

in *International Social Attitudes: The 15th British Social Attitudes Report*, ed. by Roger Jowell *et al.* Aldershot: Dartmouth, pp. 149-71.

X East meets West?

Alan Renwick and Gábor Tóka *

The European Union upon which this Report focuses is by no means fixed. Negotiations have already begun that may see the EU's enlargement to include five post-communist countries in Central Europe by the early years of the 21st century, and it is possible that further expansion into Eastern Europe will occur after that. It is often assumed that such a 'widening' of EU membership will prevent any 'deepening' of the role of the Union within the member states. It is argued that an expanded membership will seriously limit the policy options available to the EU, since members will have increasingly disparate characteristics, giving only the most shallow opportunities for integration.

There are indeed many differences between the prospective and the current member states - but how different are the attitudes and values of their inhabitants? Will enlargement result in increasing diversity of opinion throughout the EU? Or are the views of prospective members not really very different from those expressed within existing EU countries?

Our aims in this chapter are two-fold. First, we shall identify differences in social attitudes between existing EU members and post-communist applicants. Secondly, we shall attempt to explain those differences, assessing, in particular, whether they reflect primarily the legacy of communist rule or stem from other features that differentiate the two areas. We shall also consider whether attitudes within the EU and the applicant countries are likely to converge or not in the future.

The data come from the *International Social Survey Programme* (ISSP) surveys conducted in 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994.** We use data from eight

* Alan Renwick is a PhD student and Gábor Tóka is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Central European University, Budapest.

** See the Introduction and Appendices to this Report for further details about ISSP. WHY IS THIS NOT AN ENDNOTE?

EU countries (Austria, Britain, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the former West Germany), which we take to be representative of all of the EU's member states, although data for all eight are not available for each year. To represent post-communist applicant countries, we use data from five countries, including four that are likely to be in the first round of EU expansion (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia), plus one that may join at a later date (Bulgaria). In addition, data for the former East Germany are included, in order to assess the effect of communism upon the values and attitudes of its citizens.

Our focus will be upon three broad themes - religious values, moral values, and economic values. Under 'moral values' we consider attitudes towards marriage, women and work, sexual permissiveness, and the punitiveness of the legal system. Under 'economic values' we consider attitudes towards left-wing economic policies, income distribution, and concern for the environment.

All our analyses are based upon data relating to several ISSP questions. This is essential as translation difficulties make excessive reliance upon any single question dangerous. The use of several questions also allows us to construct an index for each dimension, which is not only a useful way of summarising respondents' attitudes, but is also likely to prove a more reliable indicator of underlying values than are answers to individual questions.

Why might attitudes differ?

Any differences we find between social attitudes in current EU member states and in post-communist states could fall into one of two categories - those that reflect long-term differences pre-dating the communist era, and those that stem directly from the impact of communist rule itself. This distinction is important since the latter might be expected to disappear quite fast (and, indeed, may already have done so), whereas the former can be expected to be more persistent - perhaps lasting until such time as the level of economic development in the post-communist countries catches up with that found in the EU.

There are two relevant long-term differences that pre-date communism. First, *the level of socio-economic development* in post-communist countries was always (and remains) lower than that in most existing EU states. Secondly, the *religious composition* of their populations is quite distinct. Whereas many of the EU states (particularly the more northerly ones) have substantial Protestant populations, the five post-communist countries in our sample are overwhelmingly Catholic or Orthodox.

Both these differences are associated with particular patterns in social attitudes. For instance, lower socio-economic development and a religious balance skewed towards Catholicism and Orthodoxy rather than Protestantism are likely to be associated with more traditional attitudes when it comes to the role of marriage, law and order, the place of women and

sexual morals.

As regards the legacy of communist rule, we can identify four mechanisms through which it may have had an impact upon current attitudes: those of indoctrination, repression, change in social structure and the post-communist backlash.

Indoctrination was widespread in the communist countries, particularly in the fields of economic policy, egalitarianism and the role of women, leading us to expect more left-wing economic policy attitudes, more favourable attitudes to egalitarianism, and more acceptance of the role of women in the workplace than might otherwise have been the case. It would also be expected to lead to weaker religious beliefs and, because of the emphasis placed on industrial progress, to less concern for the environment.

Repression took place on several fronts. Public debate on many social issues was often suppressed, and the activities of the churches were severely curtailed. The lack of public debate could be expected to lead to slower attitude change over time, to a fossilisation of those traditional values not affected by indoctrination, and thus to a tendency towards conservatism. This needs, however, to be set against the effect of suppressing the churches, which might be expected to weaken the role of traditional moral teachings over such matters as sexual norms and the place of women.

Radical *social change* was deliberately promoted in numerous spheres. For example, the employment of women was both boosted and celebrated, and education levels greatly increased in many communist countries. The greater employment of women could be expected to lead to increased acceptance of a role for women in the workplace, and raised education levels might be expected to have a broad range of liberalising effects.

Finally, it is important to remember that there has also been a substantial *backlash* against communist rule in all of the post-communist countries considered here. The backlash has tended to be strongest in those areas where the message or impact of communism was clearest - so we might expect it to promote inegalitarian views and right-wing attitudes towards economic policy. It may also lead to increasingly anti-authoritarian views on other issues.

Of course, the effects of these different mechanisms upon social attitudes may at times be contradictory. For example, when it comes to religious values, the effect of repressing religious teachings under communism must be weighed against the likely consequences of a backlash against such repression. And while a growth in religiosity after the collapse of communism might promote conservative attitudes towards marriage, these sit uneasily alongside some of the likely effects of social change and an anti-authoritarian backlash.

Examining differences between East and West

Because our aim is to examine differences in values and attitudes between EU and post-communist countries we use some key data at a *national* (rather than individual) level. We do not want to assess, for example, whether a Protestant person has different attitudes from a Catholic person - but whether attitudes in broadly Protestant countries are different from attitudes in generally Catholic countries. So it is the *context* of a Protestant or Catholic (or Orthodox) tradition that is important here, not individuals' religious allegiance.

