ABSTRACT This article offers three theoretical lenses in probing the EU as an international actor in CFSP and ESDP. First, the article reviews the history of CFSP and ESDP and establishes a model of semi-consciousness to explain internal and external impetus for European integration in the second pillar. Then the article goes on to examine multi-level and cross-pillar decision making in the CFSP and ESDP, and the socialization process thereof. In doing so, it attempts to demonstrate that the EU’s bureaucratic interaction is an integral part. Finally, a ‘normative’ power model is applied to account for recent ESDP operations, refute realist/neo-realist arguments in this field and show comparative advantages if one takes the EU as an international actor.

KEY WORDS EU; CFSP; ESDP; international actor; semi-consciousness; socialization process; ‘normative’ power

Introduction

Since the birth of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union’s foreign and security policy has undergone a resurgence compared to the early efforts in the 1950s\(^1\). Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and later operationalized European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) blaze the path so that the European Union (EU) has eventually obtained the capability to make joint actions and adopt common positions.

In explaining such developments within the “second pillar”, scholars and policy makers usually stand in two opposite camps. The liberal suggests that CFSP and ESDP are no more than a functional spillover of economic and social integration with limited options to explore its full potentials(Diedrichs and Jopp 2003; Lindberg 1963), while the realist insists that fear will arise from the Atlantic Alliance due to the ever...
expanding power of the European Union in terms of armed forces and independent positions (Cottrell 1999; Hyde-Price 2006; Posen 2006). Following the realist arguments, one can conclude that further claims to strengthen the CFSP and ESDP should be abandoned as flawed logic. Latent or manifest, however, a shared assumption underlines both analyses that they treat the EU as an international actor in the CFSP and ESDP. This assumption evokes more criticism from recent literature (Princen and Knodt 2003), and it is time to make a comprehensive evaluation through historical process-tracing study.

This article attempts to reframe the question with three new perspectives from which we can benefit if taking the EU as an international actor in CFSP and ESDP. In the following analysis, I identify this approach, which treats the EU as a state-like, organic actor akin to its member states in the policy areas like CFSP and ESDP. This is in contrast to the alternatives, which considers EU’s foreign and defence policy either as a process of intergovernmental bargaining or as a functional object. Possibly my approach here will fuel the debate about the role the EU plays, but I will show its comparative advantages to buttress my argument.

By weighing the relative costs and benefits, this effort is arranged as a three-stage questioning. The first section begins with a discussion whether the EU in CFSP and ESDP constitute an international actor from a historical perspective, emphasizing the EU’s semi-conscious behavior in the evolution of CFSP and ESDP. The article then moves on to examine the multi-level and cross-pillar interactions through a socialization approach, explore the inner structure of decision-making process, and show how these together underpin the EU’s foreign and security policy and make it competent as an independent actor in the international arena.

Finally, the article tackles the issue of whether the CFSP and ESDP pose a realist threat to other major powers, particularly the United States. In response to both academic camps already mentioned, “A normative power” model better accounts for the development of CFSP and ESDP, eliminates confusions and misunderstandings of EU’s intension, and bolsters the key argument of EU’s international role as a useful fiction. In the end, several operations under the ESDP are reviewed as evidence.

**A Historical Review**

With the Cold War over, as is generally accepted, the imminent threat from the Communist bloc which has hung over Europe for more than four decades is lifting.

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2 Cottrell perfectly captures the reasoning behind EU’s pursuit of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. “America is a foreign country and a long way away (although Britons are often blind to the first of those points). However sound transatlantic relations may be at any given time, a prudent Europe cannot pursue a long-term policy of dependence on America, because Europe cannot possibly have any guarantees about the future direction of American policy. Hostility is highly unlikely. Indifference or incomprehension is perfectly possible. So if Europe can provide for its own security, it should do so. And if America approves so much the better.” (Cottrell, 23 October 1999)
Peace will reign among the states and peoples of Europe in the forthcoming years. But why did the EU build up its second pillar and attempt to reach common positions in the very sensitive, frequently interest-diverging areas? From the realist point of view, this effort can be understood as a response to the looming instability in Europe after the Cold War (Mearsheimer 1990). Neo-functionalists hold the belief that the cooperation in the economic and social sectors in the EU offers a driving force for further integration in political and security sphere. Taking the EU as a mechanical object, these competing theories illuminate only part of the story. For the EU, the semi-conscious enterprise toward political integration is more likely rising from EU’s complex and organic governance. Thus both the puzzle and the answer advanced by realism or neo-functionalism might be flawed if one perceives the EU with a diametrically different approach.

