Zsolt Enyedi

Relationships Between Authoritarianism and Political Affiliations

The political implications of authoritarianism have been provoking scholarly and journalistic debate for half a century. This paper discusses possible links between authoritarianism and ideological and political affiliations. It does so relative to a seminal work on the subject, *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno et al., 1950), to later researches into social psychology and political science, and to the findings of an empirical survey, taken in Hungary in 1994.

'The Authoritarian Personality'

The purpose of Adorno and his colleagues was to discover the causes of receptiveness to fascist propaganda. They sought to do so mainly through a better understanding of the links between political ideologies and certain psychological variables. According to their line of argument, associating specific ideologies with certain character traits may also clear up why people join movements that jeopardize their interests, freedom and dignity. The authors underlined that psychological variables do not determine people’s political and ideological orientations, only make them more ‘vulnerable’ to certain approaches. Nonetheless, they claimed to have discovered psychological links between such distant ideological elements as ethnic prejudice, respect for social hierarchy, or a desire for law and order. Following a line of argument stretching back through Reich and Fromm to Freud, they stated that repression of antipathies aroused against punitive parents would tend to generate an unconditional admiration for authority, a rigid adherence to social conventions and norms, rejection of groups lower down the social ladder, and a tendency to aggression towards them. So behind attraction to fascist-type movements and their rhetoric lies unconscious
psychological needs developed in childhood. Coherence between ideological elements is seen as deriving less from logical connections between them than from them satisfying the same psychological needs.

According to Adorno and his colleagues, ideology and personality appear as two distinct, but systematically connected factors. However, they have to be measured separately and independently before the relation between them can be shown. The authors believed they had devised a scale to measure just the characteristics of authoritarianism that were independent of ideology and associated with personality—the so-called F (fascism) scale. However, the way the scale was constructed and conceptualized cast doubt on its political and ideological neutrality. The book treated fascism and anti-democratic ideas as synonymous: aggressive, punitive attitudes were associated with the right-wing, conservative end of the political spectrum. Although authoritarianism was not directly equated by the authors with affiliation to a specific political trend, the main manifestations of an authoritarian personality were seen to be ethnocentrism, which is strongly linked with the left-right dimension (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 151). So differentiation between left and right was among the prior assumptions. The findings supported this point of departure. There were positive correlations between the PEC scale (political-economic conservatism) and the ethnocentrism and F scales, though they were weaker than the one between ethnocentrism and authoritarianism. However, that is not surprising, as there are social situations in which certain ideological patterns are simply not found. It would be hard, for instance, to be a communist in a small, deeply religious American town.

After The Authoritarian Personality appeared, many scholars accused its authors of blindness to left-wing authoritarianism. Others found positively insulting the assumed relation of psychological disorders and hostility-based attitudes with right-wing convictions (see Stone et al., 1993, p. 5). The stress on the complexity of the ideological spectrum and the distinction drawn between ‘genuine’, non-racist conservatism and
prejudice-ridden 'pseudo-conservatism' did not cancel out the way the left-right continuum was associated with ethnocentrism, and thereby authoritarianism.

Paradoxically, this controversial message imparted by the research coincides with an almost commonplace treatment of the ideological sphere. The authors, in associating the left with equality and the right with hierarchy and unquestioning respect for the authorities in society, were taking a standard, historically and theoretically sustained approach (see Körösényi, 1993). However, this model has far-reaching implications. Authoritarian, ethnocentric personalities should be found to choose a programme on the right of the ideological spectrum. Tolerant personalities, who reject relations of subordination and superiority, should be drawn to left-wing movements that promise to end oppression of the weak. If the relation between personality and ideology is seen as linear, the centre right should likewise be more authoritarian than the moderate left and still more the radical left.

Empirical and theoretical research provides such frequent examples of conservatism being linked with ethnocentrism and authoritarianism as to make it questionable how far they can be seen as separate phenomena. The insufficient distinction of concept and measurement caused problems for Adorno and his team as well (Adorno et al., 1950, pp. 180 and 254). This uncertainty remains undispelled.¹

While these concepts seemed to be hopelessly entangled in people’s minds, another public perception (especially in post-socialist countries)

¹ The overlap between authoritarianism and conservatism has been shown in studies by Wilson (1973), Ray (1973), Hicks (1974), Schenk (1980), Meloen et al. (1988) and others. A difference between the empirical and the theoretical approach is apparent. While the latter recognizes the tendency of conservatism and the right wing towards authoritarianism and prejudices, but shows a sharp dividing line with aggressive authoritarianism, the former does not always detect, on a level of mass attitudes, the sharp dividing lines apparent in written texts.
is that authoritarian personalities occur in left-wing movements as well as right. Adorno and his team found in their sample a few unprejudiced, non-ethnocentric persons with low F-scale scores who showed the psychological characteristics typical of the authoritarians. This led them to conclude that specific ideological convictions might become free from the personality (Adorno, 1950, p. 772). Michael Billig expressed himself more forcefully still, rejecting altogether the possibility of attaching personality types to specific ideologies or political movements. He added somewhat cynically that describing fascists as people with a unique type of personality was useful only for making their opponents feel more comfortable (Billig, 1978, p. 48).

