older, and rural population proved to be more authoritarian, nationalist, negatively oriented towards the international community, and tended to support the SPS and SRS. The opposing camp included those with greater social and cultural capital, and those with better prospects in liberalized conditions in a market economy. After the regime change in October 2000, many of the dissatisfied voters who abandoned the SPS opted for the DSS, thus opening an increasingly important divide within the democratic bloc. The division between the two new key players on the political scene in Serbia, that is DS and DSS, is not only ideological, but also social. Ideologically, DSS is more traditionalist, conservative and nationalist. Socially, DS is more urban and elitist. The Radical Party remains consistently associated with relatively young, urban and working class members of the lower social strata. Finally, in accordance with the cleavage model, the most important issues and

divisions have clear historical background. The central political divide, authoritarianism versus democracy, with its associate oppositions (rural versus urban, nationalism versus cosmopolitanism, market versus plan), has always been part of Serbian history.

The question is to what extent the political divisions described in this chapter may be captured by the cleavage model? The cleavage concept can definitely be applied to ethnic oppositions. Borders between voters of different ethnic origin have proved remarkably impermeable. National minorities possess distinct identities; they are institutionally encapsulated, and overwhelmingly support 'their own' single party. Identity politics clearly matters (cf. Whitefield 2002). But the overall picture suggests that party politics basically is not determined by conflicts between organized groups having distinct socio-structural profiles and elaborate identities. The major structural variables such as the rural-urban division, ethnicity or region, and social stratification, are clearly relevant, but their influence is relatively small, and tends to disappear in multivariate models. However, even to the degree that these variables work, they do not work because of organizational encapsulation or closure of relevant social groups (again ethnic minorities are an exception). Age and education are particularly strongly related to party preferences, but these groups are not 'groups for themselves', and in general they 'lack that kind of social closure and/or temporal stability which are necessary preconditions for the functioning of the freezing effect' (Tóka 1998). Moreover, the parties are rarely explicit in their appeal to specific social categories. The SPS and the SRS have perhaps had the most specific appeal to 'ordinary people', while the elitism of the DS and the GSS, and more recently of the DSS, has been more implicit than open and direct.

The relatively weak socio-structural roots of the Serbian parties are explainable from the point of view of all the three key factors that matter in cleavage theory: parties, society, and voters. Serbian political parties are often described as clientilistic networks led by charismatic or would-be charismatic leaders (e.g. Sekelj 2000, 69; Antić 2002), rather than mass parties with extensive membership and developed infrastructure through which they can establish the connection with targeted social groups. The objective social situation has its role too. Weak social differentiation is often quoted as an important factor in hindering cleavage politics across the region (Wessels and Klingemann 1994). Serbia is an exception only in the sense that it was not flattened by the communist regime: it was a rather flat, or egalitarian society, consisting basically of small peasants, since it gained independence in the 19th century. In a society, which is still in flux and turmoil, we see that characteristics related to *potential* success in the transitional struggle predict libertarian-democratic attitudes rather well (cf. Kitschelt 1992). More than anything else, Serbian society had experiences that forced the social cleavages to the background: dissolution of the former

country, conflicts with secessionist republics and provinces (Kosovo), conflicts with the international community (UN sanctions, NATO attack). In our causal models, attitudes, or ideological orientations proved important as a proximal causal factor determining political preferences. The two most influential orientations are clearly reflections of the most traumatic contemporaneous processes. When borders of the national community are disputed, it is not surprising that nationalism-related attitudes play a major role in dividing the respective camps. The conflict with international community is behind the salience of the attitude towards international integration.

Political actualization of potential social cleavages, especially the development of active group-solidarity, presupposes organizational work by political entrepreneurs. That is a lengthy process with uncertain outcomes. Distinct attitudinal characteristics or negative stereotypes about political enemies can be represented and moulded via mass media as well. When these attitudinal features divide the national political field into specific camps across which there is little trust, or let alone cooperation, and the range of coalitional alternatives is determined by camp-borders, then national politics resembles the politics of those countries where socio-economic groups are pitted against each other. Stable political orientations, thus, can be rooted in political attitudes, values, or ideologies. This is not a particularly novel argument. Tóka, for example, concluded that 'pure structural voting, on the basis of social class, religion, or place of residence, seldom makes a contribution to the stabilization of critical alignments [...] Value preferences seem to provide for the relatively more solid, stable basis for enduring partisan attachments' (Tóka 1998).

This brings us to the role of individual-dispositional variables. Authoritarianism and left-right ideological self-identification exhibited strong direct and indirect (via ideological orientations) effects on political preferences, but they also mediated the influence of the background variables. Authoritarianism as an individual disposition correlated strongly with the authoritarian-democratic political divide, and with the most influential proximal ideological dimensions (especially nationalism and national integration factors in 2002 data).

This emphasis on attitudinal and psychological elements in the reconstruction of group-formation does not eliminate socio-demographic background characteristics. Psychological dispositions are formed in interaction with an individual's social position, and therefore the connection between the social structure and political behaviour should be conceived as mediated by attitudinal orientations such as authoritarianism.

