ECONOMETRICA
JOURNAL OF THE ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY

An International Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics

http://www.econometricsociety.org/

Econometrica, Vol. 86, No. 4 (July, 2018), 1159–1214

UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS AND MISGUIDED LEARNING

PAUL HEIDHUES
Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics, Heinrich–Heine Universität Düsseldorf

BOTOND KŐSZEGI
Department of Economics and Business, Central European University

PHILIPP STRACK
Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley

The copyright to this Article is held by the Econometric Society. It may be downloaded, printed and reproduced only for educational or research purposes, including use in course packs. No downloading or copying may be done for any commercial purpose without the explicit permission of the Econometric Society. For such commercial purposes contact the Office of the Econometric Society (contact information may be found at the website http://www.econometricsociety.org or in the back cover of Econometrica). This statement must be included on all copies of this Article that are made available electronically or in any other format.
UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS AND MISGUIDED LEARNING

PAUL HEIDHUES
Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics, Heinrich–Heine Universität Düsseldorf

BOTOND KŐSZEGI
Department of Economics and Business, Central European University

PHILIPP STRACK
Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley

We explore the learning process and behavior of an individual with unrealistically high expectations (overconfidence) when outcomes also depend on an external fundamental that affects the optimal action. Moving beyond existing results in the literature, we show that the agent’s beliefs regarding the fundamental converge under weak conditions. Furthermore, we identify a broad class of situations in which “learning” about the fundamental is self-defeating: it leads the individual systematically away from the correct belief and toward lower performance. Due to his overconfidence, the agent—even if initially correct—becomes too pessimistic about the fundamental. As he adjusts his behavior in response, he lowers outcomes and hence becomes even more pessimistic about the fundamental, perpetuating the misdirected learning. The greater is the loss from choosing a suboptimal action, the further the agent’s action ends up from optimal.

We partially characterize environments in which self-defeating learning occurs, and show that the decisionmaker learns to take the optimal action if, and in a sense only if, a specific non-identifiability condition is satisfied. In contrast to an overconfident agent, an underconfident agent’s misdirected learning is self-limiting and therefore not very harmful. We argue that the decision situations in question are common in economic settings, including delegation, organizational, effort, and public-policy choices.

KEYWORDS: Overconfidence, learning, misspecified models, convergence, Berk–Nash equilibrium.

1. INTRODUCTION

LARGE LITERATURES in psychology and economics suggest that in many situations, individuals have unrealistically positive beliefs about their traits or prospects, and researchers have began to investigate the nature of this “overconfidence” and to study its implications for economic interactions. One important question concerning individuals with overconfident or otherwise biased beliefs is how they update these beliefs when information comes in. Indeed, classical results identify conditions under which learning leads...
to correct beliefs (e.g., Savage (1954, Chapter 3)); more recent research explores ways in which a biased learning process can lead to overconfident beliefs (e.g., Gervais and Odean (2001), Chiang, Hirshleifer, Qian, and Sherman (2011), Jehiel (2017)).

In this paper, we investigate how overconfident individuals update not their overconfident beliefs, but their beliefs about other decision-relevant variables. Moving beyond existing results in the literature, we show that beliefs converge under weak conditions. Furthermore, we identify a broad and economically important class of situations in which an overconfident person’s inferences are self-defeating: they lead him systematically away from the correct belief and toward lower performance. For example, if a team member is overly full of himself and is hence disappointed by his team’s performance, he concludes that his teammates are less talented or lazier than he thought. He responds by increasing his control of the team, lowering team performance. He misinterprets this low performance as reflecting even more negatively on his teammates, perpetuating the misdirected learning further. Perversely, the greater is the loss from choosing a suboptimal action, the further the agent’s action ends up from optimal. We partially characterize environments in which self-defeating learning occurs, and show that the decisionmaker’s long-run behavior is optimal if and only if a specific non-identifiability condition is satisfied. In contrast to an overconfident agent, an underconfident agent’s misdirected learning is self-limiting and therefore not very harmful.

We present our framework in Section 2.1. In each period \( t \in \{1, 2, 3, \ldots \} \), the agent produces observable output \( q_t = Q(e_t, a, \phi) + \varepsilon_t \), which depends on his action \( e_t \), his ability or other output-relevant parameter \( a \), an unknown fundamental \( \phi \), and a noise term \( \varepsilon_t \). We assume that \( Q \) is increasing in \( a \) and \( \phi \), and that the optimal action is increasing in \( \phi \). The noise terms \( \varepsilon_t \) are independently and identically distributed mean-zero random variables with a log-concave distribution that has full support on \( \mathbb{R} \). The agent uses Bayes’ rule to update beliefs, and chooses the myopically optimal action in every period (although in a special case, we analyze dynamically optimal actions as well). Crucially, the agent is overconfident: while his true ability is \( A \), he believes with certainty that it is \( \tilde{a} > A \). Finally, for most of the paper we assume that the optimal action depends in weakly opposite ways on ability and the fundamental—that is, it is weakly decreasing in ability. This assumption is sufficient for generating self-defeating learning.

In Section 2.2, we argue that beyond team production, this reduced-form model captures a number of economically important situations in which individuals may have unrealistic expectations. A principal may not know how intrinsically motivated his employees are, and hence what level of control or explicit incentives maximizes performance. A person may not know how nice his partner or friend is, and hence how deferentially or assertively he should act to elicit the best outcomes from the relationship. A student or employee may not know the return to effort, and hence how much effort is optimal. Additionally, a policymaker may not know the scale of underlying problems in the economy, and hence what policy leads to the best outcomes.

Adapting Esponda and Pouzo’s (2016a) concept of Berk–Nash equilibrium to our setting, in Section 2.3 we define a stable belief according to the intuitive consistency property that—when taking the action that he perceives as optimal given his false belief—the average output the agent expects coincides with the average output he produces. Because at a stable belief the agent has no reason to question his beliefs, it is where his beliefs can be expected to converge. Motivated by this observation, in Sections 3, 4, and 6 we study the properties of stable beliefs, assuming that beliefs converge there; and in Section 5, we

\[2\]As long as these effects are monotonic, the above directional assumptions are just normalizations.
take up convergence. We assume that there is a unique stable belief, and we identify sufficient conditions on the primitives for this to be the case (Proposition 1). This assumption simplifies our statements regarding the properties of limiting beliefs, and is crucial for our convergence proof.

In Section 3, we study the key properties of the agent’s learning process and limiting beliefs, summarize a variety of casual evidence for our central mechanism, and discuss economic implications. We establish that—as in the case of the overconfident team member above—the agent’s learning process is self-defeating: if his initial action is not too far from optimal, then the opportunity to change his action in response to what he learns leads to more incorrect beliefs, and more suboptimal behavior, than if he could not change his action (Proposition 2). Furthermore, limiting beliefs satisfy a surprising and perverse comparative static: the more important it is for the agent to take the right action—that is, the greater is the loss from a suboptimal action—the further his beliefs end up from the truth, and the further his behavior ends up from optimal (Proposition 3). Intuitively, when choosing a suboptimal action is more harmful, the agent hurts himself more through his misguided learning. To develop a consistent theory of his observations, therefore, he must become more pessimistic about the fundamental.

We also consider what happens if—similarly to a dissatisfied team member deciding whether to replace his teammate—the agent can choose between the above task and an outside option. Consistent with the literature on overconfidence, the agent might be too prone to enter into and initially persist in the task. In contrast to received wisdom, however, our model predicts that the agent’s growing pessimism about the fundamental may induce him to exit the task too easily (Proposition 4), and by implication to jump too much between tasks. This prediction is consistent with the observation that many documented effects of overconfidence in economic settings, such as the pursuit of mergers and innovations by overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) or the creation of new businesses by overconfident entrepreneurs, pertain to new directions.

In Section 4, we ask what happens when our sufficient condition for self-defeating learning—that the optimal action depends in opposite ways on ability and the fundamental—is not satisfied, and we argue that self-defeating learning still occurs if and only if the optimal action depends sufficiently less on ability than on the fundamental. As a conceptually interesting case, we show that long-run behavior is always optimal if, and in a sense we will make precise only if, \( Q \) has the form \( V(e, S(a, \phi)) \)—that is, ability and the fundamental are not separately identifiable (Proposition 5). This conclusion contrasts with the lesson from classical learning settings that non-identifiability hinders efficient learning. Intuitively, because ability and the fundamental do not have independent effects on output, the agent’s misinference about the fundamental can fully compensate his overconfidence, and hence in the long run overconfidence does not adversely affect him. If his team’s output depends on his effort and the team’s total ability, for instance, the agent correctly infers total ability, and chooses effort optimally.

In Section 5, we show that if \( Q \) satisfies some regularity conditions, then the agent’s beliefs converge to the stable belief with probability 1 (Theorem 1). Furthermore, under the additional assumption that \( Q \) is linear in \( \phi \), beliefs converge to the stable belief even when actions are dynamically optimal (Theorem 2). To prove convergence, we cannot apply results from the statistical learning literature, such as those of Berk (1966) and Shalizi (2009), where the observer does not choose actions. Worse, beliefs constitute a function-valued process, whose transitions are, due to the endogeneity of the agent’s action, driven by shocks that are neither independently nor identically distributed. Little is known in general about the asymptotic behavior of the posterior distribution in such
infinite-dimensional models when the observations are not independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.), even when the model is correctly specified (e.g., Ghosal and van der Vaart (2007, pp. 192–193)). To get a handle on the problem, we employ a method that to our knowledge has not been used in the literature on learning with misspecified models. We focus on the agent’s extremal beliefs: what levels of the fundamental does he in the limit conclusively rule out? Given the structure of our problem, this puts bounds on his long-run actions, which restrict his extremal beliefs further. Using this contraction logic, we show that the agent rules out everything but a single point.

Knowing that beliefs converge with probability 1 allows us to make another economically relevant point: given that in the long run the agent correctly predicts average output, his beliefs pass a specification test based on comparing the empirical distribution of noise terms he estimates to the true distribution (Proposition 6). In this sense, the agent’s overconfidence is—even with infinite data—stable.

In Section 6, we analyze variants of our framework using a simple output function of the form \( Q(e, a, \phi) = a + \phi - L(e - \phi) \) for a symmetric loss function \( L \). We consider a setting in which the agent is initially uncertain about \( a \), and observes—in addition to output—a noisy signal of his relative contribution to output, \( a - (\phi - L(e - \phi)) \). It being highly subjective, however, the agent observes his own contribution with a positive bias. As a result, he develops overconfidence about \( a \), and his limiting belief about \( \phi \) is identical to that in our basic model (Proposition 7).

We also study underconfident agents (for whom \( \tilde{a} < A \)), and identify an interesting asymmetry: while an overconfident agent’s limiting utility loss from misguided learning can be an arbitrarily large multiple of his overconfidence \( \tilde{a} - A \), an underconfident agent’s limiting utility loss is bounded by his underconfidence \( A - \tilde{a} \) (Proposition 8). To understand the intuition, consider an underconfident agent who starts off with the correct mean belief about the fundamental. Upon observing higher levels of output than he expected, the agent concludes that the fundamental is better than he thought, and he revises his action. The resulting utility loss, however, leads him to reassess the optimistic revision of his belief, bringing his beliefs back toward the true fundamental. Hence, his misinference regarding the fundamental—which with overconfidence was self-reinforcing—is now self-correcting.

In Section 7, we relate our paper to the two big literatures it connects, that on the implications of overconfidence and that on learning with misspecified models. From a methodological perspective, our model is a special case of Esponda and Pouzo’s (2016a) framework for games when players have misspecified models. Because we have an individual-decisionmaking problem with a specific structure, we can derive novel and economically important results that are not possible in the general framework. In particular, to our knowledge our paper is the first to study the implications of overconfidence for inferences about other decision-relevant variables, and how these inferences interact with behavior. We are also unaware of other papers that characterize when self-defeating learning does versus does not occur in an individual-decisionmaking context.

In Section 8, we conclude by discussing some potential applications of our framework for multi-person situations.

2. LEARNING ENVIRONMENT

In this section, we introduce our basic framework, outline possible economic applications of it, and perform a few preliminary steps of analysis.
2.1. Setup

In each period \( t \in \{1, 2, 3, \ldots \} \), the agent produces observable output \( q_t = Q(e_t, a, \Phi) + \varepsilon_t \in \mathbb{R} \), where \( e_t \in (e, \overline{e}) \) is his action, \( a \in \mathbb{R} \) is his unchanging ability, \( \Phi \in (\phi, \overline{\phi}) \) is an unobservable unchanging fundamental, and \( \varepsilon_t \) is random noise. Throughout the paper, we make the following basic assumptions. First, the state \( \Phi \) is drawn from a continuous prior distribution \( \pi_0 : (\phi, \overline{\phi}) \to \mathbb{R}_{>0} \) with finite moments and bounded positive density everywhere on \((\phi, \overline{\phi})\), and we suppose that the agent has the correct prior belief \( \pi_0 \). Second, the \( \varepsilon_t \) are i.i.d. continuously distributed mean-zero random variables. Denoting their cumulative distribution function by \( F \), we impose a version of log-concavity: the second derivative of \( \log f \) is strictly negative and bounded from below.\(^3\) Third, output satisfies some regularity properties and normalizations: \( Q \) is twice continuously differentiable, with its and its derivates having polynomial growth in \( \phi \), and (i) \( Q_{ee} < 0 \) and \( Q_e(e, a, \phi) > 0 > Q_e(\overline{e}, a, \phi) \) for all \( a, \phi \), (ii) \( Q_a, Q_\phi > 0 \), and (iii) \( Q_{ee} > 0 \).\(^4\) Part (i) guarantees that there is always a unique myopically optimal action. Part (ii) implies that output is increasing in ability and the fundamental, and part (iii) implies the optimal action is increasing in the fundamental. As long as the effects implied by parts (ii) and (iii) are monotonic, our directional assumptions on them are just normalizations, and do not affect the logic and message of our results. Indeed, if any of these derivates was negative, we could change variables to reverse the orientation of \( a, \phi \), or \( e \), and obtain a model in which the same derivative is positive.

We assume for most of the paper that the agent chooses his action myopically in each period, aiming to maximize that period’s expected output. This assumption is irrelevant for our analysis of the properties of stable (point) beliefs in Sections 3, 4, and 6. We do use the assumption for our main convergence result, although under stronger conditions we establish convergence also when the agent optimizes dynamically.

Crucially, we posit that the agent is overoptimistic about his ability: while his true ability is \( A \), he believes with certainty that it is \( \tilde{a} > A \). Let \( \Delta = |A - \tilde{a}| \) denote the degree of the agent’s overconfidence. Given his inflated self-assessment, the agent updates his beliefs about the fundamental in a Bayesian way. To guarantee that the agent can always find a fundamental that is consistent with the average output he produces, we assume that for all \( e \), there is a \( \tilde{\phi} \in (\phi, \overline{\phi}) \) such that \( Q(e, A, \Phi) = Q(e, \tilde{a}, \tilde{\phi}) \). Note that because \( Q_\phi > 0 \), this \( \tilde{\phi} \) is unique.

We specify the agent’s belief about ability as degenerate for two main reasons. Technically, the assumption generates a simple and tractable model of persistent overconfidence, allowing us to focus on our research question of learning about other variables. More importantly, we view an assumption of overconfident beliefs that are not updated downward as broadly realistic. Quite directly, such an assumption is consistent with the view of many psychologists that individuals are extremely reluctant to revise self-views downward (e.g., Baumeister, Smart, and Boden (1996)). More generally, such an assumption can be

\(^3\)We think of strict bounded log-concavity as an economically weak restriction: it guarantees that an increase in output increases the agent’s belief about the fundamental in the sense of the monotone likelihood ratio property, and that any signal is nontrivially informative. Examples of distributions that have full support on \( \mathbb{R} \) and satisfy the assumption include the normal and logistic distributions. Technically, it also ensures that subjective beliefs are well defined and have finite moments after any history (see Lemma 3 in the Appendix).

\(^4\)A function \( J(e, a, \phi) \) is of polynomial growth in \( \phi \) if for any \( e, a \), there are \( \kappa, k, b > 0 \) such that \( |J(e, a, \phi)| \leq \kappa|\phi|^k + b \) for all \( \phi \). This assumption ensures that expected output and its derivatives exist after any history (see Proposition 9 in the Appendix).
thought of as a stand-in for forces explored in the psychology and economics literatures (but not explicitly modeled here) that lead individuals to maintain unrealistically positive beliefs. To show that our model is consistent with this perspective, in Section 6.1 we allow for the agent to be uncertain about $a$, and show that a biased learning process leads to a setting essentially equivalent to ours.\footnote{The model in Section 6.1 replaces a misspecified point belief about $a$ with misspecified learning about $a$, and hence is also not a fully rational model. But we view the misspecified nature of the agent’s learning as a feature, not a bug: any model in which the agent is correctly specified and keeps learning until he has the correct belief about his ability contradicts observed widespread overconfidence among individuals who have had plenty of opportunity to learn about themselves.}

To complete the description of our model, we state a sufficient condition for self-defeating misguided learning to occur.

**ASSUMPTION 1—Sufficient Condition for Self-Defeating Learning:** We have $\text{sgn}(Q_{ea}) \neq \text{sgn}(Q_e\phi)$.

Note that with the normalization $Q_e\phi > 0$, Assumption 1 is equivalent to $Q_{ea} \leq 0$. This assumption plays a central role in our paper: in Section 3, we explore the implications of misguided learning under Assumption 1, and in Section 4, we study what happens when Assumption 1 is not satisfied. Given our results—especially the analysis and discussion in Section 4—economically we think of Assumption 1 as allowing for two possibilities:

(i) The optimal action is almost insensitive to ability, at least relative to how sensitive it is to the fundamental ($Q_{ea} \approx 0 \ll Q_e\phi$). This is likely to be the case in many applications in which the agent is looking to fine-tune a decision—such as the design of a public policy or organizational incentive system—to circumstances he views as largely external to his ability.

(ii) In small-scale economic settings, however, the optimal action may be nontrivially sensitive to ability. Then, Assumption 1 requires that the optimal action depends in opposite ways on ability and the fundamental. This assumption naturally holds for delegation, as the optimal extent of delegation depends in opposite ways on the decisionmaker’s ability and his teammate’s ability. In contrast, the assumption does not hold if output always depends on ability and the fundamental in similar ways, such as when it depends on $a + \phi$.

The following two parametric examples are useful to keep in mind when developing our results.

**EXAMPLE 1—Loss-Function Specification:** The output function has the form

$$Q(e, a, \phi) = a + \phi - L(e - \phi),$$

where $e = \phi = -\infty$, $\overline{e} = \overline{\phi} = \infty$, $a \in \mathbb{R}$, and $L$ is a symmetric loss function with $L(0) = 0$ and $|L'(x)| < k < 1$ for all $x$. The agent observes output in each period, but does not observe output gross of the loss $L(e_t - \Phi)$ nor the loss itself. Economically, this specification captures a situation in which the agent wants to adjust his action to some underlying state of the world. Researchers have used similar, loss-function-based, specifications in Crawford and Sobel (1982) and the large literature on cheap talk, expert advice, and organizations (e.g., Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008)) following it, as well as in Morris and Shin (2002) and the subsequent literature on coordination.
EXAMPLE 2—Effort Specification: The output function has the form

\[ Q(e, a, \phi) = (a + e)\phi - c(e), \]

where \( e = \phi = 0, \overline{e} = \overline{\phi} = \infty, a > 0, \) and \( c \) is a strictly convex cost function with \( c(0) = c'(0) = 0, \) and \( \lim_{e \to \infty} c'(e) = \infty. \) In this example, the action \( e \) is effort, and the fundamental \( \phi \) determines the return to effort. The agent observes output, and may also observe output gross of the cost of effort; since he knows his level of effort, the two observations provide the same information to him.

Consistent with our motivating phenomenon of overconfidence, in describing and discussing our model and results we interpret \( a \) as ability. But more broadly, \( a \) could stand for any variable that leads the agent to be steadfastly and unrealistically optimistic about his prospects. For example, he may have overly positive views about his country or organization, or, as in the case of policymakers below, he may have overly optimistic beliefs about the technology generating output.

2.2. Applications

In this section, we argue that several economically important settings fit our model in Section 2.1. In each of these settings, other individuals are also involved, and for a full account it is necessary to model their behavior as well. Nevertheless, to focus on a single agent’s inferences and behavior, we abstract from the decisions of others, and model their effect only in reduced form.

APPLICATION 1—Delegation: The decisionmaker is working in a team with another agent and must decide how much of the work to delegate. The expected output of the team is \( Q(e, a, \phi) = au(e) + \phi v(e), \) where \( e \in (0, 1) \) is the proportion of the job the decisionmaker delegates, \( \phi \) is the teammate’s ability, and \( a, \phi > 0, u(e), v(e) > 0, u'(e), u''(e), v''(e) < 0, \) and \( v'(e) > 0. \) Then, the higher is the decisionmaker’s ability and the lower is the teammate’s ability, the lower is the optimal extent of delegation.

