

A Bargaining Theory of Minority Demands: Explaining the Dog that Did not Bite in 1990s Yugoslavia

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This article develops a general theory of bargaining between a minority, its host state, and outside lobby actor to explain why minorities shift their demands from affirmative action to cultural autonomy to secessionism and back, often in the absence of clear economic or security incentives. This paper uses a simple game tree model to show that if a minority believes that it enjoys significant support from a powerful national homeland or other external actor, it radicalized its demands against the host state, *even if the center has credibly committed to protect minority rights*. Conversely, if a minority believes that it enjoys no external support, then it will accommodate the host state, *even in the presence of significant majority repression*. As a general theory of claim-making, this model challenges structural theories of demands that rely on static economic differences or historical grievances to explain claim-making. It also challenges security dilemma arguments that hold that minority radicalization is mainly a function of ethnic fears. The model's hypotheses are tested using longitudinal analysis of Hungarians in Vojvodina during the 1990s, as the Yugoslav dog that "barked but did not bite." Careful examination of claim-making in this case demonstrates the superior explanatory power of the ethnic bargaining model as compared with dominant theories of minority mobilization in the literature.

Recent trends in violent conflict demonstrate the need for a general theory of group claim-making.¹ Over the last decade, only eight of 110 armed conflicts were fought between states; most of the remaining wars were waged between minorities and their state governments over claims of self-determination (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 2000). From the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to the Sri Lankan Tamils in the Indian Ocean; from the Chechen separatists in Russia to the Taiwanese facing off against China; from the Kashmiris sandwiched between two belligerent South Asian states to the Albanian Kosovars in Yugoslavia; from the newly independent East Timor to the periodically secessionist Acehnese in Indonesia, resistance movements routinely use terrorism and guerilla warfare to achieve

Author's note: I am grateful to colleagues at the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of the paper. I would also like to thank Barry Weingast, David Primo, and Barry O'Neill who helped me refine the model in an earlier stage of development; thanks are also due to Patrick James and three anonymous reviewers at ISQ for useful substantive and presentational criticism.

¹ Group "demands" or "claims" are defined here as calls made (a) by legitimate representatives of an ethnically defined community (b) against the state or local government (c) for goods that may be collectively enjoyed by the community.

national self-determination for the minorities they claim to represent. Without established protocols for ending sub-state violence, such conflicts can drag on for years or even decades, as seen in Sudan, Ethiopia, Angola, Northern Ireland, and Cyprus.

This phenomenon has clear implications for international security. States racked by sub-state conflict are at great risk for becoming “failed” or “failing.” They may then become hosts of terrorist networks; conduits of narcotics, human, and illegal weapons trafficking; laboratories for infectious diseases; and nurseries for insurgents, mercenaries, and international crime syndicates. If one accepts that (1) the successful resolution of majority–minority conflicts necessitates an understanding of the proclaimed *stakes* of these conflicts, and (2), that the stakes of these conflicts consist mainly of minority demands, then the field of security studies would benefit immeasurably from a theory that explains *shifts* in these demands, which correspond directly to the intensity of ethnic violence.

This paper introduces a simple model that explains shifts in minority claims—from affirmative action to regional autonomy to secession and back—as a function of ethnic bargaining between minorities, their host governments and outside lobby actors. The argument proceeds as follows. Part II reviews the existing literature on group demands, identifying “ethnic fears” as the most promising contender. Part III presents the theory of ethnic bargaining. Part IV offers a preliminary test of the bargaining theory using the case study of ethnic Hungarian claims in Vojvodina during the 1990s. Process-tracing is used to identify shifts in Belgrade’s and Budapest’s stance toward the minority; I then determine whether there was a corresponding shift in Hungarian minority claims in the predicted direction. Part V uses the claims of Vojvodinian Hungarians to test the ethnic bargaining model against alternative theories for relative explanatory power. The case of Vojvodina serves as a useful plausibility probe for this theory for at least two reasons. First, economic factors, ancient hatreds, and ethnic fears all make strong predictions concerning radicalization in this case, yielding testable hypotheses that can be used to evaluate competing theories of claim-making. Second, as the Balkan dog that “barked but did not bite”—contrary to widely held expectations—this case contains important clues as to how third party mediators can effectively lower the probability of violent conflict in high risk zones. Part VI then suggests how the ethnic bargaining model might be extended to (1) conflicts outside Europe, (2) violent conflicts, and (3) conflicts with different actor configurations in order to test its viability as a general theory of minority demands. The paper concludes that the management of such conflicts requires *de-triangulating* ethnic bargaining relations into more tractable disputes between the minority and the center, on one hand, and the host and lobby states, on the other.

Existing Explanations of Minority Demands

The literature on minority claim-making is vast, particularly with respect to secessionism and irredentism. Theories of group claims may be divided into structural and dynamic variants. In the first variant, *primordialist* or essentialist arguments posit that groups with a distinctive national identity will ultimately seek independence on the basis of a perceived right to national self-determination.² A second set of structural arguments hold that *group traits*, including size and territorial compactness, may galvanize support for secessionist agendas. Van Evera hypothesizes that groups that may be easily “rescued” by their homeland states will not seek secession because their very ease of rescue deters host states from discriminating

² For examples of primordialist arguments, see Shils (1957) and Geertz (1963). While *essentialists* acknowledge the social constructedness of ethnic identities, they hold that such identities are both persistent over time and central to social organization. See Connor (1994) for an example of this latter approach.

against them. Similarly, groups for whom ethnic rescue is impossible—because they are either too small or sparsely populated—also will not pursue secessionism because of the infeasibility of such goals. However, if ethnic rescue is *possible but difficult*—as when the minority is separated from its homeland state by “enemy” territory or when there is significant ethnic intermingling on the local level—rescuers have an incentive “to jump through any windows of opportunity that arise” (Posen, 1993:108–109; Van Evera, 1994:40–41). A third set of structural arguments holds that *economic disparities* between the minority and center give rise to group demands for secessionism or irredentism.³ Finally, a fourth set posits that *institutions of autonomy* serve to “construct” nations, creating focal points around which independence movements gather momentum when the center weakens.⁴ Explanations of claim-making that rely on structural factors are useful in shedding light upon *which* minorities are at risk of pursuing extremist agendas. However, they ultimately fail to account for claim-making itself. This is because underlying group traits are both long-standing and slow to change and therefore cannot account for the often rapid fluctuations in minority demands over time. An understanding of *shifts* in minority claims requires a *dynamic* theory of claim-making.

Among dynamic or processual theories, *instrumentalism* posits that elites generate popular support for extremist demands when they stand to gain personally from doing so, thus identifying a causal mechanism for claim-making.⁵ Unfortunately, there are both empirical and logical problems with instrumentalist accounts. For one thing, elites can be seen to “play the ethnic card” with varying degrees of success, suggesting the impact of ethnic entrepreneurs is crucially constrained by the popular resonance of their message. Indeed the rate with which leaders reinvent themselves in response to public opinion—as well as the fact that “nationalizing” elites routinely fall in and out of political favor—casts doubt on the causal power that leaders *themselves* wield in ethnic mobilization. More problematically, leadership theories run the risk of logical tautology when generating predictions about radicalization. To illustrate, instrumentalist arguments sometimes hold that opportunistic elites “play the ethnic card” in order to ward off domestic challenges to their leadership. When will they face such challenges? When other opportunistic leaders emerge who are willing to “play the ethnic card” to gain popular support.⁶ Even if they do not begin and end with opportunistic or extremist leaders, such accounts still beg the question as to *why* the “ethnic card” is so useful in achieving political power in the first place. Because the majority can no longer commit to protect the minority? Because of changes in external or internal political pressures? In either case, the emergence of nationalizing elites would then be a by-product of more *fundamental* drivers of ethnic conflict that catapult these elites, and their agendas onto political center stage.