We have already seen that there are two broad reasons as to why the attitudes of those living in EU and post-communist countries might vary - namely, trends that pre-date communism and the impact of communism itself. To disentangle these explanations our analyses take into account, or 'control for', indicators of two of the key differences that pre-date communism, such that any subsequent differences that we find are more likely to reflect the legacy of communism. To achieve this, we use data relating to two national dimensions, economic development and religion. For each dimension, we have two alternative measures. In the case of economic development, we use either GDP per capita or the average level of education. In the case of religion, we either use a measure relating to the proportion of Protestants within the country or one that reflects the level of church attendance. Any single analysis will include only one of the two measures for each dimension (as the two are so closely related to one another), with our choice in each case being determined by which measure is most closely related to the attitudes under consideration. This is explained in more detail in the appendix to this chapter.

This approach cannot, of course, differentiate perfectly between the effects of communism and any longer-term legacies. Our explanatory measures relating to the latter are clearly not independent of whether the countries have experienced communism. Nevertheless, the procedure does help to differentiate between the various mechanisms through which communist experience may have influenced attitudes.

The results of this approach are presented in tables throughout the chapter. However, in order to account for all the factors at the same time, and to comment adequately on the results, a multivariate (regression) analysis was also conducted, the details of which are described in the appendix to this chapter. The tables also show 'scores' for all the EU members together and for all the post-communist countries together, to show how similar or different the two regions are, as well as a combined score for all the countries considered in the chapter.¹

Traditional religious beliefs

Our index measuring traditional religious beliefs is drawn from five questions dealing with belief in life after death, the devil, heaven, hell and religious miracles asked in the 1991 ISSP survey on religion (the exact question wordings are given in the appendix). The next table shows the average index scores of each country, organised by GDP and national levels of church attendance. In order to make the tables easier to read, the post-communist applicant countries and the former East Germany are shown in italics, while the current EU member states (except the former East Germany) are shown in roman type.

Traditional religious beliefs

Average country index scores by church attendance and GDP²
(higher score = more religious; lower score = less religious)

| 1992 GDP per capita (\$) | High/moderate church attendance | Low church attendance |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 20,000 | W Germany -1.6 | |
| 18,000 | Austria -1.2 | |
| 17,500 | Italy 0.3 | |
| 17,200 | | Netherlands -2.5 |
| 15,900 | | Britain -1.3 |
| 12,000 | Ireland 2.0 | |
| 10,700 | <i>Slovenia</i> -2.8 | |
| 6,500 | | <i>E Germany</i> -5.2 |
| 5,380 | | <i>Hungary</i> -4.0 |
| 4,400 | <i>Poland</i> 1.0 | |

Mean index scores:

| | |
|--|-------|
| Current EU members (excluding E Germany) | - 0.9 |
| Former communist countries (including E Germany) | - 1.6 |
| Combined | - 1.0 |

Note: means are weighted by population size

The table clearly shows that, with the exception of Poland, traditional religious beliefs are rather weak in the post-communist countries. Indeed, the former East Germany and Hungary have the lowest scores of any of the countries considered. Secondly, and unsurprisingly, strength of religious beliefs is associated with average frequency of church attendance, as shown by the fact that those countries in the left hand column tend to have higher scores than those in the right hand column. What is more intriguing is a third finding, that countries with higher GDP tend to have stronger religious beliefs than countries with lower GDP (shown by the fact that countries towards the top of the table have higher scores than countries towards the bottom), contradicting much existing research on the subject (Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere, 1995). This apparent paradox is, however, resolved when the effect of communism is taken into account in the multivariate modelling. The

explanation hinges on the fact that there is an association between low levels of GDP and past experience of communism. It is the *latter* that is linked to the relatively low levels of religiosity, which, in turn, is negatively related to GDP among both post-communist countries and EU member states, when they are considered separately. So the experience of communism appears to have been to reduce traditional religious values, presumably through indoctrination (the ideology of atheism), the repression of the churches, and social change. The backlash against the communist period does not appear to have led to a revival in religious beliefs large enough to reverse this effect of communism.

Overall then, an EU expanded to include post-communist countries would actually cover a population with *weaker* religious beliefs than is now the case. Nevertheless, as is shown by the mean index scores in the table, the effect of this change would be very small once the relative sizes of post-communist countries are taken into account. Most of the post-communist countries, with the exception of Poland, are comparatively small - and it is Poland which stands out as having the strongest religious beliefs of any of the post-communist countries considered.

Moral values

Support for the institution of marriage

The index of support for the institution of marriage is drawn from six questions asked in the 1994 ISSP survey on family and gender roles (the exact question wordings are given in the appendix). The next table shows the average index scores of each country, again arranged by GDP and national levels of church attendance.

Support for marriage

Average country index scores by church attendance and GDP

(higher score = more supportive; lower score = less supportive)

| 1994 GDP per capital (\$) | High/moderate church attendance | Low church attendance |
|------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 19,660 | W Germany -3.1 | |
| 18,580 | | Sweden -4.9 |
| 17,980 | | Britain -2.5 |
| 17,940 | | Netherlands -4.8 |
| 17,500 | Austria -3.6 | |
| 17,180 | Italy -2.3 | |
| 14,060 | Ireland -1.2 | |
| 13,120 | Spain -2.6 | |
| 8,110 | Slovenia -2.8 | |
| 7,350 | | Czech Republic -2.1 |
| 5,950 | | E Germany -3.6 |
| 5,700 | | Hungary -1.9 |
| 4,920 | Poland 0.0 | |
| 3,830 | | Bulgaria 0.6 |