APPLICATION 2—Control in Organizations: A principal is deciding on the incentive system to use for an agent who chooses two kinds of effort, overt effort \( x^o \) (e.g., writing reports) and discretionary effort \( x^d \) (e.g., helping others in the organization). The principal can incentivize overt effort, for instance through monitoring (e.g., requiring and reading reports) or explicit incentives written on an objective signal of overt effort. For simplicity, we assume that the principal chooses \( x^o \) directly. Consistent with the literature on multitasking starting with Holmström and Milgrom (1991), we also assume that discretionary effort is a decreasing function of overt effort. In addition, we suppose that discretionary effort is an increasing function of the agent’s intrinsic motivation \( \phi. \) Writing discretionary effort as \( x^d = x^d(x^o, \phi), \) the principal’s profit is \( R(a, x^o, x^d(x^o, \phi)), \) where \( a \) is the quality of the organization, the principal’s ability, or other factor affecting overall productivity. Supposing that the optimal overt effort is decreasing in intrinsic motivation, this model reduces to our setting with \( Q(e, a, \phi) = R(a, -e, x^d(-e, \phi)). \)\footnote{One simple functional form capturing our discussion is \( R(a, x^o, x^d(x^o, \phi)) = a + x^o + x^d(x^o, \phi), \) where the discretionary effort function satisfies \( \frac{\partial^2 x^d(x^o, \phi)}{\partial x^o \partial \phi} < 0, \) \( \frac{\partial^2 x^d(x^o, \phi)}{\partial x^o} > 0, \) and \( \frac{\partial^2 x^d(x^o, \phi)}{\partial \phi} < 0. \)}\footnote{An alternative interpretation of the same framework is that \( x^o \) is the agent’s “mechanical” input into the organization, \( x^d \) is his “creative” input, and \( \phi \) is his ability. In this interpretation, creative input depends on creative effort—which is a substitute to overt effort—and ability.
APPLICATION 3—Assertiveness Versus Deference: The decisionmaker is in a personal relationship—such as partnership or friendship—with another individual. The output $q$ is how “nicely” the other person is acting, including how willing she is to comply with the agent’s requests, how much of the unpleasant joint work she does, and so forth. The fundamental $\phi$ is how nice the other person is, and $e$ is how deferentially the agent acts toward her. This action could range from being extremely deferential (high $e$) to being extremely aggressive or even violent (low $e$). Finally, $a$ stands for the agent’s talent or attractiveness. Output is determined according to the loss-function specification of Example 1: the partner tends to act more nicely if she is a nicer person, if the agent is more talented or attractive, and if the agent’s behavior is more attuned to the partner’s niceness.

Of course, the deference or aggressiveness of an agent, or the niceness of his partner’s behavior, are not typical outcomes studied by economists. But these are clearly observable—with noise—to individuals, and manifestations—at least of extreme choices—might be observable to researchers as well.\footnote{For instance, Card and Dahl (2011) study the role of emotions in family violence using police records.}

APPLICATION 4—Work and Return to Effort: The agent is an employee or student who must decide how hard to work at his job or school. He periodically observes the output of his efforts, such as promotions, grades, or other rewards, but he does not know the return to effort. Output is given by the effort specification in Example 2.

APPLICATION 5—Public Policy: A policymaker aims to maximize the performance of some aspect of the economy, $q$, which depends on his policy choice $e$, a fundamental $\phi$, his ability or his party’s or country’s potential $a$, and noise according to the loss-function specification in Example 1. In particular, output $q$ could be the well-being of the population in relation to drug-related crime, $\phi$ could be the underlying condition of the population with respect to drug use, and $e$ could be the degree of drug liberalization. The extent of restrictions must be optimally aligned with underlying conditions to minimize drug-related crime. In a completely different example, $q$ could represent the overall performance of the economy, $e$ could represent the country’s openness toward other countries in trade, exchange of ideas, and movement of people, and $\phi$ could represent the optimal degree of integration with the world economy.\footnote{This example was suggested to us by Francesco Squintani.}

One may argue that since politicians are heavily scrutinized and receive a lot of feedback, they should learn about themselves and not be overconfident. Yet by extensively documenting and studying overconfidence in another high-flying and heavily scrutinized group, top CEOs, Malmendier and Tate (2005) and the literature following it have shown that feedback does not necessarily eliminate overconfidence. Hence, while we are unaware of direct compelling evidence that politicians are overconfident, it is plausible that many are. In addition, a policymaker may have unrealistic expectations not only because of his trust in himself, but also because of his unrealistic beliefs about policy tools. He may, for instance, have false beliefs about how much of an increase in economic growth or reduction in crime can be achieved with the right policy.

2.3. Preliminaries

Let $e^*(\phi)$ denote the optimal action when the fundamental is $\phi$. We define the surprise function as

$$
\Gamma(\phi) = Q(e^*(\phi), A, \Phi) - Q(e^*(\phi), \tilde{a}, \phi).
$$

\footnote{For instance, Card and Dahl (2011) study the role of emotions in family violence using police records.}
If the agent believes the fundamental to be $\phi$, then he takes the action $e^*(\phi)$, and therefore expects average output to be $Q(e^*(\phi), \bar{\tilde{a}}, \phi)$. In reality, he obtains an average output of $Q(e^*(\phi), A, \Phi)$, so that $\Gamma(\phi)$ represents the average surprise he experiences. Applying Esponda and Pouzo’s (2016a) Berk–Nash equilibrium—their solution concept for games when players may have misspecified models—to our setting, yields the following definition.\(^{10}\)

**DEFINITION 1**: A stable belief is a Dirac measure on a fundamental $\phi_\infty$ at which the agent is not surprised by average output, that is, $\Gamma(\phi_\infty) = 0$.

Given our assumption of a full-support prior, a stable belief is the only type of point belief that the agent may find no reason to abandon. If the agent holds a stable belief about the fundamental, then he takes an action such that he produces on average exactly as much as he expects, confirming his belief. In contrast, if the agent holds any other point belief about the fundamental, then he takes an action such that he obtains a nonzero average surprise, accumulating evidence that the fundamental is something else. As a result, one would expect the agent’s beliefs to converge to a stable belief, if one exists.

Motivated by these observations, in the rest of the paper we perform two distinct types of analysis. In Sections 3, 4, and 6, we study properties of the agent’s stable beliefs, assuming that his beliefs converge to a stable belief. And in Section 5, we confirm in the central case of our model that—under somewhat stronger technical assumptions—beliefs indeed converge to a stable belief.

For our analysis, we assume that there is a unique stable belief. Although our model’s mechanism and insights regarding the properties of stable beliefs hold more generally, this assumption simplifies many of our statements. In addition, the assumption is crucial for our convergence proof. We identify sufficient conditions for a unique stable belief as follows.

**PROPOSITION 1**: There is a unique stable belief if any one of the following statements holds:

(i) Derivative $Q_a$ is bounded, derivative $Q_\phi$ is bounded away from zero, and overconfidence $(\bar{\tilde{a}} - A)$ is sufficiently small.

(ii) Output $Q$ takes the form in Example 1.

(iii) Output $Q$ takes the form in Example 2 and $c'''(e) \geq 0$.

3. MAIN MECHANISM AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

In this section, we lay out the main forces in our model, and discuss economic implications. For this purpose, we suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Although we state our results for general $Q$, throughout we use the loss-function specification of Example 1 for illustration. For these illustrations, we normalize $A = \Phi = 0$, and suppose that the prior on $\phi$ is symmetric and has mean equal to the true fundamental.

3.1. Self-Defeating Learning

3.1.1. Example 1. Fixed Action

As a benchmark case, we suppose for a moment that $e_t$ is exogenously given and constant over time at level $e = e^*(\Phi) = 0$. Then, average output converges to $Q(e, A, \Phi) = 0$.

\(^{10}\)Lemma 7 in the Appendix shows formally that a stable belief and the corresponding optimal action constitute a Berk–Nash equilibrium, and that every pure-strategy Berk–Nash equilibrium is of that form.
The agent, in turn, believes that if the state is $\phi$, then average output is $Q(e, \tilde{a}, \phi) = \tilde{a} + \phi - L(e - \phi) = \tilde{a} + \phi - L(\phi)$. To explain an average output of zero, therefore, he comes to believe that the fundamental is $\phi^*_{\infty}$ satisfying $\tilde{a} + \phi^*_{\infty} - L(\phi^*_{\infty}) = 0$.

Figure 1 illustrates. The agent's belief about the fundamental ($\phi$) as well as his action ($e$) are on the horizontal axis, and output is on the vertical axis. The agent's limiting belief is given by the intersection of the loss function through the origin and the line $\tilde{a} + \phi$: at this point, the loss from taking the (in his mind) suboptimal action exactly explains the average output of zero.

Clearly, $\phi^*_{\infty} < \Phi$. Intuitively, the agent is surprised by the low average output he observes, and concludes that the fundamental is worse than he thought. This tendency to attribute failures to external factors provides a formalization of part of the self-serving attributional bias documented by Miller and Ross (1975) and the literature following it. Indeed, one account of the bias is that individuals have high expectations for outcomes, and update when outcomes fall short (Tetlock and Levi (1982), Campbell and Sedikides (1999)). But while the agent’s inference about the fundamental is misguided—it takes him away from his correct prior mean—in the current setup with a fixed action it is harmless or potentially even beneficial. For instance, because the agent now correctly predicts average output, he makes the correct choice when deciding whether to choose this task over an outside option with a given level of utility.\footnote{As a simple implication, if the agent's high belief about ability is due to ego utility as in Köszegi (2006), then misdirected learning allows him to have his cake and eat it too: he can maintain the pleasure from believing that his ability is high, while not suffering any losses associated with incorrect beliefs.}

3.1.2. Example 1. Endogenous Action

Now suppose that the agent chooses his action optimally given his beliefs. We illustrate the learning dynamics in Figure 2, again putting the agent’s belief ($\phi$) as well as his action ($e$) on the horizontal axis and putting output on the vertical axis. The “average output possibilities curve” $Q(e, A, \Phi) = -L(e)$ represents true average output as a function of the agent’s action, and the “perceived average achievable output line” $Q(e^*(\phi), \tilde{a}, \phi) = \tilde{a} + \phi$ represents the average output the agent believes is reachable as a function of the funda-
mental $\phi$. Since $e^*(\phi) = \phi$, the agent’s stable belief assigns probability 1 to the intersection of the two curves. It is apparent from the figure that the limiting belief is further than in the case of exogenously fixed actions above. Hence, learning is self-defeating in a basic sense: the fact that the agent can optimize given his learning makes his learning even more inaccurate, with the corresponding bad effect on his actions. In particular, the agent’s limiting per-period utility loss relative to the optimal action can be an arbitrarily large multiple of his overconfidence $\Delta$.

How does the agent drive himself into such a highly suboptimal situation? We give a heuristic argument, assuming that the agent updates his action increasingly rarely, and pretending that his average output and beliefs reach their limit in finite time after each update. Suppose that for a long time, the agent chooses the optimal action given his initial beliefs, $e = 0$, and ends up with an average output of zero. Then, the belief $\phi_1$ he develops about the fundamental is the same as in the case of exogenously fixed actions: it is given by the intersection of the loss function starting at $(0, 0)$ (the higher dashed curve $L(\phi)$) and the perceived average achievable output line.

Now suppose that the agent updates his action, and for an even longer time keeps taking the optimal action given his new belief, $e = \phi_1$. Then, he ends up with an average output of $-L(\phi_1)$. To identify the $\phi_2$ consistent with this average output, we draw a copy of the loss function starting from his current action-average output location (the lower dashed curve $L(\phi - \phi_1) - L(\phi_1)$), and find the intersection of this curve with the perceived average achievable output line. This is his new belief $\phi_2$ (which, therefore, satisfies $\bar{a} + \phi_2 - L(\phi_2 - \phi_1) = -L(\phi_1)$). Continuing with this logic gives a sense of the agent’s learning dynamics, and illustrates why he ends up at $\phi_\infty$. 
We briefly discuss how our prediction of self-defeating learning can manifest itself in the applications outlined in Section 2.2. In the context of manager–subordinate relationships (an example of Application 1), Manzoni and Barsoux (1998, 2002) describe a common problem—the “set-up-to-fail syndrome”—that is due to a dynamic similar to our mechanism. When the subordinate performs below expectations, the manager reacts by increasing control and assigning less inspiring tasks. This undermines the employee’s motivation, lowering performance and eliciting further negative reactions from the manager.

In the context of organizations (Application 2), the notion of dysfunctional vicious circles has been described in sociology (March and Simon (1958), Crozier (1964), Masuch (1985)). Management is dissatisfied with the performance of the organization and attempts to improve things with increased monitoring, control, or other bureaucratic measures. These measures backfire, for instance, because they alienate employees. Management reacts by tightening bureaucratic measures further.

In the context of personal relationships (Application 3), our model provides one possible mechanism that links unrealistically high self-views to aggressive behavior. Although it had been hypothesized that aggression is associated with low self-esteem, Baumeister, Smart, and Boden (1996) and the subsequent literature reviewed by Lambe, Hamilton-Giachritsis, Garner, and Walker (2018) argue that aggressive individuals tend to have high self-esteem that is not based on compelling facts. Our model says that in this situation, the agent comes to feel that his partner does not treat him with the respect he deserves from a nice partner, and reacts by becoming more assertive. As a result of this misguided reaction, he receives even less respect from his partner, leading him to react even more strongly. The relationship deteriorates, and potentially ends up abusive and/or violent.12

Although we have not found discussions that are reminiscent of our mechanism in our other applications, self-defeating interpretations of worse-than-expected outcomes also seem plausible in these settings. In the context of work or study effort (Application 4), when a person with unrealistic expectations does not obtain the rewards he expects, he concludes that the return to talent and effort is lower than he thought, and he lowers his effort in response. But because effort is important, this lowers his output more than he expects, leading him to become even more pessimistic about the return to effort. As a case in point, our mechanism may contribute to the widespread underestimation of the returns to college education documented by Bleemer and Zafar (2018), but more research is necessary to determine the extent and nature of its role.

In an interesting contrast to our model, existing work on overconfidence, such as Bénabou and Tirole (2002), Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2011) and de la Rosa (2011), has emphasized that if ability and effort are complements, then overconfidence can benefit a person by leading him to exert higher effort. Our model says that if ability and effort have separable effects, or even if they are complements, but the complementarity is low, then exactly the opposite is the case.

In the context of the war on drugs (an example of Application 5), a policymaker may interpret drug problems as indicating that he should crack down on drugs, only to make the problem worse and the reaction harsher. In the context of nationalism, policymakers (or citizens) may react to disappointing economic outcomes by concluding that globalization does not hold as much promise as they had hoped. This leads the country to adopt

---

12The mechanism that Baumeister and coauthors describe verbally is somewhat different from ours. They hypothesize that violence serves as a way for a person to protect his unrealistically high self-views when these views are threatened by an outsider. While this is consistent with our mechanism if we interpret a “threat” as treating the agent with less respect than he believes he deserves, the relationship of the two mechanisms warrants further research.
more nationalistic and protectionist policies, exacerbating the problem and hardening the conclusion that globalization is a failure.

3.1.3. General $Q$

We now state the self-defeating nature of learning formally and for general $Q$.

**Proposition 2:** Suppose Assumption 1 holds. If the agent’s action is exogenously fixed at $e \geq e^*(\Phi)$, then his beliefs converge to a Dirac measure on a point $\phi_e^\infty$ satisfying $\phi_e^\infty < \phi^\infty < \Phi$.

Proposition 2 implies that if the agent starts off with an action at or above the optimal action, then the opportunity to change his action in response to his inferences leads to more incorrect long-run beliefs than if he could not change his action. By continuity, the same is the case if his initial action is below but close to the optimal action. Of course, the self-defeating nature of learning also implies that if the initial action is not too far from the optimal action, then the opportunity to update his action lowers the agent’s long-run average utility.

We conclude this section by illustrating in the loss-function specification that the directional assumptions we have made on the effect of the fundamental on output and the optimal action ($Q_\phi, Q_{e\phi} > 0$) are indeed irrelevant for the logic of our results. First, suppose that the production function is of the form $Q(e, a, \phi) = a - \phi - L(e - \phi)$, so that an increase in the fundamental lowers expected output. As Figure 3 makes clear, this leaves the

![Figure 3](image-url)
logic—including that the agent’s learning is self-defeating and can leave his beliefs arbitrarily far from the truth relative to $\Delta$—completely unchanged: the average output possibilities curve is still $-L(e)$, and the perceived average achievable output line is now $\tilde{a} - \phi$, so the mirror image of our previous analysis applies. Consider also the possibility that the optimal action depends negatively on the state ($Q_{e\phi} < 0$): $Q(e, a, \phi) = a + \phi - L(e + \phi)$. With the trivial change of variables $\phi' = -\phi$, this is equivalent to the case above, so once again the same analysis and the same insights result.

3.2. The Importance of Being Right

3.2.1. Example 1

Because it provides a surprising and potentially testable prediction of our model, we consider the comparative statics of stable beliefs with respect to the loss function. An increase in the loss function increases the agent’s incentive to act in accordance with the fundamental. His action responds in an unfortunate way: by ending up further from the fundamental. If the loss function shifts up, then the curve $-L(e)$ in Figure 2 shifts down, and the stable belief $\phi_\infty$ therefore moves to the left. Intuitively, a steeper loss function means that the agent hurts himself more through his misinferences. To develop a consistent theory of his observations, therefore, he must become more pessimistic about the world.

3.2.2. General $Q$

To generalize the above result to arbitrary production functions, we define

\[
R(a, \phi) = Q(e^*(a, \phi), a, \phi),
\]

\[
L(e, a, \phi) = Q(e^*(a, \phi), a, \phi) - Q(e, a, \phi),
\]

and observe that $Q(e, a, \phi) = R(a, \phi) - L(e, a, \phi)$. Intuitively, $R(a, \phi)$ is the average achievable output given $a$ and $\phi$, and $L(e, a, \phi)$ is the loss relative to the achievable output due to choosing a suboptimal action. We compare two technologies $Q_1$ and $Q_2$ with corresponding $e_1^*, e_2^*, R_1, R_2, L_1$, and $L_2$.

**Proposition 3:** Suppose Assumption 1 holds, $e_1^*(a, \phi) = e_2^*(a, \phi)$ and $R_1(a, \phi) = R_2(a, \phi)$ for all $a, \phi$, and $L_1(e, a, \phi) < L_2(e, a, \phi)$ for all $a, \phi, e \neq e^*(a, \phi)$. Then, the agent’s stable belief is further below the true fundamental $\Phi$ under technology $Q_2$ than under technology $Q_1$.

The key step in the proof of Proposition 3 is that an increase in the loss function decreases the surprise function. An increase in the loss function means that the agent hurts himself more through his misinference-induced suboptimal behavior, and this must mean that he is more negatively surprised by his average output. Additionally, a downward shift in the surprise function lowers the agent’s stable belief.

3.3. Outside Options

In the above model, we have assumed that the agent participates in the task in every period regardless of his beliefs. It is natural to consider an environment in which he has an outside option, such as another task he could perform. In the manager–employee setting,
for instance, a manager can keep working with the current employee, or he can fire the employee and reopen or discontinue the position.

Let the utility of the outside option be $u$. We suppose that the agent correctly understands $u$, and discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption below. We denote by $\Phi$ the prior mean of the fundamental, and by $\phi_\infty$ the stable belief when the fundamental is $\Phi$. Let $u_t = \max_e \int Q(e, \tilde{a}, \psi) \pi_{t-1}(\psi) \, d\psi$ be the utility the agent assigns to the task according to the belief he holds at the beginning of period $t$, $\pi_{t-1}$. The agent chooses the outside option in period $t$ if and only if $u_t < u$. We assume that $Q(e^*(\phi_\infty), \tilde{a}, \phi_\infty) < u < u_1$, which is the situation in which interesting new issues arise. As Proposition 4 below shows, in this case the overconfident agent starts off by choosing the task, but as the prior becomes sufficiently concentrated, the probability that he eventually switches to the outside option approaches 1.

There are then two cases defined by how a realistic agent behaves. If $u > \max_e \int Q(e, A, \psi) \pi_0(\psi) \, d\psi$, then a realistic agent would not enter the task in the first place, so an overconfident agent’s entry into it and his initial persistence in it are both suboptimal. The prediction that overconfident individuals—overestimating their ability to perform well—are more likely to enter into and persist in ability-sensitive tasks is consistent with common intuition and evidence from psychology as well as economics. Overconfidence is often invoked as one explanation for why many new businesses fail in the first few years, and indeed Landier and Thesmar (2009) find that entrepreneurs of small startups have overconfident expectations about future growth. Similarly, several studies suggest that CEO overconfidence is associated with a higher likelihood of pursuing risky actions, such as making acquisitions (Malmendier and Tate (2008)) and undertaking innovation (Galasso and Simcoe (2011), Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012)). And persisting in tasks (often for too long) is regarded as one of the main characteristics of overconfidence (McFarlin, Baumeister, and Blascovich (1984), for example).

More novel and surprising insights emerge if $u < \max_e Q(e, A, \tilde{\Phi})$.

**PROPOSITION 4:** Suppose that $Q_\phi < \kappa_\phi$ and $Q(e^*(\phi_\infty), \tilde{a}, \phi_\infty) < u < \max_e Q(e, A, \tilde{\Phi})$. As the variance of $\pi_0$ approaches 0:

(i) The probability that the overconfident agent eventually switches to and then sticks with the outside option approaches 1.

(ii) The probability that a realistic agent ever chooses the outside option approaches 0.

Given that the outside option is relatively poor, the agent should start off choosing the task, and given that the prior variance is small, sticking with the task is likely to be the rational strategy. Yet the overconfident agent is likely to suboptimally give up on the task. Ironically, therefore, the agent stops performing the task because he overestimates his ability to do well in it. Intuitively, he is more prone to exit than a realistic agent because his negative inferences about the fundamental eventually negate his overconfidence.