Ethnic fears or grievance theories of ethnic conflict stand as the most plausible accounts of claim-making in the existing literature. One variant holds that ethnic groups mobilize in response to the internal security dilemma brought about by state collapse. Credible commitment theories posit that minorities pursue secession when the center or majority cannot commit to offering something better in a unitary

³ There are two opposite predictions in the political economy literature on secessionism. The first argues that regions or minorities economically *advantaged* relative to the center will attempt to secede in order to avoid making net transfer payments to the center (see Gourevitch, 1979; Treisman, 1997). The second posits that regions or minorities economically *disadvantaged* relative to the state or dominant group attempt to secede in order to avoid victimization and marginalization by the center (see Hechter, 1975; Gellner, 1983: Chs. 6, 7).

⁴ For *institutionalist* accounts of secessionism, see Suny (1993), Slezkine (1994), and Cornell (2002).

⁵ These theories hold that individual leaders mobilize populations around ethnic agendas in order to gain political power or territory, or to maintain power when they are in danger of being “ethnically outbid” by extremists or when domestic or international changes threaten to remove them from office. See, for example, Brass (1974), Gagnon (1994/1995), Tishkov (1996), and de Figueiredo and Weingast (1999).

⁶ This “ethnic outbidding” argument was made most famously by Shepsle and Rabushka (1972).

state.⁷ Grievance theories, in turn, argue that minorities suffering serious discrimination will mobilize around collective demands such as secessionism or irredentism once they obtain the resources to do so.⁸ Ethnic fears arguments are superior to alternative accounts because they (1) generate clear predictions concerning radicalization, (2) can explain shifts in group demands in a way that the structural theories cannot, (3) do not suffer from the logical tautology of instrumentalism. Their major shortcoming as an overall theory of claim-making is that they focus overly on *defensive* motivations, which is just one side of the cost-benefit decision-making calculus. In games—as in politics, and war—competitive interaction involves mixed motives of opportunism, and fear. To address this imbalance, this paper will present a model that synthesizes defensive, and offensive motives in the context of strategic interaction between the minority, and center in order to generate more accurate predictions concerning minority claim-making.

The Logic of Ethnic Bargaining

Following Brubaker (1996), I posit that a national minority, the state majority, and the minority's lobby state (or actor) co-exist in a "triadic" political space. Although this conceptualization requires thinking about these players as "unitary," in reality they are anything but—usually consisting of a wide spectrum of individual leaders, interest groups, and political parties who regularly compete for representation within, and of each "player." To the extent that this internal competition takes place in the context of a larger minority-majority-lobbyist political nexus, I argue that it is useful to begin with this larger abstraction.⁹ Doing so is in fact the only way to formulate hypotheses concerning the ways in which perceived *shifts in power relations* between the minority, majority, and outside lobby actor lead more or less radical voices to gain political dominance within the minority rank, and file, causing the minority *as a whole* to appear more or less radicalized over time (see Figure 1). To be clear, although the model below treats these actors as unitary, the terms "minority," "majority," and "lobby actor" only serve as short-hand to indicate the *dominant* actions, and preferences of each player.

The dependent variable in this model is *minority radicalization*, which is measured along a continuum of demands against the center (see Figure 2). Although there is almost never perfect unanimity among the minority rank and file over *which* demand to seek, a dominant preference can usually be discerned. In this formulation, a minority can be said to "make" a particular demand if that demand is sought by the party or political leader who (a) gained a plurality of minority votes in the most recent elections, or (b) is the recognized legitimate representative of the minority. Here, minority demands are meaningful primarily in so far as they constitute a challenge to the existing state. Demands are ordered along this continuum of challenge from (1) moderate claims of affirmative action, (2) demands for linguistic or cultural autonomy, (3) goals of regional autonomy, to (4) the most extreme demands of secession or irredentism.¹⁰ It is hypothesized here that *group demands*

⁷ See especially Fearon (1998), Weingast (1998), and Weingast and de Figueiredo (1999).

⁸ Prominent grievance theories of ethnic conflict include Moore and Jagers (1990), Gurr (1993), Gurr and Moore (1997), Davenport (2000), and Fox (2000).

⁹ There is a vast and growing literature on the link between ethnic conflict and international politics. See in particular Suhrke and Noble (1977), Heraclides (1991), Morgan and Campbell (1991), Cooper and Berdal (1993), Carment and James (1995), Davis and Moore (1997), Saideman (1997), Lake and Rothchild (1998) and Saideman (2001). I hope to contribute to this literature by explaining shifts in minority demands over time as a response to both internal and external factors.

¹⁰ Here, *secession* and *irredentism* represent the most extreme demands, as they challenge the very existence of the majority-controlled state. Demands for *regional autonomy* are less extreme since they assert power-sharing in the territory of "minority regions," while leaving state borders unchallenged. Claims of *cultural or linguistic autonomy* are more moderate still, since they call for power sharing in the realm of culture and education, while leaving unchallenged majority control over politico-territorial institutions. The most moderate claims include *affirmative action*,




FIG. 1. The Bargaining Model




FIG. 2. Dependent Variable: Extremity of Group Claims

mainly serve to indicate the minority's position as claimant to state institutions. To illustrate, when a minority abandons demands for "regional" or "territorial" autonomy in favor of demands for "cultural" autonomy, a minority signifies that it has *de-radicalized* its challenge against the center. If the minority then exchanges these demands for "secession" or "irredentism," it is understood to have *intensified* its challenge against the center.¹¹ The minority rank and file mobilize in support of leaders who make claims that reflect the perceived power differential between the minority and majority at any given time. In this context, group demands are meaningful mainly as indicators of the minority's legitimate position along the spectrum of state control.¹²

since they aim at *integrating* into the majority-controlled state, rather than achieving explicit power sharing between the minority and majority. See Ayres (2001) for a similar ordering of minority demands.

¹¹There is both theoretical and empirical support for ordering group claims along such a continuum. Donald Horowitz (1991: 13) notes that "[g]roups (and states) are not born irredentist or secessionist. They can and do move back and forth from integrated participation in the state of which they are a part to a posture of secession or irredentism." Others, too, have commented on the "convertibility" or "mutability" of minority demands from regional autonomy to secessionism, pointing out that shifts in demands are largely a function of strategic considerations as minorities negotiate their status with the center (Chazan, 1991: 144–149). In the course of negotiations, secessionist claims can be, and often are, bought off through cooptation, power-sharing agreements and other political or economic concessions.

¹²By arguing that group claims serve as bargaining chips, I do not mean to suggest that members of the minority are not also interested in *attaining* these goals. However, the fact that groups shift their demands rapidly over time, sometimes abandoning these demands in return for economic concessions, indicates that there is a powerful strategic component to minority claim-making.

A. The Ideal World—Bargaining with Complete Information

If minority radicalization is driven by perceptions of relative power between the minority and majority, how do these perceptions come about? On the most basic level, beliefs about minority leverage are a function of group traits, including size and territorial compactness. It is reasonable to assume that the larger the minority is relative to the state, the greater the minority's ability to exit or alter the state framework. The minority's *absolute* size may matter as well, since small groups are unlikely to mount extreme demands for political independence because of the fact that they are too weak to defend themselves militarily. *Territorial concentration* is also expected to limit the extremity of group demands. It may be that political independence is only sought by highly compact groups, because of the fact that dispersed groups are insufficiently integrated—both economically and politically—to make credible claims for statehood. In general, structural traits are both transparent and relatively constant and therefore serve as *base indicators* of minority leverage against the center.¹³

However, group traits tell only part of the story. While size and compactness place *limits* on group leverage—and therefore the demands they may credibly advance against the center—they do not predict when or even if a minority is likely to push these limits. It therefore stands to reason that *sudden shifts* in the minority's perceived leverage are driven not by its structural traits (which remain relatively constant) but by shifting beliefs concerning the *intentions* of the other players toward the minority. These in turn are a function of (1) signals of support by the minority's lobby actor, and (2) indications of repressive intent by the minority's host state. In sum, radicalization of minority demands is a function of minority beliefs concerning the capacity and preferences of the other players.

The ethnic bargaining model assumes that the minority makes the first move at the outset of state transition (see Figure 3). This is because the majority has already made an offer to the minority in the course of transition by altering existing state institutions or creating new ones. Faced with a new "ethnic contract," the minority has the first move and can choose to either rebel against or submit to the new institutions. The majority moves next and can either challenge the minority or back down. Ethnic bargaining is a sequential game, and so the majority must wait until the minority makes its move. It should be remembered in this context that the *moves themselves* are valuable under the logic of ethnic bargaining, since minority claims and majority counter-claims are the stuff of politicking in divided societies—they are the means by which leaders gain and maintain the support of their ethnic constituencies. Both players therefore have an incentive to move down the game tree rather than reach a settlement at the outset of the game.