In this section, I will discuss whether the EU can be understood as a semi-conscious international actor, rather than an intergovernmental regime in the foreign and security areas. From a historical perspective, the semi-consciousness of the EU represents a deepening and widening trend of EU’s foreign and security policy half as a result of internal promotion and half as a reaction to the external contingencies.

(1) Origins of the CFSP

At the very beginning of the CFSP, several reasons have been drawn to answer “why a Common Foreign Policy” (Mahncke 2004). Apart from the functional explications, I focus more on the contingent events which give rise to the CFSP and ESDP. For the CFSP, two events are most relevant to speed up the process when the First Gulf War ended.

In the first instance, US forces transferred from Germany to the Gulf returned direct to the US in 1991, accelerating an arms reduction of American troops in Europe from 350,000 in 1989 to a target of 100,000 by 1994 (Forster and Wallace 2000). Rather than the concomitant worries of being abandoned within an alliance (Snyder 1984; Walt 1987), the European countries faced a power vacuum after the redeployment of American troops. Such an opportunity, along with the positive effort of the Delor commission, precipitated the process for deeper integration. As a result of these efforts, the Maastricht Treaty and the CFSP came into existence in the end of 1992.

The next issue related to the origin of CFSP is the breakout of the Yugoslav crisis. 1991 witnessed the initial stage of a series of violent conflicts in the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). War started in Slovenia, known as the Ten-Day War, which was first fought to prevent the breakup of Yugoslavia. Prior to the crisis, Yugoslavia held a privileged position with the

3 Considering the US tough commitment to its European alliances during the past 45 years, the European countries has little reason to worry about being abandoned. Moreover, with the dissolution of the potential threat from the Soviet Union, European countries feel less, at least not more, insecure than before. This also leads the European Community to water down their dependence on the US force.
European countries due to its geopolitical importance between the Soviet bloc and the West. So after the American administration clearly signaled its expectation that the European allies should take the lead, the Europeans had eventually, and reluctantly, to dispatch peacekeeping forces under the auspices of the UN. The EC realized its inability to back words with actions from this event, and initiated a ‘pillar’ system in the Luxembourg presidency for the first six months of 1991. This model was finally accepted in the Maastricht treaty and came into force in November 1993.

(2) Incentives for the ESDP

The Maastricht treaty gave birth to the CFSP, which in principle included “the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence” (Art. 17, TEU). Nevertheless, the EU had to request the Western European Union (WEU) to carry out its missions at that time. It is not until the Helsinki European Council of December 1999, that the EU set the Headline Goal and decided to establish new bodies to manage the ESDP.

The Kosovo war, which erupted in between the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty and the opening of the Helsinki meeting, provided a major impetus for the launch the ESDP. Embracing the Balkans as Europe’s backyard, the EU has its security and energy concerns in that region. However, it lacked both the institutions and the capabilities to exert its influence. This insufficiency directly led to the Pörtschach informal European Council in October 1998 and further to the Helsinki Council in 1999.

From an institution-building perspective, the evolution can be split into several steps. First and foremost, the ‘Petersberg tasks’ were literally incorporated in the new Art.17 of Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, thus significantly broadening the scope of CFSP. Then during the Kosovo crisis, France and Britain released a Joint Declaration at St. Malo in 3-4 December 1998 and called on the Union to “have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” (Rutten 2001). Finally, the Helsinki European Council on 10-11 December 1999 set the

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4 As such, the EU gave $4.8bn worth of loans and grants to improve Yugoslav infrastructure in order to stabilize the political vacuum left by the death of Tito between 1985 and 1991. In 1991, over 90 per cent of Yugoslav exports to Europe were tariff free. The EU also decided to lend 730 million euros to the federal government for sensitive infrastructure improvement. See Dover (2005, 303).

