The
Budapest Mind Society aims to bring together researchers in Hungary
with interests in philosophy of mind. The Society organises bimonthly talks
and will sponsor reading groups to examine the latest monographs in philosophy
of mind. Queries: contact Hong Yu Wong at whywong@gmail.com or Istvan Aranyosi
at fphari01@phd.ceu.hu. Fom November 2004, contact Andras Simonyi
at simka@ludens.elte.hu, as he will
organize the meetings.
From November 2004 up to date information
about the Society can be found at:
http://philosophy.elte.hu/bms/
Upcoming Talks
Professor Tim Crane, Philosophy, University College London
"The efficacy of colour, shape and size"
November 10, Wednesday, 2004, 5 PM, Dept. of Philosophy, CEU, Zrínyi utca 14, 4th floor, room 412.
ABSTRACT:
This paper presents an antinomy about the role of properties in causation. If we think of causation in terms of counterfactual dependence, then there is a persuasive case (made, for example, by Stephen Yablo) for thinking that determinable properties (like redness) can be causes. But on the other hand, if we think of properties as the
'truth-makers' for predications, then it is arguable that only determinate properties (maximally specific shades of colour) are causes. But these claims cannot both be true; which should we deny?
Past Talks
Dr. Zoltán Jakab, Cognitive Science, Budapesti Mûszaki és Gazdaságtudományi Egyetem (Technical University Budapest)
"Perceptual content: an objection to externalism"
October 20, 2004, 5 PM, Department of Philosophy, CEU, Zrínyi utca 14, 4th floor, room 412.
ABSTRACT:
I start by arguing for one important difference between visual perception of shape and that of color. Visual representation of shapes is compositional, whereas that of colors is representationally atomic. This difference explains a few other features of visual perception. The first is that shape is absolute whereas color is relative, even though both shapes and colors are reasonably taken to be physical properties. The second is that vision is revelatory with respect to shape and space but it is not revelatory with respect to color. Finally, there is one way in which shape perception is normative, and color perception is not. Shape percepts encode the structure of the corresponding stimuli, and this imposes constraints on which percept can correctly track which stimulus. There is no such constraint in color perception, due to the fact that color percepts are representationally atomic.This picture in turn gives rise to an anti-externalist argument about perceptual content which, in my opinion, is quite compelling.
István Aranyosi, Philosophy, Central European University
"Why Property Dualism drives me Out of My Mind"
September 22, 2004, 5 PM, Department of Philosophy, CEU, Zrínyi utca 14, 4th floor, room 412.
ABSTRACT:
Property Dualism has become a more popular doctrine than substanve dualism. I will analyze the coherence of the property dualist view about disembodiment, according to which the conceivability of disembodiment can coexist with its impossibility. Since the argument for such a view draws largely on Saul Kripke's idea of a posteriori necessity, I will also appeal to it, but in order to show that such a view is incoherent. The puzzle that I find can be solved only by rejecting property dualism and adopting either substance dualism or a certain kind of materialism.
Chalmers, D. J. 2002. Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? In T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.) Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press, pp.145-200.
Kripke, S. 1972. Naming and Necessity. In D. Davidson and G. Harman, (eds.) Semantics of Natural Language, Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 253--355.
Inaugural talk:
Professor Howard Robinson, Philosophy, Central European University
September 17, 2004, 2 PM, Department of Philosophy, CEU, Zrínyi utca 14, 4th floor, room 412.
ABSTRACT:
This talk might have either of two titles. It might be called 'Theknowledge argument and the conceivability of zombies' or, alternatively,'Reduction, supervenience and the a priori sufficiency of the base'.The common factor is the question of what kind of relation a physicalist must think there to be between physical and mental states, and whether, and in what way, he could accept the knowledge argument and still hold on to his physicalism. I shall look at the issue of whether the base should entail states that supervene on it (as Chalmers and Jackson 2001 claim) or whether the relation can be contingent. Those who defend the latter view include Block and Stalnaker 1999, and Balog 1999, in their respective Philosophical Review articles. I shall try also to bring out what I take to be features common to the debates on different kinds of physicalism.
Balog, K. 1999. Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body
problem. Philosophical Review 108:497-528.