Before making its move, the minority must ascertain the intentions of the other players. In this model, the players include the minority's host government and the state with which it identifies ethnically. I assume that the majority is either repressive (R) or non-repressive (\sim R), and that the lobby state is either supportive (S) or non-supportive (\sim S). Figure 4 depicts the four combinations of these types, yielding four possible "states of the world." The minority's decision whether to radicalize depends on which state of the world it believes it is in.¹⁴ Assuming the minority has

¹³For arguments on the correlation between group size and secessionism, see Alesina and Spolaore (1997: 1027–1056), Freidman (1997: 59–77), Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1997), and Wittman (1998). Toft (2003) was the first to use the minorities at risk data to identify a positive correlation between territorial concentration and ethnic rebellion. Fearon and Laitin (1999) and Saideman and Ayres (2000) also find a correlation between geographical concentration and secessionism in their analysis of the MAR dataset, although they find no significant link between group size and secessionism.

¹⁴I assume that the minority prefers concessions to equal treatment at the outset of state transition due to its heightened vulnerability vis-à-vis the majority during this time.




FIG. 3. The Extended Game Form

complete information concerning the other players' types, the logic governing minority behavior in each of the four states is as follows.

State of Conflict (Repressive Majority and Supportive Lobby State)

This combination of types is the most likely to lead to inter-communal violence. Here, the minority's outside lobby state has both the incentive and capacity to intervene on behalf of its co-ethnics over the border, while a repressive majority gains more from "violating" the minority than it does from granting the minority concessions. In this state of the world, the minority can expect repression if it chooses to accommodate the majority. If the minority instead radicalizes its demands, the majority will either grant the minority concessions or meet the minority's challenge with warfare. Since a supportive lobby state can be expected to intervene in the event of inter-ethnic war, the repressive majority is likely to back down, and grant the minority concessions. *Because the minority prefers concessions to repression, the minority can be expected to radicalize its demands to receive concessions in State 1 of the world.* The danger here is that the audience costs to a repressive majority of backing down may begin to outweigh the costs of granting minority concessions, even given the risk of outside intervention. If the minority is unaware of this, it may radicalize to receive concessions but instead find itself locked into war with the center. This combination of types is therefore most likely to lead to inter-ethnic warfare.

		MAJORITY	
		R	~R
LOBBY ACTOR	S	1 Radicalize State of Conflict	2 Radicalize State of Opportunity
	~S	3 Accommodate State of Vulnerability	4 Accommodate State of Peace

FIG. 4. Minority Behavior in Four Possible States of the World

State of Opportunity (Non-repressive Majority and Supportive Lobby State)

The minority is in an optimal bargaining position in this state of the world. This is because a non-repressive majority prefers to make concessions to the minority in order to reap the rewards of inter-ethnic harmony. The minority, for its part, enjoys the support of a lobby state willing to intervene on its behalf. The minority therefore has a choice between two attractive outcomes. If the group accommodates the majority, the center can be expected to refrain from repressing the minority, yielding a liberal society. If the minority instead radicalizes, the center should offer concessions since the group enjoys the backing of a strong lobby state. *Since the minority prefers concessions to no concessions at the outset of state formation, it is likely to radicalize to obtain concessions.*

State of Vulnerability (Repressive Majority and Non-Supportive Lobby State)

The minority has the *least* amount of bargaining power in the third state of the world. Since a repressive majority prefers exploitation to a liberal society, the minority can expect repression if it accommodates the majority. If the minority instead radicalizes, it faces annihilation because of its lack of outside support. The minority therefore chooses the lesser of the two evils. *Since it prefers repression to the devastating costs of military defeat, the minority is likely to accommodate the majority and endure repression.* Politics in such societies are very often ethnicized because of rampant minority discrimination. These minorities are likely to remain mobilized even if their weakness deters them from making any overt challenge to the center.

State of Peace (Non-Repressive Majority and Non-Supportive Lobby State)

This state of the world represents the greatest opportunity for inter-ethnic peace. This is because a non-repressive majority prefers an egalitarian society to minority exploitation. Consequently, if the minority accommodates the center, it can expect a liberal society. However, the majority will not back down in the face of minority radicalization, since challenging an unsupported minority is less costly than granting the minority concessions. The minority can therefore expect war if it chooses to radicalize against the center. *Since the minority prefers a liberal society to the costs of debilitating warfare, it is likely to accommodate the majority, yielding inter-ethnic peace.*

The Real World: Bargaining with Uncertainty

These equilibria hold when the minority knows which of the four states it is in. In the real world, however, the minority must make its decisions under considerable uncertainty. It must therefore infer the likely intentions of the other players on the basis of their *actions*. Moreover, since host, and lobby state governments have incentives to misrepresent their preferences in their official statements, the minority cannot rely on their representatives to reveal their true intentions. *As a consequence, the minority can never know for sure which of the four states it is in.* The minority therefore uses “signals” from its host and lobby actors to reduce this uncertainty.

Signals and Cues

In the context of ethnic bargaining, *signals* will refer to both intentional and unintentional signs that communicate certain preferences.¹⁵ The minority uses the signals it receives from the other two players in order to update its beliefs concerning the state of the world it is in. The more credible the signal, the more certain the minority is concerning the prevailing state of the world.¹⁶ What follows is a list of the types of signals host and lobby states send, ranked in order of credibility.

1. *Official Statements.* Public statements by government officials or political leaders are among the *least* credible signals of state intentions. Because such statements are easy to make, they may be little more than empty rhetoric or bluffing devices. Official statements do have *some* credibility, however, since governments incur audience costs by reneging on their public commitments.
2. *Historical Precedent.* Historical precedents are more credible than official statements not only because actions speak louder than words, but also because past behavior is a reliable predictor of future behavior. Policies also bind a state to a future set of actions. A minority may infer *shifts* in host and lobby state preferences by observing shifts in policies toward the minority.
3. *Policy Guarantees.* Policy guarantees are perhaps the most credible signs of state intentions, as they are both difficult to achieve and costly to violate. As such, they constitute *credible commitments* on the part of a host or lobby state to adhere to a particular policy. These include signing onto international treaties that have strict monitoring and enforcement devices.

Minorities rely on these signals to infer the preferences of their host and lobby states with ascending degrees of certainty. In doing so, a minority alters its beliefs concerning the prevailing state of the world, which may lead it to alter its strategy vis-à-vis the center. Since the minority is continually updating its beliefs concerning the prevailing preferences of its bargaining partners, minority radicalization *fluctuates* over time so that a society—once driven by ethnic violence—may rapidly become a model of inter-ethnic co-habitation, and vice versa.

Equilibrium Behavior in an Uncertain World

I now solve for minority behavior in the real world, where there is incomplete information concerning players' intentions. This is done by comparing the minority's expected utility over two possible actions: radicalization and accommodation. The expected utility of each action is the weighted sum of the *value* of each possible outcome multiplied by the *probability* that that outcome will occur. The minority's

¹⁵A sign is defined as follows: X is a sign of Y if X is evidence for Y and Y caused X. For example, high fever is a sign of sickness, since high fever is an indication of sickness and sickness causes high fever. A person's high fever does not provide *definitive* proof that the person is sick. The presence of a high fever does, however, increase the estimated probability that this is the case.