5 This defines the WEU, which encompasses those EU members that were also NATO allies, as the European pillar of NATO, with a WEU Rapid Reaction Force based on ‘double-hatted’ NATO and national contributions.

6 As Robert Hunter claims, an implicit reason for the EU to promote ESDP is “the growing sense in Europe that it had not been able to ‘pull its weight’ in the air war then being conducted against Serbia in the Kosovo conflict.” See Hunter (2002, 55).

7 The ‘Petersberg tasks’ were originally stated in the WEU Petersberg declaration of June 1992, and currently reflected in Article 17.2 of the TEU. The missions assigned to the EU military forces refer to “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.” (Art. 17, TEU)
Headline Goal\textsuperscript{8} and established new political and military bodies\textsuperscript{9} within the Council. Thereafter, the ESDP offers a channel to coordinate security-related positions among member states and becomes a part and parcel of EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy\textsuperscript{10}.

Past experiences constitute the main point of reference for future contemplation. The growth of CFSP and ESDP are at all times accompanied by contingent events, first the Yugoslav crisis and subsequently the Kosovo war. In a sense, there are always demands ahead for the EU to deepen its political and security integration. From another point of view, some member states put a high priority on further integration, which in turn unleash major consequences on those who do not. These demand and supply logics intertwined illuminate the essence of EU’s semi-conscious characteristic in its foreign and security policy and account for most of the development of CFSP and ESDP. Thus, the EU \textit{per se} acts more likely as a state, rather than an ambiguous intergovernmental regime in international politics.

**Bureaucratic Bargaining**

When theorizing EU’s external relations, some scholars emphasize the \textit{sui generis} characteristics of EU’s decision making process, its cross-pillar interactions among different hierarchies, and the crucial role member states play in sensitive areas. Based on these observations, they affirm the EU as an incomplete, fragmented and impotent actor and propose a move from actors to processes to understand EU’s foreign policy(Princen and Knodt 2003). This section, in contrast, brings the “actors” perspective back in, given the EU’s multi-level and cross-pillar structure of policy making.

Recent literature has shown a growing interest in intergovernmental bargaining in the EU. However, academic efforts are put either in one specific level of decision making in EU’s foreign and security policy(Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006; Juncos and Pomorska 2006; Lewis 2005) or generally in the bureaucratic bargaining among all policy areas(Allison 1969; Putnam 1988). Useful analytical conceptions have been introduced in the International Relations field, which creates a starting point for

\textsuperscript{8} “Cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks.” Presidency Conclusions II, the European Council, Helsinki. See Rutten (2001, 82).

\textsuperscript{9} These include the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS).

\textsuperscript{10} The Union has continued to improve its civil capabilities in the four priority areas identified at Feira on 19-20 June 2000: “police, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection.” See Rutten (2001, 134). Member states also agreed on a “European Capability Action Plan” at the Brussels Conference on EU Capability Improvement in 19 November 2001, which makes for an enhanced European military capability by rationalizing Member States’ respective defence efforts and increasing the synergy between their national and multinational projects. See Rutten (2002, 98). The ESDP, with the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) at its heart after the Laeken European Council on 14-15 December 2001, is more tangible to implement.
further elaboration.

For the purpose of this study, a concept of ‘socialization’ is specified as “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” (Checkel 2005, 804). In parallel with the concept of semi-consciousness, socialization is described as a way to foster the EU as an international actor. When socialization works, agents may follow the logic of appropriateness, in which conscious instrumental calculation will be replaced by conscious role playing. Agents will act in accordance with expectations – regardless of whether they like the role or agree with it. Even more, the logic of appropriateness may imply that agents follow the community norms as “the right thing to do”, thus according legitimacy to the actions in the social context.\(^\text{11}\)

Employing this logic to the study of CFSP and ESDP will shed light on the interactions among multi-level and cross-pillar decision making, from which bureaucratic bargaining can be viewed as an integral part in the EU.

**1 (1) Multi-Level Decision Making**

Decision making in the CFSP and ESDP is composed of several steps. Appendix 1 summarizes these procedures in general. However, it overlooks the low level of policy making in the Council Working Groups (CWGs), and cannot clearly show the interactions among each hierarchy. Figure 1 overcomes these pitfalls with a relatively concise structure.