Mean index scores:

| | |
|--|------|
| Current EU members (excluding E Germany) | -2.9 |
| Former communist countries (including E Germany) | -1.3 |
| Combined | -2.5 |

Note: means are weighted by population size

The table shows that support for marriage tends to be greater in the post-communist applicant countries than it is in the existing EU member states, suggesting that the incorporation of these countries into the EU would lead to a strengthening of traditional values in this respect. But it should be said that support is no more than lukewarm in any of the countries we examined (bearing in mind that a score of zero represents a neutral attitude). As we would expect, higher church attendance is associated with more traditional attitudes on marriage, while higher levels of GDP are associated with less traditional attitudes. However, even once these two characteristics are taken into account, the legacy of communism is still found to have a significant (though slight) association with greater traditionalism in attitudes towards marriage. Two plausible explanations for this exist. The first is that a backlash against communism's suppression of church teachings has revived traditional values. However, this is inconsistent with our finding that any such backlash has not been strong enough to reverse the tendency of communism to reduce traditional religious values. More likely is that the repression of social debate during communism has slowed down value change and fossilised those value systems that existed prior to communism.

Women and work

The index for attitudes towards women and work is drawn from six questions asked in the 1994 ISSP survey on family and gender roles (the exact question wordings are given in the appendix). As with the previous tables, we organise our findings by GDP - but this time we refer to the religious composition of the country instead of levels of church attendance (as this proved to have a stronger relationship with attitudes towards women and work).

Attitudes to women and work**Average country index scores by religious composition and GDP**

(higher score = more in favour of working women; lower score = more against working women)

| 1994 GDP per capita (\$) | High % Protestants | Low % Protestants |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| 19,660 | W Germany 0.8 | |
| 18,580 | Sweden 1.9 | |
| 17,980 | Britain 1.8 | |
| 17,940 | Netherlands 1.2 | |
| 17,500 | | Austria 0.9 |
| 17,180 | | Italy -0.5 |
| 14,060 | | Ireland 1.0 |
| 13,120 | | Spain 0.4 |
| 8,110 | | Slovenia -0.5 |
| 7,350 | | Czech Republic -0.9 |
| 5,950 | E Germany 3.3 | |
| 5,700 | | Hungary -1.8 |
| 4,920 | | Poland -0.2 |
| 3,830 | | Bulgaria -1.0 |

Mean index scores

| | |
|--|------|
| Current EU members (excluding E Germany) | 0.8 |
| Former communist countries (including E Germany) | -0.1 |
| Combined | 0.6 |

Note: means are weighted by population size

Once more the post-communist countries (with the notable exception of the former East Germany) are the most conservative in their attitudes, suggesting that enlarging the EU would cause attitudes in the EU as a whole to become more conservative. As one might expect, countries where Protestantism is the dominant religion tend to be more liberal in their attitudes towards the role of women, while predominantly Catholic or Orthodox countries are more traditionalist. Similarly, higher GDP levels are also related to a more liberal view. However, as was the case with attitudes towards marriage, the multivariate analysis shows that differences between current EU members and post-communist countries cannot be explained solely by reference to these factors. The experience of communism also appears to be associated with more traditionalist views, one possibility being that it has tended to impede

value change. This effect has overshadowed any effects of social change and of the declining role of the church.

Sexual permissiveness

To examine attitudes towards sexual permissiveness we consider four questions dealing with the acceptability of various sexual relations asked on the 1994 ISSP survey about family and gender roles (the exact question wordings are given in the appendix). The table shows the average index scores of each country, organised by GDP and levels of church attendance.

Sexual permissiveness

Average country index scores by church attendance and GDP

(higher score = more permissive; lower score = less permissive)

| 1994 GDP per capita (\$) | High/moderate church attendance | Low church attendance |
|-------------------------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| 19,660 | W Germany 0.0 | |
| 18,580 | | Sweden -0.4 |
| 17,980 | | Britain -2.0 |
| 17,940 | | Netherlands 0.5 |
| 17,500 | Austria -1.6 | |
| 17,180 | Italy -2.5 | |
| 14,060 | Ireland -4.5 | |
| 13,120 | Spain -1.6 | |
| 8,110 | Slovenia -1.6 | |
| 7,350 | | Czech Republic -0.2 |
| 5,950 | | E Germany 0.2 |
| 5,700 | | Hungary -2.0 |
| 4,920 | Poland -3.4 | |
| 3,830 | | Bulgaria -3.1 |

Mean index scores:

| | |
|--|------|
| Current EU members (excluding E Germany) | -1.5 |
| Former communist countries (including E Germany) | -2.2 |
| Combined | -1.7 |

Note: means are weighted by population size

The table again shows that the post-communist countries are more conservative when it comes to sexual attitudes than are the existing members of the EU. So the inclusion of these countries in the EU would lead to its covering a slightly more conservative population than is currently the case. Not surprisingly, higher church attendance is associated with more conservatism when it comes to sexual issues, while higher GDP is associated with greater permissiveness.

However, multivariate modelling shows that once church attendance and GDP are taken into account, communism actually has a small *liberalising* effect upon attitudes towards sexuality. In other words, once their levels of church attendance and GDP are taken into account, the communist countries

are slightly *more* liberal when it comes to attitudes towards sex than we would predict. One possible explanation for this could be the weakening of church teachings and the promotion of social change that took place under the previous communist regime (particularly the promotion of education, which tends to be associated with more liberal attitudes in this sphere). An alternative possibility is that such attitudes towards sexuality reflect a backlash against communist authoritarianism, and an embracing of liberal values and behaviour. But neither of these interpretations is easily reconciled with the finding that the experience of communism is linked to traditional attitudes towards marriage and the role of women - it would be arbitrary to give such explanations here where they were rejected in each of the previous cases. Our findings on sexual attitudes can therefore be described only as a paradox that must await further investigation.