Importantly, an overconfident agent is prone to overestimate not only output in the current task, but—in as much as it depends in part on ability—also the outside option $u$. Such overestimation exacerbates the tendency to exit the task, and can generate interesting dynamics when there are multiple types of alternative tasks for the agent to choose. The logic of our model suggests that the agent first seeks out another ability-sensitive task in which he believes a different fundamental determines outcomes, and then successively
jumps from one such task to the next. And once he runs out of these tasks, he chooses a less ability-sensitive task and sticks with it.\footnote{A related point to ours is made in a bargaining context by Bénabou and Tirole (2009), who show that an individual may leave a productive partnership in part because he overestimates his outside option. Our model predicts that the agent may well exit even if he correctly understands the outside option. As a result, he may exit even if no ability-sensitive alternative tasks are available.}

The prediction that overconfidence leads individuals to eventually quit superior tasks, to jump too much between tasks, and to eventually prefer less ability-sensitive tasks, contrasts with the typical view on the implications of overconfidence. While we have not found direct evidence for this prediction, it is consistent with the observation that many documented effects of overconfidence in economic settings, such as the tendency of overconfident CEOs to undertake mergers or innovations, pertain to the pursuit of new directions rather than to persistence in old directions.

Our result that an overconfident agent jumps between tasks suggests one possible reason for the persistence—though not for the emergence—of overconfidence. Since the agent often abandons tasks and prefers tasks for which previous learning does not apply, he can keep updating mostly about external circumstances, slowing down learning about his ability.

## 4. WHEN LEARNING IS NOT DETRIMENTAL

In Section 3, we have shown that self-defeating learning—whereby the agent’s response to his misguided inferences leads to even more misguided inferences and even more suboptimal behavior—always occurs under Assumption 1. We now discuss what happens when Assumption 1 is not satisfied, allowing us to partially characterize the conditions that facilitate self-defeating learning.

Suppose, therefore, that $Q_{ea} > 0$, so that the optimal action is strictly increasing in ability. To understand the key issue, suppose also that the agent starts off with a belief that is concentrated around the true fundamental. Then, because he is overconfident and $Q_{ea} > 0$, his initial action is too high. As in the rest of our analysis, the surprisingly low average output he observes leads him to revise his belief about the fundamental downward—and, as a consequence, to choose lower actions. Because his initial action was too high, this adjustment is in the right direction. We then have two cases. It is possible that in the limit misdirected learning increases output, so that self-defeating learning does not occur. It is, however, also possible that misdirected learning lowers the action below optimal, at which point the logic by which further learning occurs is analogous to that in Section 3. Then, self-defeating learning may occur: any further negative inference about $\phi$ leads the decisionmaker to choose lower actions, lowering output and reinforcing his negative inference.

As a conceptually interesting question, as well as to say more about when each of the above two cases obtains, we ask when a misspecified agent’s long-run behavior is optimal. Call the action that is optimal given the unique stable belief the stable action.

**Proposition 5:** The following statements are equivalent:

(i) For any $A, \tilde{a},$ and $\Phi$, the agent’s stable action is optimal (i.e., maximizes true expected output).

(ii) There is a function $V(e, S(a, \phi))$ such that (a) for any $A, \tilde{a},$ and $\Phi$, the agent’s stable action is identical to that with the output function $Q(e, a, \phi) = V(e, S(a, \phi))$, and (b) $V, S_{a}, S_{\phi} > 0$, and for any $a, \phi$, and $\tilde{a}$, there is a unique $\phi'$ satisfying $S(a, \phi) = S(\tilde{a}, \phi')$.\footnote{A related point to ours is made in a bargaining context by Bénabou and Tirole (2009), who show that an individual may leave a productive partnership in part because he overestimates his outside option. Our model predicts that the agent may well exit even if he correctly understands the outside option. As a result, he may exit even if no ability-sensitive alternative tasks are available.}
Proposition 5 says that agents with wrong beliefs about ability always (i.e., for any $A$, $\bar{a}$, and $\Phi$) behave optimally in the long run if and only if there is an output function that always describes long-run behavior and that depends only on a summary statistic $S$ of ability and the fundamental, and not independently on the two variables. With such an output function, the agent can in the limit correctly deduce $S$ from average output, so he correctly predicts how changes in his action affect output. As a result, he chooses the optimal action. Our proof establishes that this kind of production function is not only sufficient, but in the above sense is also necessary for learning to be optimal in the limit.

An interesting aspect of Proposition 5 is that the agent is able to find the optimal action exactly when the problem is not identifiable—that is, when his observations of output do not allow him to separately learn $a$ and $\Phi$. This beneficial role of non-identifiability is in direct contrast to what one might expect based on the statistical learning literature, where non-identifiability is defined as a property of the environment that hinders learning. Yet it is exactly the non-identifiability of the problem that allows the overconfident agent to choose his long-run action well: because ability and the fundamental do not have independent effects on output, the agent’s misinference about the fundamental can fully compensate his overconfidence regarding ability, and hence overconfidence does not adversely affect him.

In the team production setting, for instance, suppose that the agent—instead of making delegation decisions—chooses his effort level, and that output depends on effort and the total ability of the team (i.e., output takes the form $V(e, a + \phi)$). Then, although the agent still underestimates his teammates, he is able to deduce the team’s total ability $a + \phi$ from output. As a result, he chooses the optimal action.

Notice that statement (ii) of Proposition 5 implies that controlling for their effect on output, the optimal action is equally sensitive to ability and the fundamental $(e_0^*(a, \phi) / Q_e(e^*(a, \phi), a, \phi) = e_0^*(a, \phi) / Q^*(e^*(a, \phi), a, \phi))$. This insight indicates that if $Q_{ea} > 0$, then changes in the agent’s beliefs about the fundamental eventually induce actions that are significantly lower than optimal—and, hence, self-defeating learning occurs—if the optimal action is sufficiently more sensitive to the fundamental than to ability. Adding our insights from Section 3, we conclude that self-defeating learning occurs if the optimal action either (i) depends sufficiently less on ability than on the fundamental or (ii) depends in opposite ways on ability and the fundamental.

5. CONVERGENCE

In this section, we establish conditions under which the agent’s beliefs converge to the stable belief. We also argue that when the agent’s beliefs converge, his overconfidence is stable—that is, he will not realize he is wrong—in a specific sense.

5.1. Convergence With Myopic Actions

To establish convergence, we maintain the same assumptions as in Section 2.1, but impose stronger conditions on some of the derivatives of $Q$.14

ASSUMPTION 2: We have (i) $|Q_e| < \kappa_e$, (ii) $Q_a \leq \overline{\kappa}_a$, $0 < \kappa_\phi \leq Q_\phi \leq \overline{\kappa}_\phi$, and (iii) $|Q_{\phi\phi}| \leq \overline{\kappa}_{\phi\phi}$.

14Example 1 satisfies Assumption 2 as long as $L^\tau$ is bounded. Example 2 does not satisfy Assumption 2 as stated, but it does so under economically minor modifications: that $\tau < \infty$, $\overline{\theta} < \infty$, and $a$ is positive, bounded, and bounded away from zero.
The various bounds in Assumption 2 guarantee that the agent’s inferences from output and his reactions to these inferences are always of comparable size.\textsuperscript{15}

Our main result in this section is the following theorem.

**THEOREM 1:** Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, the agent’s beliefs almost surely converge in distribution to the unique stable belief $\phi_\infty$, and his actions almost surely converge to $e^*(\phi_\infty)$.

The interdependence between actions and beliefs—that the agent’s action depends on his belief, and the bias in his inferences in turn depends on his action—creates several difficulties in our convergence proof. To start, we cannot apply results from the statistical learning literature, such as those of Berk (1966) and Shalizi (2009), where the observer does not choose actions. Even one central necessary component of the convergence of beliefs, the concentration of beliefs, requires some properties of the path of actions. Indeed, convergence does not hold in some other models with endogenous actions, such as those of Nyarko (1991) and Fudenberg, Romanyuk, and Strack (2017), and the convergence result of Esponda and Pouzo (2016a, Theorem 3) applies only for priors close to the stable belief and for actions that are only close to optimal. To make matters especially difficult, beliefs constitute a function-valued process whose transitions are driven by shocks that are neither independently nor identically distributed. In general, the asymptotic behavior of the posterior distribution in such infinite-dimensional models when the observations are not i.i.d. is not well understood, even when the model is correctly specified (e.g., Ghosal and van der Vaart (2007, pp. 192–193)).

To resolve this problem, we apply a technique that to our knowledge has not been used in the literature on learning with misspecified models. We focus on extremal beliefs: what levels of the fundamental does the agent in the limit conclusively rule out? Given the structure of our problem, this puts bounds on his long-run actions, which restrict his extremal beliefs further. Using this contraction argument, we show that the agent rules out everything but the root of $\sqrt{1}$. We explain the detailed logic of our proof in six steps.

Step 1. We show that the change in beliefs can in the long run be approximated well by the expected change. To argue this, we use that the log-likelihood function is the average of the log-likelihoods of the realized outputs. This is the technically most demanding step in the proof, as—due to the endogeneity of actions—the log-likelihood is an average of nonidentical and nonindependent random variables. We adapt existing versions of the law of large numbers to the types of non-i.i.d. random variables our framework generates.

Step 2. We establish that if the agent is on average positively surprised by output for belief $\phi$, then by Step 1 the derivative of his subjective log-likelihood goes to infinity almost surely at $\phi$. An analogous statement holds for negative surprises.

Step 3. If the agent has realistic beliefs about ability ($\tilde{a} = A$), then—no matter his action—his average surprise is positive for $\phi < \Phi$, and negative for $\phi > \Phi$. By Step 2, his beliefs converge to $\Phi$ almost surely.

Step 4. Now we turn to the overconfident agent. We define $\phi_\infty$ as the supremum of fundamentals such that in the long run, the agent almost surely convinces himself that the

\textsuperscript{15}Specifically, the lower bound on $Q_\phi$ ensures that the agent always makes a nontrivial inference from an increase in output. The upper bound on $Q_\phi$ bounds how much the agent learns from the output of a single period. Similarly, the bounds on $Q_e$ and $Q_a$ ensure that changing the action or ability has a limited effect on output. The condition on $Q_{\phi, \phi}$ helps us to bound the second derivative of the subjective posterior log-likelihood.
true fundamental is above \( \phi_\infty \). We define \( \overline{\phi}_\infty \) analogously. We show that the beliefs of an overconfident agent can be bounded—in the sense of the monotone likelihood ratio property—relative to the beliefs of a realistic agent. Using that the beliefs of a realistic agent converge to \( \Phi \), this means that \( \phi_\infty \) and \( \overline{\phi}_\infty \) exist. And because the agent is overconfident, his beliefs about the fundamental must in the long run be below the truth: \( \phi_\infty \leq \overline{\phi}_\infty \leq \Phi \). The goal for the rest of the proof is to show that \( \overline{\phi}_\infty = \phi_\infty = \overline{\phi}_\infty \).

Step 5. We show that the above bounds on long-run beliefs also bound long-run actions. In particular, we know that the optimal action is increasing in the fundamental. Therefore, in the long run the agent’s action must be on (or arbitrarily close to) the interval \([e^*(\phi_\infty), e^*(\overline{\phi}_\infty)]\).

Step 6. Now we show by contradiction that \( \overline{\phi}_\infty \geq \phi_\infty \). Supposing that \( \phi_\infty < \overline{\phi}_\infty \), we establish that the agent’s average surprise at \( \overline{\phi}_\infty \) is positive in the long run. To see this, note that because \( \overline{\phi}_\infty < \phi_\infty \), the average surprise is positive for the action \( e^*(\overline{\phi}_\infty) \). Furthermore, since the agent overestimates ability and underestimates the fundamental (and \( Q_{ee} \leq 0, Q_{e\phi} > 0 \)), he underestimates \( Q_e \). This implies that the agent’s average surprise is positive for any action near or above \( e^*(\overline{\phi}_\infty) \), that is, for any long-run action. By Step 2, in the long run the agent convinces himself that the fundamental is above, and bounded away from, \( \overline{\phi}_\infty \), contradicting the definition of \( \overline{\phi}_\infty \). An analogous argument establishes that \( \overline{\phi}_\infty \leq \phi_\infty \).

### 5.2. Convergence With Dynamically Optimal Actions When \( Q \) Is Linear in \( \phi \)

In Section 5.1, we established convergence by assuming that the agent takes the myopically optimal action. In the current section, we consider dynamically optimal actions. We assume that the agent has discount factor \( \delta \in (0, 1) \), and in each period chooses a current action and a (history-contingent) strategy for future actions to maximize discounted expected output. Because \( e_t \) affects how much the agent learns about the fundamental, the myopically optimal action is in general not dynamically optimal, making it difficult to bound actions based on beliefs. For example, the agent will take an action associated with a low payoff this period if that action reveals a lot of information about optimal future actions. Nevertheless, we establish convergence in a special case of our model.

**ASSUMPTION 3:** Suppose (i) \( Q(e, a, \phi) = \phi H(e, a) + G(e, a) \), (ii) the second derivative of \( \log f \) is bounded away from zero, (iii) the prior distribution \( \pi_0 \) of \( \Phi \) satisfies \(-\infty < \kappa_n \leq (\partial^2 / \partial \phi^2) \log \pi_0(\phi) \leq \kappa_n < \infty \) as well as \( \phi \geq 0 \) and \( \pi_0(\phi) = 0 \), and (iv) \( e_t \) is chosen from a bounded interval.

The substantive new assumption is (i), which says that average output is linear in \( \phi \). The other assumptions are regularity conditions that add to Assumption 2.\(^{16}\)

**THEOREM 2:** Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold, and the agent chooses dynamically optimal actions. Then, the agent’s beliefs almost surely converge in distribution to the unique stable belief \( \phi_\infty \), and his actions almost surely converge to \( e^*(\phi_\infty) \).

\(^{16}\)The output function of Example 2 is linear in the fundamental and thus the example satisfies Assumption 3 as long as \( e \) is bounded. Example 1 does not satisfy Assumption 3.
To understand the key new idea, notice that for any $e_t$, the agent believes that
\[ \phi + \frac{e_t}{H(e_t, \tilde{a})} = \frac{q_t - G(e_t, \tilde{a})}{H(e_t, \tilde{a})}. \]
Hence, the agent believes that the observations $(q_t - G(e_t, \tilde{a}))/H(e_t, \tilde{a})$ are independently distributed signals with mean $\phi$, albeit with a variance that depends on $e_t$. By the logic underlying the law of large numbers, the agent’s subjective beliefs therefore concentrate in the long run for any sequence of actions. This implies that the subjective expected benefit from learning about the fundamental $\Phi$ vanishes, so the agent must eventually choose actions that are close to myopically optimal. As a result, the logic of Theorem 1 applies.

5.3. Stability of Overconfidence

A central assumption of our paper is that the agent has an unrealistically high point belief about his ability. In this section, we ask whether his observations might lead him to conclude that something about his beliefs is awry, which might lead him to reconsider his belief about ability.\(^\text{17}\) We show that if beliefs and actions converge, then there is a strong sense in which the agent will see no reason to doubt his belief about ability, even after he has observed infinite data.

To make our point, we construct a specification test for the agent’s beliefs that—in addition to relying on infinitely many observations—is arguably far more stringent than what a person would realistically submit his views to. Formally, suppose that the agent’s beliefs converge to the stable belief. Given this limiting belief, the agent looks back and extracts the noise realizations he thinks have generated his observations:
\[ \tilde{\epsilon}_t = q_t - Q(e_t, \tilde{a}, \phi_{\infty}). \]
Now the agent takes the infinite subsample $\{\tilde{\epsilon}_{t_1}, \tilde{\epsilon}_{t_2}, \ldots\}$ of the $\tilde{\epsilon}_t$, where $t_1, t_2, \ldots$ are specified ex ante. Let $\hat{F}_i(x) = |\{i' \leq i | \tilde{\epsilon}_{i'} \leq x\}|/i$ be the empirical frequency of observations below $x$ in the first $i$ elements of his subsample. The agent expects this empirical cumulative distribution to match the true cumulative distribution of $\epsilon_t$ in the long run, it does.

**Proposition 6:** Suppose that beliefs converge in distribution to the unique stable belief. Then, for any sequence $t_i$ and any $x$, $\lim_{i \to \infty} \hat{F}_i(x) = F(x)$.

Intuitively, in the long run the agent settles on beliefs that lead him to predict average output accurately, so that he also extracts the noise terms accurately. Hence, he cannot be surprised about the long-run distribution of noise terms.

It is worth noting the role of the convergence of actions—as distinct from the convergence of beliefs—in our result. Suppose, for example, that the agent is forced to take each of the two actions $e_1$ and $e_2 > e_1$ infinitely many times at prespecified dates, but at vanishing rates, so that his beliefs still converge to $\phi_{\infty}$. Since $\tilde{a} > A$ and $\phi_{\infty} < \Phi$, $Q_{e\phi} > 0$ and $Q_{e\omega} \leq 0$ imply that $Q_e(e, A, \Phi) > Q_e(e, \tilde{a}, \phi_{\infty})$. The agent therefore underestimates the difference in average output with $e_2$ versus $e_1$, and hence Proposition 6 fails in a strong way: the empirical mean of $\tilde{\epsilon}_t$ must be nonzero either at $e_1$ or at $e_2$. This example illustrates that the informational environment makes it possible for our specification test to

\(^{17}\)See Gagnon-Bartsch, Rabin, and Schwartzstein (2017) for a more detailed exploration of when a person with a misspecified model may discover that he is wrong.
fail—but the agent takes actions under which it does not. In particular, his action does not vary enough for him to reject his belief about ability.

Of course, one may imagine a more sophisticated specification test that hinges on the speed of convergence of the agent’s beliefs. Unfortunately, we are unable to determine whether the agent passes such a test, because our convergence proofs cannot say anything about the speed of convergence, not even in the case of a realistic agent. We are skeptical, however, that a typical economic agent would perform specification tests of such sophistication.18

6. EXTENSIONS AND MODIFICATIONS

In this section, we discuss some economically relevant variants of our model. For simplicity, we restrict attention to the loss-function specification of Example 1 throughout this section. In addition, as in Sections 3 and 4, we assume that beliefs converge to the Dirac measure on the root of the surprise function, and study only properties of limiting beliefs.

6.1. Biased Learning About Ability

Throughout the paper, we have assumed that the agent holds a point belief about ability that is too high, thinking of this assumption as a stand-in for forces that generate overconfidence. We now show through a simple example that the mechanisms we have identified are consistent with a setting in which overconfidence arises endogenously through biased learning. Although the precise bias we assume is different, one can think of this exercise as integrating Gervais and Odean’s (2001) model of “learning to be overconfident” with our model of misdirected learning.

Suppose that the agent has continuously distributed prior beliefs about $a, \phi$ with full support on the plane. In each period, he observes output $q_t = a + \phi - L(e_t - \phi) + \epsilon_t$ as previously. In addition, he observes a noisy measure of his relative contribution to output, $r_t = a - (\phi - L(e_t - \phi) + \epsilon_t) + \epsilon'_t + \Delta'$, where the $\epsilon'_t$ have mean zero. However, the agent perceives his relative contribution with a bias: while he believes that $\Delta' = 0$, in reality $\Delta' = 2\Delta$.

The assumption that individuals perceive their own contribution to performance in a biased way is supported by a variety of evidence in psychology. For instance, Ross and Sicoly (1979) find that when married couples are asked about the portion of various household chores they perform, their answers typically add up to more than 100 percent. Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) provide evidence that parties in a negotiation interpret the same information differently and in a self-serving way. Summarizing the literature, Bénabou and Tirole (2016) explain that selective attention to and recall of information, asymmetric interpretation of information, and asymmetric updating can all contribute to individuals’ biased self-evaluations. Our model captures these possibilities in one simple reduced-form way.

Logically, it is possible that the agent evaluates not only $r_t$, but also $q_t$ in a biased way. But in most situations motivating our analysis, a person’s contribution to output is more...
subjective than output itself, and is hence more vulnerable to distortion. Bénabou and Tirole (2009) make a similar distinction.

Because the agent now observes both \( q_t \) and \( r_t \), we redefine his surprise function for this two-dimensional case. If the agent believes that his ability is \( a \) and the fundamental is \( \phi \), then he takes the action \( \phi \). We therefore write

\[
\begin{align*}
\Gamma_q(\phi, a) & = [A + \Phi - L(\phi - \Phi)] - [a + \phi], \\
\Gamma_r(\phi, a) & = [A - (\Phi - L(\phi - \Phi)) + \Delta] - [a - \phi].
\end{align*}
\]

The first line is the agent’s surprise function for output, which follows the same logic as in our basic model. The second line is the agent’s surprise function for his relative contribution. Due to his bias, the average relative contribution the agent perceives is \( A - (\Phi - L(\phi - \Phi)) + \Delta \). But because he is not aware of his bias, he expects his average relative contribution to be \( a - \phi \). Setting both surprises to zero, adding, and rearranging gives that the stable belief about ability must be \( \tilde{a}_\infty = A + \Delta/2 = A + \Delta \)—exactly the point belief that we imposed exogenously in our basic model. Plugging this into the unchanged surprise function for output, we get that the stable belief about the fundamental must also be the same as in our basic model.

PROPOSITION 7: There is a unique stable belief \( \tilde{a}_\infty, \phi_\infty \), where \( \tilde{a}_\infty = A + \Delta = \tilde{a} \) and \( \phi_\infty \) is the unique root of \( \Gamma \) defined in Equation (3).

Intuitively, the agent believes that the average of total output and his relative contribution, \( \sum_t (q_t + r_t)/2 \), provides an unbiased estimate of his ability. This estimator, however, converges to \( A + \Delta \), so that he develops overconfident beliefs over time. Given that he becomes overconfident about ability, he is misled about the fundamental in the same way as in our basic model.