¹⁶A signal is credible when it commits the host or lobby state to a certain set of actions.

expected utility of radicalizing is as follows:

$$EU_m(\text{RAD}) = p_2\text{CON} + (1 - p_2)\text{WAR} \quad (1)$$

In words, this means that the value to the minority of radicalizing is equal to the value of receiving Concessions multiplied by the probability that its lobby state is supportive *plus* the expected value of War multiplied by the probability that the minority's lobby state is *not* supportive. In contrast, the expected utility to the minority of accommodating is:

$$EU_m(\text{ACC}) = p_1\text{REP} + (1 - p_1)\text{LIB} \quad (2)$$

This is a weighted sum of the value of Liberal Society multiplied by the probability that the majority is non-repressive plus the value of Repression multiplied by the probability that the majority is repressive. *The minority is likely to radicalize when the following inequality holds:*

$$EU_m(\text{RAD}) > EU_m(\text{ACC}) \quad (3)$$

As the probability that the minority's lobby state is supportive (p_2) increases, the probability of obtaining concessions through radicalization also increases (see equation (1)). This in turn increases the expected utility of radicalization (left side of equation (3)). Similarly, as the probability that the majority is repressive (p_1) increases, the probability that the minority will be repressed if it accommodates likewise increases. This *decreases* the minority's expected utility of accommodation (the right side of equation (3)). In sum, expectations concerning majority repression as well as external support jointly determine the minority's expected value of accommodation versus radicalization. Assigning concrete values to the preference orderings given in Figure 3 allows us to solve for critical probabilities of p_1 and p_2 , above which the minority should choose radicalization.¹⁷

Figure 5 indicates that as the lobby actor appears increasingly supportive, the majority must appear increasingly *non-repressive* for the minority to continue to choose accommodation over radicalization. This suggests the following hypothesis concerning minority behavior:

H1: *If the minority is certain that its lobby state or actor is non-supportive, the minority is likely to accommodate no matter how repressive the majority.*

On the other hand, even if the majority is perceived to be absolutely non-repressive, the minority may still radicalize so long as the probability that its lobby actor is supportive is at least 2/3. This yields a second hypothesis:

H2: *Once a minority believes beyond a certain level of probability that its lobby state is supportive, it should radicalize to obtain concessions regardless of majority guarantees of protection.*

In sum, the external lobbyist has a greater influence on a minority claim-making than does the majority. This goes against existing arguments that *domestic* factors are the most important determinants of minority rebellion.¹⁸ At the same time, it is consistent with the observation that external intervention often exacerbates

¹⁷I obtain these critical probabilities by assigning numerical values to the minority's preference ordering given in Figure 3 and then solving simultaneously. I set these values as follows: Concessions = 4; Liberal Society = 3; Repression = 2; and War = 1.

¹⁸Numerous scholars have focused on *domestic* causes of minority rebellion. Posen (1993), Fearon (1998), Weingast (1998), and de Figueiredo and Weingast (1999) generally hold that the inability of the majority to commit to protect the minority create incentives for the minority to mobilize for secession. Others argue that political or economic discrimination is among the crucial determinants of minority rebellion. See, for example, Horowitz (1985, Ch. 6), Moore and Jagers (1990), Gurr (1993), Gurr and Moore (1997), Davenport (2000), and Gurr (2000).




FIG. 5. Comparative Statics of Minority Behavior

conflicts between minorities and majorities in divided societies.¹⁹ The first of these hypotheses will now be tested using longitudinal analysis of minority claim-making in Vojvodina throughout the 1990s. In this case, the minority is the ethnic Hungarians, the majority is the Yugoslav government, and the external lobby actor is Hungary—the state with which the minority identifies ethnically.

The Evidence: Hungarian Claims In 1990s Yugoslavia


Brief History of Vojvodina

Hungarians, the largest ethnic minority in Vojvodina, are the descendants of Magyar tribes who invaded the Danube Basin and the Pannonian plain between the seventh and ninth centuries (see Map 1). The region had been part of the Kingdom of Hungary for many centuries when it was conquered by the Turks in the 1500s. After the Austrians gained control of Vojvodina in the early eighteenth century, the region was incorporated into the Habsburg Empire and re-settled with non-Hungarians in order to prevent re-Magyarization of the region (Korhecz, 2000:2).²⁰ This, together with the in-migration of Slavs and others following the collapse of Turkish rule, resulted in ethnic Hungarians gradually going from majority to minority status in Vojvodina. There were considerable tensions between the Hungarians and other groups throughout the nineteenth century, culminating in the armed uprising of national minorities against Hungarians in the 1848 revolutions. Following the *Ausgleich* of 1867, harsh assimilationist policies were imposed on minorities throughout the kingdom, giving rise to the myth of “millennial Magyar crime of national repression,” a belief that lives on to this day (Borsody, 1992:19). After World War I, Vojvodina was detached from Hungary and awarded to the multi-national Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes, which later became known as Yugoslavia. The region was subject to centralized rule by Belgrade during the interwar period, during which time Vojvodina enjoyed no autonomy. After the German invasion in 1941, Yugoslavia was dismembered and much of the territory of Vojvodina was occupied by Hungary—an outcome welcomed by Hungarians in the region (Friedman, 1982:64).

The postwar Yugoslav government adopted a Soviet-style constitution that established Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, Slovenian, Montenegrin, and Macedonian Republics under a strong federal government. The Autonomous Province of

¹⁹See, for example, Betts (1994: 20–33). Kuperman (2001) also warns about the unintended consequences of external intervention on behalf of beleaguered minorities, arguing it may even lead to harsher minority repression. Similarly, Saideman and Ayres (2000), Jenne (2001), and Fearon and Laitin (2003) note a statistical correlation between foreign patronage and minority demands for secession or irredentism. In contrast, Van Evera (1994: 40–41) and Houten (1998) argue that an active and powerful lobby state may actually *forestall* minority secessionism by deterring the majority from overt discrimination.

²⁰Like Kosovo, Vojvodina was a major center of Serbian nation-building during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Serbian refugees from the Ottoman Empire flooded into Serbian academies, monasteries, and cultural societies that sprang up to protect a nascent Serbian culture (Friedman, 1982: 62–63).



MAP 1. Ethnic Composition of Former Yugoslavia

Vojvodina and the Autonomous Region of Kosovo-Metohija were given separate status within the Serbian Republic. Although the regional authorities were vested with the power to enact provincial laws, set social plans, elect judges, and pass legislation in their respective territories, the early postwar period was one of Serbian centralization—Vojvodina and Kosovo autonomy existed on paper only.²¹ This state of affairs continued more-or-less until the mid-1960s, when a series of constitutional amendments upgraded the status of Kosovo and Vojvodina to that of quasi-republics; the 1974 Constitution granted them the same rights, privileges, and responsibilities as the six republics. Relations between the Hungarians and Serbs in Vojvodina remained more-or-less harmonious under Josip Broz Tito's policies of ethnic appeasement. Following Tito's death in 1980, however, Serbia's communist leaders began to assert greater dominance over the federal government and within Serbia itself, particularly once Slobodan Milošević assumed leadership of the Serbian Communist Party in 1986.

1989–1992: Hungarian Demands Accelerate

In October 1988, Milošević ordered the removal of Vojvodina's "pro-autonomist" provincial assembly. The heads of schools and cultural organizations, as well as the courts, law enforcement, and other administrative posts in majority Hungarian districts were replaced with ethnic Serbs and Hungarian loyalists. Vojvodina's autonomy was effectively revoked under the 1990 Serbian constitution while most executive, judicial, and administrative competences were transferred to the Serbian government (Bugajski, 1993:136–137, 141). Many Hungarian schools and classes

²¹ Both regions were allowed to send delegations to the Federal Assembly, but they only served as rubber stamps for the central government (Friedman, 1982: 67).




FIG. 6. Minority Behavior in the Case of Vojvodina

were also closed, and the authorities clamped down on Hungarian newspapers, as well as radio and television stations. Belgrade's control over media in Vojvodina coincided with inflammatory reports that Hungarians were plotting to secede from Yugoslavia. These actions only served to intensify anti-Hungarian sentiment in the region.