Since dispositional variables have broader influence, they could be helpful in predicting orientations of particular segments of population in case particular issues become politicized, or predicting re-orientations in case of major changes in the party system. During the 1990s all social strata

suffered, yet the popularity of the SPS remained high. The voters started to desert the SPS only when military defeat and the zigzags of the party elite undermined the image of the party. Thus, it could have been predicted that in case of the decline of SPS, these voters would be attracted to conservative-traditionalist parties. More to the point, the question is about the consequences of the fact that the DSS attracted most of the former SPS and SRS voters. Perhaps, the nationalist and traditionalist reputation of the DSS might satisfy them, while the firm democratic orientation of the party might help navigate Serbia into safer, more stable and democratic waters.

### **Acronyms of Parties and Coalitions**

DC	Democratic Centre ( <i>Demokratski centar</i> )
DEPOS	Democratic Movement of Serbia ( <i>Demokratski pokret Srbije</i> ); 1992–3 electoral coalition; principal members SPO, ND, GSS.
DOS	Democratic Opposition of Serbia ( <i>Demokratska opozicija Srbije</i> ); 2000 electoral coalition, principal members DSS, DS, GSS, ND, SVM, LSV, DC.
DRSM	Democratic Reform Party of Muslims ( <i>Demokratsko reformska stranka Muslimana</i> )
DS	Democratic Party ( <i>Demokratska Stranka</i> )
DSHV	Democratic Alliance of Croats in Vojvodina ( <i>Demokratski savez Hrvata u Vojvodini</i> )
DSS	Democratic Party of Serbia ( <i>Demokratska stranka Srbije</i> )
DZVM	Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians ( <i>Demokratska zajednica vojvođanskih Mađara</i> )
GSS	Citizens' Alliance of Serbia ( <i>Građanski savez Srbije</i> )
JUL	Yugoslav United Left ( <i>Jugoslovenska ujedinjena levica</i> )

LSV	League of Vojvodina Social Democrats ( <i>Liga socijaldemokrata Vojvodine</i> )
ND	New Democracy ( <i>Nova Demokratija</i> )
RDSV	Reform Democratic Party of Vojvodina ( <i>Reformsko-demokratska stranka Vojvodine</i> )
<i>Savez za promene</i>	Alliance for changes; coalition of DS, GSS, DHSS, and New Serbia ( <i>Nova Srbija</i> )
SDA	Party of Democratic Action ( <i>Stranka demokratske akcije</i> )
SKS	League of Communists of Serbia ( <i>Savez komunista Srbije</i> )
SNP CG	Socialist People's Party of Montenegro ( <i>Socijalistička narodna partija Crne Gore</i> )
SPO	Serbian Renewal Movement ( <i>Srpski pokret obnove</i> )
SPS	Socialist Party of Serbia ( <i>Socijalistička partija Srbije</i> )
SRS	Radical Party of Serbia ( <i>Srpska Radikalna stranka</i> )
SSJ	Party of Serbian Unity ( <i>Stranka srpskog jedinstva</i> )
SSS	Peasants' Party of Serbia ( <i>Srpska Seljačka Stranka</i> )
SVM	Alliance of Hungarians of Vojvodina ( <i>Vajdasági Magyar Szövetsége/Savez Vojvodanskih Mađara</i> )
<i>Zajedno</i>	Coalition 'Together'; 1996 electoral coalition; principal members SPO, DS, GSS, DSS.

## NOTES

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1. In his database of articles on voting and election studies in all post-communist countries published in 16 leading journals, there was only one article that included Serbia/Yugoslavia. Only the former Soviet republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia are less studied.
2. Kosovo is excluded from the analysis since throughout 1990s it was outside the sphere of Serbian politics.
3. On 7 September 1990, in Kačanik, Kosovo, a secret meeting of 111 representatives of the dissolved Kosovo Assembly, all of Albanian nationality, announced the 'Constitution' of what was termed 'Kosovo Republic' – defined as an independent state (Vukomanović 1999).
4. The term 'democratic opposition' refers to the Serbian parties who opposed Milošević, with the exception of SRS.
5. Dobrica Ćosić, another famous writer with political background, was appointed Federal President. He also came into conflict with Milošević, and was consequently dismissed in June 1993.
6. SDA boycotted the 1992 elections.
7. The New Democracy (ND) has had a political influence highly disproportional to its electoral base. The only time this party participated in an election on its own was in 1990, and it won only 1.3 per cent of the vote and no representatives. Interestingly, ND was a member of the DOS coalition when Milošević was removed after the elections of 2000. Its leader Dušan Mihajlović became nothing less than a Minister of Interior in the Đinđić government.
8. At the time, the Federal President was elected by the federal parliament i.e. not directly. Montenegrin representatives, under Đukanović's control, fully supported Milošević's appointment.
9. Federal Government Report of 14 January 1999 (quoted in Antonić 1999).
10. Milošević distributed some 4 200 decorations after the 'victory' against NATO (Antonić 2000, 595).
11. It was estimated that the immediate war damage was above 4 billions of dollars. The indirect costs exceeded 100 billion dollars (Antonić 2001, 37).
12. The ruling coalition in Montenegro immediately declared that they did not recognize these constitutional changes, and refused to participate in the scheduled elections.
13. Foreign financial intervention was decisive in this respect. According to Antonić (2001), more

than 40 million dollars were 'invested' from abroad in the campaign for removing Milošević from power.

14. Data source: 1996 data: ZA Study 2911; 2002 data: author's survey. In 1996, support for SRS was positively associated with sympathy towards the opposition parties (e.g., with DS  $r=.32$ ,  $p<.01$ ).