6.2. Underconfidence

While many or most people are overconfident, some are “underconfident”—they have unrealistically low beliefs about themselves. We briefly discuss the implications of underconfidence for misguided learning. In Figure 4, we redraw the relevant parts of Figure 2 for underconfident beliefs (\( \tilde{a} < A \)), again normalizing \( A \) and \( \Phi \) to 0. As for overconfident agents, any possible stable belief is given by the intersection of the average output possibilities curve \(-L(e)\) and the perceived average achievable output line \( \tilde{a} + \phi \). If \( \tilde{a} < A \), the two curves intersect to the right of the true fundamental: since the agent is pessimistic about his own ability, he becomes overly optimistic about the fundamental. Furthermore, it is apparent from the figure that in the limit the agent’s loss from underconfidence is bounded by \( \Delta \). The formal statement follows.

PROPOSITION 8: Suppose \( Q \) takes the loss-function form in Example 1 and \( \tilde{a} < A \). Then, there is a unique stable belief \( \phi_\infty \), which satisfies 0 < \( \phi_\infty - \Phi < \Delta \) and \( L(\phi_\infty - \Phi) < \Delta \).

These results contrast sharply with those in the overconfident case, where the limiting belief is always more than \( \Delta \) away from the true fundamental (\( \Phi - \phi_\infty > \Delta \)), and the associated loss can be an arbitrarily large multiple of \( \Delta \). To understand the intuition, consider again an agent who has a symmetric prior with mean equal to the true fundamental.
Due to his underconfidence, the agent is then likely to observe some better performances than he expects. As a result, he concludes that the fundamental is better than he thought, and he revises his action. The resulting utility loss, however, leads him to reassess the optimistic revision of his belief, bringing his beliefs back toward the true fundamental. In this sense, the agent’s misinference regarding the fundamental is self-correcting—in contrast to the logic in the case of overconfidence, where the misinference is self-reinforcing. Moreover, because a utility loss of $\Delta$ or more cannot be explained by a combination of underconfidence in the amount of $\Delta$ and an unrealistically positive belief about the fundamental (which increases expected output), any consistent belief must generate a utility loss of less than $\Delta$.

7. RELATED LITERATURE

Our theory connects two literatures, that on overconfidence and that on learning with misspecified models. While we discuss other more specific differences below, to our knowledge our paper is the first one to study the implications of overconfidence for inferences about other, decision-relevant exogenous variables. More recently, Le Yaouanq and Hestermann (2016) study the same question, focusing on the issue of persistence, which we cover only briefly in Section 3.3. We are also unaware of previous research that characterizes when self-defeating learning does versus does not occur in an individual-decisionmaking context.
7.1. Overconfidence

Our paper studies the implications of unrealistic expectations regarding a variable for learning about another variable. In many applications, the most plausible source of such unrealistic expectations is overconfidence, which is the topic of an extensive literature in economics and psychology.

A plethora of classical evidence in psychology as well as economics suggests that on average people have unrealistically positive views of their traits and prospects (e.g., Weinstein (1980), Svenson (1981), Camerer and Lovallo (1999)). Recently, Benoît and Dubra (2011) have argued that much of this evidence is also consistent with Bayesian updating and correct priors, and thus does not conclusively demonstrate overconfidence. In response, a series of careful experimental tests have documented overconfidence in the laboratory in a way that is immune to the Benoît–Dubra critique (Burks, Carpenter, Goette, and Rustichini (2013), Charness, Rustichini, and van de Ven (2018), Benoît, Dubra, and Moore (2015)). In addition, there is empirical evidence that consumers are overoptimistic regarding future self-control (Shui and Ausubel (2004), DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006), for instance), that truck drivers persistently overestimate future productivity (Hoffman and Burks (2017)), that genetically predisposed individuals underestimate their likelihood of having Huntington’s disease (Oster, Shoulson, and Dorsey (2013)), that unemployed individuals overestimate their likelihood of finding a job (Spinnewijn (2015)), and that some CEOs are overoptimistic regarding the future performance of their firms (Malmendier and Tate (2005)). Moreover, in all of these domains the expressed or measured overconfidence predicts individual choice behavior. For example, CEOs’ overconfidence predicts the likelihood of acquiring other firms (Malmendier and Tate (2008)), of using internal rather than external financing (Malmendier and Tate (2005)), of using short-term debt (Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2013)), of engaging in financial misreporting (Schrand and Zechman (2012)), and of engaging in innovative activity (Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012)). While all of these papers look at the relationship between overconfidence and behavior, they do not theoretically investigate the implications of overconfidence for (misdirected) learning about other variables.

A number of theoretical papers explain why agents become (or seem to become) overconfident. In one class of papers, the agent’s learning process is tilted in favor of moving toward or stopping at confident beliefs (Gervais and Odean (2001), Bénabou and Tirole (2002), Zábojnik (2004), Kőszegi (2006), Chiang et al. (2011), Jehiel (2017)). In other papers, non-common priors or criteria lead agents to take actions that lead the average agent to expect better outcomes than others (Van den Steen (2004), Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005)). Finally, some papers assume that an agent simply chooses unrealistically positive beliefs because he derives direct utility from such beliefs (Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), Oster, Shoulson, and Dorsey (2013)). While these papers provide foundations for overconfident beliefs and some feature learning, they do not analyze how overconfidence affects learning about other variables.

Many researchers take the view that overconfidence can be individually and socially beneficial even beyond providing direct utility.19 Our theory is not contradictory to this view, but it does predict circumstances under which overconfidence can be extremely harmful.

19See, for example, Taylor and Brown (1988) for a review of the relevant psychology literature, and Bénabou and Tirole (2002) and de la Rosa (2011) for economic examples.
7.2. Learning With Misspecified Models

On a basic level, an overconfident agent has an incorrect view of the world. Hence, our paper is related to the literature on learning with misspecified models—that is, models in which the support of the prior does not include the true state of the world. Closely related to our theory, Esponda and Pouzo (2016a) develop a general framework for studying repeated games in which players have misspecified models. Methodologically, our model is a special case of theirs in which there is one player. Building on Berk (1966), Esponda and Pouzo establish that if actions converge, beliefs converge to a limit at which a player’s predicted distribution of outcomes is closest to the actual distribution. Our stable beliefs have a similar property. Because of our specific setting, we derive stronger results on convergence of beliefs and establish many other properties of the learning process and limiting beliefs. Esponda and Pouzo (2016b) extend the concept of Berk–Nash equilibrium to general dynamic single-agent Markov decision problems with nonmyopic agents. In Section 5.2, we prove convergence to a Berk–Nash equilibrium for a forward-looking agent. Technically, the agent’s problem with an outside option in Section 3.3 is a dynamic single-agent Markov problem, and hence is related to Esponda and Pouzo (2016b). Our specific context allows us to draw a number of lessons that have no parallel in their work.

Our convergence results with endogenous actions contrast with Nyarko (1991), who provides an example in which a misspecified myopic agent’s beliefs do not converge. Focusing on the case in which the agent’s subjective state space is binary, Fudenberg, Romanyuk, and Strack (2017) fully characterize asymptotic actions and beliefs for any level of patience. Even for a myopic agent beliefs often do not converge. Furthermore, Fudenberg, Romanyuk, and Strack provide a simple example in which the beliefs of a myopic agent converge, but those of a more patient agent do not. In our model the subjective state space is continuous, and we provide conditions under which beliefs do converge.

Taking the interpretation that at most one prior can be correct, multi-agent models with non-common priors can also be viewed as analyzing learning with misspecified models. In this literature, papers ask how different agents’ beliefs change relative to each other, but do not study the interaction with behavior. Dixit and Weibull (2007) construct examples in which individuals with different priors interpret signals differently, so that the same signal can push their beliefs further from each other. Similarly, Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2016) consider Bayesian agents with different prior beliefs regarding the conditional distribution of signals given (what we call) the fundamental, and show that the agents’ beliefs regarding the fundamental do not necessarily converge.

Misdirected learning also occurs in some other settings in which individuals have misspecified models of the world. In the social-learning model of Eyster and Rabin (2010) and in many cases also in that of Bohren (2016), agents do not sufficiently account for redundant information in previous actions. With more and more redundant actions accumulating, this mistake is amplified, preventing learning even in the long run. Esponda (2008)
studies an adverse-selection environment in which—similarly to the notion of cursed equilibrium by Eyster and Rabin (2005)—a naive buyer underestimates the effect of his price offer on the quality of supplied products. As the buyer learns from experience that the quality is low, he adjusts his price offer downward, leading to an even worse selection of products and perpetuating the misguided learning. We explore the implications of a very different mistake than these papers.

The interaction between incorrect inferences and behavior we study is somewhat reminiscent of Ellison’s (2002) model of academic publishing, in which researchers who are biased about the quality of their own work overestimate publishing standards, making them tougher referees and thereby indeed toughening standards. In contrast to our work, updating is ad hoc, and the model relies on “feedback” from others on the evolution of the publishing standard. In a similar but more distant vein, Blume and Easley (1982) ask when traders in an exchange economy learn the information held by others through the observation of equilibrium prices, allowing traders to entertain incorrect models. Traders consider a finite set of models—including the true model—and use a “boundedly rational” learning rule that ignores how learning by traders affects equilibrium prices. They show that the true model is locally stable but also that there could be cycles or an incorrect model can be locally stable.

There is also a substantial amount of other research on the learning implications of various mistakes in interpreting information (see, for instance, Rabin and Schrag (1999), Rabin (2002), Madarász (2012), Jehiel (2005), Rabin and Vayanos (2010), Benjamin, Rabin, and Raymond (2016), Spiegler (2016)). Overconfidence is a different type of mistake—in particular, it is not directly an inferential mistake—so our results have no close parallels in this literature.

Methodologically, our theory confirms Fudenberg’s (2006) point that it is often insufficient to do behavioral economics by modifying one assumption of a classical model, as one modeling change often justifies other modeling changes as well. In our setting, the agent’s false belief about his ability leads him to draw incorrect inferences regarding the fundamental, so assuming that an overconfident agent is otherwise classical may be misleading.

8. CONCLUSION

While our paper focuses exclusively on individual decisionmaking, the possibility of self-defeating learning likely has important implications for multi-agent situations. For example, it has been recognized in the literature that managerial overconfidence can benefit a firm both because it leads the manager to overvalue bonus contracts and because it can lead him to exert greater effort (de la Rosa (2011), for example). Yet for tasks with the properties we have identified, misguided learning can also induce a manager to make highly suboptimal decisions. Hence, our analysis may have implications for the optimal allocation of decisionmaking authority for a manager.

Beyond how an overconfident agent operates in a standard economic environment, it seems relevant to understand how multiple overconfident individuals interact with each other. As a simple example, consider again our application to assertiveness in personal relationships (Application 3), where an overconfident agent misinterprets his partner’s actions and ends up treating her more and more assertively. This dynamic is likely to be reinforced if the partner is also overconfident and, hence, similarly misinterprets the agent’s actions, creating a downward spiral on both sides. Peace has a chance only if the partners “indulge” each other’s overconfidence by holding overly positive views of each other.
A completely different issue is that different individuals may have different interpretations as to what explains unexpectedly low performance. For instance, a Democrat may interpret poor health outcomes as indicating problems with the private market, whereas a Republican may think that the culprit is government intervention. In the formalism of our model, one side believes that output is increasing in $\phi$, while the other side believes that output is decreasing in $\phi$. Similarly to Dixit and Weibull’s (2007) model of political polarization, decisionmakers with such opposing theories may prefer to adjust policies in different directions. Our model highlights that unrealistically high expectations regarding outcomes can play an important role in political polarization. Furthermore, our model makes predictions on how the two sides interpret each other’s actions. It may be the case, for instance, that if a Republican has the power to make decisions, he engages in self-defeating learning as our model predicts, with a Democrat looking on in dismay and thinking that—if only he had the power—a small adjustment in the opposite direction would have been sufficient. If the Democrat gets power, he adjusts a little in the opposite direction, initially improving performance, but then he engages in self-defeating learning of his own. Frequent changes in power therefore help keep self-defeating learning in check. Meanwhile, an independent who also has unrealistic expectations but is unsure about which side’s theory of the world is correct always tends to move his theory toward the theory of the party in opposition, as that party’s theory is better at explaining current observations.

APPENDIX: PROOFS

A.1. Auxiliary Results

This preliminary section introduces useful notation for the main proofs, shows that expected output and its derivative with respect to $e_t$ are well defined, that output has an intuitive influence on subjective beliefs, and applies a well known result from Berk (1966) on the convergence of subjective beliefs with fixed actions to our setting.

We say that a probability density function $f$ has decreasing tails if there is a $\epsilon_c > 0$ such that $\epsilon > \epsilon_c$ or $\epsilon < \epsilon_c$ implies $f(\epsilon) \leq f(\epsilon')$.

**Lemma 1**: Since $f$ is log concave, it has decreasing tails.

**Proof**: Log-concavity of $f$ implies that $(f'/f)$ is decreasing. Because the density has to integrate to 1, the fact that $(f'/f)$ is decreasing implies that there exists some $\epsilon^c$ such that both for all $\epsilon > \epsilon^c$, one has $f' < 0$, and for all $\epsilon < -\epsilon^c$, one has $f' > 0$. Therefore, $f$ has decreasing tails.

**Q.E.D.**

**Lemma 2**: Suppose that $f$ is bounded and has decreasing tails, and that $\pi_{t-1}$ has positive density everywhere. Then $\pi_t$ has positive density everywhere, and for any $e_t$, $q_t$, and any $\nu > 0$, there is a $\phi^{h_t} > 0$ such that if $\phi > \phi' > \phi^{h_t}$ or $\phi < \phi' < -\phi^{h_t}$, then

$$\frac{\pi_t(\phi)}{\pi_t(\phi')} < (1 + \nu) \frac{\pi_{t-1}(\phi)}{\pi_{t-1}(\phi')}.$$ 

**Proof**: By Bayes’ rule,

$$\pi_t(\phi) = \frac{f(q_t - Q(e_t, \hat{a}, \phi))\pi_{t-1}(\phi)}{\int f(q_t - Q(e_t, \hat{a}, s))\pi_{t-1}(s)\,ds}.$$
The numerator is clearly positive, and since \( f \) is bounded, the denominator is positive and finite, so \( \pi_t(\phi) \) is positive.

We show the claim of the lemma on the positive tail; the proof is analogous for the negative tail. Furthermore, the claim is obvious if \( \bar{\phi} \) is finite, so we suppose that \( \bar{\phi} \) is infinite. Notice that

\[
\frac{\pi_t(\phi)}{\pi_t(\phi')} = \frac{f(q_t - Q(e_t, \tilde{a}, \phi))}{f(q_t - Q(e_t, \tilde{a}, \phi'))} \cdot \frac{\pi_{t-1}(\phi)}{\pi_{t-1}(\phi')}.
\]

Now we consider two cases. First, suppose that \( \lim_{\phi \to \infty} Q(e_t, \tilde{a}, \phi) = q < \infty \). Then \( \lim_{\phi \to \infty} f(q_t - Q(e_t, \tilde{a}, \phi)) = f(q_t - q) \). This implies that there is a \( \phi^h_t \) such that if \( \phi > \phi' > \phi^h_t \), then

\[
\frac{f(q_t - Q(e_t, \tilde{a}, \phi))}{f(q_t - Q(e_t, \tilde{a}, \phi'))} < 1 + \nu,
\]

completing the proof for this case.

Alternatively, suppose that \( \lim_{\phi \to \infty} Q(e_t, \tilde{a}, \phi) = \infty \). Then there is a \( \phi^h_t \) such that if \( \phi > \phi' < -\phi^h_t \), then \( f(q_t - Q(e_t, \tilde{a}, \phi)) < f(q_t - Q(e_t, \tilde{a}, \phi')) \), again completing the proof. \( \square \)

For the following result, we first note that the existence of all moments (\( \|E[\phi^k]\| < \infty \) for all \( k \)) of \( \pi_0 \) implies the existence of all absolute moments (\( \|E[|\phi|^k]\| < \infty \) for all \( k \)). Observe that for \( k \) even, \( \|E[\phi^k]\| = \|E[|\phi|^k]\| \) and, thus, \( \|E[\phi^k]\| < \infty \Rightarrow \|E[|\phi|^k]\| < \infty \). For \( k \) odd, we have that

\[
|\phi|^k \leq \max\{1, |\phi|^k\} \leq \max\{1, |\phi|^{k+1}\} \leq 1 + |\phi|^{k+1}.
\]

Thus, \( \|E[|\phi|^k]\| \leq 1 + \|E[|\phi|^{k+1}]\| < \infty \) and the existence of the \( k+1 \)th moment implies the existence of the \( k \)th absolute moment.

**Lemma 3:** The posterior belief admits a density \( \pi_t \) and all its absolute moments are finite after any history.

**Proof:** We are going to show the result by induction over \( t \). First, the prior \( \pi_0 \) has a positive density by assumption, and since it has finite moments, by the argument above its absolute moments are also finite. We will show that if the posterior at time \( t-1 \) has a positive density and all its moments are finite then the posterior at time \( t \) is well defined and all its moments are finite.

By Lemmata 1 and 2 the posterior density \( \pi_t \) is well defined. To show that all moments exist, we need to verify that for any \( k \geq 1 \) the absolute moment

\[
\chi_{k,t} = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \pi_t(\psi) |\psi|^k d\psi
\]

is finite. To show this, first note that Lemma 2 implies that for every \( \nu > 0 \), there exists a \( \phi^h_t \) such that if \( \phi > \phi' > \phi^h_t \) or \( \phi < \phi' < -\phi^h_t \), then

\[
\frac{\pi_t(\phi)}{\pi_{t-1}(\phi)} < (1 + \nu) \frac{\pi_t(\phi')}{\pi_{t-1}(\phi')}.
\]
It follows from this that
\[
X_{k,t} = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \pi_t(\psi) |\psi|^k \, d\psi = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \pi_t(\psi) |\psi|^k \, d\psi + \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \pi_t(\psi) |\psi|^k \, d\psi \\
\leq \max \{ 1, |\phi_{ht}|^k \} + \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \pi_{t-1}(\psi) \frac{\pi_t(\psi)}{\pi_{t-1}(\psi)} |\psi|^k \, d\psi \\
\leq \max \{ 1, |\phi_{ht}|^k \} + \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \pi_{t-1}(\psi) (1 + \nu) \frac{\pi_t(\phi_{ht})}{\pi_{t-1}(\phi_{ht})} |\psi|^k \, d\psi \\
\leq \max \{ 1, |\phi_{ht}|^k \} + (1 + \nu) \frac{\pi_t(\phi_{ht})}{\pi_{t-1}(\phi_{ht})} \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \pi_{t-1}(\psi) |\psi|^k \, d\psi \\
= \max \{ 1, |\phi_{ht}|^k \} + (1 + \nu) \frac{\pi_t(\phi_{ht})}{\pi_{t-1}(\phi_{ht})} X_{k,t-1}.
\]
Thus, the \( k \)th moment of the posterior in period \( t \) is finite if the \( k \)th moment of the posterior in period \( t - 1 \) is finite. \( Q.E.D. \)

Recall that by assumption \( Q \) and \( Q_e \) have polynomial growth, that is, \( |Q(e, a, \phi)| + |Q_e(e, a, \phi)| \leq \kappa|\phi|^k + b \) for some \( \kappa, k, b > 0 \).

**Proposition 9:** The expected payoff is well defined for every action \( e \) and ability \( a \) after every history, and the expected payoff’s derivative with respect to the action is given by
\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial e} \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} Q(e, a, \psi) \pi_t(\psi) \, d\psi = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} Q_e(e, a, \psi) \pi_t(\psi) \, d\psi.
\]

**Proof:** Polynomial growth implies that the expected payoff is bounded by the \( k \)th absolute moment and, thus, is well defined:
\[
\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} |Q(e, a, \psi)| \pi_t(\psi) \, d\psi \leq \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} (b + \kappa|\phi|^k) \pi_t(\psi) \, d\psi = b + \kappa X_{k,t}.
\]
Note that \(|Q_e(e, a, \phi)| \leq \kappa|\phi|^k + b\) and as \(|\phi|^k\) is integrable with respect to \( \pi_t \), the dominated convergence theorem implies that
\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial e} \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} Q(e, a, \psi) \pi_t(\psi) \, d\psi = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} Q_e(e, a, \psi) \pi_t(\psi) \, d\psi. \quad Q.E.D.
\]

Let \( \mathcal{L}(x) = \mathbb{E}[\log f(x + \epsilon_1)] \), where the expectation is taken with respect to \( \epsilon_i \). Note that as \( \epsilon_1, \epsilon_2, \ldots \) are i.i.d., this expectation is independent of \( t \). Our first result shows that the log-concavity of \( f \) implies that \( \mathcal{L} \) is single-peaked, with its peak at zero. Let \( g(x) = \frac{1}{x} (\log f(x)) \) and let \(|\kappa_f|\) denote the bound on the absolute value of \( g' \), that is, \(|\kappa_f| > |g'|\).