Punitiveness of the legal system

For a direct measure of such anti-authoritarianism, we turn to our index of attitudes towards the punitiveness of the legal system. This is derived from two questions about stiffer sentences and the death penalty asked in the 1991 ISSP survey (the exact question wordings are given in the appendix). As was the case when examining attitudes towards women and work, we organise our findings by GDP and the religious composition of the country.

Attitudes on the punitiveness of the legal system

Average country index scores by religious composition and GDP (higher score = more punitive; lower score = less punitive)

| 1991 GDP per capita (\$) | High % Protestants | | Low % Protestants | |
|-------------------------------------|--|-----|--------------------------|-----|
| 20,000 | W Germany | 0.4 | | |
| 18,000 | | | Austria | 0.8 |
| 17,500 | | | Italy | 1.4 |
| 17,200 | Netherlands | 1.1 | | |
| 15,900 | Britain | 1.4 | | |
| 12,000 | | | Ireland | 1.0 |
| 10,700 | | | Slovenia | 1.3 |
| 6,500 | E Germany | 1.3 | | |
| 5,380 | | | Hungary | 2.7 |
| 4,400 | | | Poland | 2.1 |
| Mean index score | | | | |
| | Current EU members (excluding E Germany) | | 1.1 | |
| | Former communist countries (including E Germany) | | 2.0 | |
| | Combined | | 1.3 | |

Note: means are weighted by population size

Once again, the post-communist countries tend to be more conservative than the existing members of the European Union, with populations in the post-

communist countries being significantly more likely to favour stiffer sentencing and the use of the death penalty than are those in existing EU member states. This is partly explained by the religious composition of the post-communist countries and by their lower GDP levels - the Catholic and Orthodox churches have more punitive attitudes than do the Protestant churches, and lower GDP levels are also associated with stronger punitivism. In fact, multivariate analysis shows that once GDP and religion are taken into account, the effect of communism is actually a *liberalising* one - as was the case with attitudes towards sexuality. Unlike in the case of sexuality, however, an explanation for the present findings does present itself - namely, that a backlash against communism - specifically, against communist authoritarianism - affects attitudes towards punitivism while having no direct effect upon attitudes to marriage, the role of women or sexuality. Of particular relevance here is the fact that opposition to the excessively heavy hand of the law was an important element of the opposition to communist rule during the 1980s. The data we use were collected in 1991, at a time when the liberal backlash against communist authoritarianism was particularly strong. Circumstantial evidence suggests that subsequent experience of rising crime has led to the development of more punitive attitudes.

Moral values - East and West

We have considered four attitude dimensions that relate to moral values - attitudes towards marriage, women and work, sexuality and the punitiveness of the legal system. In all four cases we find that post-communist countries are more conservative than the existing EU member states. Consequently, the enlargement of the EU would tend to cause attitudes in the EU as a whole to become more conservative, although this effect would be muted by the relatively small populations in the countries we are considering here.

In all cases, a substantial amount of the variation we found is due to socio-economic and religious differences between post-communist and EU countries. It is true that these characteristics do, to a certain degree, reflect the policies of the communist era. But they are also the product of trends that substantially pre-date that period. Their importance suggests that differences between East and West in Europe are deep-rooted, and that they are certainly not merely short-term reflections of a communist past. In fact, when it comes to attitudes towards sexuality and the punitiveness of the legal system, communism appears to have produced a degree of convergence between EU countries and post-communist countries.

When we look in detail at the effect of communism on attitudes and values, once levels of economic development and religious difference are taken into account, the picture is rather contradictory. In two respects (attitudes towards the role of marriage and towards women and work) communism appears to have reinforced conservative attitudes. But in the other two respects (attitudes towards sexuality and towards the punitiveness of the legal system) communism seems to have promoted liberalism. It is not difficult to

provide plausible explanations for each of these findings - the various mechanisms through which communism might be expected to influence attitudes often work in opposite directions, making it easy to explain almost any result that is reached. The difficulty is, of course, that it is unsatisfactorily *ad hoc* to suggest that one mechanism may have been more influential with respect to one attitudinal dimension, and another mechanism of greater significance to another, unless we are able to provide a theoretical justification for these differences.

One such theoretically grounded explanation for the liberalising effect of communism on attitudes to punishment is that this reflects a backlash against communist authoritarianism and the heavy hand of the law. It is more paradoxical, however, why communism should apparently have had a permissive effect upon sexual attitudes while seemingly promoting conservatism in respect of both marriage and the role of women. We might in particular expect that attitudes relating to marriage and sexual behaviour would follow similar patterns. Why attitudes on sexual issues fail to follow what is apparently the general trend is a paradox that cannot be satisfactorily explained without further research.

Economic values

Support for left-wing economic policies

Our index on support for left-wing economic policies is drawn from two questions about whether private enterprise is the best way to solve a country's economic problems and about the responsibility of government to reduce income differences, both of which were included in the 1993 ISSP survey (the exact question wordings are given in the appendix). Preliminary analysis suggested that the best two explanatory factors were GDP and church attendance.

Support for left-wing economic policies

Average country index scores by church attendance and GDP
(higher score = more left-wing; lower score = more right-wing)

| 1993 GDP per capita (\$) | High/moderate church attendance | Low church attendance |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 19400 | W Germany | -0.3 |
| 17200 | | Netherlands |
| 17000 | | Britain |
| 16700 | Italy | 0.1 |
| 13100 | Ireland | 0.5 |
| 12700 | Spain | 0.3 |
| 7600 | <i>Slovenia</i> | 0.5 |
| 7200 | | <i>Czech Republic</i> |
| 6300 | | <i>E Germany</i> |
| 5500 | | <i>Hungary</i> |
| 4680 | <i>Poland</i> | 0.8 |
| 3800 | | <i>Bulgaria</i> |

Mean index scores:

| | |
|--|-----|
| EU members (excluding E Germany) | 0.1 |
| Former communist countries (including E Germany) | 0.6 |
| Combined | 0.2 |

Note: means are weighted by population size

As the table shows, support for left-wing economic policies is significantly stronger in the post-communist countries than it is in the existing EU member states. Consequently, an EU *including* the five applicant countries considered here would, in economic terms, be more left-wing than that of today.