15. G17 transformed from an expert group closely affiliated with DOS (provided several ministers in the contemporary government), into a political party under the leadership of former presidential candidate Miroljub Labus. It is programmatically close to DS.

16. However, party programmes and ideological commitments are not always reliable predictors of promoted policies once a party comes to power. For example, a minister from the GSS – one of the most liberal and libertarian parties within the DOS – introduced religious classes into Serbian schools.

17. Neither the original collectors nor the Central Archive in Cologne (ZA) bear any responsibility for the analysis or the interpretation presented here.

18. Data from Slavujević (2002) are generally based on surveys and election studies on national random samples.

19. Data source: ZA Study 2904, 1992. In the same study, for the sake of comparison, age correlated with preference for each one of the included leaders, and was the highest for Milošević ( $r=-.29$ ,  $p<.001$ ).

20. Data source: ZA Study 2907, 1993.

21. Data source: ZA Study 2910, 1995.

22. Author's data, 2002.

23. Data source: ZA Study 2910, 1995.

24. In 1990, 36.7 per cent of the respondents (the highest percentage) believed that the most pressing issue of the day was 'living standard and economic development'. Five years later 'economic problems' were once again selected as the most pressing issue (chosen by more than 38 per cent of the respondents). (Data source: ZA Study 2901, 1990, and ZA Study 2910, 1995. In both surveys, the second most often chosen issue trailed some twenty-percentage points behind.)

25. Data source: ZA Study 2901, 1990.

26. This strategy is chosen because this variable strongly co-varies with the expressed vote preference; it increases the number of available observations, and enables more powerful and elegant statistical methods.

27. Authoritarianism is interpreted here more in the sense of a worldview rooted in social conditions (Gabennesch 1972), than as a personality disposition (Adorno et al. 1950).

28. More detailed analysis of the relationship between authoritarianism and the left-right scale shows a U-shape curve, indicating higher authoritarianism on the extremes, but the increase is stronger on the left side of the spectrum.

29. When the bi-variate relationship between education and left-right ideology is examined, a reverse U-shape curve appears: those on ideological extremes are less educated, but left-wing extremists are still better educated than those on the right wing.

30. The negative relationship between DSS support and environmentalism suggests that this party attracts voters with materialist value orientation in Inglehart's sense of that term. Some of the smaller parties from the DOS coalition, such as regionalist and libertarian LSV, tend to be more post-materialist.

31. The reason for the lack of a direct effect of authoritarianism might partly be in the content of the authoritarianism scale in 2002. Namely, in 1996 the scale was more ideological, while in 2002 it was somewhat more psychological.

32. For example, coalition Vojvodina had two representatives in the Federal parliament after the 1996 elections, and four representatives after the Serbian parliamentary elections in 1997.

33. *Subotičke Novine*, No. 40, 4 October 2002.

34. Antić (1998) calculated the so called Alford index of class voting in Serbia for data from 1996, and found that it was extremely low (approximately 1), suggesting that workers did not give disproportional support to parties of the 'Left Coalition'.

35. On the mass level, as shown in the multivariate models, economic liberalism was basically not related to party preferences.

36. SPS stopped privatization by law in 1996 (Antić 2000, 608–9). It was estimated that approximately 85 per cent of basic capital remained under state ownership (Goati 1996, 19). The present DOS government, on the other hand, started privatization on a very fast pace.

37. Šešelj's Radicals are only one of many parties with 'Radical' in their name to claim ties with

Pašić's Radical Party, but the other parties are generally very small.

38. The destiny of Serbs in Kosovo was an important symbolic issue even before the territory was incorporated into modern Serbia. Radoje Domanović, a well-known Serbian writer, in one of his famous political satires written in 1903 ridiculed a political meeting where one of the speakers laments the fate of Serbs being harassed by Albanians and calls for the revenge.

39. Quoted in Antonić, 1998; 71.9 per cent of the land was in possessions smaller than 5 hectares (Grbić 1991).

40. However, FR Yugoslavia has still a large proportion of rural population (48 per cent of the population in 2000), larger than in 'Visegrad Four', or even in the 'Balkan six' countries (average for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania) (IMF Country Report No. 02/103, May 2002).

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## APPENDIX 14.1: SPECIFICATIONS

### Variables used in 1996 and 2002 multivariate models

#### *Ideological dimensions, 1996 survey*

Ideological dimension	Number of items	Alpha	Items
Liberalism	5	.81	Private ownership and free enterprise necessary for economy. Freedom of individual expression necessary for political life. Freedom more important than equality. Private ownership is guarantee of freedom. Private interests more important than group interests...
Authoritarianism	8	.90	The purpose of the police is to control opponents... Government should control universities. Citizens who misbehaved abroad should be deprived of a passport. Children and youth should not be allowed to express disobedience.