**Lemma 4:** The function \( \mathcal{L}(x) \) is well defined for all \( x \in \mathbb{R} \). Furthermore,
(i) \( \mathcal{L}(\cdot) \) is strictly concave,
(ii) \( \mathcal{L}'(x) > 0 \) for \( x < 0 \) and \( \mathcal{L}'(x) < 0 \) for \( x > 0 \).
Proof: As the distribution of $\epsilon$ is log concave, it has finite variance $\sigma^2 = \mathbb{E}[|\epsilon|^2]$ (see, for example, Proposition 5.2 in Saumard and Wellner (2014)). Our bounded log-concavity assumption on $f$ implies that

$$|\log(f(x + \epsilon))| = \left| \log(f(x)) + \int_x^{x+\epsilon} g(z) \, dz \right| = \left| \log(f(x)) + \epsilon g(x) + \int_x^{x+\epsilon} g'(y) \, dy \right| \leq \left| \log(f(x)) \right| + |\epsilon| |g(x)| + |\epsilon|^2 \frac{|\kappa_f|}{2},$$

It thus follows that

$$|\mathcal{L}(x)| = \left| \mathbb{E}[\log f(x + \epsilon_i)] \right| \leq \mathbb{E}[|\log f(x + \epsilon_i)|] \leq \left| \log(f(x)) \right| + \mathbb{E}[|\epsilon_i|] |g(x)| + \mathbb{E}[|\epsilon_i|^2] \frac{|\kappa_f|}{2} \leq \left| \log(f(x)) \right| + \sigma |g(x)| + \sigma^2 \frac{|\kappa_f|}{2},$$

where we used in the last step that by Jensen’s inequality $\mathbb{E}[|\epsilon|] \leq \sqrt{\mathbb{E}[|\epsilon|^2]} = \sigma$. Thus, $\mathcal{L}(x)$ is well defined for every $x$.

As our log-concavity assumption implies that $|g|$ and $|g'|$ are bounded by an integrable function, majorized convergence yields that the derivatives of $\mathcal{L}'(\cdot)$ are given by

$$\mathcal{L}'(x) = \int_\mathbb{R} g(x + \epsilon) f(\epsilon) \, d\epsilon,$$

$$\mathcal{L}''(x) = \int_\mathbb{R} g'(x + \epsilon) f(\epsilon) \, d\epsilon \in [\kappa_f, 0).$$

Since $g' < 0$, $\mathcal{L}$ is strictly concave. To see that the peak is at zero, note that

$$\mathcal{L}(x) - \mathcal{L}(0) = \mathbb{E}[\log f(x + \epsilon_i) - \log f(\epsilon_i)] = -\mathbb{E} \left[ \log \left( \frac{f(\epsilon_i)}{f(x + \epsilon_i)} \right) \right].$$

The right-hand side equals minus the Kullback–Leibler divergence. By Gibb’s inequality the Kullback–Leibler divergence is larger or equal to zero, holding with equality if and only if both densities coincide almost everywhere (a.e.). Hence, the right-hand side is minimized at $x = 0$, so that $\mathcal{L}'(\cdot)$ is maximized at $x = 0$. Finally, as $\mathcal{L}$ is strictly concave and maximized at 0, it follows that $\mathcal{L}'(0) = 0$, and $\mathcal{L}'(x)$ is thus positive for $x < 0$ and negative for $x > 0$.

Q.E.D.

Denote by $\ell_0: \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$ the subjective prior log-likelihood of the agent. By Bayes’ rule the agent’s subjective log-likelihood $\ell_t: \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$ assigned to the state $\phi$ in period $t$ is given by

$$\ell_t(\phi) = \sum_{s=1}^t \log f(q_s - Q(e_s, \tilde{a}, \phi)) + \ell_0(\phi).$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)
The density function $\pi_t: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ of the agent’s subjective belief in period $t$ equals

$$
\pi_t(\phi) = \frac{e^{\ell_t(\phi)}}{\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} e^{\ell_t(z)} \, dz}.
$$

Denote by $\tilde{P}_t[\cdot] = \tilde{P}[\cdot \mid q_1, \ldots, q_t]$ the agent’s subjective probability measure over states conditional on the outputs $q_1, \ldots, q_t$ and denote by $\Pi_t: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the agent’s subjective belief

$$
\Pi_t(z) = \tilde{P}_t[\Phi \leq z] = \int_{-\infty}^{z} \pi_t(\phi) \, d\phi.
$$

We sometimes write $\ell_t(\phi; q)$ and $\pi_t(\phi; q)$ if we want to highlight the dependence of the agent’s belief on the outputs $q_1, \ldots, q_t$ observed in previous periods.

**DEFINITION 2—Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property:** A distribution with density $\pi: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ is greater than a distribution with density $\pi': \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ in the sense of monotone likelihood ratio $\pi' \leq_{\text{MLR}} \pi$ if and only if for all states $\phi' \leq \phi$,

$$
\frac{\pi'(\phi)}{\pi(\phi)} \leq \frac{\pi'(\phi')}{\pi(\phi')} \quad \text{(MLRP)}
$$

The next lemma shows that higher observed output $q_t$ in any period $t$ leads to a higher posterior belief in the sense of monotone likelihood ratios (MLR).

**LEMMA 5—Beliefs are Monotone in Output:** If $q_s \leq q_s$ for all $s \leq t$, then $\pi_t(\cdot; q) \leq_{\text{MLR}} \pi_t(\cdot; q)$.

**PROOF:** Condition (MLRP) is equivalent to

$$
0 \leq \log \left( \frac{\pi_t(\phi; q)}{\pi_t(\phi'; q)} \right) - \log \left( \frac{\pi_t(\phi'; q')}{\pi_t(\phi'; q')} \right) = [\ell_t(\phi; q) - \ell_t(\phi'; q)] - [\ell_t(\phi'; q') - \ell_t(\phi'; q')].
$$

Hence, it suffices to show that for all $s \leq t$,

$$
\frac{\partial^2 \ell_t(\phi; q)}{\partial q_s \partial \phi} \geq 0.
$$

Taking the derivative of the log-likelihood given in Equation (5) yields that for $s \leq t$,

$$
\frac{\partial^2 \ell_t(\phi; q)}{\partial q_s \partial \phi} = -g'(q_t - Q(e_s, \tilde{a}, \phi))Q_\phi(e_s, \tilde{a}, \phi).
$$

As $g' < 0$ and $Q_\phi > 0$, the result follows.

Our next result shows that beliefs converge when the agent takes the same action in every period. As in this case the outputs are independent, the result follows immediately from the characterization of long-run beliefs with i.i.d. signals in Berk (1966).
Lemma 6—Berk (1966): Suppose that the agent takes a fixed action \( e \) in all periods and there exists a state \( \phi^e_\infty \in (\phi, \Phi) \) that satisfies

\[
Q(e, A, \Phi) = Q(e, \tilde{a}, \phi^e_\infty).
\]  

(6)

Then the agent’s belief almost surely (a.s.) converges and concentrates on the unique state \( \phi^e_\infty \).

Proof: For fixed actions, outputs \( q_1, q_2, \ldots \) are i.i.d. random variables. The expectation of an outside observer of the log-likelihood that the agent assigns to the state \( \phi \) after observing a single signal \( q_t \) is given by

\[
E\left[ \log f(q_t - Q(e, \tilde{a}, \phi)) \right] = E\left[ \log f(Q(e, A, \Phi) - Q(e, \tilde{a}, \phi) + \varepsilon_t) \right] = L(Q(e, A, \Phi) - Q(e, \tilde{a}, \phi)).
\]  

(7)

By the main theorem in Berk (1966, p. 54), the agent’s subjective belief concentrates on the set of maximizers of (7). By Lemma 4, \( L(\cdot) \) is uniquely maximized at zero and, hence, (7) is maximized whenever (6) is satisfied. By assumption there exists such a point and since \( Q_\phi > 0 \) it is unique. Hence, the agent’s subjective belief converges to a Dirac measure on that point.

Q.E.D.

Let us denote a Dirac measure on the state \( \phi \) by \( \delta_\phi \).

Lemma 7: The set \((e, \pi)\) is a pure-strategy Berk–Nash equilibrium if and only if \( \pi \) is a stable belief \( \delta_\phi \) and \( e = e^\ast(\phi) \).

Proof: For a given state \( \phi' \) and action \( e \), the Kullback–Leibler divergence between the true distribution of signals and the distribution that the agent expects is given by

\[
E\left[ \log \frac{f(\varepsilon_i)}{f(Q(e, A, \Phi) - Q(e, \tilde{a}, \phi') + \varepsilon_i)} \right] = L(0) - L(Q(e, A, \Phi) - Q(e, \tilde{a}, \phi')).
\]

By the definition of Berk–Nash equilibrium, the agent assigns positive probability only to states that minimize the Kullback–Leibler divergence. Since, by Lemma 4, \( L(\cdot) \) is maximized at zero, it follows that the agent’s belief is a Dirac measure on the state \( \phi \) that satisfies \( Q(e, A, \Phi) - Q(e, \tilde{a}, \phi) = 0 \). Because the equilibrium action must be optimal given this belief, it follows that \((e^\ast(\phi), \delta_\phi)\) is a pure-strategy Berk–Nash equilibrium if and only if \( \phi \) is a stable belief.

Q.E.D.

A.2. Main Results

A.2.1. Proving Properties of Limiting Beliefs

We first show that all stable beliefs are in an interval around the true state \( \Phi \) if \( Q_\alpha \) and \( Q_\phi \) are bounded.

Lemma 8: Let \( \kappa_\alpha \geq Q_\alpha \) be an upper bound on \( Q_\alpha \) and let \( 0 < \kappa_\phi \leq Q_\phi \) be a lower bound on \( Q_\phi \). Any root of \( \Gamma \) lies in the interval \( I_\tilde{a} = [\Phi - \frac{\kappa_\alpha}{\kappa_\phi} (\tilde{a} - A), \Phi] \). Furthermore, \( \Gamma(\Phi) < 0 \) and \( \Gamma(\Phi - \frac{\kappa_\alpha}{\kappa_\phi} (\tilde{a} - A)) \geq 0 \), so if \( I_\tilde{a} \subset (\phi, \Phi) \), then \( \Gamma \) has at least one root in \( I_\tilde{a} \).
PROOF: Note that for $\tilde{a} = A$, the surprise function

$$\Gamma(\phi) = Q(e^*(\phi), A, \Phi) - Q(e^*(\phi), \tilde{a}, \phi)$$

has a unique root at $\phi = \Phi$ since $Q_{\phi} > 0$. Furthermore, since $Q_a > 0$ and $Q_{\phi} > 0$, when $\tilde{a} > A$ any root of $\Gamma$ must be less than $\Phi$. Now for any $\phi < \Phi$,

$$\Gamma(\phi) \geq \min_e \{ Q(e, A, \Phi) - Q(e, \tilde{a}, \phi) \}$$

$$= \min_e \{ Q(e, A, \Phi) - Q(e, A, \phi) + Q(e, A, \phi) - Q(e, \tilde{a}, \phi) \}$$

$$\geq \kappa_{\phi}(\Phi - \phi) - \kappa_{\phi} (\tilde{a} - A).$$

Therefore, any root of $\Gamma$ must lie in the interval $I_{\tilde{a}} = [\Phi - \frac{\kappa_{\phi}}{\kappa_{\phi}} (\tilde{a} - A), \Phi]$. Furthermore, since $A < \tilde{a}$, we have that $\Gamma(\Phi) < 0$, and by the above inequality, $\Gamma(\Phi - \frac{\kappa_{\phi}}{\kappa_{\phi}} (\tilde{a} - A)) > 0$. It thus follows from the continuity of $\Gamma$ that $\Gamma$ has at least one root in $I_{\tilde{a}}$. Q.E.D.

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: Part (i). We first show that for $\tilde{a} - A$ sufficiently small, $\Gamma$ can have at most one root. Since $e^*(\phi)$ is implicitly defined through $Q_e(e^*(\phi), \tilde{a}, \phi) = 0$ and $Q$ is twice continuously differentiable with $Q_{e^*} < 0$, $e^*(\phi)$ is a continuous function of $\phi$ and $\tilde{a}$. By the implicit function theorem, $e^*(\phi) = -Q_{e^*}/Q_{e^*}$ and, hence, is also a continuous function of $\phi$ and $\tilde{a}$. Thus,

$$\Gamma'(\phi) = Q_e(e^*(\phi), A, \Phi)(e^*)'(\phi) - Q_{\phi}(e^*(\phi), \tilde{a}, \phi)$$

is a continuous function of $\phi$ and $\tilde{a}$. Since for $\tilde{a} = A$ and $\phi = \Phi$,

$$\Gamma'(\phi)|_{\phi=\Phi,\tilde{a}=A} = -Q_{\phi}(e^*(\phi), A, \Phi) < 0,$$

continuity of $\Gamma'(\phi)$ implies that there exists a pair $\eta_A, \eta_{\phi} > 0$ such that for all $\tilde{a} \in [A, A + \eta_A]$ and $\phi \in (\Phi - \eta_{\phi}, \Phi]$, one has $\Gamma'(\phi) < 0$. Thus, for any $\tilde{a} \geq A$ that satisfies $\tilde{a} < A + \min\{\eta_A, \eta_{\phi} + \frac{\kappa_{\phi}}{\kappa_{\phi}}\}$, one has that $\Gamma'(\phi) < 0$ over the relevant interval $I_{\tilde{a}}$. By Lemma 8, all roots of $\Gamma$ lie in $I_{\tilde{a}}$ and, thus, for all such $\tilde{a}$, $\Gamma$ has a unique root. Furthermore, for $\tilde{a} - A$ small enough, $I_{\tilde{a}} \subset (\phi, \bar{\phi})$ and, hence, by Lemma 8, $\Gamma$ crosses zero in $(\phi, \bar{\phi})$. We conclude that $\Gamma$ has a unique root if overconfidence ($\tilde{a} - A$) is sufficiently small.

Part (ii). When $Q$ takes the form in Example 1, then $e^*(\phi) = \phi$ and

$$\Gamma(\phi) = -(\tilde{a} - A) + (\Phi - \phi) - L(\Phi - \phi).$$

Since $L'(x) < 1$, $\Gamma'(\phi) < 0$ and, hence, $\Gamma$ has at most one root. Finally, as $(\phi, \bar{\phi}) = \mathbb{R}$, we have that $I_{\tilde{a}} \subset (\phi, \bar{\phi})$ and, hence, there exists a stable belief by Lemma 8.

Part (iii). Since $Q_a > 0$ and $Q_{\phi} > 0$, when $\tilde{a} > A$ any root of $\Gamma$ must be less than $\Phi$. Now $\phi$ is a root of $\Gamma$ if and only if $(A + e^*(\phi))\Phi = (\tilde{a} + e^*(\phi))\phi$, or

$$e^*(\phi) = -A + (\tilde{a} - A)\phi/(\Phi - \phi).$$

The right-hand side of this equation is increasing and convex over the interval $(0, \Phi)$, negative at $\phi = 0$, and approaches $\infty$ as $\phi$ approaches $\Phi$. 
Furthermore, for $e^*(\phi)$ to be optimal given $\phi$, we must have $c'(e^*(\phi)) = \phi$. This implies that $e^*(\phi) = 1/c'(e^*(\phi))$, so that if $c''(e) \geq 0$, then $e^*(\phi)$ is concave. Furthermore $e^*(0) = 0$ and $e^*(\Phi)$ is finite, so that it equals the right-hand-side of (8) at exactly one point.

Q.E.D.

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: By Lemma 6, if, for any fixed action $e$ the unique solution $\phi^*_e$ satisfies $\phi^*_e \in (\overline{\phi}, \phi)$, beliefs converge to a Dirac measure on $\phi^*_\infty$. Since $\overline{\phi} > A$ and $Q_{e\phi} > 0$, we have $\phi^* \in (\overline{\phi}, \phi^*_\infty)$, so that if $Q_{e\phi} \geq 0$, then $e^*(\phi)$ is concave. Furthermore $e^*(0) = 0$ and $e^*(\Phi)$ is finite, so that it equals the right-hand-side of (8) at exactly one point.

Q.E.D.

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: Since $Q_a > 0$ and $\phi^*_e < \phi$, the surprise function $\Gamma_1$ is negative for all $\phi \geq \Phi$ and, hence, has a negative slope at its unique root $\phi^*_1$. Furthermore, when the agent’s belief is a Dirac measure on $\phi$, he chooses the myopically optimal action that satisfies

$$Q_e(e(\phi), \Phi) = 0.$$

By the implicit function theorem, $e^*(\phi) = -Q_{e\phi}/Q_{ee} > 0$. Hence, $e(\phi) < e^*(\Phi)$.

Since $Q_{e\phi} > 0$ and, by Assumption 1, $Q_{ae} \leq 0$, the derivative

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial e}[Q(e, \Phi) - Q(e, \overline{\phi}, \phi^*_\infty)] = -\int_{\Phi}^{\overline{\phi}} Q_{ae}(e, a, \Phi) \, da + \int_{\phi^*_\infty}^{\overline{\phi}} Q_{ae}(e, \overline{\phi}, \phi) \, d\phi > 0.$$

Because $Q(e, \Phi) - Q(e, \overline{\phi}, \phi^*_\infty) = 0$ and $e(\phi) < e^*(\Phi) \leq e$, therefore,

$$Q(e(\phi), \Phi) - Q(e(\phi), \overline{\phi}, \phi^*_\infty) < 0 = Q(e(\phi), \Phi) - Q(e(\phi), \overline{\phi}, \phi^*_\infty).$$

Since $Q_{e\phi} > 0$, it follows that $\phi^*_\infty < \phi^*_\infty$.

Q.E.D.

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: Since $Q_a > 0$, $Q_{e\phi} > 0$, and $\overline{\phi} > A$, the surprise function $\Gamma_1$ is negative for all $\phi \geq \Phi$ and, hence, has a negative slope at its unique root $\phi^*_1$. Furthermore, when the agent’s belief is a Dirac measure on $\phi$, he chooses the myopically optimal action that satisfies

$$Q_e(e(\phi), \overline{\phi}, \phi) = 0.$$

By the implicit function theorem, $e^*(\phi) = -Q_{e\phi}/Q_{ee} > 0$ and $e^*(\overline{\phi}) = -Q_{ea}/Q_{ee} \leq 0$. Since $\phi^*_1 < \Phi$ and $\overline{\phi} > A$, the agent chooses a suboptimally low stable action. Because $\Gamma_1(\phi) = R_i(A, \Phi) - R_i(\overline{\phi}, \phi) - L_i(e^*(\overline{\phi}, \phi), A, \Phi)$, $\Gamma_1 > \Gamma_2$ pointwise at all but the optimal action, the fact that the agent chooses some suboptimal action implies that $\phi^*_1 > \phi^*_2$.

Q.E.D.

LEMA 9—Monotonicity of Stable Beliefs: The subjective $\phi^*_\infty$ is increasing and continuous in the true state $\Phi$. 

1192 P. HEIDHUES, B. KŐSZEGI, AND P. STRACK
PROOF: The stable state \( \phi_\infty \) is defined as the unique solution \( \phi \) to
\[
Q(e^*(\phi), A, \Phi) - Q(e^*(\phi), \bar{a}, \phi) = 0. \tag{9}
\]
Now fix a \( \phi_\infty \) for a given \( \Phi \). Slightly increase \( \Phi \) to \( \Phi' > \Phi \). Then the left-hand side increases, while the right-hand side remains unchanged, so
\[
Q(e^*(\phi_\infty), A, \Phi') - Q(e^*(\phi_\infty), \bar{a}, \phi_\infty) > 0.
\]
We know that for \( \phi > \Phi' \), \( Q(e^*(\phi), A, \Phi) < Q(e^*(\phi), \bar{a}, \phi) \). So
\[
Q(e^*(\phi), A, \Phi') - Q(e^*(\phi), \bar{a}, \phi) < 0 \quad \text{for} \quad \phi > \Phi',
\]
\[
Q(e^*(\phi_\infty), A, \Phi') - Q(e^*(\phi_\infty), \bar{a}, \phi_\infty) > 0 \quad \text{for} \quad \phi > \phi_\infty.
\]
By the continuity of \( Q \) and \( e^* \), there must be a new solution to the equation
\[
Q(e^*(\phi), A, \Phi') - Q(e^*(\phi), \bar{a}, \phi) = 0
\]
that satisfies \( \phi \in (\phi_\infty, \Phi') \). Since the stable belief is unique, this implies that the stable belief associated with the state \( \Phi' \) is greater than the stable belief associated with the state \( \Phi \).

The continuity of the stable belief in the true state follows from the differentiability of \( Q \) by applying the implicit function theorem to (9). \( \text{Q.E.D.} \)

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: Consider first the overconfident agent. Since \( u_1 > u_0 \), the agent chooses the task in the first period. Because by Lemma 9 the long-run belief of the agent is increasing and continuous in the true state and, in addition, \( Q(e(\hat{\phi}_\infty), \bar{a}, \hat{\phi}_\infty)) < u_0 \), there exists a critical state \( \hat{\Phi} > \hat{\Phi} \) such that the agent eventually abandons the task whenever the realized state \( \Phi < \hat{\Phi} \). By Chebychev’s inequality, the probability that the state is in a range where the agent does not eventually abandon the task is bounded by the prior variance \( \sigma_0^2 \):
\[
P \left[ \left| \Phi - \bar{\Phi} \right| \geq \frac{1}{2} \left| \Phi - \hat{\Phi} \right| \right] \leq \frac{2\sigma_0^2}{(\hat{\Phi} - \bar{\Phi})^2}.
\]
As \( \sigma_0^2 \to 0 \), the probability that \( \Phi < \hat{\Phi} \) approaches 1. Therefore, as \( \sigma_0^2 \to 0 \), the probability that the agent eventually abandons the task approaches 1.