As with other studies (for example, Haller, Höllinger and Raubal, 1990; Knutsen, 1995; Roller, 1995), we find that higher GDP is associated with greater support for right-wing economic policies. Higher church attendance, meanwhile, is associated with greater support for left-wing policies, though this effect is not statistically significant. Once differences in GDP and church attendance are taken into account, however, the effect of communism is to promote *right-wing* attitudes on economic policy. Although it would seem at first glance that communist policies succeeded in producing populations that are unusually left-wing in their economic attitudes, this is not, in fact, the case. Rather, the left-wing orientation of these countries is better explained by other factors (particularly their lower GDP). While we might expect communist rule and the social changes it fostered to have promoted attitudes favouring more left-wing economic policies, what we find here is clear evidence of a backlash against communist rule, a popular rejection of communist policies and the espousal of more market-oriented economic strategies.

It might be pointed out that the data used for this index were collected in 1993 - during the early years of post-communism, when right-wing parties were elected to governmental office in almost all of the countries under

consideration. Attitudes on economic policy have been highly volatile in these countries during the 1990s, with early enthusiasm for the market later being followed, at least on the mass level, by a shift to more statist views on matters of economic policy (Markowski and Tóka, 1995; Mateju and Vlachova, 1997). Nevertheless, most of this leftward shift seems to have occurred before rather than after the 1993 ISSP surveys were conducted. As a result, it is likely that our findings do indeed have lasting significance.

Income redistribution

The index on income redistribution or economic egalitarianism is developed from four questions asked in the 1992 ISSP survey (the exact question wordings are given in the appendix). Rather than GDP (used in the previous tables), educational attainment emerged as the best measure relating to socio-economic development, and so the table is organised by this as well as by levels of church attendance.

Support for income redistribution

Average country index scores by church attendance and educational level

(higher score = more in favour of income redistribution; lower scores = more against income redistribution)

| Educational attainment* | High/moderate church attendance | Low church attendance | |
|--------------------------------|--|------------------------------|-----|
| 66 | | <i>Czechoslovakia</i> | 1.6 |
| 65 | | Britain | 2.2 |
| 65 | <i>Slovenia</i> | | 2.0 |
| 64 | | Sweden | 0.7 |
| 60 | <i>Poland</i> | | 1.5 |
| 59 | | <i>Bulgaria</i> | 3.1 |
| 57 | | <i>E Germany</i> | 3.8 |
| 56 | Austria | | 2.3 |
| 56 | W Germany | | 2.1 |
| 55 | | <i>Hungary</i> | 2.5 |
| 53 | Italy | | 2.2 |

Mean index scores

| | |
|--|-----|
| EU members (excluding E Germany) | 2.1 |
| Former communist countries (including E Germany) | 2.2 |
| Combined | 2.2 |

Note: means are weighted by population size

* Educational attainment is measured for each individual and then a country 'mean' score calculated. The higher the score, the higher the level of educational attainment reached. For further details see the appendix to this chapter.

The post-communist countries show very slightly higher levels of egalitarianism than the existing members of the EU. This effect is strengthened when levels of church attendance and educational attainment are

taken into account (as high levels in both are associated with lower levels of support for egalitarianism). Here, in contrast with support for left-wing economic policies, the evidence is that communist ideology and indoctrination have indeed had a lasting impact on attitudes in the countries concerned, making them more egalitarian than one would otherwise expect. This apparent conflict in findings is not as implausible as it might seem at first. While our index of support for left-wing economic policies is geared towards the specificities of the economic order, our measure of support for income redistribution is concerned more with the broad principles by which the economy operates. And it was the *governments* of the communist countries and their *specific policies* that were considered to have failed in the last years of communist rule, not the general goal of a more egalitarian world. Indeed, many of the anti-Communist reformers in the region during the 1980s advocated a 'third way' in economic policy that was built upon strongly egalitarian principles.

Concern for the environment

The index on concern for the environment is drawn from four questions asked in the 1993 ISSP survey (the exact question wordings are given in the appendix). Preliminary analysis suggested that the best two explanatory factors were GDP and religious composition.

Environmental concerns

Average country index scores by religious composition and GDP

(higher score = more environmentalist; lower score = less environmentalist)

| 1993 GDP per capita (\$) | High % of Protestants | | Low % of Protestants | |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|------|-----------------------------|------|
| 19400 | W Germany | 0.8 | | |
| 17200 | Netherlands | 1.3 | | |
| 17000 | Britain | 0.1 | | |
| 16700 | | | Italy | 0.3 |
| 13100 | | | Ireland | -1.8 |
| 12700 | | | Spain | 0.6 |
| 7600 | | | <i>Slovenia</i> | -0.1 |
| 7200 | | | <i>Czech Republic</i> | -1.4 |
| 6300 | <i>E Germany</i> | -0.8 | | |
| 5500 | | | <i>Hungary</i> | -2.2 |
| 4680 | | | <i>Poland</i> | -0.5 |

| | | |
|--|-----------------|------|
| 3800 | <i>Bulgaria</i> | -0.1 |
| Mean index score | | |
| EU members (excluding E Germany) | | 0.5 |
| Former communist countries (including E Germany) | | -0.9 |
| Combined | | 0.2 |

Note: means are weighted by population size

As the table shows, the populations of the post-communist countries are considerably less concerned about the environment than those in the EU. As would be predicted, high levels of GDP are strongly related to environmental concern. Rather more curiously, we find that largely Protestant countries exhibit lower levels of environmental concern than do predominantly Catholic or Orthodox countries.