			Without a leader every nation is like a man without a head. Young people need strict discipline. Citizens should behave according to instructions from above... We should follow our leaders.
Workers' participation	4	.70	Participation in management would stimulate employees to work better. If everyone were allowed to participate in management ... this would cause more harm than good. Workers not capable of management. Participation in management would stimulate faithfulness...
Democratic orientation	3		Democracy is dangerous. Majorities are entitled sometimes to deny some right to minorities. Democracy may have weaknesses, but is still better than other forms of government.
Nationalism	8	.85	Different nationalities can live together in one state. National minorities should be given all the rights... Serbs should have priority in getting a job. Every nationality should preserve its ethnic purity... Openness toward the world brings harm. We should be careful in dealing with other nationalities... Mixed marriages are doomed to failure. It is essential for every nation to be open.
International integration	3		In favour of joining the EU. Attitude towards EU. In favor of joining the 'Partnership for Peace'.
Media censorship	4	.36	Published material should never be banned for political reasons. Media should have more consideration for those who do not want to hear bad news. Censorship of films and magazines... Private media are more objective.

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*Note:* Reliability not calculated for scales with less than 4 items.

*Representative items included in the ideological dimensions, 2002 survey*

Ideological dimension	Number of items	Alpha	Sample items
International integration	4	.73	We should welcome openings of international companies, banks and other firms in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's future is joining the EU. The Western world is ready to accept and help democratic Serbia and Yugoslavia.
Nationalism	11	.85	Serbs should be proud of their people. There are few nations that contributed to the world's culture

			and science as ours.
			No nation has such a glorious and at the same time tragic history as the Serbs.
Militarism	4	.82	More money from the budget shall be devoted to modernizing our army. It is a great honour to serve in our army. Strong army is the only guarantee of our security.
Socialism	6	.60	For workers it is better to be employed in state-owned firms, than in private or privatized companies. The state should provide job to everybody who wants to work.
Authoritarianism	10	.84	The most important virtues a child has to learn are obedience and respect for authority. All true patriots are obliged to take measures against those condemned by the leaders of the country. Young people need strict regulations and determination to fight for their families and their country.
Economic liberalism	8	.52	Every individual has to take care of him/herself and it is no state business to worry about individual welfare. The state ought to be involved in economy as little as possible.
Clericalism	3	.76	The role of the Serbian Orthodox Church should be increased in managing the country's matters. Religious teaching should be compulsory, not only an optional course in all elementary and secondary schools.
Tradition-alism	4	.69	Sexual relationships between people of the same sex are always wrong. There are certain life-styles the state (law) should not allow, such as for example, smoking of marijuana, religious sects, and homosexual relations. Television should support more the nation's traditions.
Punitiveness	4	.50	The problem of crime cannot be solved without harsher punishments for criminals. The death penalty is the best punishment for the worst criminals.
Environmentalism	4	.53	There are more important problems the state should care about than environmental pollution. It is more important to preserve and improve nature than to achieve economic development.
Feminism	2		Sexual discrimination is not a serious problem in contemporary Yugoslavia. Women should politically organize in order to fight against sexual discrimination.
Elitism	3		In this life, it is important to rise above other, ordinary people. No amount of education can make up for the wrong breeding. Great art is not meant for the common folk.

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*Note:* Reliability not calculated for scales with less than 4 items.

## APPENDIX 14.2: GOVERNMENT COMPOSITION

Date	Prime minister	Government parties	Political orientation	Reason of termination
February, 1991	Dragutin Zelenović (SPS)	SPS (majority)	Communist	Premier resigned on 11 December 1991
December, 1991	Radoman Božović (SPS)	SPS (majority)	Communist	Elections of 1992
February, 1993	Nikola Šainović (SPS)	SPS (minority, with informal support from SRS)	Reformed communist	President of the Republic dissolved the parliament (20 October 1993); new elections December 1993
March, 1994	Mirko Marjanović (SPS)	SPS, ND, DS	'Government of national unity'	Elections of 1997
March, 1998	Mirko Marjanović (SPS)	SPS, JUL, SRS (majority)	Authoritarian	Government resignation, 21 October 2000 (in fact regime change of 5 October: The 'political agreement' included the formation of a



DSHV	1	0.4							
PDD	1	0.4							
SJ	1	0.4							
DRSM	1	0.4							
Independent candidates	8	3.2							
<i>Vojvodina</i> coalition						4	1.6		
DA						1	0.4		
SSJ								14	5.6
DS-RDSV coalition			2	0.8					
<i>Arkan</i> <sup>c</sup>			5	2.0					
DRSM			1	0.4					
<i>Preševo-Bujanovac</i> coalition						1	0.4		
Total			250	100.0	250	100.0	250	100.0	250
Turnout			71.5	69.7	61.3	57.4	57.7		
			%	%	%	%	%		

<sup>a</sup> Coalition of the Party for Democratic Action and Democratic Party of Albanians in 1993.

<sup>b</sup> *Sandžak* coalition in 1997.

<sup>c</sup> Citizen's group 'Ž. R. Arkan'.

Sources: Republican Election Commission 1990, 1992, 1993, 1997, 2000; Goati, 2002, 2001b.