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**Figure 1. Multi-Level Decision Making in the CFSP and ESDP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The European Council</th>
<th>The High Representative for the CFSP (HR)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GAERC/HR</td>
<td>COREPER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COREPER</td>
<td>PSC</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>CFSP CWGs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP CWGs</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1 shows that decision-making within the second pillar can be categorized into three levels. Top-level negotiations mainly take place at the European Council or the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). The High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (HR) is also a high-profile head of a burgeoning foreign service\(^\text{12}\). While the function of the HR is exercised by the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers (SG) in assisting the Council and the Presidency within the scope of the CFSP, the HR takes the responsibility to formulate,

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\(^{11}\) See Checkel (2005, 804) and Juncos and Pomorska (2006, 3-4).

\(^{12}\) Although divergence stands out during the discussion of the EU institutional reform as whether to merge the HR and the External Relations Commissioner or abolish the position altogether, conservative thinking remains due to the concern of member states over an expanding power of the commission. See Dassu and Missiroli (2002, 83-84), Ludlow (2001, 18-20).
prepare and implement policy decisions, and when appropriate, acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency through conducting political dialogue with third parties (Art. 26, TEU). Key decisions and contentious issues are always solved at this level.

The second level is the level of decision-making at ambassadors, which comprises the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Before draft CFSP decisions are formally adopted by the GAERC, they are discussed in two fora: first is the PSC and then all issues are put on the agenda of COREPER II. As the Treaty stipulates, the PSC shall “monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the CFSP …monitor the implementation of agreed policies … [and] exercise …political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations.” (Art. 25, TEU) Then all issues subject to Council decision have to be examined in the COREPER II. Taking into account the turf battle within the political committee, there is an agreement between the two bodies. While COREPER is in charge of the institutional, legal, financial and Community aspects of the question on the table, the PSC focuses mainly on the substance and political analysis (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006). These two committees combined constitute a mid-range level of decision making.

The foundation of CFSP and ESDP decision-making is a wide array of Working Groups. For the CFSP, the number of CWGs has grown to 36 (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006), following thematic or geographical lines. With the evolution of ESDP, new CWGs are created for the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) (Juncos and Pomorska 2006). Contrary to the intergovernmentalist prediction, which insists that the indispensable divergence of national interests will handicap most agreements in foreign and security policy, a recent empirical study arrives at a different conclusion. Approximately 70 per cent of the total items in the GAERC agenda and 15-20 per cent in the COREPER has been previously agreed in the CWGs (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006).

It is evident now that this three-level decision-making procedure in the CFSP and ESDP has integrated into an organic part. The interactions among different levels give the chance for its members to play their role and get accustomed to the norms and regulations of their communities. With this incremental progress of socialization, both agenda-setter and agenda-shaper contribute to increasing the possibility of a proposal to be accepted. It is reasonable to emphasize the considerable impact national governments pose upon their representatives in Brussels. In the same manner, the ‘Brusselization’ also shapes national representatives’ interests and identity in a way which facilitates the EU bureaucratic interactions less intergovernmentally.

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13 The PSC is the successor of the Political Committee (PoCo) since 2001, and consists of representatives of the Member States, the Commission member to the PSC and four Council Secretariat members.
(2) Cross-Pillar Decision Making

With regard to the interactions between the CFSP and other pillars of the EU, first it is necessary to state that national governments are still the most essential underpinnings of the CFSP. This by no means indicates that a last say in this area is firmly retained in the hands of member states, rather than that the CFSP is “less a policy than a set of procedures for mutual foreign policy consultation and cooperation” (Mahncke 2004, 28) without commonly perceived interests. However, even in this highly decentralized area, one can somehow identify the “socialization” process from a cross-pillar perspective. Due to the existing rules of the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the Parliament, financing the CFSP and ESDP is just a good case in point.