Now we turn to the rational agent. Since \( \max_e Q(e, A, \bar{\Phi}) > u \), Lipschitz continuity of \( Q \) in the state implies that for a sufficiently small prior variance \( \sigma_0^2 \), the agent chooses the task in the first period. Now we prove the following statement: if the agent chooses the task in the first period, then the probability that he ever takes the outside option is bounded by \( \sigma_0^2 \) times a constant, and hence approaches 0 as \( \sigma_0^2 \to 0 \).

Without loss of generality, let \( u = 0 \) to simplify notation (otherwise normalize the output function by subtracting \( u \) from \( Q \)). Let
\[
m_t = E_t[Q(e_1, A, \Phi)] - E_t[Q(e_1, A, \Phi)]. \tag{10}
\]
Since \( \max_e Q(e, A, \bar{\Phi}) > u = 0 \), it follows from the continuity of \( Q \) that for sufficiently small \( \sigma_0 \), it holds that \( E_t[Q(e_1, A, \Phi)] > 0 \), that is, the agent finds it initially optimal not
to take the outside option. Note that $m_t$ is by construction a martingale. As the agent
picks an optimal action, a lower bound on the agent's payoff is given by the expected
payoff implied from taking the initial action $e_1$ forever:

$$\max_e E_t[Q(e, A, \Phi)] \geq E_t[Q(e_1, A, \Phi)] = m_t + E_t[Q(e_1, A, \Phi)].$$

Thus, the agent refrains from taking the outside option in period $t$ as long as $|m_t|$ is not
too large:

$$|m_t| < E_t[Q(e_1, A, \Phi)] \Rightarrow 0 < m_t + E_t[Q(e_1, A, \Phi)] \leq \max_e E_t[Q(e, A, \Phi)].$$

Hence, an upper bound on the probability that the agent takes the outside option before
period $t$ is given by the probability that the absolute value of the martingale $m$ exceeds
$u_1 = E_t[Q(e_1, A, \Phi)]$:

$$\mathbb{P}\left[\max_{s \leq t} |m_s| \geq u_1 \right] \leq \mathbb{P}\left[\max_{s \leq t} |m_s| \geq u_1 \right].$$

Applying the Burkholder–Davis–Gundi inequality to the martingale $(m_t)$, yields that
there exists a constant $\kappa$ such that

$$\mathbb{P}\left[\max_{s \leq t} |m_s| \geq u_0 \right] \leq \kappa \times \left( E[m_t^2] - E[m_1^2] \right)$$

$$= \kappa \times E\left[ (E_t[Q(e_1, A, \Phi)] - E_t[Q(e_1, A, \Phi)])^2 \right]$$

$$= \kappa \times E\left[ (E_t[Q(e_1, A, \Phi) - E_t[Q(e_1, A, \Phi)])^2 \right]$$

$$\leq \kappa \times E\left[ (Q(e_1, A, \Phi) - E_t[Q(e_1, A, \Phi)])^2 \right]$$

$$= \kappa \times E\left[ (Q(e_1, A, \Phi) - E_t[Q(e_1, A, \Phi)])^2 \right],$$

(11)

where we use Jensen's inequality in the second inequality and the law of iterated expec-
tations in the last equality. To bound the right-hand side, we need to bound the prior
variance associated with the payoff of the initial action. As $Q$ is Lipschitz continuous in
$\phi$, we have that the right-hand side of (11) can be bounded by the prior variance

$$E\left[ (Q(e_1, A, \Phi) - E_t[Q(e_1, A, \Phi)])^2 \right] = E\left[ (Q(e_1, A, \Phi) - E_t[Q(e_1, A, \Phi)])^2 \right]$$

$$= E\left[ (Q(e_1, A, \Phi) - \int Q(e_1, A, z) \pi_0(z) dz)^2 \right]$$

$$= E\left[ (\int Q(e_1, A, \Phi) - Q(e_1, A, z) \pi_0(z) dz)^2 \right]$$

$$\leq \kappa^2 \phi E\left[ (\int (\Phi - z) \pi_0(z) dz)^2 \right]$$

$$\leq \kappa^2 \phi E\left[ (\Phi - z)^2 \pi_0(z) dz \right] = \kappa^2 \phi \sigma_0^2,$$
where the last inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality. Hence, there exists some constant $\kappa’$ such that
\[
\mathbb{P}\left[ \sup_{s \leq t} |m_s - m_0| \geq k \right] \leq \kappa’ \times \sigma_0^2.
\]
Thus, the probability that the agent takes the outside option before period $t$ is bounded by the prior variance times a constant
\[
\mathbb{P}\left[ \min_{s \leq t} \left( \max_{\epsilon} \mathbb{E}_s[Q(e, A, \Phi)] \right) \leq 0 \right] \leq \kappa’ \times \sigma_0^2.
\]
Because the right-hand side is independent of $t$, the limit $t$ to infinity of the above equation is well defined. Using independence of $t$, existence of the limit, and dominated convergence, we conclude that
\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} \mathbb{P}\left[ \min_{s \leq t} \left( \max_{\epsilon} \mathbb{E}_s[Q(e, A, \Phi)] \right) \leq 0 \right] = \mathbb{P}\left[ \lim_{t \to \infty} \min_{s \leq t} \left( \max_{\epsilon} \mathbb{E}_s[Q(e, A, \Phi)] \right) \leq 0 \right]
\]
\[
= \mathbb{P}\left[ \min_{t} \left( \max_{\epsilon} \mathbb{E}_t[Q(e, A, \Phi)] \right) \leq 0 \right] \leq \kappa’ \times \sigma_0^2.
\]

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: (i) $\Rightarrow$ (ii). Denote by $\tilde{\phi}(A, \tilde{a}, \Phi)$ the state corresponding to the unique stable belief when perceived ability equals $\tilde{a}$, true ability equals $A$, and the true state equals $\Phi$. Denote by $e^*(a, \phi)$ the optimal action when the ability equals $a$ and the state equals $\phi$.

Since the action is objectively optimal for the state $\Phi$ as well as subjectively optimal when the agent holds beliefs $\tilde{\phi}(A, \tilde{a}, \Phi)$, we have
\[
e^*(A, \Phi) = \arg\max_{\epsilon} Q(e, A, \Phi) = \arg\max_{\epsilon} Q(e, \tilde{a}, \tilde{\phi}(A, \tilde{a}, \Phi))
\]
\[
= e^*(\tilde{a}, \tilde{\phi}(A, \tilde{a}, \Phi))
\]
\[
e^*(a, \phi)
\]
for all $A, \tilde{a}, \Phi$. Furthermore, by the definition of a stable belief, the agent gets no surprise:
\[
Q(e^*(A, \Phi), A, \Phi) = Q(e^*(A, \Phi), \tilde{a}, \tilde{\phi}(A, \tilde{a}, \Phi))
\]
\[
Q(e^*(A, \phi), A, \phi)
\]
for all $A, \tilde{a}, \Phi$.

We establish some properties of $e^*(a, \phi)$. First, we know that $e^*_\phi(a, \phi) > 0$. Second, we show that $e^*_a(a, \phi) > 0$ (recall that we do not assume $Q_{ea} \geq 0$ in Proposition 5). Totally differentiating Equation (13) with respect to $\tilde{a}$ and using that $Q_\phi > 0$, we get that $\tilde{\phi}_\tilde{a}(a, \tilde{a}, \phi) < 0$. Furthermore, by Equation (12) we have $e^*(a, \phi) = e^*(\tilde{a}, \tilde{\phi}(a, \tilde{a}, \phi))$. Totally differentiating this equality with respect to $\tilde{a}$ gives that $e^*_\tilde{a}(a, \tilde{\phi}(a, \tilde{a}, \phi)) = -e^*_a(a, \tilde{\phi}(a, \tilde{a}, \phi)) \tilde{\phi}_\tilde{a}(a, \tilde{a}, \phi) > 0$. Setting $\tilde{a} = a$ and using that $\tilde{\phi}(a, a, \phi) = \phi$ establishes our claim that $e^*_a(a, \phi) > 0$.

Given these properties, we can define $S(a, \phi) = e^*(a, \phi)$, and this function satisfies $S_\phi, S_\phi > 0$. Furthermore, using again that $e^*(a, \phi) = e^*(\tilde{a}, \tilde{\phi}(a, \tilde{a}, \phi))$, note that for any $a, \tilde{a}, \phi$, the unique $\phi'$ satisfying $S(a, \phi) = S(\tilde{a}, \phi')$ is $\phi' = \phi(a, \tilde{a}, \phi)$. Now we define $V^*(e, S) = S - L(e - S)$, where $L(\cdot)$ is any strictly increasing function satisfying $L'(x) < 1$ everywhere. By construction, $V_\phi > 0$, and because $S(\tilde{a}, \tilde{\phi}(A, \tilde{a}, \Phi)) = S(A, \Phi)$,
\( \Gamma(\tilde{\phi}(A, \tilde{a}, \Phi)) = 0 \). Thus, the Dirac measure on \( \tilde{\phi}(A, \tilde{a}, \Phi) \) is the stable belief and \( S(\tilde{a}, \tilde{\phi}(A, \tilde{a}, \Phi)) = e^*(\tilde{a}, \tilde{\phi}(A, \tilde{a}, \Phi)) = e^*(A, \Phi) \) is the stable action.

(ii) \( \Rightarrow \) (i). Because \( V_S, S_\phi > 0 \), for any action \( e \) there is a unique \( \tilde{\phi} \) such that \( V(e, S(A, \Phi)) = V(e, S(\tilde{a}, \tilde{\phi})) \). At this \( \tilde{\phi} \), \( \Gamma(\tilde{\phi}) = 0 \), and, hence, \( \delta_{\tilde{\phi}} = \delta_{\phi_{\infty}} \) is a stable belief. Hence the stable action \( e^*(\phi_{\infty}) \) of the agent satisfies

\[
Ve(e^*(\phi_{\infty})/S(\tilde{a}, \Phi)) = Ve(e^*(\phi_{\infty})/S(a, \Phi)),
\]

Q.E.D.

A.2.2. Belief Concentration in the Myopic Case

We now prove Theorem 1.

**Step 1: In the Long Run the Expected Change Approximates the Actual Change in Beliefs.** To characterize the long-run behavior of the agent’s beliefs, we show that the change in his beliefs in the long run can be approximated well by the expected change. To establish this, we use the fact that the log-likelihood function is the average of the log-likelihoods of the realized outputs. As the log-likelihood is an average of nonidentical and nonindependent random variables, however, we need to generalize existing versions of the law of large numbers to non-i.i.d. random variables. To do so, we use the fact that a square-integrable martingale divided by its quadratic variation converges to zero whenever the quadratic variation goes to infinity.

The following proposition states a law of large numbers like result for square-integrable Martingales with bounded quadratic variation. Recall the definition of the quadratic variation of a martingale \((y_t)_t\) as

\[
[y]_t = \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \mathbb{E}\left[ (y_{s+1} - y_s)^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_s \right],
\]

where \( \mathcal{F}_s \) denotes filtration of an outside observer who knows the state at time \( s \), that is, the expectation is taken with respect to all information available at time \( s \). For brevity, we refer to the martingale \((y_t)_t\) as martingale \( y \).

**PROPOSITION 10—Law of Large Numbers:** Let \((y_t)_t\) be a martingale that satisfies a.s. \([y]_t \leq vt\) for some constant \( v \geq 0 \). We have that a.s.

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{y_t}{t} = 0.
\]

**PROOF:** We first show that \( y \) is square integrable. By the law of iterated expectations, we have that

\[
\mathbb{E}[y_t^2] = \mathbb{E}\left[ y_1^2 + \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} y_{s+1}^2 - y_s^2 \right] = y_1^2 + \mathbb{E}\left[ \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \mathbb{E}[y_{s+1}^2 - y_s^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_s] \right]
\]

\[
= y_1^2 + \mathbb{E}\left[ \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \mathbb{E}[(y_{s+1} - y_s)^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_s] \right] = y_1^2 + \mathbb{E}[\{y\} \leq y_1^2 + vt.
\]

Consequently, the martingale \( y \) is square integrable.
In the next step we show that \( \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{y_t}{t} = 0 \) almost surely. If the limit of the quadratic variation \( \{y_t\}_t = \lim_{t \to \infty} \{y_t\}_t \) exists, the martingale \( y \) converges almost surely (Theorem 12.13 in Williams (1991)), and hence \( \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{y_t}{t} = 0 \). Hence, from now on we consider the remaining histories for which the quadratic variation does not converge. We can rewrite the average value of the martingale \( y \) as

\[
\frac{y_t}{t} = \frac{y_t}{[y]_t} \cdot \frac{[y]_t}{t}.
\]

Because the square quadratic variation is monotone increasing by definition, it must go to infinity after those histories. Furthermore (as argued, for example, in Section 12.14 in Williams (1991)), for any square-integrable martingale and any history for which \( \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{y_t}{t} = 0 \), then \( \lim \sup_{t \to \infty} \frac{y_t}{[y]_t} \leq v \lim \sup_{t \to \infty} \frac{[y]_t}{t} = 0 \) almost surely. Since \( \lim \sup_{t \to \infty} \frac{y_t}{t} = 0 \) a.s., \( \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{y_t}{t} = 0 \) a.s., Q.E.D.

To apply the result of Proposition 10, we will, for every fixed belief \( \phi \), consider the Doob decomposition (Section 12.11 in Williams (1991)) of the derivative of the log-likelihood process into a martingale \( (y_t(\phi))_t \) and a previsible process \( (z_t(\phi))_t \), henceforth \( y(\phi) \) and \( z(\phi) \).

Let \( m_t(\phi) := Q(e_t, A, \Phi) - Q(e_t, \tilde{a}, \phi) \). We define \( x_i(\phi) \) as

\[
x_i(\phi) = -(g(m_t(\phi) + e_t) - \mathbb{E}[g(m_t(\phi) + e_t) | \mathcal{F}_i]) Q_\phi(e_t, \tilde{a}, \phi)
\]

\[
= -(g(m_t(\phi) + e_t) - \mathbb{E}[g(m_t(\phi) + e_t) | e_i]) Q_\phi(e_i, \tilde{a}, \phi)
\]

\[
= -(g(m_t(\phi) + e_t) - \mathcal{L}(m_t(\phi))) Q_\phi(e_t, \tilde{a}, \phi),
\]

where the second equality uses the fact that an outside observer who knows the true state needs only to condition on the current action \( e_t \) to calculate the expected surprise in the next period. Furthermore, we define \( y_i(\phi) = \sum_{s=1}^i x_s(\phi) \) and \( z_i(\phi) \) as

\[
z_i(\phi) = -\sum_{s \leq t} \mathcal{L}(m_s(\phi)) Q_\phi(e_s, \tilde{a}, \phi).
\]

**Lemma 10:** For every \( \phi \), the processes \((y(\phi), z(\phi))\) have the properties

(i) \( \ell'_i(\phi) = \ell'_i(\phi) + y_i(\phi) + z_i(\phi) \),

(ii) \( |x_i(\phi)| \leq \kappa_\phi |\mathcal{K}_f|(|e_i| + \sigma) \),

(iii) \( y_i(\phi) \) is a martingale with \( |y(\phi)| \leq t3(\kappa_\phi |\mathcal{K}_f|\sigma)^2 \).

**Proof:** Part (i) follows immediately from the definition. Furthermore, by construction \( \mathbb{E}[x_i(\phi) | \mathcal{F}_i] = \mathbb{E}[x_i(\phi) | e_i] = 0 \) and, hence, \( y \) is a martingale. Using the bound on the absolute value of the derivative of \( g, |\mathcal{K}_f| \), part (ii) follows since

\[
|x_i(\phi)| = |g(m_t(\phi) + e_t) - \mathbb{E}[g(m_t(\phi) + e_t) | e_i]| Q_\phi(e_t, \tilde{a}, \phi)
\]

\[
= |[g(m_t(\phi) + e_t) - g(m_t(\phi))] - \mathbb{E}[g(m_t(\phi) + e_t) - g(m_t(\phi)) | e_i]| | Q_\phi(e_t, \tilde{a}, \phi)
\]

\[
\leq \kappa_\phi |g(m_t(\phi) + e_t) - g(m_t(\phi))| + \kappa_\phi |\mathbb{E}[g(m_t(\phi) + e_t) - g(m_t(\phi)) | e_i]| Q_\phi(e_t, \tilde{a}, \phi)
\]

\[
\leq \kappa_\phi |\mathcal{K}_f||e_i| + \kappa_\phi |\mathcal{K}_f| \mathbb{E}[|e_i|],
\]
and by Jensen’s inequality \( E[|\varepsilon_t|] \leq \sqrt{E[|\varepsilon_t|^2]} = \sigma \). Part (iii) follows from (ii) and the definition of the quadratic variation (14):

\[
[y(\phi)]_t = \sum_{s=2}^{t} E\left[ x_s^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_{s-1} \right] \leq \kappa_\phi^2 |\mathcal{K}_f|^2 \sum_{s=2}^{t} E[|\varepsilon_s|^2] + \sigma^2 + E[|\varepsilon_s|] \sigma \leq 3\kappa_\phi^2 |\mathcal{K}_f|^2 \sigma^2 t.
\]

Q.E.D.

An immediate corollary from the law of large numbers given in Proposition 10 and Lemma 10(iii) is that for every \( \phi \), the average of \( y_t(\phi) \) converges to zero almost surely, that is,

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{y_t(\phi)}{t} = 0.
\]

We next want to show that this convergence is uniform in \( \phi \).

Let \( \phi_\infty \) be the largest number such that the agent almost always convinces himself eventually that the state \( \Phi \) is greater than \( \phi_\infty \) and let \( \phi_\infty \) be the smallest number such that the agent is eventually convinced that the state is below \( \phi_\infty \), that is,

\[
\phi_\infty = \sup \left\{ \phi' : \lim_{i \to \infty} \Pi_i(\phi') = 0 \text{ almost surely} \right\},
\]

\[
\phi_\infty = \inf \left\{ \phi' : \lim_{i \to \infty} \Pi_i(\phi') = 1 \text{ almost surely} \right\}.
\]

**DEFINITION 3—Uniform Stochastic Convergence:** The sequence \((G_t(\cdot))_t\) converges uniformly over \([\phi_\infty, \phi_\infty]\) stochastically to zero if and only if

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} \sup_{\phi \in [\phi_\infty, \phi_\infty]} |G_t(\phi)| = 0 \quad \text{a.s.} \quad (\text{U-SCON})
\]

For deterministic sequences of real-valued function, Ascoli’s theorem states that pointwise convergence implies uniform convergence if and only if the functions are equicontinuous. Despite the fact that our sequence of real-valued functions is not equicontinuous for every realization, we use a stochastic analogue—strong stochastic equicontinuity (SSE) as defined on p. 245 in Andrews (1992)—to establish uniform convergence below.

**DEFINITION 4—Strong Stochastic Equicontinuity:** Let \( G_t^*(\phi) = \sup_{s \geq t} |G_s(\phi)| \). A sequence \((G_t(\cdot))_t\) is strongly stochastic equicontinuous if and only if:

(i) \( G_t^*(\phi) < \infty \) for all \( \phi \in [\phi_\infty, \phi_\infty] \) a.s.,

(ii) for all \( \gamma > 0 \), there exists \( \delta > 0 \) such that

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} P \left[ \sup_{\phi \in [\phi_\infty, \phi_\infty]} \sup_{\phi' \in \Theta_t(\phi)} |G_t^*(\phi) - G_t^*(\phi')| > \gamma \right] < \gamma.
\]

The usefulness of SSE comes from the fact that almost sure convergence in combination with SSE implies (U-SCON).
THEOREM 3—Theorem 2(a) in Andrews (1992): If $G$ satisfies strong stochastic equicontinuity and $G$ converges pointwise to zero a.s., then $G$ converges uniform stochastically to zero.

Our next result argues that the sequence $\frac{y_t(\cdot)}{t}$ is strong stochastic equicontinuous and thus converges uniform stochastically to zero.

LEMMA 11: The sequence $(\frac{y_t(\cdot)}{t})_t$ converges uniform stochastically to zero.

PROOF: By Lemma 2 in Andrews (1992), strong stochastic equicontinuity of $(\frac{y_t(\cdot)}{t})_t$ follows if the absolute value of the derivative of $x_t(\cdot)$ can be uniformly bounded by a random variable $B_t$ for all $\phi \in [\underline{\phi}, \overline{\phi}]$ such that $\sup_{t \geq 1} \frac{1}{t} \sum_{s=1}^{t} \mathbb{E}[B_s] < \infty$ and $\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{1}{t} \sum_{s=1}^{t} (B_s - \mathbb{E}[B_s]) = 0$.