Meanwhile, the minority's lobby state, Hungary, began to sound a nationalist chord vis-à-vis its co-ethnics in Yugoslavia. In 1990, Prime Minister Jozsef Antall announced that he was "in spirit" the prime minister of Hungarians throughout the world, including 5 million outside Hungary's borders. When Yugoslavia teetered on the brink of collapse in 1991, Antall asserted that Hungary's southern borders applied only to *Yugoslavia* and not to Serbia, implying that Hungary might make territorial claims on Vojvodina if Yugoslavia disintegrated (Oltay, 1992:28). Although the Hungarian government studiously renounced all claims on territory outside its borders, it began to argue that it had a duty to "protect the rights" of Hungarians in neighboring states. In early 1991, Antall proclaimed "[we] never said that the minority question was the *only* factor in interstate relations, but we find it impossible to have good relations with a country that mistreats its Hungarian minority."²²

With signs of increased Serbian repression and increased support from their lobby state, the bargaining model predicts that Hungarians in Vojvodina would believe with greater probability that the state of the world was that of conflict, in which case they should radicalize their claims against the center (see Figure 6). Consistent with this prediction, the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians (DCVH)—headed by András Ágoston—radicalized its demands from *cultural autonomy* to *territorial autonomy*.²³ Having run on a platform of cultural autonomy in

²²MTI, April 20, 1991, as cited in Oltay, 1991: 27 (emphasis mine).

²³Formed in 1990, the DCVH became the dominant Hungarian party in Yugoslavia. At its first party congress in August 1990, the delegates adopted a program of "cultural autonomy," defined as "the guaranteed collective rights of the Hungarian minority through the equal use of language and freedom of the press" (Andreyevich, 1990: 44). The DCVH ran on a platform of cultural autonomy in the December 1990 elections and won an estimated 80 percent of the Hungarian vote (*Tarsadalmi Szemle*, July 1991: 36–48, as cited in Oltay, 1991: 40). The DCVH platform thus serves as a reasonable proxy of Hungarian claims at this time.

1990, Ágoston issued a formal memorandum calling for “tri-partite autonomy” for Hungarians in Serbia in April 1992.²⁴ Ágoston also asserted that Hungarians in Vojvodina should be given the same level of autonomy as the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Hezegovina under Lord Carrington’s peace plan.²⁵ Despite significant controversy generated by this program, Ágoston and the DCVH did even better in the 1992 elections than in 1990, receiving 18 out of 60 seats in Vojvodina’s parliament and more than 90 percent of the ethnic Hungarian vote (Fox, 1996).

1993–2000: Hungarians Moderate Their Claims

Pressure on the Hungarian minority intensified in the mid-1990s. The regime in Belgrade began to resettle Serbian refugees from the Croatian and Bosnian wars in Serbia proper; a disproportionate number were given homes in Vojvodina and Kosovo. During these wars, an estimated 200,000 Serbs were re-settled in Vojvodina, particularly in areas with high concentrations of ethnic Hungarians (Fox, 1996). The ultra-nationalist Serbian Radicals also gained control of Novi Sad’s municipal government, which most Hungarians viewed as a serious threat. Throughout the Bosnian war, ethnic Hungarians endured systematic intimidation—bombings, beatings, death threats, and threats of rape. In many cases, people were forcibly evicted from their homes or coerced into signing house-swapping agreements with Serb refugees from Croatia and Bosnia. Some 35,000 Hungarians fled the region during this time to escape a campaign of “quiet ethnic cleansing.”

At the same time, Hungary actually *moderated* its stance toward Hungarians in Vojvodina. As attacks escalated against the Hungarian minority, Hungary made it clear that it would not intervene on their behalf. Asked what they would do if their co-ethnics became victims of ethnic cleansing, Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky stated, “I can say only that Hungary is not in a position to be seen as a threat by any of our neighbors . . . At most, we are capable of deterring a possible aggressor for a few hours or days . . . until United Nations or other international help comes” (Williams, 1993). Upon taking office in 1994, the new socialist government in Budapest marked a significant moderation in Hungary’s policies toward minorities abroad. Already in his electoral campaign, Prime Minister Gyula Horn stated that he wanted to be the prime minister of only 10.5 million Hungarians (i.e., those *within* the country’s borders), but that he had a “deep feeling of responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living abroad.” This differed markedly from Antall’s earlier statement that he was “in spirit” prime minister of 15 million Hungarians, and was seen as a conciliatory gesture by Hungary’s neighboring states (Reisch, 1994:46–47). At the same time, Horn made it clear that he intended to normalize relations with neighboring countries—seeking “historic reconciliation” with Serbia, Slovakia, and Romania. Hungary thus signaled that protecting Magyars abroad was just *one* of Hungary’s foreign policy objectives—in contrast to the overriding foreign policy goal it had been under the previous government.²⁶ Budapest dealt with the issue of Hungarians in Vojvodina with great delicacy through-

²⁴This plan envisioned the creation of a Hungarian Autonomous District, which would preside over 56 percent of Vojvodina’s ethnic Hungarians. Its capital in Novi Sad would administer public education, local budgetary affairs, the judiciary, law enforcement, and other economic and social affairs. It would have its own coat of arms and its own flag with the red, white, and green colors of Hungary’s national flag (Oltay, 1993: 46).

²⁵Ágoston privately admitted that the proposal had only been designed to mobilize the minority rank and file; indeed, it had not even been translated into Serbo-Croatian (Várady, 2002). This demonstrates the strongly strategic nature of group claim-making.

²⁶Hungary’s new stance was largely driven by the urgings of NATO and European Union leaders, who asserted that Hungary would not be admitted to these clubs until it resolved its outstanding disputes with neighboring countries. Second, Hungary’s leaders were becoming keenly aware of the need to focus on a reform agenda and to improve trade relations with states in the region in order to boost Hungary’s flagging post-communist economy. Moreover, the new policy toward Hungarians abroad reflected grass-roots sentiment within the country itself. Reisch notes, “Because of the large number of refugees from Romania and Vojvodina, and because of the mistakes

out the Bosnian war. It declined to support the DCVH in its calls for autonomy and actually *supported* Belgrade when the international community imposed economic sanctions on Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s, allowing the passage of goods and people across the Hungarian–Yugoslav border.

In light of increased Serbian repression and Hungary's new non-interventionist stance, the bargaining model predicts that Hungarians in Vojvodina would believe with greater probability that the state of the world is now that of vulnerability (see Figure 6), in which case they should moderate their demands against the center. Consistent with this hypothesis, the DCVH—advocating territorial autonomy for the Hungarian minority—began to fragment after its electoral disappointment in the 1993 republican elections in Serbia. Because he was now perceived as too radical, Ágoston began to lose the support of his constituents. There were two splits within his party, the second of which led to his ejection from DCVH leadership, after which six other Hungarian parties quickly sprang up to vie for the disaffected minority vote. The Alliance of Hungarians then took over as the primary representative of the Hungarian minority, with Jozsef Kasza, the affable mayor of Subotica, as its leader. Kasza was a self-described moderate who proclaimed his willingness to negotiate directly with Serbian authorities concerning the position of Hungarians in Yugoslavia (Várady, 2002). Through the remainder of the 1990s, mainstream Hungarian leaders abandoned their program of autonomy and focused instead on defending the minority from ethnic reprisals and other discrimination (Fox, 1996). In a statement capturing the stance of ethnic Hungarians during this time, Kasza said, “We look for the little openings . . . [w]e work in the background, and through our personal contacts in the ministries in Belgrade” (Ingram, 1993).

In 1999, NATO bombs rained down on the territory of Yugoslavia as the Alliance engaged in a three-month bombing campaign to force Milošević to withdraw from Kosovo. Vojvodina, too, found itself a target in these attacks, as bombs hit factories, power stations, television and radio stations, government buildings, bridges, and trains—terrorizing the population and crippling the local economy (Jósza, 2002).²⁷ To make matters worse, the Hungarian minority found itself once again the victim of ethnic scapegoating by Serbian ultra-nationalists who viewed the conflict as a battle for the survival of the Serbian nation against a minority fifth column intent on breaking the country apart. With Belgrade signaling its tacit approval of these acts, the Serbian government appeared repressive in the extreme. Hungary, meanwhile, gave full backing to NATO bombing even though its co-ethnics in Vojvodina suffered as a result.²⁸ Given signals that the Serbian regime was repressive in the extreme and that its lobby state was unwilling to intervene to protect the minority, Hungarians in Vojvodina had every reason to believe that the state of the world was still that of vulnerability, in which case the minority should refrain from radicalizing against the center, even in the face of significant threat. Consistent with this prediction, Kasza (head of the DVH and the most popular political representative of Hungarians in Vojvodina at the time) spoke out against NATO strikes but not

of the previous government, the original feeling of solidarity for and sympathy with the Magyar minorities abroad had diminished in Hungary and been replaced by indifference and even hostility” (1994: 50).