*Elections to the Chamber of Citizens of the Federal Assembly of the FR Yugoslavia (Veće Građana Saveznog Parlamenta)*

138 members, four-year term; Results for Serbia (108 representatives)

	May 1992 <sup>a</sup>		December 1992		November 1996		September 2000	
	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%
SPS (with JUL and ND in 1996; with JUL in 2000)	73	68.9	47	43.5	64	59.3	44	40.7
SRS	30	28.3	30	27.8	16	14.8	5	4.6
DEPOS in December 1992; <i>Zajedno</i> in 1996			20	18.5	22	20.4		
DS			5	4.6				
DOS							58	53.7
DZVM; SVM from 1996	2	1.9	3	2.8	3	2.8	1	0.9
DS/RDSV			2	1.9				
DS/RDSV/GSS			1	0.9				
<i>Vojvodina</i> coalition					2	1.9		
<i>Sandžak</i> coalition					1	0.9		
Independent	1	0.9						
Total	106	100.0	108	100.0	108	100.0	108	100.0

Turnout	56.0%	67.4%	60.3%	74.4%
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<sup>a</sup> Boycotted by some opposition parties.

Source: Federal Election Commission reports; Goati, 2001b.

#### *Chamber of Republics of the Federal Assembly*

September 2000

Serbia	Votes	%	Seats	%
DOS	2,092,799	44.0	10	50
SPS – JUL	1,479,583	31.1	7	35
SRS	472,820	9.9	2	10
SPO	281,153	5.9	1	5
Total for Serbia		90.9	20	100

*Note:* Representatives for the Chamber of Republics of the FRY were elected directly for the first time in September 2000. Chamber of Republics has 40 members, 20 from each republic.

*Source:* Federal Election Commission, 2000; Goati, 2001b.

#### *Elections to the Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro*

Date: 25 February 2003

Parliamentary caucus	Mandates in the SMN Assembly
DSS	17
DOS	37
SPS	12
SRS	8
SSJ	5
SDP (Social Democratic Party)	5
DA	2
DHSS	2
<i>New Serbia</i>	1
<i>Srbija</i>	1
SNS	1
Total	91

*Note:* Indirect elections based on Serbian parliamentary caucuses. Unicameral federal parliament, total 126 seats, 91 representatives from Serbia.

*Source:* *Glas javnosti*, 18 February 2003.

## SERBIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

*1990 elections**Date:* 9 December*Turnout:* 71.50%

Candidate (Party)	Votes	%
Slobodan Milošević (SPS)	3,285,799	65.34
Vuk Drašković (SPO)	824,674	16.40
Ivan Đurić (UJDI)	277,398	5.52
Sulejman Ugljanin (SDA)	109,456	2.18
Vojislav Šešelj (citizens' group)	96,277	1.91
Blažo Petrović (YU blok)	57,420	1.14
Slobodan Matić ( <i>Savez svih Srba u svetu</i> )	28,978	0.58
Dragan Jovanović ( <i>Zelena partija</i> )	22,458	0.45
Ljuben Aleksov (citizens' group)	19,123	0.38
Ljubomir Grujić (citizens' group)	17,675	0.35
Total	4,739,258	94.24

*Source:* Republican Election Commission, 1990; Goati, 2001b.*1992 elections**Date:* 20 December*Turnout:* 69.7%

Candidate (Party)	Votes	%
Slobodan Milošević (SPS)	2,515,047	53.24
Milan Panić (citizens' group)	1,516,693	32.11

Milan Paroški (People's Party and Serbian Opposition)	147,693	3.13
Dragan Vasiljković (citizens' group)	87,847	1.86
Jezdimir Vasiljević (citizens' group)	61,729	1.31
Miroslav Milanović (citizens' group)	28,010	0.59
Blažo Petrović (Democratic-Patriotic coalition)	20,326	0.43
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,377,345</b>	<b>92.66</b>

Source: Goati, 2001b.

*1997 elections (failed)*

Date: 21 September (first round) and 5 October (second round)

Turnout: 57.47 % (first round) 48.97% (second round)

First round			Second round		
Candidate (Party)	Votes	%	Candidate (Party)	Votes	%
Zoran Lilić (SPS)	1,474,924	35.70	Zoran Lilić (SPS)	1,691,354	47.90
Vojislav Šešelj (SRS)	1,126,940	27.28	Vojislav Šešelj (SRS)	1,733,859	49.10
Vuk Drašković (SPO)	852,800	20.64			
Mile Isakov	111,156	2.69			
Vuk Obradović	100,523	2.43			
Nebojša Čović	93,133	2.25			
Sulejman Ugljanin	68,446	1.66			
Milan Paroški	27,100	0.66			
Milorad Vidojković	14,105	0.34			
Predrag Vuletić	11,463	0.28			
Dragan Đorđević	10,864	0.26			
Milan Mladenović	10,112	0.24			
Đorđe Drljača	9,430	0.23			
Branko Čičić	7,097	0.17			
Gvozden Sakić	3,293	0.08			
Radomir Tukmanović	2,647	0.06			

Source: Republican Election Commission, 1997, Goati, 2001b.

*1997 elections, Second attempt*

Date: 7 December (first round) and 21 December (second round)

Turnout: 52.75 % (first round) 53.47 (second round)

First round			Second round		
Candidate (Party)	Votes	%	Candidate (Party)	Votes	%
Milan Milutinović (SPS, JUL, ND)	1,655,822	43.44	Milan Milutinović (SPS, JUL, ND)	2,181,808	56.47
Vojislav Šešelj (SRS)	1,227,076	32.19	Vojislav Šešelj (SRS)	1,383,868	35.82
Vuk Drašković (SPO)	587,776	15.42			
Vuk Obradović (SDP)	115,850	3.04			
Dragoljub Mićunović (DC)	86,583	2.27			
Miodrag Vidojković (citizens' group)	29,180	0.77			
Miodrag Vuletić (LDS)	21,353	0.56			

Source: Republican Election Commission, 1997; Goati, 2002.