From the definition of $x$ in Equation (15) it follows that

$$|x_t'(\phi)| = \left| (g'(m_t(\phi) + \varepsilon_t) - \mathcal{L}''(m_t(\phi))) \left[ Q_\phi(\varepsilon_t, \tilde{a}, \phi) \right]^2 - (g(m_t(\phi) + \varepsilon_t) - \mathcal{L}(m_t(\phi))) Q_{\phi\phi}(\varepsilon_t, \tilde{a}, \phi) \right| \leq |g'(m_t(\phi) + \varepsilon_t) - \mathcal{L}''(m_t(\phi))) \left[ Q_\phi(\varepsilon_t, \tilde{a}, \phi) \right]^2 + \left| (g(m_t(\phi) + \varepsilon_t) - \mathcal{L}'(m_t(\phi))) \right| \times |Q_{\phi\phi}(\varepsilon_t, \tilde{a}, \phi)|.$$ 

Since $|g'| \leq |\kappa_f|$, one has $|\mathcal{L}''(m_t(\phi)))| \leq |\kappa_f|$, and by Assumption 2, $Q_\phi \leq \overline{\kappa}_\phi$, $|Q_{\phi\phi}| \leq \overline{\kappa}_{\phi\phi}$; using this and substituting $x_t(\phi)$ yields

$$|x_t'(\phi)| \leq 2|\kappa_f| \overline{\kappa}_\phi^2 + |x_t(\phi)| \frac{\overline{\kappa}_{\phi\phi}}{\overline{\kappa}_\phi} \leq 2|\kappa_f| \overline{\kappa}_\phi^2 + \frac{\overline{\kappa}_{\phi\phi}}{\overline{\kappa}_\phi} \overline{\kappa}_\phi |(\varepsilon_t + \sigma) =: B_t,$$ 

where the last inequality follows from Lemma 10(ii). As $(B_t)_t$ are i.i.d., it follows that

$$\frac{1}{t} \sum_{s=1}^{t} \mathbb{E}[B_s] = \mathbb{E}[B_0] < \infty.$$ 

Furthermore, as $B_t$ also has finite variance, the law of large numbers implies $\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{1}{t} \sum_{s=1}^{t} (B_s - \mathbb{E}[B_s]) = 0.$ Q.E.D.

Step 2: No Long-Run Surprises. The next lemma shows that if the agent is always on average surprised by the output for some beliefs—i.e., $m_t(\cdot)$ is bounded away from zero—then the absolute value of the derivative of his subjective log-likelihood goes to infinity almost surely for those beliefs.

Let $I$ denote an interval.

LEMMA 12: (a) If $\lim \inf_{t \to \infty} m_t(\phi) \geq \underline{m} > 0$ for all $\phi \in I$, then there exists $r > 0$ such that a.s.

$$\lim \inf \inf_{\phi \in I} \frac{\ell_t'(\phi)}{t} \geq r.$$ 

(b) If $\lim \sup_{t \to \infty} m_t(\phi) \leq \overline{m} < 0$ for all $\phi \in I$, then there exists $r > 0$ such that a.s.

$$\lim \sup \sup_{\phi \in I} \frac{\ell_t'(\phi)}{t} \leq -r.$$
PROOF: We show (a); the proof of (b) is analogous. As $\mathcal{L}'$ is decreasing, we have that for all $\phi \in I$,

$$\mathcal{L}'(m_t(\phi)) \leq \mathcal{L}'(m).$$

We use this fact and that $\mathcal{L}'(m) < 0$ to bound $z_t(\phi)$ for all $\phi \in I$:

$$z_t(\phi) = -\sum_{s=1}^{s} \mathcal{L}'(m_t(\phi))Q(\epsilon_t, \tilde{a}, \phi)$$

$$\geq \sum_{s=1}^{s} |\mathcal{L}'(m)|Q(\epsilon_t, \tilde{a}, \phi) \geq t \cdot |\mathcal{L}'(m)|k_\phi.$$

Define $r = |\mathcal{L}'(m)|k_\phi > 0$. Using the definition of $y_t(\phi)$ and $z_t(\phi)$, $r$, and the uniform stochastic convergence of $y_t/t$ to zero that we established in Lemma 11, respectively, we have that

$$\lim inf_{t \to \infty} \inf_{\phi \in I} \ell_t(\phi) = \lim inf_{t \to \infty} \inf_{\phi \in I} \ell_0(\phi) + y_t(\phi) + z_t(\phi) t \geq \left[ \lim inf_{t \to \infty} \inf_{\phi \in I} y_t(\phi) t \right] + r$$

$$\geq -\left[ \lim sup_{t \to \infty} \inf_{\phi \in I} \frac{y_t(\phi)}{t} \right] + r = r. \quad Q.E.D.$$

The next lemma argues that if the agent is surprised by the output for an interval of beliefs then he will a.s. assign probability 0 to those beliefs in the long run. Intuitively, as by Lemma 12 the absolute value of the derivative of the agent’s subjective likelihood goes to infinity, the absolute value of the derivative of his posterior density goes to infinity. The next lemma shows that this implies that the agent must assign probability 0 to those beliefs.

LEMMA 13: (i) If $\lim inf_{t \to \infty} m_t(\phi) \geq m > 0$ for all $\phi \in (l, h) \subset (\phi, \bar{\phi})$, then

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} \tilde{P}_t[\Phi \in (l, h)] = 0.$$

(ii) If $\lim sup_{t \to \infty} m_t(\phi) \leq m < 0$ for all $\phi \in (l, h) \subset (\phi, \bar{\phi})$, then

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} \tilde{P}_t[\Phi \in (l, h)] = 0.$$

PROOF: First consider the case where $m_t(\phi) \geq m > 0$. Lemma 12 implies that there a.s. exists $r > 0$ such that for sufficiently large $t$ for all $y \in (l, h)$,

$$\ell'_t(y) \geq rt.$$

Let $\eta = h - l$. We have that the probability the agent assigns to state in $[l + \eta/2, l + \eta]$ satisfies

$$\tilde{P}_t[\Phi \in [l + \eta/2, l + \eta)] = \int_{l + \eta/2}^{l + \eta} \pi_t(z) dz = \int_{l + \eta/2}^{l + \eta/2} \pi_t(z) \frac{\pi_t(z + \eta/2)}{\pi_t(z)} dz$$

$$= \int_{l + \eta/2}^{l + \eta/2} \pi_t(z) \exp(\ell_t(z + \eta/2) - \ell_t(z)) dz$$
\begin{align*}
&= \int_{l}^{l + \eta / 2} \pi_t(z) \exp \left( \int_{z}^{z + \eta / 2} \ell_r'(y) \, dy \right) \, dz \\
&\geq \int_{l}^{l + \eta / 2} \pi_t(z) \exp(rt \eta / 2) \, dz = e^{rt \eta / 2} \tilde{P}_t[\Phi \in [l, l + \eta / 2]].
\end{align*}

As \( r > 0 \), we have that the probability assigned to the interval \([l, l + \eta / 2]\) is bounded by a term that vanishes for \( t \to \infty \):
\[
\tilde{P}_t[\Phi \in [l, l + \eta / 2]] \leq e^{-rt \eta / 2} \tilde{P}_t[\Phi \in [l + \eta / 2, l + \eta]] \leq e^{-rt \eta / 2}.
\]

Hence, the agent must assigned zero probability to the interval \([l, l + \eta / 2]\) in the long run.

Applying this argument iteratively yields that the agent assigns zero probability to the interval \([l, h)\).

**Step 3: Convergence in the Correctly Specified Case.** Lemma 13 allows us to argue that the agent’s subjective beliefs converge when her model of the world is correctly specified \((\tilde{a} = A)\).

**PROPOSITION 11:** If \( \tilde{a} = A \), then the agent’s posterior belief converges to a Dirac measure on the true state \( \Phi \).

**PROOF:** Fix an \( \eta > 0 \). We have that for all \( \phi \leq \Phi - \eta \),
\[
m_t(\phi) = Q(e_t, A, \Phi) - Q(e_t, \tilde{a}, \phi) \geq \eta \kappa_\phi.
\]

Hence, by Lemma 13, we have that a.s. \( \lim_{t \to \infty} \Pi_t(\Phi - \eta) = 0 \) and thus a.s. \( \Phi_\infty \geq \Phi - \eta \).

Taking the supremum over \( \eta \) yields that a.s. \( \Phi_\infty \geq \Phi \). An analogous argument yields that a.s. \( \Phi_\infty \leq \Phi \). Since \( \Phi_\infty \leq \Phi_\infty \), we conclude that a.s. \( \Phi_\infty = \Phi_\infty = \Phi \).

**Q.E.D.**

**Step 4: Long-run Bounds on the Agent’s Beliefs.** Building on Lemma 5, in this step we show that the agent’s subjective belief is bounded in the long run. The next lemma shows that \( \phi_\infty \) and \( \Phi_\infty \) are well defined and that the agent’s long-run beliefs are almost surely bounded.

**LEMMA 14:** We have that \( \Phi - \kappa_\phi (\tilde{a} - A) \leq \phi_\infty \) and \( \Phi_\infty \leq \Phi \).

**PROOF:** We first show \( \Phi_\infty \leq \Phi \). Note that as the average output increases in ability, it follows that for every sequence of actions, the output that the agent observes is smaller than
\[
q_t \leq \hat{q}_t := q_t + Q(e_t, \tilde{a}, \Phi) - Q(e_t, A, \Phi).
\]

By construction, if the agent where to observe the outputs \( (\hat{q}_i) \) instead of \( (q_i) \), he would have the same belief as a correctly specified decisionmaker with ability \( \tilde{a} \) would have if the state equals \( \Phi \). The beliefs of such a correctly specified decisionmaker converge to \( \Phi \) almost surely for every sequence of actions by Proposition 11.

By Lemma 5, \( q_t \leq \hat{q}_t \) implies that the agent’s posterior belief is lower in the sense of MLR than for a sequence of beliefs that converges to \( \Phi \) almost surely. As MLR implies first order stochastic dominance, it follows that \( \Phi_\infty \leq \Phi \).
We next show $\phi_\infty \geq \Phi - \frac{\kappa a}{\kappa b} (\tilde{a} - A)$. Let $\Phi' = \Phi - \frac{\kappa a}{\kappa b} (\tilde{a} - A)$. We will show that

$$q_t \geq \hat{q}_t := q_t + Q(e_t, \tilde{a}, \Phi') - Q(e_t, A, \Phi).$$

We have that

$$Q(e_t, \tilde{a}, \Phi') - Q(e, A, \Phi) = Q(e_t, \tilde{a}, \Phi') - Q(e_t, \tilde{a}, \Phi) + Q(e_t, \tilde{a}, \Phi) - Q(e_t, A, \Phi) \leq -\kappa \phi (\Phi - \Phi') + \kappa a (\tilde{a} - A) = 0.$$

By construction, if the agent were to observe the outputs $(\hat{q}_t)$ instead of $(q_t)$, he would have the same belief as a correctly specified decisionmaker with ability $\tilde{a}$ would have if the state equals $\Phi'$, and hence the result follows from the same argument as above. Q.E.D.

**Step 5: Bounds on the Myopically Optimal Actions.** Let $e_t^m$ be the action that is myopically optimal in period $t$:

$$e_t^m = \arg \max_e \tilde{E}_{t-1}[q_t] = \arg \max_e \int_{(\phi, \bar{x})} Q(e, \tilde{a}, \phi) \pi_{t-1}(\phi) d\phi.$$

We define the long-run lower and upper bound on the agent’s actions:

$$\tilde{e} = \lim_{t \to \infty} e_t^m,$$

$$\hat{e} = \limsup_{t \to \infty} e_t^m.$$

The next lemma shows that if the agent assigns subjective probability of almost 1 to the event that the state is strictly greater (smaller) than some $\phi_\infty$ ($\phi_\infty$), then the myopically optimal action is greater (smaller) than the optimal action if the agent assigns probability 1 to the state $\phi_\infty$ ($\phi_\infty$). Recall that $e^*(\phi)$ denotes the optimal action when the agent has point beliefs on $\phi$, and that $e^*(\phi)$ is increasing.

**Lemma 15:** If the agent is myopic $e_t = e_t^m$, then the long-run bounds on his actions satisfy

$$e^*(\phi_\infty) \leq \tilde{e} \leq \hat{e} \leq e^*(\phi_\infty).$$

**Proof:** Because $Q$ is strictly concave with positive derivative at $e$ and negative derivative at $\tilde{a}$, the agent’s myopically optimal action is characterized by the first order condition

$$\tilde{E}_{t-1}[Q_e(e_t, \tilde{a}, \Phi)] = 0.$$

Let $\phi' = \phi_\infty - 2\gamma$ for some $\gamma > 0$. To show that the myopically optimal action $e_t$ is greater $e' = e^*(\phi')$ for large $t$, it suffices to show that the expected marginal output is positive at $e' < e^*(\phi_\infty)$:

$$\tilde{E}_{t-1}[Q_e(e', \tilde{a}, \Phi)] = \int_{(\phi, \bar{x})} Q_e(e', \tilde{a}, \phi) \pi_{t-1}(\phi) d\phi$$

$$= \int_{\phi'} Q_e(e', \tilde{a}, \phi) \pi_{t-1}(\phi) d\phi + \int_{\phi'}^{\phi_\infty} Q_e(e', \tilde{a}, \phi) \pi_{t-1}(\phi) d\phi.$$
Recall that by Assumption 2, the derivative with respect to the action is bounded by $|Q_e| \leq \kappa_e$ and that $Q_{e\phi} > 0$, and hence the above equality is greater than or equal to

$$\int_{\phi' + \gamma}^{\bar{\phi}} Q_e(e', \tilde{\phi}, \phi' + \gamma) \pi_{t-1}(\phi) \, d\phi - \kappa_e \int_{\phi}^{\phi' + \gamma} \pi_{t-1}(\phi) \, d\phi \geq Q_e(e', \tilde{\phi}, \phi' + \gamma)[1 - \Pi_{t-1}(\phi' + \gamma) - \kappa_e \Pi_{t-1}(\phi' + \gamma)].$$

Furthermore, by definition of $e' = e^*(\phi') \leq e^*(\phi' + \gamma)$, we have $Q_e(e', \tilde{\phi}, \phi' + \gamma) > 0$. As $\phi' + \gamma = \phi_{\infty} - \gamma$, it follows from the definition of $\phi_{\infty}$, which exists by Lemma 14, that $\lim_{t \to \infty} \Pi_{t-1}(\phi' + \gamma) = 0$. Hence, taking the limit $t \to \infty$ yields that $\bar{E}_{t-1}[Q_e(e', \tilde{\phi}, \Phi)] > 0$ for $t$ large enough. Consequently, for all $\gamma > 0$, the myopically optimal action is greater than $e' = e^*(\phi_{\infty} - 2\gamma)$ for sufficiently large $t$. Taking the supremum over $\gamma$ yields the result

$$\hat{e} \geq \sup_{\gamma > 0} e^*(\phi_{\infty} - 2\gamma) = e^*(\phi_{\infty}).$$

The proof for the upper bound $\hat{e}$ is analogous. \textit{Q.E.D.}

---

**Step 6. Beliefs Converge to Limiting Belief.** We begin by showing that the bounds on the myopically optimal action imply bounds on the long-run average output; then we complete the proof of Theorem 1 by showing that beliefs a.s. converge.

The next lemma is useful for arguing that if the agent takes an action above the action that is optimal for the state $\phi_{\infty} < \Phi$, then the realized average output will be strictly greater than the average output that the agent expects if the state is $\phi_{\infty}$.

**Lemma 16:** The long-run average surprise in output satisfies

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} \inf Q(e_t, A, \Phi) - Q(e_t, \tilde{\phi}, \phi_{\infty}) \geq \Gamma(\phi_{\infty}),$$

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} \sup Q(e_t, A, \Phi) - Q(e_t, \tilde{\phi}, \phi_{\infty}) \leq \Gamma(\phi_{\infty}).$$

**Proof:** Let $e' = e^*(\phi')$ for some $\phi'$. We have that

$$Q(e_t, A, \Phi) - Q(e_t, \tilde{\phi}, \phi') - \Gamma(\phi') = [Q(e_t, A, \Phi) - Q(e_t, \tilde{\phi}, \phi')] - [Q(e', A, \Phi) - Q(e', \tilde{\phi}, \phi')]$$

$$= -[Q(e', A, \Phi) - Q(e_t, A, \Phi)] + [Q(e', \tilde{\phi}, \phi') - Q(e_t, \tilde{\phi}, \phi')]$$

$$= \int_{e_t}^{e'} Q_e(z, \tilde{\phi}, \phi') - Q_e(z, A, \Phi) \, dz.$$

We first establish that (16) holds. To show this, we first show that (18) is nonnegative for $\phi' = \phi_{\infty}$ and $e_t \geq \hat{e}$. For $e' = e^*(\phi_{\infty})$, Lemma 15 implies that $e^*(\phi_{\infty}) \leq \hat{e}$, and hence the term (18) equals

$$\int_{e_t}^{e^*(\phi_{\infty})} Q_e(z, \tilde{\phi}, \phi_{\infty}) - Q_e(z, A, \Phi) \, dz = \int_{e_t}^{e^*(\phi_{\infty})} Q_e(z, A, \Phi) - Q_e(z, \tilde{\phi}, \phi_{\infty}) \, dz \geq 0,$$
where the last inequality follows from the facts that $Q_{e\phi} > 0$ and $\phi_\infty \leq \Phi$ by Lemma 14, and $Q_{ea} \leq 0$ and $\tilde{a} > A$. That (16) holds follows as $Q$ is continuous in $e$ and $\lim \inf_{t \to \infty} e_t \geq \hat{e} \geq e^*(\phi_\infty)$.

We finally show that (17) holds. To show this, we first show that (18) is nonpositive for $\phi' = \phi_\infty$ and $e_t \leq \hat{e}$. In this case, $e' = e^*(\phi_\infty)$, and Lemma 15 implies $e^*(\phi_\infty) \geq \hat{e}$. Hence, the term (18) equals

$$\int_{e}^{e^*(\phi_\infty)} Q_e(z, \tilde{a}, \phi_\infty) - Q_e(z, A, \Phi) \, dz \leq 0,$$

where the last inequality follows from the facts that $Q_{e\phi} > 0$ and $\phi_\infty \leq \Phi$ by Lemma 14, and $Q_{ea} \leq 0$ and $\tilde{a} > A$. That (17) holds follows as $Q$ is continuous in $e$ and $\lim \sup_{t \to \infty} e_t \leq \hat{e} \leq e^*(\phi_\infty)$. Q.E.D.

Lemma 16 shows that if $\Gamma(\phi_\infty) > 0$ and $\Gamma(\phi_\infty) < 0$, the output will be on average higher than the output he would expect at the state $\phi_\infty$ and lower than the output he would expect at the state $\phi_\infty$. Intuitively, this should lead the agent to assign probability 0 to states around $\phi_\infty$ and $\phi_\infty$, which contradicts the definition of $[\phi_\infty, \phi_\infty]$ as the smallest interval to which the agent assigns probability 1 in the long run and, hence, implies that $\Gamma(\phi_\infty) = \Gamma(\phi_\infty) = 0$. We use the next lemma to formalize this intuition.

The next lemma shows that the condition of Lemma 13 is satisfied whenever the surprise function is positive at $\phi_\infty$ or negative at $\phi_\infty$.

**Lemma 17:** (a) If $\Gamma(\phi_\infty) > 0$, then there exists $\beta, m > 0$ such that a.s. for all $\phi \in [\phi_\infty, \phi_\infty + \beta]$,

$$\lim \inf_{t \to \infty} m_t(\phi) \geq m.$$

(b) If $\Gamma(\phi_\infty) < 0$, then there exists $\beta, m < 0$ such that a.s. for all $\phi \in [\phi_\infty - \beta, \phi_\infty]$,

$$\lim \sup_{t \to \infty} m_t(\phi) \leq m.$$

**Proof:** We show (a); the proof of (b) is analogous. Lemma 16 implies that almost surely

$$\lim \inf_{t \to \infty} m_t(\phi_\infty) = \lim \inf_{t \to \infty} Q(e_t, A, \Phi) - Q(e_t, \tilde{a}, \phi_\infty) \geq \Gamma(\phi_\infty) > 0.$$

As $0 < Q_{\phi} < \bar{k}_{\phi}$, it follows that $m_t(\phi) \geq m_t(\phi_\infty) - \bar{k}_{\phi}(\phi - \phi_\infty) \geq \Gamma(\phi_\infty) - \bar{k}_{\phi}(\phi - \phi_\infty)$ and, hence, that

$$m_t(\phi) \geq \frac{1}{2} \Gamma(\phi_\infty)$$

for all $\phi \in [\phi_\infty, \phi_\infty + \beta]$ with $\beta = \frac{\Gamma(\phi_\infty)}{2\bar{k}_{\phi}}$. Q.E.D.

We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.

**Proof of Theorem 1:** We first show that $\Gamma(\phi_\infty) \leq 0$. Suppose for the sake of a contradiction that $\Gamma(\phi_\infty) > 0$. By Lemma 17 there exists a $\beta, m > 0$ such that
lim inf \( t \to \infty \m_t(\phi) \geq m > 0 \) for all \( \phi \in [\phi_{\infty}, \phi_{\infty} + \beta] \). By Lemma 13 almost surely

\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} P_t[\Phi \in [\phi_{\infty}, \phi_{\infty} + \beta]] = 0.
\]

Hence, the agent assigns zero probability to the interval \([\phi_{\infty}, \phi_{\infty} + \beta]\) in the long run, which contradicts the definition of \( \phi_{\infty} \). Consequently, \( \Gamma(\phi_{\infty}) \leq 0 \).

An analogous argument yields that \( \Gamma'(\phi_{\infty}) \geq 0 \). Since \( \Gamma \) crosses zero from above by Lemma 8, it follows that \( \phi_{\infty} \geq \phi_{\infty} \) and \( \phi_{\infty} \leq \phi_{\infty} \) by definition. Consequently, \( \phi_{\infty} = \phi_{\infty} \).

A.2.3. Belief Concentration in the Linear Nonmyopic Case

Next, we argue that beliefs concentrate and converge in distribution to the root of the surprise function \( \Gamma \) even when the agent is nonmyopic (i.e., experiments) if \( Q \) is linear in \( \phi \).