²⁷An analysis of the intent of these bombings and how they fit in with the overall strategy of NATO's air war is beyond the scope of this paper. For readings on this subject, see Campbell (2000), Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000), and Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000).

²⁸Hungary actually *supported* NATO strikes in the territory of Vojvodina and even allowed the Alliance to fly bombing missions to Vojvodina out of Hungary. The Hungarian Premier Viktor Orbán spoke out in favor of NATO bombing of the bridges of Novi Sad, despite the fact that Hungarian companies expected to suffer substantial losses as a result of interruptions to shipping traffic in the Danube. These events go against primordialist expectations that national homelands act to “rescue” their co-ethnics due to cross-border ethnic ties. By all accounts, Hungary—a new member of the NATO alliance and eager to prove its pro-western credentials—felt constrained to act or even speak out against these strikes. One Hungarian leader in Vojvodina affirmed that Budapest's “extreme” support for the air strikes could even harm ethnic Hungarians in Yugoslavia (Baumgartner, 1999, RFE/RL Report, April 12).

against Serbian aggression against minorities in Yugoslavia. In doing so, he actually staked out a position *against* the minority's lobby state, and, even more strangely, *in favor of the Yugoslav government*.²⁹ This is consistent with predictions of ethnic bargaining that an unsupported minority facing a repressive regime is likely to lay low rather than radicalize to defend itself.³⁰

2001–2002: Inter-ethnic Coalitioning in Vojvodina

Following the popular ouster of Milošević in 2000, the new Yugoslav Premier Vojislav Koštunica promised a new pro-minority stance toward ethnic Albanians and Hungarians in Yugoslavia.³¹ Kasza's Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina was invited into the ruling coalition, and Kasza was made deputy prime minister of Serbia in charge of minority affairs and local governments, even though the party had won only *six seats* in the Serbian Assembly. At the same time, Hungary maintained its non-interventionist stance vis-à-vis the Hungarian minority, focusing instead on fostering closer ties with the new government in Belgrade. Given signals of non-repressive intent on the part of Belgrade and Hungary's continued hands-off policy, the Hungarian minority should believe with high probability that the state of the world is now that of peace, yielding political coalitions across ethnic lines.

Consistent with this expectation, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina managed to cobble together an alliance with non-Hungarian parties in calling for autonomy on a *non-ethnic principle*. Tamás Korhecz, Minister for Minorities of Affairs and a prominent Hungarian representative, noted that regime change in Belgrade laid the foundation for a historic reconciliation between the two groups, which in turn paved the way for an autonomy project "linking" the interests of the region's Hungarian and Serb communities (Korhecz, 2002). In return for abandoning its purely ethnic agenda, the minority's coalition partners agreed to support cultural autonomy for ethnic Hungarians. With the salience of ethnicity declining relative to that of economic interests, Hungarians threw their support behind leaders who favored coalitioning *across ethnic lines* in order to lobby more effectively for the economic interests of *all* Vojvodinian inhabitants. Consistent with this non-ethnic stance, the Hungarian party's proposal for Vojvodinian autonomy aimed at improving the status of people of *all* ethnic groups in the region. Partly as a result of the minority's new non-ethnic agenda, minority legislation has actually become *easier* to get through parliament. In February 2002, cultural autonomy was granted to the Hungarian minority, and some 200 of the region's competencies were restored to Vojvodina under the 2001 Omnibus Act (Várady, 2002). In March, the Yugoslav government offered to open a Hungarian consulate in Vojvodina in order to foster better relations with ethnic Hungarians of the region (Szabo, 2001, RFE/RL Newsline, March 19, 2001). The government also signed the Council of

²⁹Jozsef Kasza said on April 8 that Orban's supportive statements of NATO air strikes are "irresponsible and incomprehensible," adding, "Hungary should fulfill its NATO obligations . . . without sacrificing the Vojvodina Hungarians" (Shafir, 1999, RFE/RL Report, April 8).

³⁰When the nationalist FIDESZ government won the 1998 Hungarian elections, there were renewed calls for autonomy for the Vojvodinian Hungarians. Most notably, in February 1999, Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban called for establishing autonomy in Vojvodina along the lines of what was being proposed in Kosovo. These and other public statements by Hungary's government served to radicalize the demands of ethnic Hungarians leading up to the NATO war, and minority representatives met to draft a proposal for ethnic Hungarian autonomy (Fox, 1996). Once the Kosovo war was underway, however, Hungary abandoned its demands for autonomy and instead lobbied quietly to spare Vojvodina from NATO bombing. Mainstream leader Jozsef Kasza reacted to Hungary's moderation by moderating his demands as well.

³¹Soon after taking office, Koštunica announced the authorities were now preparing new legislation aimed at promoting the rights of the country's ethnic minorities. The new minorities law would include provisions for regional and local autonomy. He also promised that previous policies aimed at discrimination and assimilation would cease (Moore, 2000, RFE/RL Report, December 14).

TABLE 1. Competing Explanations for Vojvodina Claims in 1990s

<i>Theory</i>	<i>Prediction</i>	<i>Evidence</i>
Ethnic ties, historic grievances	Hungarians in V. seek to reunite with Hungary due to ~ 1,000 year ties with their motherland as well as historic grievances against the Serbs.	Hungarians rejected irredentism throughout the 1990s.
Structural group traits	Hungarians pursue irredentism in order to attach their ethnic islands to the motherland, taking advantage of window of opportunity following collapse of communism.	Hungarian minority eschews irredentism throughout the 1990s.
Economic arguments	Hungarians seek autonomy or secession in order to avoid making transfer payments to poorer regions of the federation.	Hungarians seek a degree of financial autonomy in the early 1990s, but focus mainly on <i>cultural</i> autonomy.
Security dilemma/ethnic fears	Hungarians radicalize for secession during times of extreme repression or majority threat.	Hungarians are <i>least</i> radical during periods of majority threat (the Bosnian and Kosovar wars).
Instrumentalist arguments	Hungarians radicalize for independence when nationalizing leaders emerge to "play the ethnic card."	Nationalizing leaders advanced extreme demands <i>throughout</i> the 1990s, but they were politically marginalized after the early 1990s.
Theory of ethnic bargaining	Hungarians radicalize only when they enjoy significant bargaining leverage against the center.	Hungarians radicalized after 1989 when the Antall government indicated significant support for co-ethnics abroad; these demands subsided with the emergence of a pro-Belgrade Horn government.

Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in May 2001, committing itself to linguistic, cultural, and educational rights for ethnic minorities.

Evaluating the Competing Explanations

The predictions of each dominant theory of group demands will now be evaluated using evidence gathered in the case of Hungarian claims in Vojvodina during the 1990s (see Table 1).

Ethnic ties and historic grievances predict that Hungarians in Yugoslavia would pursue secession in the early 1990s, as did the other Yugoslav minorities with distinctive national identities (including the Croats, Bosnians, Slovenes, and Macedonians). Indeed, the differences between Hungarians and Serbs were far greater than those between Serbs and any of the other seceding groups. One may object that Vojvodinian Hungarians could not have realistically attempted secession because they made up only 17 percent of the population of Vojvodina, rendering the minority too small and territorially dispersed to feasibly pursue secessionism.³² It is

³²According to the Yugoslav census of 1991, roughly 340,000 of Vojvodina's two million inhabitants declared themselves ethnic Hungarians. Kocsis and Kocsis-Hodosi (1995, Ch. 5).

important to note, however, that, while small, the minority was actually territorially *concentrated*, with seven Hungarian-majority districts near the border with Hungary (see Map 1).³³ Therefore, the minority (in cooperation with Hungary) could have reasonably sought a border adjustment on the grounds of a mismatch between ethnic geography and political borders; Hungary also has a claim to Vojvodina on the basis of the historic Habsburg “Military Frontier,” which ran between Vojvodina and Serbia. Nor was there any lack of “ancient grievances” upon which to mobilize ethnic Hungarians. The region was detached from Hungary under the 1920 Treaty of Trianon—an act long considered a political crime among Hungarians both in and out of Hungary. Furthermore, some 40,000 Hungarian civilians were tortured and summarily executed when the Serb Partisans recaptured Vojvodina from the occupying Hungarian Army in 1944.³⁴ There are therefore ample historic grievances upon which to mobilize a secessionist movement.