![Figure 2. CFSP Expenditure 1999-2003](image)

In the first place, the first and second pillars have an interplay regarding the budgetary issue. Originally a distinction between “administrative” expenditures\(^\text{14}\) (charged to the EC budget) and “operational” expenditures\(^\text{15}\) (as enshrined in Art. 28, TEU, and

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\(^{14}\) “Administrative” expenditure can be interpreted quite broadly, thus encompassing such preliminary steps as fact-finding missions, pre-planning, and several civilian aspects. See Dassu and Missiroli (2002, 86).

\(^{15}\) “Operational” expenditure is also charged to the EC budget unless the Council decides otherwise, but for those
Budget Subsection B-8) is laid down to manage the budget of CFSP. In principle, the clear differentiation in terms of military or non-military use constrains a more flexible and interactive CFSP with other building blocs of the EU. As for the actual practice of financing the CFSP, however, there are several grey areas in which operations are funded within the first pillar and under the Community budgetary line for External Relations (Subsection B-7)\textsuperscript{16}. These extra financial resources used in EU’s external relations will all contribute to the management of the second pillar. Hence, the existing rule of game generates a closer association between first and second pillar, gives a chance for EU cross-pillar dynamics and makes the CFSP less insulated than it is assumed to be.

Figure 2\textsuperscript{17} depicts recent development of CFSP expenditure in a more visual way. From 1999 to 2003, the CFSP expenditure has more than doubled. The largest growing part in this area is the Conflict Resolution Verification, Support for the Peace Progress and Stabilization (B8-012), which has more civilian implications thus leaving a broader space of cooperation with the first pillar. Considering the increasing tendency of the CFSP expenditure and the conceiving mission plan for the ESDP operations, the second pillar of the EU is in its own right on the way to becoming an integrated organism. Cross-pillar interaction thus offers an opportunity for the CFSP to pool capability and legitimacy from outside and reconstructs itself through a socialization process.

Another institution CFSP needs to deal with is the European Parliament (EP). Under the terms of the TEU, the Parliament’s role is quite limited. Although “the Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy,” (Art. 21, TEU) the provisions do not entail a right of consultation on all Council CFSP acts(Eeckhout 2004). Actually the hardest competencies of the EP in the conduct of the CFSP are in the budgetary field. As most CFSP operational expenditure is covered by the EC budget\textsuperscript{18}, the Parliament is automatically involved and holds the right to amend the draft CFSP budget. For instance, the European Parliament has progressively reduced the B-8 line to a €30 million in 2002, raised again in 2003 to €47 million to finance the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) – in order to increase its leverage over CFSP compared with the Council and Commission(Missiroli 2003). The EP’s involvement in the CFSP budget control, on the one hand, adds to the intricacy of bureaucratic bargaining. On the other hand it consolidates the democratic legitimacy and accountability, which makes the EU more a state-like actor in CFSP and ESDP.

\begin{footnotesize}
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having military and defense implications it is charged to the member states in accordance with the GNP scale.

\textsuperscript{16} These include such actions as de-mining and DDR (demobilization, disarmament and reintegration), civilian emergency assistance and humanitarian aid, human rights, institution building, election monitoring, consolidation of democracy and the rule of law. See Missiroli (2003, 7-8).

\textsuperscript{17} Data in making this figure is collected from Missiroli (2003, 10). Original Source: European Parliament.

\textsuperscript{18} The administrative expenditure is covered by the Council’s budget and not subject to interference by the EP, according to the so-called Gentlemen’s Agreement between the institutions. See Diedrichs (2004, 4).
\end{footnotesize}
The interactions between the Council, the Commission and the Parliament illustrate that the EU has been socialized toward a complete actor, given the basic rules of game and institutional arrangements. Likewise, the EU’s economic, social and security policies together bolster the whole edifice and make it externally enforceable.

**A New Vision of Power Ambition**

This section looks in closer detail at how to perceive the European security and defense capabilities in an age of U.S. primacy. Does the security aspiration of the EU constitute a realist threat to the U.S., as well as to other major powers? The great discrepancy between EU’s nascent capability in ESDP and the will to become an emerging power casts doubt on the untenable critiques from realist or neorealist school of thought. The reality check serves as a point of reference for deeper scrutinizing the new vision of EU power ambition. From both the Laeken Declaration in 2001 and the European Security Strategy in 2003, one can read the European power ambition anchored as a normative power. Thus the EU military capability is well matched with this kind of power motive, on the basis of which the EU in CFSP and ESDP may be viewed as an actor potent in fulfilling its specific tasks.