If \( Q \) is linear in \( \phi \), there exist functions \( G \) and \( H \) such that

\[
Q(e, a, \phi) = \phi H(e, a) + G(e, a).
\]

To satisfy the assumption that \( Q_{\phi} > 0 \), we need to assume that \( \Phi \) does not change sign. We will thus henceforth consider the case where subjectively as well as objectively \( \Phi > 0 \). As \( Q_{\phi} \geq \kappa_{\phi} > 0 \) by Assumption 2, it follows that \( H(e, a) \geq \kappa_{\phi} > 0 \). We impose this linear structure until the end of the proof of Theorem 2.

**Lemma 18:** There exists constants \( \kappa_\ell \leq \kappa_\ell < 0 \) and \( \tau > 0 \) such that for every sequence of signals \((q_s)_{s \leq t}\) and actions \((e_s)_{s \leq t}\) and all \( \phi \)

\[
\kappa_\ell \cdot t \leq \ell''_t(\phi) \leq \kappa_\ell \cdot t \quad \text{for} \quad t \geq \tau.
\]

**Proof:** Note that \( g' \in [\kappa_f, \kappa_f] \) by our assumption of bounded log-concavity and Assumption 3. The first and the second derivative of the log-likelihood function are given by

\[
\ell'_t(\phi) = \sum_{s \leq t} -g(q_s - Q(e_s, \tilde{a}, \phi))H(e_s, \tilde{a}) + \frac{\partial}{\partial \phi} \log \pi_0(\phi),
\]

\[
\ell''_t(\phi) = \sum_{s \leq t} g'(q_s - Q(e_s, \tilde{a}, \phi))H^2(e_s, \tilde{a}) + \frac{\partial^2}{\partial \phi^2} \log \pi_0(\phi)
\]

\[
\leq t\kappa_f \kappa_f + \kappa_.
\]

Observe that for large enough \( t \), \( t\kappa_f \kappa_f + \kappa_ < 0 \), which establishes that there exists a \( \kappa_\ell < 0 \) such that \( \ell''_t(\phi) \leq \kappa_\ell \cdot t \) for large enough \( t \).

By essentially the same argument, \( \ell''_t(\phi) \geq t \cdot \kappa_f \kappa_f + \kappa_ \), and, hence, there exists a \( \kappa_ < 0 \) such that \( \ell''_t(\phi) \geq \kappa_ \cdot t \) for large enough \( t \).

Since \( \kappa_f < 0 \), for large enough \( t \), the agent’s posterior log-likelihood is strictly concave for every sequence of signals, and hence there exists a unique log-likelihood maximizer (or modal belief) of the agent when \( t \) is large enough:

\[
\phi_{\ML} := \arg \max_{\phi} \ell_t(\phi).
\]
PROPOSITION 12—Concentration: There exists a constant \( k \) such that for all large enough \( t \),
\[
\tilde{E}_t[(\phi - \phi_{ML}^t)^2] \leq k \frac{1}{t}.
\] (19)

PROOF: We consider large enough \( t \) such that the agent’s posterior log-likelihood is strictly concave for every sequence of signals, and hence the log-likelihood maximizer \( \phi_{ML}^t \) is unique. Furthermore, because \( \pi_0(\phi) = 0 \), we have that \( \ell_t(\phi) = -\infty \). Thus, the maximizer \( \phi_{ML}^t \) is interior. Since \( \ell_t \) is strictly concave and twice differentiable, \( \phi_{ML}^t \) is implicitly defined by
\[
0 = \ell'_t(\phi_{ML}^t).
\]
The loss in log-likelihood relative to this maximizer is bounded from below by the squared distance from the maximizer:
\[
\ell_t(\phi_{ML}^t) - \ell_t(\phi) \leq t |\kappa_{\ell}| \frac{1}{2} (\phi - \phi_{ML}^t)^2.
\]
By an analogous argument, \( \ell_t(\phi_{ML}^t) - \ell_t(\phi) \leq t |\kappa_{\ell}| \frac{1}{2} (\phi - \phi_{ML}^t)^2 \). The expected distance of the true state from the log-likelihood maximizer is given by
\[
\tilde{E}_t[(\phi - \phi_{ML}^t)^2] = \int_{(\phi, \phi)} (\phi_{ML}^t - \phi)^2 \frac{e^{\ell_t(\phi)}}{\int_{(\phi, \phi)} e^{\ell_t(z)} dz} d\phi
\]
\[
= \int_{(\phi, \phi)} (\phi_{ML}^t - \phi)^2 \frac{e^{-t(\ell_t(\phi_{ML}^t) - \ell_t(\phi))}}{\int_{(\phi, \phi)} e^{-t(\ell_t(\phi_{ML}^t) - \ell_t(z))} dz} dz
\]
\[
\leq \frac{|\kappa_{\ell}|}{|\kappa_{\ell}|} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi} t} \frac{t |\kappa_{\ell}|}{|\kappa_{\ell}|} \int_{(\phi, \phi)} e^{-t|\ell_t|} d\phi
\]
\[
= \frac{|\kappa_{\ell}|}{|\kappa_{\ell}|} \frac{1}{t}.
\]
In the last step, we use that the term above the numerator is the variance of a normal distribution with variance \( \frac{1}{|\kappa_{\ell}|^2} \), and the term in the denominator is the integral over a normal density (with variance \( \frac{1}{|\kappa_{\ell}|^2} \)) and, hence, is equal to 1. 

Q.E.D.

As a consequence for large enough \( t \), the agent’s posterior expected squared distance between the state and the log-likelihood maximizer decays at the speed of \( 1/t \) for any sequence of signals he observes.
Define $\tilde{\phi}_t$, as the agent’s subjective posterior mean

$$\tilde{\phi}_t := \tilde{E}_t[\phi].$$

The result of Proposition 12 immediately implies that the agent’s subjective beliefs also concentrate around his posterior mean.

**Lemma 19:** There exists a constant $k$ such that for all large enough $t$,

$$\tilde{E}_t[(\phi - \tilde{\phi}_t)^2] \leq \frac{k}{t}. \quad (20)$$

**Proof:** The agent’s subjective posterior mean minimizes the squared distance from the agent’s point of view, that is, for any $\hat{\phi}$,

$$0 = \frac{\partial}{\partial \hat{\phi}} \tilde{E}_t[(\hat{\phi} - \phi)^2] = 2\tilde{E}_t[\hat{\phi} - \phi] = 2(\hat{\phi} - \tilde{\phi}_t).$$

Hence, the posterior variance must be less than the expected distance between the state and the maximum likelihood estimate:

$$\tilde{E}_t[(\phi - \tilde{\phi}_t)^2] \leq \tilde{E}_t[(\phi - \phi_{ML})^2] \leq \frac{k}{t}.$$

Q.E.D.

Denote by $e^m_t$ the action that is myopically optimal given the agent’s posterior belief:

$$e^m_t \in \arg \max_e \tilde{E}_{t-1}[Q(e,a,\phi)].$$

Recall that we denote by $e^*(\hat{\phi})$ the action that is subjectively optimal when the agent assigns probability 1 to some state $\hat{\phi}$. As the output function is linear in $\phi$, the myopically optimal action is implicitly given by the first order condition

$$0 = \tilde{E}_t[\phi] \cdot He(e,\tilde{a}) + Ge(e,\tilde{a}).$$

This immediately implies the following lemma.

**Lemma 20:** The myopically optimal action $e^m_t$ equals the optimal action when the agent assigns probability 1 to the state $\tilde{\phi}_t$:

$$e^m_t = e^*(\tilde{\phi}_{t-1}).$$

In the next step, we show that the change in the optimal action is locally Lipschitz continuous in the subjective average belief.

**Lemma 21:** For every compact interval $I$, there exists $k_I$ such that $0 \leq (e^*)'(\phi) \leq k_I$.

**Proof:** As $Q$ is concave in the action $e$, the optimal action $e^*(\phi)$ when the agent assigns a point belief to $\phi$ satisfies $0 = Q_e(e(\phi),\tilde{a},\phi)$. By the implicit function theorem,

$$(e^*)'(\phi) = -\frac{Q_{e\phi}(e^*(\phi),\tilde{a},\phi)}{Q_{ee}(e^*(\phi),\tilde{a},\phi)} > 0.$$
As \((e^*)'\)' is continuous, it follows that it is bounded on \(I\) by
\[
k_I = \max_{\phi \in I} \frac{Q_e^\phi(e^*(\phi), \tilde{a}, \phi)}{|Q_e^e(e^*(\phi), \tilde{a}, \phi)|}.
\]
Q.E.D.

In the next step, we show that the agent’s gain from learning vanishes as \(t\) increases, and hence the optimal action approaches the myopically optimal one. An easy upper bound on the gain from learning is the change in payoffs when the agent uses the myopically optimal action.

**Lemma 22:** As \(t \to \infty\), the optimal action \(e_t\) and myopically optimal action \(e_t^m\) converge, that is, \(\lim_{t \to \infty} (e_t^m - e_t)^2 = 0\).

**Proof:** Fix an interval of beliefs \(I_{\phi} = [\phi_{\infty} - \gamma, \phi_{\infty} + \gamma]\) for some \(\gamma > 0\) and fix a corresponding set of actions \(I_e = [e^*(\phi_{\infty} - \gamma), e^*(\phi_{\infty} + \gamma)]\). Let \(\kappa_{ee}\) be given by
\[
\kappa_{ee} = \sup_{\phi \in I_{\phi}, e \in I_e} Q_{ee}(e, \tilde{a}, \phi).
\]
As \(I_{\phi} \times I_e\) is compact and \(Q\) is continuous with \(Q_{ee} < 0\), it follows that \(\kappa_{ee} < 0\). By Lemma 15, the myopic action will be in the interval \(I_e\) after some period \(T_e\).

Define the projection \(P_e\) of an action \(e\) to \(I_e\) by
\[
P_e = \arg \min_{\hat{e} \in I_e} |\hat{e} - e|.
\]
We have that the subjectively expected contemporaneous loss in period \(t\) from taking an action \(e\) other than the myopically optimal one is given by
\[
\tilde{E}_{t-1}[Q(e_t^m, \tilde{a}, \phi) - Q(e, \tilde{a}, \phi)]
\]
\[
= \int_{(\phi, \overline{\phi})} \{Q(e_t^m, \tilde{a}, \phi) - Q(e, \tilde{a}, \phi)\} \pi_{t-1}(\phi) \, d\phi
\]
\[
= \int_{(\phi, \overline{\phi})} \int_{e}^{e_t^m} Q_e(z, \tilde{a}, \phi) \, dz \pi_{t-1}(\phi) \, d\phi
\]
\[
= \int_{(\phi, \overline{\phi})} \int_{e}^{e_t^m} \{Q_e(e_t^m, \tilde{a}, \phi) - \int_{e}^{e_t^m} Q_{ee}(y, \tilde{a}, \phi) \, dy\} \, dz \pi_{t-1}(\phi) \, d\phi
\]
\[
= \int_{(\phi, \overline{\phi})} \{e_t^m - e\} Q_e(e_t^m, \tilde{a}, \phi) - \int_{e}^{e_t^m} \int_{e}^{e_t^m} Q_{ee}(y, \tilde{a}, \phi) \, dy \, dz \pi_{t-1}(\phi) \, d\phi.
\]
Using that \(\int_{(\phi, \overline{\phi})} Q(e_t^m, \tilde{a}, \phi) \pi_{t-1}(\phi) \, d\phi = 0\) and that the integral bounds of the second term in curly brackets are ordered the same way, we have that
\[
\tilde{E}_{t-1}[Q(e_t^m, \tilde{a}, \phi) - Q(e, \tilde{a}, \phi)]
\]
\[
= \int_{(\phi, \overline{\phi})} \int_{e}^{e_t^m} \int_{z}^{e_t^m} |Q_{ee}(y, \tilde{a}, \phi)| \, dy \, dz \pi_{t-1}(\phi) \, d\phi
\]
\[
\geq \int_{(\phi, \overline{\phi})} \int_{e}^{e_t^m} \int_{z}^{e_t^m} 1_{\{y \in I_e\}} |Q_{ee}(y, \tilde{a}, \phi)| \, dy \, dz \pi_{t-1}(\phi) \, d\phi
\]
By Jensen’s inequality, we can bound the above term by that by Lemma 21.

\[
\int_{(\phi, \bar{\phi})} \left| \int_e^{e_{t-1}} \int_z 1_{\{y \in E_t\}} |\kappa_{ee}| dy dz \right| 1_{\{\phi \in I_\phi\}} \pi_{t-1}(\phi) d\phi \\
\geq \frac{|\kappa_{ee}|}{2} 1_{\{t \geq T_t\}} \int_{\mathbb{R}} (e_t^m - P_e)^2 1_{\{\phi \in I_\phi\}} \pi_{t-1}(\phi) d\phi \\
= \frac{|\kappa_{ee}|}{2} 1_{\{t \geq T_t\}} \pi_{t-1}([\Phi \in I_\phi](e_t^m - P_e)^2).
\]

We next derive a (rough) upper bound on the gain of learning. We calculate the upper bound on the per-period gain by taking the difference in expected payoffs between an agent who gets to know the state of the world perfectly minus one who learns nothing over and above what he knows at the beginning of period \(t\). To state the bound, we use that by Lemma 21 \(e^*\) is Lipschitz continuous on \(I_\phi\), and we denote the corresponding Lipschitz constant by \(\kappa_o\). We have

\[
\pi_{t-1}[Q(e^*(\phi), \tilde{a}, \phi) - Q(e_t^m, \tilde{a}, \phi)] \\
= \int_{(\phi, \bar{\phi})} \{Q(e^*(\phi), \tilde{a}, \phi) - Q(e_t^m, \tilde{a}, \phi)\} \pi_{t-1}(\phi) d\phi \\
\leq \kappa_e \int_{(\phi, \bar{\phi})} 1_{\{\phi \in I_\phi\}} |e^*(\phi) - e^*(\phi_{t-1})| \pi_{t-1}(\phi) d\phi \\
+ \kappa_e \int_{(\phi, \bar{\phi})} 1_{\{\phi \in I_\phi\}} |e^*(\phi) - e^*(\phi_{t-1})| \pi_{t-1}(\phi) d\phi \\
\leq \kappa_e \kappa_o \int_{(\phi, \bar{\phi})} 1_{\{\phi \in I_\phi\}} |\phi - \phi_{t-1}| \pi_{t-1}(\phi) d\phi + \kappa_e \pi_{t-1}([\Phi \notin I_\phi](e_{\max} - e_{\min}).
\]

By Jensen’s inequality, we can bound the above term by

\[
\pi_{t-1}[Q(e^*(\phi), \tilde{a}, \phi) - Q(e_t^m, \tilde{a}, \phi)] \\
\leq \kappa_e \kappa_o \sqrt{\int_{(\phi, \bar{\phi})} (\phi - \phi_{t-1})^2 \pi_{t-1}(\phi) d\phi + \kappa_e \pi_{t-1}([\Phi \notin I_\phi](e_{\max} - e_{\min})} \\
= \kappa_e \kappa_o \sqrt{\pi_{t-1}([\Phi - \phi_{t-1})^2]} + \kappa_e \pi_{t-1}([\Phi \notin I_\phi](e_{\max} - e_{\min}).
\]

As \(\delta\) times the current loss must be smaller than \((1 - \delta)\) times the future gains, we have that

\[
\delta \pi_{t-1}[Q(e_t^m, \tilde{a}, \phi) - Q(e_t, \tilde{a}, \phi)] \leq (1 - \delta) \pi_{t-1}[Q(e^*(\phi), \tilde{a}, \phi) - Q(e_t^m, \tilde{a}, \phi)] \\
\Rightarrow \frac{|\kappa_{ee}|}{2} 1_{\{t \geq T_t\}} \pi_{t-1}([\Phi \in I_\phi](e_t^m - P_e)^2 \\
\leq \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} \{\kappa_e \kappa_o \sqrt{\pi_{t-1}([\Phi - \phi_{t-1})^2]} + \kappa_e \pi_{t-1}([\Phi \notin I_\phi](e_{\max} - e_{\min})].
\]
Consequently, we have that for \( t > T \),

\[
(e^m_t - Pe_t)^2 \leq \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta |\kappa_e|} \sqrt{\hat{E}}_{t-1}[(\Phi - \phi_{t-1})^2] + \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta |\kappa_e|} \hat{P}_{t-1}[\Phi \notin I_{\phi}] (e_{\max} - e_{\min}).
\]

By Lemma 19, the subjective posterior variance is bounded, \( \hat{P}_{t-1}[(\Phi - \phi_{t-1})^2] \leq k/(t - 1) \), and thus for \( t > T \),

\[
(e^m_t - Pe_t)^2 \leq \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta |\kappa_e|} \sqrt{\frac{k}{t - 1}} \frac{1}{\hat{P}_{t-1}[\Phi \in I_{\phi}]} + \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta |\kappa_e|} \hat{P}_{t-1}[\Phi \notin I_{\phi}] (e_{\max} - e_{\min}).
\]

As \( \hat{P}_{t-1}[\Phi \in I_{\phi}] \) converges to 1 by the definition of \( I_{\phi} = (\phi_{\infty} - \gamma, \phi_{\infty} + \gamma) \), it follows that the right-hand side converges to 0. By Lemma 15, the myopically optimal action \( e^m_t \) is strictly inside \( I_\epsilon \). Consequently, (21) implies \( \liminf_{t \to \infty} e_t \) and \( \limsup_{t \to \infty} e_t \) are strictly inside \( I_\epsilon \), and (21) implies that \( \lim_{t \to \infty} (e^m_t - e_t)^2 = 0 \). \( Q.E.D. \)

PROOF OF THEOREM 2: By Lemma 22, the limit inferior and the limit superior over actions are the same if the agent behaves strategically and if he behaves myopically. Hence, it follows from the proof for myopic actions (Theorem 1) that the agent’s belief converges in distribution to a Dirac measure on \( \phi_{\infty} \) and the agent’s action to \( e^*(\phi_{\infty}) \). \( Q.E.D. \)

A.2.4. Further Proofs on Stable Beliefs

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6: Analogously to \( \hat{F}_t \) defined for the perceived error in the text, we let \( F_t \) be the empirical frequency of the true error \( e_t \) at the prespecified time periods \( t_1, t_2, \ldots \), that is, \( F_t(x) = |\{i' \leq i | e_{i'} \leq x\}|/i \).

For an infinite sample, the agent beliefs must equal his stable belief \( \phi_{\infty} \). Hence, once the agent observed an infinite sample,

\[
\hat{e}_{i\hat{i}} = Q(e_{i\hat{i}}, A, \Phi) - Q(e_{i\hat{i}}, \hat{a}, \phi_{\infty}) + e_{i\hat{i}}
\]

\[
= Q(e^*(\phi_{\infty}), A, \Phi) - Q(e^*(\phi_{\infty}), \hat{a}, \phi_{\infty}) + e_{i\hat{i}}
\]

\[
- \int_{e_{i\hat{i}}}^{e^*(\phi_{\infty})} Q_e(s, A, \Phi) \, ds + \int_{e_{i\hat{i}}}^{e^*(\phi_{\infty})} Q_e(s, \hat{a}, \phi_{\infty}) \, ds
\]

\[
= e_{i\hat{i}} - \int_{e_{i\hat{i}}}^{e^*(\phi_{\infty})} Q_e(s, A, \Phi) \, ds + \int_{e_{i\hat{i}}}^{e^*(\phi_{\infty})} Q_e(s, \hat{a}, \phi_{\infty}) \, ds.
\]

Now because \( Q \) is twice continuously differentiable and \( e_{i\hat{i}} \to e^*(\phi_{\infty}) \), for every \( \eta > 0 \) there exists a \( \hat{i} \) such that for all \( t > \hat{i} \), \( \hat{e}_{i\hat{i}} \in (e_{i\hat{i}} - \eta, e_{i\hat{i}} + \eta) \). Choose a time period \( \tau \) such that the fraction of observations in the sequence \( t_1, t_2, \ldots \) the agent observed before \( \hat{i} \) is less than \( \eta \). Then for all \( t > \tau, \hat{F}_t(x) \in (F_t(x - \eta) - \eta, F_t(x + \eta) + \eta) \). This implies that \( \hat{F}_t(x) \to F_t(x) \) for all \( x \), for otherwise there exists an \( x \in (0, 1) \) and an \( \eta > 0 \) such that for all \( \tau \) there exists some \( t > \tau \) for which \( \hat{F}_t(x) \notin (F_t(x - \eta) - \eta, F_t(x + \eta) + \eta) \), a
contradiction. Now because the true errors are i.i.d., $F_t(x) \to F(x)$ a.s., and since $\hat{F}_t(x) \to F_t(x)$ a.s., we conclude that $\hat{F}_t(x) \to F(x)$ a.s. \(Q.E.D.\)

The proof of Proposition 7 was given in the text.

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8: For the loss-function specification, the surprise function is

$$\Gamma(\phi) = - (\tilde{a} - A) + (\Phi - \phi) - L(\Phi - \phi).$$

The stable beliefs are the Dirac measure on the unique root $\phi_\infty$ of $\Gamma$. Using that this root $\phi_\infty > \Phi$ and that $A > \tilde{a}$ to rewrite $\Gamma(\phi_\infty) = 0$ gives

$$L(\phi_\infty - \Phi) + (\phi_\infty - \Phi) = |\Delta|.$$ 

Thus $\phi_\infty - \Phi < |\Delta|$ and $L(\phi_\infty - \Phi) < \Delta$. \(Q.E.D.\)

REFERENCES


Co-editor Itzhak Gilboa handled this manuscript.

Manuscript received 9 January, 2016; final version accepted 9 April, 2018; available online 16 April, 2018.