The multivariate analysis shows that the low levels of environmental concern in the post-communist countries can be explained in part by the lower levels of material well-being seen in those countries, but that this is not sufficient to explain all of the difference between the regions. Two possible explanations present themselves. One is that current attitudes reflect communist indoctrination, and that the view that it is acceptable to pursue industrial progress at the cost of environmental damage is one that has taken hold among the populations of these countries. However, the importance of environmental issues within the anti-Communist movements of the 1980s suggests that this explanation may not be entirely plausible. An alternative explanation is that the low level of environmental concern in these countries is a short-term product of the severe economic recessions that they have undergone during the 1990s. It is highly plausible that environmental concern will fluctuate strongly with the economic cycle, as perceptions of personal material well-being change (Taylor, 1997). Given the severity of the downturn that has been experienced in the post-communist region during the early 1990s, it is hardly surprising that the levels of environmental concern found should be lower than would be predicted simply on the basis of levels of GDP.

Economic values - East and West

Our findings suggest that, while the economic policies of communism have been rejected, its ultimate goal of egalitarianism continues to be strongly held. Many of the post-communist applicant countries are more egalitarian in this respect than existing members of the EU, and they appear to be economically more left-wing only before their low income levels are taken into account. They also display less concern for the environment than do the current EU member states, reflecting their lower levels of material well-being and the severe recessions that they have recently undergone.

Conclusions

What do these findings tell us about the likely impact of the EU's eastward expansion on social attitudes within the EU as a whole? Although various differences in attitudes between the existing member states and the post-communist applicants have been identified, there are many reasons for thinking that we should not exaggerate the impact of enlargement on mass opinion within the EU.

First, most attitude differences occur within, not between, the borders of individual countries. In trying to account for the difference between two people's attitudes, the country they are from matters far less than other characteristics (such as age or educational attainment). Only in the case of traditional religious beliefs does country make a substantial difference.

Furthermore, in most cases only a small fraction of the difference between countries reflects the communist legacy. In most respects the post-communist countries differ just as much among themselves as do current EU member states. Only when it comes to environmental concern, attitudes towards punishment, and support for left wing economics does having a communist past appear to account for a substantial percentage of the difference in attitudes between countries (accounting for a third or more of this variation, which, it is worth stressing once more, is dwarfed by the magnitude of within-country variation). This suggests that the impact of communism on public attitudes was limited, and that no single generic type of communism ever really existed.

It is likely that the already small gap between attitudes in the post-communist countries and the existing EU member states will decrease further as a consequence both of EU enlargement and the currently high rates of economic growth in Eastern Europe. An additional reason for attitude change in the post-communist countries may be the fact that attitudes are less 'crystallised' in these countries - where there has been little free public debate - and may thus be more likely to change once such debate occurs. This can be tested by examining the extent to which responses to different questions about a similar subject are coherent (or correlate) with one another. If attitudes are clearly crystallised we would expect to find high levels of correlation. And average correlations are indeed lower in post-communist countries than in the EU countries for all but two of the eight sets of attitude questions we examine. The exceptions to this concern attitudes to do with traditional religious beliefs (on which there has been as little public debate in the post-war West as in the East) and support for left-wing economic policies (which have been the subject of very intense public contestation in nearly all East European countries since the late eighties).

Finally, when it comes to attitudes towards economic policy issues, generational replacement may also serve to reduce any discrepancy between East and West. In our EU member states we found no relationship between age and attitudes towards economic policy (with the exception of the Netherlands, where the young are more left-wing). In contrast, in our post-communist countries, the young are significantly more right-wing than average

in their attitudes towards economic policy issues. This is hardly surprising - those less exposed to communist ideology and more affected by any post-communist backlash might be expected to be more right-wing than those in older cohorts. Consequently, as these generations gradually replace older ones, the gap between EU and post-communist states might be expected to diminish still further. This is not the case for any of the other attitudes and values explored in this chapter (where the differences between EU and non-EU nations in the relationship of attitudes to age is minimal).

Social attitudes in post-communist countries do indeed differ from those held by current EU members. Post-communist states are morally more conservative and economically more left-wing and egalitarian than the current EU member states, and they are characterised by less concern for the environment. To a large degree, this simply reflects differences between the two areas in their levels of socio-economic development and in the nature of religiosity. However, it also reflects the direct legacy of the communist experience, with the repression of social debate under communism leading to the fossilisation of existing, traditional moral values. Only when other, stronger, forces are at work does it seem that the overall impact of communist experience and the subsequent post-communist backlash has been to promote liberalism. And, while communist ideology appears to have had a lasting effect through its promotion of egalitarian values, it has also led to a considerable backlash against left-wing economic policies.

Although clear differences exist between the attitudes of East and West, these must not be exaggerated. Indeed, there is reason to believe that these differences are already in decline, reflecting generational attitude change, economic progress and the rejuvenation of social debate in the post-communist world.

Notes

1. When calculating the overall mean index scores we weighted each country by its population size in order to allow the assessment of the potential effects of enlargement to be understood. Given that most of the applicant countries have small populations, the impact of their admittance on EU-wide attitudes would clearly be over-estimated were this weighting not carried out.
2. All GDP figures are for purchasing power parity.