The EU, as Ian Manners suggests, represents neither a civilian power nor a military power, “but a normative power of a ideational nature characterized by common principles” (Manners 2000, 29). Following this logic, EU’s normative power is “characterized by its ability to shape standards of common sense” (Ehrhart 2002, 13) and achieve mostly non-military aims. According to Javier Solana:

> CFSP is about Europe making a difference in international politics. It is about the European Union being able to project its values and its interests – the core of its political identity – effectively beyond its own borders.¹⁹

In the same speech, Solana also delivered the political priorities of the CFSP, which are: (1) relations with neighboring countries, (2) relations with a wide array of international organizations and institutions, and (3) relations with a number of major players and actors on the world scene. To these ends, the EU has incrementally established its power ambitions, most explicitly expressed in the Laeken Declaration:

> The role it [EU] has to play is that of a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world's heartrending injustices. In short, a power wanting to change the course of world affairs in such a way as to benefit not just the rich countries but also the poorest. A power seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and

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Tracing the development of ESDP operations from 2003 to 2005\textsuperscript{21}, one can find that only 4 out of 15 missions are carried out with military implications. Most of the rest are police missions, rule of law missions, monitoring missions and assistance missions. Afterwards, a strategy of preventive engagement and effective multilateralism was advocated on 12 December 2003 to address 5 key threats and bring “A Secure Europe in a Better World”.\textsuperscript{22}

The changed context requires different visions of power ambition. Contrary to the excessive worry about EU’s armed forces\textsuperscript{23}(Posen 2006; Sangiovanni 2003), scholars now more focus on the normative dimension of the EU’s military forces(Kaldor and Salmon 2006). Kaldor and Salmon argue that the EU’s new tasks are law-enforcement operations with irregular forces, rather than traditional war-fighting operations. So the role of ESDP should adjust accordingly. This transformation of ESDP happens to illuminate the EU’s role as an international actor in that EU’s military capabilities basically match the goals set in the Laeken Council and the European Security Strategy, which makes the EU eligible as a state-like actor from the normative power vision.

\textbf{Concluding Remarks}

In this article, I probe the EU in CFSP and ESDP from three angles. Historical process-tracing reveals the development of CFSP and ESDP as a semi-conscious evolution half as a result of internal promotion and half as a reaction to external contingencies. The bureaucratic bargaining section perceives the EU from two dimensions – vertically as multi-level decision making and horizontally as cross-pillar decision making. A concept of socialization is applied to analyze the process of reshaping actor’s interests and identity involved in it, which leads to a more organic EU architecture of bureaucratic bargaining. The last section offers a “normative” power vision to understand the CFSP and ESDP developments. From this vision, EU is no more impotent in the security and defense areas due to its changed power ambition. Following these steps, one can draw the conclusion that if the EU is viewed as an international actor, it helps to explain many events in the history of CFSP and ESDP, clarify confusing arguments raised by both intergovernmentalism and neo-realism, and open up the “black box” with a clear-cut map of thinking.


\textsuperscript{21} See Appendix 2. ESDP Operations: Law Enforcement and Human Security.

\textsuperscript{22} These five threats are: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, failed states, regional conflicts and organized crime. See “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy.” Brussels, 12 December 2003.

\textsuperscript{23} 60,000 troops under the Headline Goal and a smaller battle groups of 1,500 troops, which are for rapid deployment to areas crisis. See Kaldor and Salmon (2006, 19).
REFERENCE