*2002 elections (failed)*

Date: 29 September (first round) and 13 October (second round)

Turnout: 55.50 % (first round) 45.31% (second round)

First round			Second round		
Candidate (Party)	Votes	%	Candidate (Party)	Votes	%
Vojislav Koštunica (DSS)	1,123,420	30.89	Vojislav Koštunica (DSS)	1,991,947	66.86
Miroljub Labus (citizens' group)	995,200	27.36	Miroljub Labus (citizens' group)	921,024	30.91
Vojislav Šešelj (SRS)	845,308	23.24			
Vuk Drašković (SPO)	159,959	4.40			
Borislav Pelević (SSJ)	139,047	3.82			
Velimir Živojinović (SPS)	119,052	3.27			

Source: <http://www.cesid.org>.

*2002 II elections, second attempt (failed)*

Date: 8 December

Turnout: 45.17%

Candidate (Party)	Votes	%
Vojislav Koštunica (DSS)	1,699,098	57.66
Vojislav Šešelj (SRS)	1,063,296	36.08
Borislav Pelević (SSJ)	103,926	3.53

Source: Republican Election Commission (via <http://www.statserb.sr.gov.yu>).

*Elections for the President of FR Yugoslavia*

*2000 elections**Date:* 24 September*Turnout:* 71.55%

Candidate (Party)	Votes	%
Vojislav Koštunica (DOS)	2,470,304	50.24%
Slobodan Milošević (SPS, JUL, SNP CG)	1,826,799	37.15%
Vojislav Mihailović (SPO)	145,019	2.95%
Tomislav Nikolić (SRS)	289,013	5.88%
Miodrag Vidojković	45,964	0.93%

*Note:* Boycotted by the ruling coalition in Montenegro.*Source:* Official Gazette of the FR Yugoslavia, Vol. 9, No. 55, October 2000.

## APPENDIX 14.4: THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

***Serbia****Parliament*

The first pluralist election law was passed by the one party Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Serbia 1990, and was based on the two-round majoritarian principle. The system was changed in 1992 into a proportional system with nine electoral districts (increased to 29 in 1997) and a five per cent elimination quota on the constituency level.

The current system is based on the Law on the Elections of Representatives (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 35/2000) from October 2000. The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (*Narodna Skupština*) consists of 250 representatives, elected for a period of four years.

Elections for representatives are called by the President of the *Narodna Skupština*. Not less than 45 days, and no more than 90 days may pass between the day of calling for elections and the day of holding of elections.

The right to elect a representative, as well as to be elected as a representative, is given to legally competent citizens over the age of 18 residing on the territory of the Republic of Serbia. The Republic of Serbia forms a single electoral district, and representatives are elected on the basis of lists submitted by political parties, coalitions of parties, other political organizations or groups of citizens. An electoral list is confirmed when accompanied by the signatures of not less than 10,000 voters. Each electoral list is apportioned a number of mandates proportional to the number of votes it has gathered, provided that it meets the five per cent clause.

The mandates are apportioned according to the system of the largest quotient. The total number of votes received by each separate electoral list is divided by numbers from one to 250. The quotients thus arrived at are sorted by size, and the 250 largest quotients are taken into account. Each electoral list is apportioned a number of mandates corresponding to the number of quotients. If two or more electoral lists get the same quotient on the basis of which a mandate is to be apportioned, and there are no more mandates to be apportioned, the mandate is apportioned to the list which has received the overall largest number of votes.

The electoral law stipulates that the mandates belong to the parties or organizations who submit the electoral lists. However, on May 28, 2003, the Constitutional Court found this provision unconstitutional and decided that the mandates belong to the electoral representatives.

Authorities responsible for conducting the elections are the Republican Electoral Commission and polling boards. The *Narodna Skupština* appoints a President and sixteen permanent members of the Republican Electoral Commission; the organizations behind the various electoral lists are entitled to appoint one representative each for the sessions of the enlarged electoral commission.

The municipalities keep the records of eligible voters. There have been serious controversies about their accuracy, especially in connection with the 2002 presidential elections.

#### *President*

According to the Law on Election of the President of the Republic of Serbia (passed in 1990, amended in 1992 and 2002) the President is directly elected, by secret voting, for a mandate of five years. The same person can be elected only twice.

The President of the *Narodna skupština* announces elections for the President of the Republic of Serbia. Any legally competent citizen of Serbia, above the age of 18, who has resided in Serbia for at least one year, may be nominated for the President. Political parties and groups of citizens, may submit candidacies, provided that they collect at least 10, 000 signatures for their respective candidates.

A candidate, polling an absolute majority, is considered elected if at least 50 per cent of the eligible voters have taken part in the election. If none of the candidates obtains an absolute majority, voting is repeated in a second round of elections within the next fifteen days. The two candidates with the largest number of votes participate in the second round. If less than 50 per cent of the eligible voters cast their vote, the election is considered invalid, and repeated. The President of the *Narodna Skupština* has to announce repeated elections within 60 days, and the elections must be held no later than 90 days after the announcement. The President of the *Narodna Skupština* performs the function of the president until a new president is elected (Article 87). The law was amended in the autumn 2002 when the 50 per cent turnout requirement was removed for the second round of elections (but retained for the first round).