Block, N. & Stalnaker, R. 1999. Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the
explanatory gap. Philosophical Review 108:1-46.
Chalmers, D. J. & Frank Jackson. 2001. Conceptual Analysis and
Reductive Explanation. Philosophical Review 110:315-61.
From November 2004 up to date information
about the Society can be found at:
http://philosophy.elte.hu/bms/
Upcoming Talks
Professor Tim Crane, Philosophy, University College London
"The efficacy of colour, shape and size"
November 10, Wednesday, 2004, 5 PM, Dept. of Philosophy, CEU, Zrínyi utca 14, 4th floor, room 412.
ABSTRACT:
This paper presents an antinomy about the role of properties in causation. If we think of causation in terms of counterfactual dependence, then there is a persuasive case (made, for example, by Stephen Yablo) for thinking that determinable properties (like redness) can be causes. But on the other hand, if we think of properties as the
'truth-makers' for predications, then it is arguable that only determinate properties (maximally specific shades of colour) are causes. But these claims cannot both be true; which should we deny?
Past Talks
Dr. Zoltán Jakab, Cognitive Science, Budapesti Mûszaki és Gazdaságtudományi Egyetem (Technical University Budapest)
"Perceptual content: an objection to externalism"
October 20, 2004, 5 PM, Department of Philosophy, CEU, Zrínyi utca 14, 4th floor, room 412.
ABSTRACT:
I start by arguing for one important difference between visual perception of shape and that of color. Visual representation of shapes is compositional, whereas that of colors is representationally atomic. This difference explains a few other features of visual perception. The first is that shape is absolute whereas color is relative, even though both shapes and colors are reasonably taken to be physical properties. The second is that vision is revelatory with respect to shape and space but it is not revelatory with respect to color. Finally, there is one way in which shape perception is normative, and color perception is not. Shape percepts encode the structure of the corresponding stimuli, and this imposes constraints on which percept can correctly track which stimulus. There is no such constraint in color perception, due to the fact that color percepts are representationally atomic.This picture in turn gives rise to an anti-externalist argument about perceptual content which, in my opinion, is quite compelling.
István Aranyosi, Philosophy, Central European University
"Why Property Dualism drives me Out of My Mind"
September 22, 2004, 5 PM, Department of Philosophy, CEU, Zrínyi utca 14, 4th floor, room 412.
ABSTRACT:
Property Dualism has become a more popular doctrine than substanve dualism. I will analyze the coherence of the property dualist view about disembodiment, according to which the conceivability of disembodiment can coexist with its impossibility. Since the argument for such a view draws largely on Saul Kripke's idea of a posteriori necessity, I will also appeal to it, but in order to show that such a view is incoherent. The puzzle that I find can be solved only by rejecting property dualism and adopting either substance dualism or a certain kind of materialism.
Chalmers, D. J. 2002. Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? In T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.) Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press, pp.145-200.
Kripke, S. 1972. Naming and Necessity. In D. Davidson and G. Harman, (eds.) Semantics of Natural Language, Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 253--355.
Inaugural talk:
Professor Howard Robinson, Philosophy, Central European University
September 17, 2004, 2 PM, Department of Philosophy, CEU, Zrínyi utca 14, 4th floor, room 412.
ABSTRACT:
This talk might have either of two titles. It might be called 'Theknowledge argument and the conceivability of zombies' or, alternatively,'Reduction, supervenience and the a priori sufficiency of the base'.The common factor is the question of what kind of relation a physicalist must think there to be between physical and mental states, and whether, and in what way, he could accept the knowledge argument and still hold on to his physicalism. I shall look at the issue of whether the base should entail states that supervene on it (as Chalmers and Jackson 2001 claim) or whether the relation can be contingent. Those who defend the latter view include Block and Stalnaker 1999, and Balog 1999, in their respective Philosophical Review articles. I shall try also to bring out what I take to be features common to the debates on different kinds of physicalism.
Balog, K. 1999. Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body
problem. Philosophical Review 108:497-528.
Block, N. & Stalnaker, R. 1999. Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the
explanatory gap. Philosophical Review 108:1-46.
Chalmers, D. J. & Frank Jackson. 2001. Conceptual Analysis and
Reductive Explanation. Philosophical Review 110:315-61.