Group traits theories of secessionism hold that ethnic islands (pockets of ethnic groups in “enemy” territory) create incentives for national homelands to engage in “ethnic rescue.” This logic was used to explain Serbian irredentism in Bosnia and Croatia, as Serb forces “punched through” walls of enemy groups in order to rescue marooned Serbian communities in the context of Yugoslav disintegration. If this is true, however, we should *also* have seen irredentist mobilization by Hungarians in Vojvodina, given the fact that Hungarian-majority districts are surrounded on all sides by Serbian-dominated land (see Map 2).³⁵ In sum, ethnic geography in Vojvodina predicts irredentist mobilization by both the Hungarian minority and its homeland state, particularly as Serb paramilitaries began to ethnically cleanse Hungarians from Vojvodina, resettling Serb refugees in Hungarian homes and forcing tens of thousands of Hungarians to flee during the Bosnian and Croatian wars.


Economic theories also fail to predict minority accommodation in Vojvodina during the 1990s. With small reserves of oil, fertile land and a well-developed economy, Vojvodina was one of the richest regions of the federation. If one accepts that Slovenia and Croatia pursued secession in order to avoid making net transfer payments and to improve their economic position, then the same should hold true for Vojvodina. Instead, mainstream Vojvodinian leaders have steadfastly rejected agendas of secessionism and irredentism, enduring crippling economic sanctions imposed against Yugoslavia during the Bosnian and Kosovo wars. Finally, none of these structural theories explains *fluctuations* in Hungarian demands during the 1990s.

Ethnic fears theories also do not explain minority behavior in Vojvodina. From 1988 to 1990, Serbian authorities effectively neutered Vojvodina’s autonomous status and enacted a series of repressive language and education laws targeting the Hungarian minority. Hungarians were also sent to fight Yugoslavia’s civil wars in disproportionate numbers. Finally, Belgrade sanctioned the activities of Serbian nationalists and paramilitaries who harassed and intimidated ethnic minorities, forcing Hungarians to give up their homes to Serbian refugees. Security dilemma or credible commitment theories would predict Hungarian radicalization in reaction to this climate of extreme insecurity. Instead, the minority pledged its loyalty to Belgrade during the Croatian, Bosnian, and Kosovar wars.

³³This map is reprinted from Carter and Norris (1996: xii–xiii).

³⁴The infamous “freezing weeks” of 1944 were undertaken in revenge for the preceding three “Cold Days,” when the Hungarian Army rounded up and executed hundreds of suspected Serbian Partisans—among whom were innocent civilians—in the center of Novi Sad. See Cseres (1993) for one of the few accounts of this period in the English language.

³⁵This map is reprinted from Kocsis and Kocsis-Hodosi (1995: 98). It is interesting to compare the ethnic geography of Bosnia and Croatia in Map 1 with that of Vojvodina in Map 2. Similar “ethnic islands” exist in all three cases; yet irredentism was only pursued in Croatia and Bosnia.



MAP 2. Percentage of Ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina and East Croatia (1991)

Finally, this case highlights the shortcomings of instrumentalist theories of minority demands. By all accounts, András Ágoston was exactly the kind of leader who could play the ethnic card in order to maintain political power. Charismatic and popular, Ágoston was regarded as the natural leader of an ethnic Hungarian movement in Vojvodina in the early 1990s when he and his party garnered 80–90 percent of the Hungarian vote. However, with increased signs of Serbian repression and growing moderation of their lobby state in the mid-1990s, Ágoston and his party began to lose the support of the minority. At the same time, Jozsef Kasza—a moderate advocating cooperation with Belgrade—moved into the mainstream, winning the plurality of Hungarian votes in the region in the 1996 elections. The case of Vojvodina thus suggests that nationalizing elites are instead *generated* by external conditions that mobilize populations on the grass roots level. This process in turn brings extremists to power.

Claim-making in Vojvodina lends support to the bargaining theory of minority demands. Minority leaders in Vojvodina radicalized and moderated their demands in response to signals of increased and decreased bargaining leverage, respectively. Although Hungarians in Vojvodina *did* mobilize in reaction to the removal of Vojvodina's provincial autonomy in 1988—a finding more consistent with ethnic fears theories—these demands were not made *on an ethnic basis* until the new Antall government began to argue in favor of autonomy for ethnic Hungarians in the region. When the Hungarian government moderated its position in 1993, the minority understood that it would now have to negotiate directly with the Serbian government over its status within the federation. Consistent with the predictions of ethnic bargaining, the Hungarian minority responded by *moderating* its position, even in the presence of significant repression. This state of affairs continued for the remainder of the 1990s. When a moderate Serbian government came to office in 2000, the political salience of ethnic cleavages diminished radically, increasing the value of political coalitions along common economic lines. As a consequence, the ethnic bargaining model predicts the emergence of new inter-ethnic alliances in Vojvodina, which occurred in 2001. The second hypothesis concerning minority

behavior in the state of opportunity (Box 2 in Figure 4) requires additional case-work for empirical testing.

Extending the Theory: Suggestions for Future Research

One might reasonably object that the scope conditions of the triadic model are not met by most ethnic conflicts in the world, thus limiting its explanatory power as a theory of minority claim-making. There are three possible objections along these lines. The first is that, while it accounts for Hungarian demands in post-communist Yugoslavia, it may not explain minority–majority relations in *other* regions of the world where ethnic politics may be governed according to a different logic. Second, it is possible that the prevailing level of violence at the sub-state level is critical for minority behavior. Since the bargaining model is tested using a single case of *non-violent* conflict, we cannot necessarily infer that the model's predictions hold equally well in cases of violent ethnic conflict. Third, and most importantly, in many inter-group conflicts the minority has *no* lobby state or any other external lobbyist willing to intervene on its behalf. Such cases include Chechens in Russia; Nagas in India; and Burmese minorities. The question then becomes: what does triadic bargaining have to say about one-on-one interactions between the minority and the majority or host government?³⁶ Together, these concerns stand as an important indictment of the bargaining model as a generalizable theory of minority demands. Although these questions cannot be adequately addressed in the space of this article, I suggest below how they may be dealt with in future research. The following tables outline three research agendas that speak to each of these objections in turn.

Generalizability to Violent Conflicts Outside Europe

What follows is a partial list of violent conflicts outside Europe that may be used to test the model's applicability to violent non-European disputes (see Table 2). I also give predictions generated by the bargaining model and the dominant ethnic fears model for each case. In drafting this list, I include cases of violent conflict in disparate regions of the world, including Southeast Asia, the former Soviet Union, South Asia, the Middle East, and South Africa. The list thus serves as a useful guide for testing the extent to which ethnic bargaining can account for minority behavior in armed conflicts around the world.

Applicability of Model to Cases where the Minority has other Lobby Actors

In many ethnic conflicts, the minority lacks a lobby state (defined here as a “national homeland” with which the minority identifies ethnically, and which engages in diplomatic and/or military intervention on behalf of the minority). However, *other* lobby actors—including military alliances, international organizations, diasporas, or other states—may provide military or diplomatic leverage to the minority. Such actors serve as “surrogate lobby states” that influence a minority's decision to radicalize or accommodate the majority at the sub-state level. Below is a partial list of minority–majority conflicts in which the minority is supported by a variety of external lobby actors, including the United Nations, the United States as the world's superpower, NATO, a militia, and a Russian army (see Table 3). This list may therefore be used to test the range of external actors that can act as “surrogate” lobby states, provoking minority behavior that conforms with the expectations of the bargaining model.

³⁶I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer at ISQ for raising these important points.