References

- Haller, M., Höllinger, F., and Raubal, O. (1990), 'Leviathan or welfare state? The role of government in six advanced Western nations' in Alwin, D., Becker, J., Davis, J., Haller, M., Höllinger, F., Jowell, R., Küchler, M., Morrow, B., Raubal, O. and Smith, T. *Attitudes to Inequality and the Role of Government*, Rijswijk: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau.
- Jagodzinski, W., and Dobbelaere, K. (1995), 'Secularization and church religiosity' in Deth, J., and Scarbrough, E. (eds.), *Beliefs in Government Volume Four: The Impact of Values*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Knutsen, O. (1995), 'Left-right materialist value orientation' in Deth, J., and Scarbrough, E. (eds.), *Beliefs in Government Volume Four: The Impact of Values*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Markowski, R., and Tóka, G. (1995), 'Left turn in Hungary and Poland five years after the collapse of communism' *Sisyphus: Social Studies* **1 (IX 1993)**, 75-100.
- Mateju, P., and Vlachova, K. (1997), 'The crystallisation of political attitudes and political spectrum in the Czech Republic' *Working Papers of the Research Project 'Social Trends' 9/1997*, Prague: Institute of Sociology.
- Roller, E. (1995), 'Socioeconomic equality - one goal of the welfare state' in Borre, O., and Scarbrough, E. (eds.), *Beliefs in Government Volume Three: The Scope of Government*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Taylor, B. (1997), 'Green in word ...', in Jowell, R., Curtice, J., Park, A., Brook, L., Thomson, K. and Bryson, C. (eds), *British Social Attitudes: the 14th Report*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

Appendix

The regression analyses referred to in the text were run using pooled cross-national data sets. In addition to using standard country-specific weights where necessary, data for each country were weighted to correspond to that country's total population in the period around 1993. Respondents with missing values (i.e. no, or 'can't say' responses) on any of the variables used to construct the attitude index in question were left out of the respective analysis.

Independent variables

The impact of communism was assessed by regressing the attitude indices on a dummy variable called Communism, which distinguished between former communist and other countries (coded as 1 and 0, respectively) and the predicted country means of the attitude indices (called Predicted) derived from a previous regression of the given attitude index on two independent variables. These two independent variables were:

- *either* GDP per capita
or the mean level of education in the population aged 25 years or older, and
- *either* average frequency of church attendance in the adult population
or the percentage of Protestants among adults belonging to a Christian church.

In the case of the religious composition, we make the choice on the basis of the measure that has the highest correlation with that attitude scale. The choice between GDP and education is slightly more complicated: GDP is strongly (negatively) correlated with whether a country has experienced communism, so any correlation between GDP and the attitude scale scores may in fact be spurious, being caused by the correlations of communism itself with both GDP and attitudes. GDP is therefore preferred to education only if it shows a higher correlation with the attitude scale than education *and* the sign of this correlation is the same in both the post-communist and the current-EU parts of the sample.

These variables were obtained as follows:

GDP per capita: purchasing power parity figures as reported in the annual editions of the CIA World Fact Book. This source is the only one available to us that gives comparable figures for Eastern and Western Europe. Since GDP estimates based on purchasing power parity are not available for 1991, 1992 GDP figures are used in the analysis of the 1991 ISSP data.

Average education levels are taken from the last pre-1995 ISSP data set available for each country. Level of education was recoded as 0=none, 25=incomplete primary, 50=at least primary completed, 75=at least secondary completed, 100=university degree.

Church attendance is taken from the last pre-1995 ISSP data set available for each country. Frequency of church attendance was recoded as 100=at least once a week, 67=1-3 times a month, 33=less frequently, 0=never.

Proportion of Protestants (among adults belonging to a Christian church) is taken from the last pre-1995 ISSP data set available for each country.

The country means of these variables were then used as independent variables in our regression analyses.

Dependent variables

The attitude indices are based on the summation of the responses to several different

questions and were all scaled so that an index value of 0 expresses a neutral attitude - for instance that the respondent answered all questions with the 'neither agree nor disagree' response option, or that on the various questions he or she signalled exactly as many times a positive as a negative attitude towards the given attitude object. The higher the value a respondent has on an index, the more positive attitudes he or she has towards the issue in question.

The **traditional religious beliefs** index was constructed as $12.5 - V34 - V35 - V36 - V37 - V38$, where the variables come from the 1991 data set and record responses to the following questions using a four-point scale (1=definitely yes; 2=probably yes; 3=probably not; 4=definitely not):

- Do you believe in ...*
 [V34] ... *life after death?*
 [V35] ... *the Devil?*
 [V36] ... *in Heaven?*
 [V37] ... *in Hell?*
 [V38] ... *in religious miracles?*

The index thus runs from +7.5 (most religious) to -7.5 (least religious).

The **marriage** index was constructed as $V25 + V26 + V27 - V19 - V22 - V23$, where the variables come from the 1994 data set and record responses to the following questions using the same five-point agree-disagree scale (1=agree strongly; 2=agree; 3=neither agree nor disagree; 4=disagree; 5= disagree strongly):

- Do you agree or disagree that ...*
 [V19] ... *married people are generally happier than unmarried people?*
 [V22] ... *it is better to have a bad marriage than no marriage at all?*
 [V23] ... *people who want children ought to get married?*
 [V25] ... *it is all right for a couple to live together without intending to get married?*
 [V26] ... *it is a good idea for a couple who intend to get married to live together first?*
 [V27] ... *divorce is usually the best solution when a couple can't seem to work out their marriage problems?*

The index thus runs from +12 (most pro-marriage) to -12 (least pro-marriage).

The **women and work** index was constructed as $V5 + V6 + V7 + V8 - V4 - V9 - 6$, where V5 to V9 are variables in the 1994 data set and record responses to the following questions on a five-point agree-disagree scale (1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=neither agree nor disagree; 4=disagree; 5=strongly disagree):

- Do you agree or disagree that ...*
 [V4] ... *a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work?*
 [V5] ... *that a pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works?*
 [V6] ... *that all in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job?*
 [V7] ... *that a job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children?*
 [V8] ... *that being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay?*
 [V9] ... *that having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person?*

The index thus runs from +12 (most in favour of working women) to -12 (most against working women). (NOTE: LAST LINE HERE CHANGED)

The **sexual permissiveness** index was constructed as $V45 + V46 + V47 + V48 - 12$, where the variables come from the 1994 data set and record responses to the following questions using a five-point scale (1=always wrong; 2=almost always wrong; 3=it depends - this response option was only offered in Spain; 4= wrong only sometimes; 5=not wrong at all):

[V45] Do you think it is wrong or not wrong if a man and a woman have sexual relations before marriage?