#### *Sources:*

The Law on the Elections of Representatives, *Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije*, No. 35/2000.

The Law on Electing the President of the Republic, *Službeni glasnik RS*, No. 1/90, 79/92.

The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, *Službeni glasnik RS*, No. 1/1990).

*Politika*, June 14, 2002, No. 31826.

### ***The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro***

The Parliament of the SMN is unicameral, consisting of 126 members, 91 coming from Serbia. For the first term of two years, the representatives were elected indirectly and proportionally (D'Hondt system) to the parliamentary caucuses in the republican parliaments. In the future, the representatives are to be elected directly for a term of four years. The President of the SMN is elected indirectly by the parliament, for a two years term (four years subsequently) by majority vote, upon a proposal submitted by the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Parliament. If the Parliament fails to elect the president twice, the Parliament is dissolved and elections are called.

### ***FR Yugoslavia (1992–2003)***

#### *Federal Parliament*

The *Savezna Skupština* (Federal Assembly) consisted of two chambers: the *Veće Građana* (Council of Citizens; 138 members, 108 members elected in Serbia), and the *Veće Republika* (Council of the Republics; 40 members, 20 from each of the Republics).

Initially, elections for the *Veće Građana* were based on a mixed system (valid in May 1992; 60 members were elected in single-seat constituencies and 78 members by proportional representation). A proportional system has been in use since December 1992. The republican assemblies originally appointed the representatives of the *Veće Republika*, but direct elections were introduced in 2000 (Amendment 3). Until 2003, both chambers of the federal parliament were elected through proportional representation with a five per cent threshold at constituency level in 27 constituencies. Serbia was divided into 26 constituencies, while Montenegro constituted a single constituency. In Serbia, typically 3 to 5 representatives were elected in a single constituency. The President of the FRY called elections for the federal parliament, both houses of which were elected for four-year terms.

In order to be considered valid, electoral lists had to be signed by a minimum of 1,000 voters in constituencies of up to one million voters, and by 2,500 voters in constituencies larger than one million of voters. The seats were apportioned according to the principle of the largest quotient. One third of the seats were assigned according to candidates' place on the electoral list, while two thirds were distributed according to preferences of the list submitter. Mandates could be assigned only to candidates on the list.

#### *Federal president*

Direct and secret elections for the Federal President were introduced by constitutional amendments in 2000. The term was four years, with the possibility of reelection (Amendment 5 of 2000 introduced the possibility of reelection).

Presidential candidates had to be above the age of 18, residents of Yugoslavia and to holders of Yugoslavian citizenship for at least 10 years before the day of submitting the candidacy. Elections for the federal presidency were called by the *Veće građana* of the *Savezna skupština*. Political parties, other political organizations, or groups of citizens may nominate a candidate provided that the candidate enjoys the support of at least 25,000 voter signatures.

A candidate winning a majority of votes cast was considered elected. If none of the candidates obtained a majority, voting had to be repeated in a second round. The two candidates with the largest number of votes (or more candidates in the unlikely event of vote parity) could participate in the second round. No minimum turnout was required.

#### *Sources:*

Amandmani na Ustav Savezne republike Jugoslavije, *Službeni list SRJ*, No. 29, July 6, 2000.

Zakon o izboru i prestanku mandata Predsednika republike, *Službeni list SRJ*, No. 32, July 24, 2000.

Zakon o izboru saveznih poslanika u Veće građana Savezne skupštine, *Službeni list SRJ*, No. 57/93 and 32/2000.

Zakon o izboru saveznih poslanika u Veće republika Savezne skupštine, *Službeni list SRJ*, No. 32, July 24, 2000.

Zakon o izboru poslanika Skupštine Srbije i Crne Gore, *Službeni glasnik*, 10/03.

## APPENDIX 14.5: THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

### *Serbia*

The contemporary constitution dates back to 28 September 1990. It was passed by the one-party Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, elected in 1989. Constitutional and legislative power belongs to the *Narodna Skupština* (National Assembly). The President represents the Republic and symbolizes state unity. Executive power belongs to the Government, while judicial power belongs to the courts. The Constitutional Court assesses the constitutionality of laws and the constitutionality and legality of regulations and other general enactments.

The *Narodna Skupština* is entitled to schedule referenda; to elect the President and the Vice-President of the *Narodna Skupština*; to elect the President, Vice-Presidents and Ministers of the Government; to elect the President and Justices of the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court and other courts; and to elect the Republican Public Prosecutor and Public Prosecutors; to appoint the Governor of the National Bank. The President of the *Narodna Skupština* represents it in the country and abroad, and calls parliamentary and presidential elections. Citizens are also entitled to propose laws, if they have the backing of 15, 000 citizens. Constitutional changes require a two-thirds majority in parliament, and subsequent confirmation in a referendum. Referenda may also be initiated by the public, if the request is supported by 100,000 voters.

The President of the Republic of Serbia (Article 83) nominates a candidate for the position as Prime Minister and candidates for the positions as President and Justices of the Constitutional Court; proclaims laws by decree, and handles the foreign relations of the Republic of Serbia. The President is Head of the Armed Forces in war and peace, and orders general and partial mobilization. The Presidents of the Republics and the President of the FRY are automatically members of the Defence Council. The President can return a law to parliament for reconsideration, but if the law is passed for the second time, it must be promulgated. A two-thirds majority can overrule a presidential veto.