TABLE 2. Violent Minority Conflicts Outside Europe

<i>Minority</i>	<i>Host State/ Majority</i>	<i>Lobby State</i>	<i>Ethnic Bargaining Prediction</i>	<i>Ethnic Fears Prediction</i>
Armenians (Nagorno- Karabakh)	Azerbaijan	Armenia (1990s)	Minority radicalizes when Armenia indicates irredentist intent	Minority radicalizes when Azerbaijan represses minority
Sri Lankan Tamils	Sri Lanka	India/Tamil Nadu (1980s)	Minority radicalizes when India or Tamil Nadu gov'ts provide support	Sri Lanka Tamils radicalize when gov't discriminates
Somalis	Ethiopia	Somalia (1960s and 1970s)	Somali minority radicalizes when Somalia indicates intent to attack Ethiopia	Somalis rebel when Ethiopia signals intent to oppress
Palestinians	Israel	Syria/Jordan	Palestinians rebel when they receive succor or support from Arab countries	Palestinians rebel as a result of Israeli repression
Kashmiris	India	Pakistan	Kashmiri insurgency increases when Pakistan provides military support	Kashmiris radicalize when India represses minority by increased centralization
Malay-Muslims	Thailand	Malaysia (1970s and 1980s)	Minority radicalizes when Malaysia lends cross-border support to rebels	Malay-Muslims rebel as a result of discrimination by the Thai majority

Applicability of Model to Cases where there is no Major Lobby Actor

Although the bargaining model formalizes minority-majority relations in the context of external lobbyists, ethnic bargaining may also take place between minorities and majorities in the *absence* of major lobby actors. In the triadic model, minority radicalization is the result of fluctuations in *both* internal and external group leverage. In a *dyadic* bargaining model, however, radicalization is a function of shifts in internal leverage only. Here, relative minority size and territorial compactness serve as preexisting structural determinants of internal leverage, placing limits on the extremity of demands that may be feasibly sought by the group. A second source of internal leverage is the *relative power balance* between the group and the center. If the host government is weakened by severe economic recession, civil unrest or foreign military campaigns, the minority may infer that it is relatively strong vis-à-vis the center and radicalize its demands as a means of obtaining greater concessions. What follows is a partial list of conflicts in various regions of the world where the minority has no lobby actor (see Table 4). This table thus offers a template for testing the predictions of a dyadic model of ethnic bargaining across a range of geopolitical conditions. As in the prior two tables, I derive predictions for both a dyadic bargaining model, and the dominant ethnic fears model in each case.

The above tables outline three distinct research agendas that can be used to test the applicability of ethnic bargaining across a range of ethnic conflicts. If the model can be shown to account for minority claim-making in cases of (1) significant ethnic violence outside Europe, (2) conflicts in which the minority has an alternate or "surrogate" lobby state, and (3) conflicts in which the minority has *no* major external lobbyist, this would help establish the bargaining model as a general theory

TABLE 3. Minority Conflicts with Surrogate Lobby States

<i>Minority</i>	<i>Host State/ Majority</i>	<i>Lobby Actor</i>	<i>Ethnic Bargaining Prediction</i>	<i>Ethnic Fears Prediction</i>
Trans Dniestrian Russians	Moldova	Russian 14 th Army (1990s)	Trans Dniestrian minority radicalizes as a function of army military and logistical support for separatists	The minority rebels as a function of nationalizing policies of the Moldovan state
Kosovar Albanians	Serbia	NATO (1999 –)	The Kosovar Albanians radicalize as a function of NATO signals to intervene	Kosovar Albanians radicalize as a result of Serbian repression
Macedonian Albanians	Macedonia	Kosovar Liberation Army (2001)	Macedonian Albanians escalate tensions in response to cross- border incursions by the KLA	Macedonian Albanians escalate tensions when the state restricts minority rights
Kurds	Iraq	U.S. (1991)	Kurds radicalize against Iraq as a function of promises of U.S. support	Kurds radicalize in reaction to Iraqi acts of oppression
Saharawis	Morocco	U.N. (1960s –)	Saharawis escalate demands as a function of U.N. support for Saharawi independence	Saharawis accelerate demands when Moroccan state signals intent to retain Sahara

of minority claim-making. The above section provides a springboard for future research into the field of minority claim-making.

Conclusion: An “Outside-In” Approach to Conflict Resolution

This analysis provides tentative support for a bargaining theory of claim-making, which holds that minority radicalization is a function of *signals* sent by the minority’s host and lobby states concerning their intentions toward the minority. The minority uses these signals to infer its prevailing bargaining leverage against the center, leading it to radicalize or moderate its claims accordingly. Since minorities are constantly updating their beliefs concerning the probable state of the world, multi-ethnic societies experience continual shifts in minority mobilization over time. Contrary to security dilemma arguments, the bargaining model predicts that minorities do not always respond to credible promises of protection by moderating their demands. If they enjoy backing from outside actors, groups may instead radicalize *even with credible guarantees of protection*. Conversely, a minority that enjoys minimal leverage against the center may choose to accommodate *even in the face of significant repression*. The Vojvodina case provides initial confirmation for the second prediction; additional casework will be necessary to test the first hypothesis as well as the viability of the model as a general theory of minority claims.

The policy prescriptions yielded by the study are straightforward. In brief, the ethnic bargaining model suggests that conflicts over territorial or separatist demands should be brokered from the “outside-in” rather than the “inside-out.” This is a two-step process. First, triadic conflicts should be *de-triangulated* into separate negotiating tracks between the minority and the state majority, on one hand, and the host state and lobby actors on the other. Second, the host-lobby state conflict

TABLE 4. Dyadic Minority Conflicts

<i>Minority</i>	<i>Host State/ Majority</i>	<i>Lobby Actor</i>	<i>Ethnic Bargaining Prediction</i>	<i>Ethnic Fears Prediction</i>
East Timorese/ Acehnese	Indonesia (1970s, 1998)	None	Minorities mobilize as a function of indications of regime weakness	Minorities mobilize upon fears of state crackdown
Afars	Ethiopia (1990s)	None	Afars radicalize demands for secession when Ethiopian state shows signs of state failure	Afars radicalize when they receive signals of Ethiopian intent to repress
Quebecois	Canada (1960s)	None	French-speaking Quebecois escalate demands for separatism in response to increased economic empowerment of French-speaking minority in the 1950s	French-speaking Quebecois escalate demands for separatism in response to acts of linguistic assimilation by Canadian government
Karens, Mons, Shans, Kachins	Burma	None	Groups radicalize demands once Burma's military regime weakens and/or loses international support	Groups radicalize demands when Burma's regime engages in repressive acts
Chechens	Russia (1990s)	None	Chechen minority radicalizes for secession once it gains sufficient military strength or when the Russian government is internally weakened or exhibiting signs of overstretch	Chechen minority radicalizes when Russian state indicates intent to centralize Moscow's control over the region

should be resolved *first*, since doing so would neutralize the crucial impact of the external actor. Minority-state conflicts can never be resolved if the minority enjoys external support for extremist agendas. It should be noted, however, that the model does not counsel external peace-brokers to sit back and do nothing when minorities suffer discrimination or oppression. It suggests instead that the *type* of intervention will have a critical influence on the success of external mediation. Specifically, external states, IGOs and military alliances should avoid intervening explicitly on behalf of minorities, which may paradoxically encourage minority rebellion or provoke a majority backlash. Mediators that instead direct their carrots and sticks at the *entire state population* create incentives for minorities *and* majorities to form coalitions across ethnic cleavages in order to reap a joint peace dividend.

Almost all internal conflicts wax and wane over time. During times of peace, minorities moderate their demands and majorities refrain from assimilation or repression. These periods are usually preceded by a deal that to some extent normalizes relations between the minority's host, and lobby states. An examination of periods of peace, or the "dogs that did not bark" (such as the case of Hungarians in Vojvodina), shows that minority radicalization *and* minority moderation are driven by ethnic bargaining between the minority, its host state and its outside lobby actor. Understanding the bigger picture of ethnic bargaining is essential for interrupting the spiral of ethnic conflict. By (1) counseling external patrons or national homelands to watch what they signal to minorities (as Hungary has done vis-à-vis its co-ethnics in Vojvodina); (2) challenging the international norms that support cross-border bargaining; and (3), making financial assistance or membership in valued

international or regional organizations conditional upon sustained inter-ethnic cooperation in divided societies, we may come closer to constructing lasting solutions to minority-state conflicts in today's world.

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