[V46] What if they are in their early teens, say under 16 years old, in that case is it ...

[V47] What about a married person having sexual relations with someone other than his or her husband or wife, is it ...

[V48] And what about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex, is it ...

The index thus runs from +8 (most permissive) to -8 (least permissive).

The **punitiveness** index was constructed as $6 - V7 - V8$, where the variables come from the 1991 data set and record responses to the following questions on a five-point agree-disagree scale (1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=neither agree nor disagree; 4=disagree; 5=strongly disagree):

Here are some measures to deal with crime. Some people are in favour of them while others are against them. Do you agree or disagree that ...

[V7] ... criminals should be given stiffer sentences?

[V8] ... people convicted of murder should be subject to the death penalty?

The index thus runs from +4 (most punitive) to -4 (least punitive).

The **support for left-wing economic policies** index was constructed as $V5 - V6$, where the variables come from the 1993 data set and record responses to the following questions using a five-point agree-disagree scale (1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=neither agree nor disagree; 4=disagree; 5=strongly disagree):

How much do you agree or disagree with each of these statements?

[V5] Private enterprise is the best way to solve <the respondent's country's> economic problems.

[V6] It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.

The index thus runs from +4 (left-wing) to -4 (right-wing).

The **income redistribution** index was constructed as $V23 + V24 - V56 - V57$, where the variables come from the 1992 data set and record responses to the following questions using a five-point agree-disagree scale (1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=neither agree nor disagree; 4=disagree; 5=strongly disagree):

Please show how much you agree or disagree with each statement ...

[V23] ... Large differences in income are necessary for <the respondent's country's> prosperity.

[V24] ... Allowing business to make good profits is the best way to improve everyone's standard of living.

[V56] ... Differences in income in <the respondent's country> are too large.

[V57] ... It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.

The index thus runs from +8 (most pro income redistribution) to -8 (most anti income redistribution).

The **concern for the environment** index was constructed as $6 + V13 - V24 - V25 - V26$, where the variables come from the 1993 data set and record responses to the following questions using the same five-point agree-disagree scale for V13 and a different scale for variables V24 to V26 (where 1=very willing; 2=fairly willing; 3=neither willing nor unwilling; 4=fairly unwilling; 5=very unwilling):

Please tick one box [respond using the card] for each of these statements to show how much you agree or disagree with it.

[V13] We worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about prices and jobs today.

How willing would you be ...

[V24] ... to pay much higher prices in order to protect the environment?

[V25] ... to pay much higher taxes in order to protect the environment?

[V26] ... to accept cuts in your standard of living in order to protect the environment?

The index thus runs from +8 (most environmentalist) to -8 (least environmentalist).

Regression analyses of the contextual determinants of social attitudes

The table entries below are metric regression coefficients. Each dependent variable was regressed first on two independent variables (either GDP per capita or average educational level and either the proportion of Protestants or mean church attendance rate in the respective countries). The predicted value of the dependent variable derived from this equation became, alongside a dummy variable distinguishing between former communist and other countries, one of the independent variables in the second regression. The two initial independent variables and the Communism dummy entered the third equation simultaneously.

| Dependent variable: | GDP per capita | Educ level | Independent variables: | | | Predicted value | Communism | Adj R ² | N (un-weighted) |
|---------------------|----------------|------------|------------------------|---------------|--------|-----------------|-----------|--------------------|-----------------|
| | | | Protes-tants | Church attend | | | | | |
| RelBeli | .086** | - | - | .085** | - | - | .091 | 9785 | |
| RelBeli | - | - | - | - | .987** | -.393** | .092 | 9785 | |
| RelBeli | -.237** | - | - | .081** | - | -4.36** | .104 | 9785 | |
| Marriage | -.118** | - | - | .032** | - | - | .044 | 15606 | |
| Marriage | - | - | - | - | .958** | .128 | .045 | 15606 | |
| Marriage | -.072** | - | - | .033** | - | .611** | .045 | 15606 | |
| PermSex | .054** | - | - | -.045** | - | - | .045 | 13957 | |
| PermSex | - | - | - | - | 1.04** | .188* | .045 | 13957 | |
| PermSex | .153** | - | - | -.042** | - | 1.29** | .047 | 13957 | |
| WomWork | .030** | - | .026** | - | - | - | .048 | 16231 | |
| WomWork | - | - | - | - | .965** | -.272** | .049 | 16231 | |
| WomWork | -.178** | - | .031** | - | - | -2.64** | .054 | 16231 | |
| Punish | -.088** | - | -.003** | - | - | - | .061 | 11308 | |
| Punish | - | - | - | - | 2.09** | -1.39** | .070 | 11308 | |
| Punish | -.213** | - | -.003** | - | - | -1.72** | .072 | 11308 | |
| LeftEcon | -.055** | - | - | .001 | - | - | .031 | 12405 | |
| LeftEcon | - | - | - | - | 1.85** | -.634** | .035 | 12405 | |
| LeftEcon | -.113** | - | - | -.001 | - | -.749** | .035 | 12405 | |
| Egalitar | - | -.078** | - | -.024** | - | - | .020 | 10952 | |
| Egalitar | - | - | - | - | 1.12** | .371** | .023 | 10952 | |
| Egalitar | - | -.089** | - | -.027** | - | .373** | .023 | 10952 | |
| Environ | .117** | - | -.004** | - | - | - | .027 | 12671 | |
| Environ | - | - | - | - | .542** | -.666** | .028 | 12671 | |
| Environ | .062** | - | -.003** | - | - | -.691** | .028 | 12671 | |

* = significant at 5% level

** = significant at 1% level