Source: Taken from Wallace and Wallace (2000: 476).
## Appendix 2. ESDP Operations: Law Enforcement and Human Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date and Duration</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Joint Action</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Budget (EUR)</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2003.1.1</strong> 3 years</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission (EUPM)</td>
<td>2002/2107/CFSP (2002.3.11)</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>38 million (20 million are financed from the EC budget)</td>
<td>531 police officers</td>
<td>First civilian crisis management; establish local law enforcement capabilities; establish sustainable policing arrangements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2003.3.31</strong> 6 months + 2.5 months of extension</td>
<td>‘Concordia’ military</td>
<td>2003/92/CFSP (2003.1.27)</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)</td>
<td>6.2 million (not include the cost of Proxima, which is 15 million for the first yr)</td>
<td>350 lightly armed military personnel</td>
<td>First military operation; ensuring the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, the political accord which settled the mounting conflict between Macedonian Slavs and Albanians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2003.6.12 -- 2003.9.1</strong></td>
<td>‘Artemis’ military</td>
<td>2003/423/CFSP (2003.6.5)</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>7 million</td>
<td>About 1,800 soldiers, mostly French</td>
<td>First military operation outside Europe and, unlike the other two missions, without the assistance of NATO; prevent a large-scale humanitarian and civil crisis in Ituri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2003.12.15</strong> 1 year + 1 year extension</td>
<td>EUPOL Proxima (EUPM)</td>
<td>2003/681/CFSP (2003.9.29) (FYROM)</td>
<td>15 million</td>
<td>200 police officers</td>
<td>Support, monitor and mentor the consolidation of law and order, the practical implementation of the reform of the Ministry of the Interior, including the police.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2004.7.16 -- 2005.7.14</strong></td>
<td>EUJUST Themis</td>
<td>2004/523/CFSP (2004.6.28)</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2.05 million</td>
<td>9 legal experts</td>
<td>First rule of law mission; confirm the development of new capabilities for the civilian dimension of ESDP; assist the Government of Georgia to reform the criminal justice system and improve legislative procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2004.12.2</strong> 1 year</td>
<td>ALTHEA military</td>
<td>2004/570/CFSP (2004.7.12)</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)</td>
<td>71.7 million (administered by the ATHENA mechanism)</td>
<td>7,000 troops</td>
<td>Guarantee continuous compliance with Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Dayton/Paris Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Initiative or Mission</td>
<td>Instrument/Document</td>
<td>Country/Region</td>
<td>Development Fund (EDF)</td>
<td>Force</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005.7.1 12 months</td>
<td>EUJUST LEX</td>
<td>2005/190/CFSP (2005.3.7)</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>10 million</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>An integrated rule of law mission; provide training for (770) high and mid-level officials; improve the capacity of the Iraqi criminal justice system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005.7.18 6 months</td>
<td>AMIS II</td>
<td>2005/557/CFSP (2005.7.18)</td>
<td>Darfur, Sudan</td>
<td>2.1 million 6 months 1.9 million 6 months</td>
<td>16 police officers, 19 experts</td>
<td>Enhance AMIS to include assistance to confident building, protection of civilian and humanitarian operations and observance of all agreements sign since the N’djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005.9.15 6 months</td>
<td>AMM</td>
<td>2005/643/CFSP (2005.9.9)</td>
<td>Aceh Indonesia</td>
<td>9 million</td>
<td>80 monitors</td>
<td>Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM); monitor the implementation of the MoU signed by the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) on 15 August 2005.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005.11.30 2 years</td>
<td>EUBAM</td>
<td>2005/776/CFSP (2005.11.7)</td>
<td>Moldova/Ukraine</td>
<td>8 million</td>
<td>69 police and customs experts + 50 local support staff</td>
<td>EU border Assistance Mission; provide on-the-job training and advice to Moldovan and Ukrainian officials, reinforcing their capacity to carry out effective border and customs controls and border surveillance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005.12.15 6 months</td>
<td>EUPAT</td>
<td>2005/826/CFSP (2005.11.24)</td>
<td>(FYROM)</td>
<td>1.5 million</td>
<td>30 police advisors</td>
<td>EU Policy Advisory Team; support the development of an efficient and professional police service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006.1.1 3 years</td>
<td>EU COPPS (EUPM)</td>
<td>13696/05/CFSP (2005.11.8)</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>6.1 million first year</td>
<td>33 police and civilian personnel</td>
<td>The EU Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support; assist in the implementation of the Palestinian Civil Police Development Plan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Adapted from Nowak, ed. (2006, 141-142) and Grevi, Lynch and Missiroli (2006, 1-17).