The *Narodna Skupština* can initiate recall proceedings in the event that the President is in violation of the constitution, but only if recall enjoys the support of two thirds of the elected representatives. The President may also be recalled, if more than 50 per cent of the voters vote for recall. If initiated recall proceedings fail, the *Narodna Skupština* is dissolved.

Upon the proposal of the Government, the President of the Republic may dissolve the *Narodna Skupština*. With the dissolution of the *Narodna Skupština*, the Government's mandate is also terminated. In the event of the dissolution of the *Narodna Skupština*, the election for a new *Narodna Skupština* must be held within 60 days of its dissolution. The *Narodna Skupština* may not be dissolved during a state of war, an immediate threat of war or a state of emergency. The *Narodna Skupština* may express non-confidence in the Government or in any of its members. A proposal for a non-confidence vote must be submitted by at least 20 representatives.

The Republic of Serbia includes two Autonomous Provinces – Kosovo and Vojvodina.

### ***The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro***

The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SMN) was established on 4 February 2003, by adoption of the Constitutional Charter of the SMN. The SMN is defined as a federal state consisting of two states, Serbia and Montenegro. The unicameral Parliament of the SMN consists of 126 members, of whom 91 come from Serbia and 35 from Montenegro. For the first term of two years, the representatives were elected indirectly and proportionally to the parliamentary caucuses in the republican parliaments. The Charter stipulates that member states have the right to initiate proceedings for terminating the state union the expiry of a three-year period. If the union continues to exist, the representatives will be elected directly for a term of four years. Parliament makes decision by majority vote, provided that the decision gains the approval of parliamentary majorities in the two member states.

The President of the SMN represents the SMN at home and abroad, chairs the Council of Ministers and runs its activities, nominates candidates for the Council of Ministers, sits on the Supreme Defence Council, proclaims laws passed by the Parliament of the SMN and decrees adopted by the Council of Ministers, and calls elections for the Parliament of the SMN.

The President is elected for a four years term, upon proposal submitted by the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Parliament. If the Parliament fails to elect the president twice, the Parliament is dissolved and new elections are called. The President of the SMN cannot come from the same member state twice in succession, and is accountable to the Parliament. The Parliament may remove the President if he/she has been found to be in breach of the Constitutional Charter.

The Supreme Defence Council acts as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the SMN; it includes the President of the SMN and the presidents of the member states. The Supreme Defence Council takes decisions by consensus.

Executive power is in the hands of the Council of Ministers, headed by the President of the SMN. The Council of Ministers takes decisions by majority vote. In the event of an equal number of votes, the casting vote belongs to the President, provided that at least one minister from the other member state votes in favour of the decision. Ministers are elected for a four-year term, on a list, i.e., not individually. The Council includes the following ministers: the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence (after a period of two years, these ministers have to switch posts with their respective deputies, each coming from another member state than the minister), the Minister for International Economic Cooperation, the Minister for Internal Economic Cooperation, and the Minister for Human and Minority Rights.

Judiciary power is administered through the Court of Serbia and Montenegro, which has an equal number of judges from both member states. The justices are elected for a six-year period by the Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro upon the proposal of the Council of Ministers.

### ***FR Yugoslavia (1992–2003)***

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was established on 27 April 1992. The FRY Constitution was promulgated by the former federal parliament that consisted of representatives of the two republics, Serbia and Montenegro. FRY was defined as a federal state, composed of two federal units, Serbia and Montenegro.

The Federal Assembly was the highest representative and legislative body of the federation. The bicameral assembly comprised the Chamber of Citizens and the Chamber of Republics. The 138-member Chamber of Citizens represented the citizens of Yugoslavia. There were 65,000 voters to every deputy, but each republic was entitled to a minimum of 30 deputies (Article 80). The latter proviso was basically designed for the benefit of Montenegro, the small of the two republics. It ensured that the Chamber of Citizens always included 108 deputies from Serbia and 30 Montenegrin deputies.

The Chamber of Republics consisted of 20 representatives from each republic, representing the interests of the federal units within the federation. The Federal Assembly made decisions in a bicameral procedure, which meant that all decisions had to be harmonized between the two chambers.

Executive power was in the hands of the President of the Republic and the Federal Government. Until 2000, the Federal Government elected the President of the Republic, but the constitutional amendments paved the way for direct elections. The President could be recalled by

a two-thirds majority vote in the Federal Assembly, if the Federal Constitutional Court found that s/he violated the Constitution.

The Federal Government was elected by the Federal Assembly, and formed by a candidate nominated by the President of the Republic. The President of the Republic and the Prime Minister had to be from different republics. Furthermore, the number of ministers from the two republics had to be strictly proportionate. The Federal Government performed the executive power falling in the domain of federal competence, and was responsible to the Federal Assembly. A vote of no confidence in the Federal Government required a majority in both chambers, and the initiative by no fewer than 20 federal deputies of one chamber of the Federal Assembly. The Federal Assembly could be dissolved at the request of the federal government.

The Federation administered judiciary powers through the Federal Court, the Federal Attorney General and the Federal Constitutional Court. The Justices of the Federal Court were appointed (for nine-year terms) and dismissed by the Federal Assembly.

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