Though this conclusion may mean that discussion of authoritarianism as a type of personality can be laid aside, authoritarianism as a cluster of social values and attitudes remains relevant. The nature of political systems and most government decisions link directly with the authoritarian-libertarian value dimension. So the value orientation of citizens is likely to appear in their political behaviour and party choices. This is the sense (as a cluster of attitudes and values) in which authoritarianism normally features in political studies. The basic question in this paper can be expressed like this: How does the authoritarian-libertarian pair of value opposites relate to dimensions of political ideologies and social attitudes, above all the left-right dimension?

Authoritarianism left, right and centre

The first serious reaction from a political scientist to The Authoritarian Personality was an article by Edward Shils (1954) strongly attacking the

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2 There is a whole literature on whether social attitudes should be treated as an imprint of personality type or as an ideological element independent of psychological structures. Goertzel (1987) refers to this dilemma. In general, few researchers still think of authoritarianism as a personality structure implanted in childhood in the way Adorno described.
book’s basic approach. He underlined the positive social role played by conventionalism (see Er_s, 1986, p. 215) and warned against the dictatorial methods employed by communist regimes, arguing that the F scale constructed to measure authoritarianism was loaded against the right. Hans Eysenck (1954; Eysenck and Wilson, 1978) went a step further, demonstrating that the dimension of authoritarianism (which he called tough-mindedness versus tender-mindedness) was independent of the radical-conservative (left-right) pair of opposites. To use the customary spatial metaphor, the former axis is perpendicular to the latter. Patriotism, support for restoring the death penalty, and religious affiliation appear at the conservative pole of Eysenck’s two-dimensional continuum. The radical end of Eysenck’s two-dimensional attitude space is taken by patriotism, support for the death penalty, and religious affiliation, while communism, pacifism, belief in evolution, and religious and sexual freedom appear at the radical end. The tough-minded and the tender-minded choose attitudes from both these poles. The former, in line with their materialist and pragmatic orientation, pick the death penalty, divorce, birth control and sexual freedom, while the latter, showing more idealistic attitudes, go for religion, pacifism and self-restraint (Eysenck, 1954). According to both Shils’ and Eysenck’s models, authoritarianism marks the extremes, and equally so—fascists are ‘tough-minded’ conservatives and communists ‘tough-minded’ radicals. Although the social psychological researches to support this were based mainly on questionnaires and laboratory experiments, the popularity of this approach was closely tied to the success of the totalitarian theories then in vogue among historians and political scientists. These emphasized the underlying similarity discerned between extreme right and left-wing movements and regimes, rather than the differences, which were seen as superficial.

3 Eysenck still insisted on defining this dimension as a personality type.
This approach did not cut the link between authoritarianism and the left-right spectrum. It simply made it symmetrical. Milton Rokeach (1960), on the other hand, advanced arguments for saying that authoritarian (dogmatic, in his terminology) thinking occurs at all points along the political scale. Though the content of the ideology may vary, the way it is practiced (open and flexible or closed and rigid) may still be the same.

Behind all these ideas lies the basic attitude that regards as acceptable only a centrist, liberal, or in Rokeach’s case, an expressly ideology-free approach, and looks with suspicion on Utopian, radical ways of thinking. The opposite approach—to associate authoritarianism with centrist, moderate tendencies—appears to be a paradox and does not appear in a pure form among the hypotheses to be found in the literature. However, the ‘context theory’ of Sidanius comes very close to it. The cognitive style of authoritarian personalities is usually described as rigid and parochial. According to this approach, authoritarians shield themselves from any information that conflicts with their simplistic world-view. However, Sidanius argues that those upholding extreme views have to invest a lot of energy in defending their viewpoint from the majority. His researches showed that both far-left and far-right students were more informed about historical and political facts and more interested in such matters than their moderate colleagues (Sidanius 1984; 1985).

Identification of authoritarianism with the left is a frequent formula in political journalism, but rare in academic literature. Mention can be made of some attempts by Ray (e.g. 1985) and of the examination by Lichter and Rothman (1981—2; 1982). The latter traced the motives of radical, left-wing activists in the 1960s to a thirst for power, an

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4 Stone (1980), discussing this attitude, blamed a centrist bias to be found in the social sciences.
unquestioned self-confidence, and insensitivity towards others—typical authoritarian traits.

After reviewing the main approaches, it becomes possible to formalize the relation between authoritarianism and the left-right axis. The following possibilities present themselves: (i) Authoritarianism is not tied to any ideological tendency; it can appear at any point on the left-right continuum. (ii) Authoritarianism is associated with the right, (iii) with the left, (iv) with the extremes, or (v) with the centre.

As the classification shows, almost every theoretically possible solution has been proposed at some time for the political and ideological focus of authoritarianism. It hardly needs adding that every solution has received methodological criticisms. The problem, as Stone and Smith remarked about left-wing authoritarianism, is basically statistical (Stone and Smith, 1993, p. 154). Statistics, of course, are a serious study. However, it is remarkable what diverse results appear from similar methods when it comes to the connection between authoritarianism and politico-ideological affiliation, and how well these correlate to the political allegiances of their authors (see Eckhardt, 1991).

The political aspects of authoritarianism relate to the organization of socio-political attitudes in the broader sense. The view has been expressed that most people have no coherent socio-political attitudes (Converse, 1964), so that there is no sense in talking about the dimensions of them. Researchers of a more ideological frame of mind have devised several theories to do with the dimensional nature of attitudes, of which two are important here. One (espoused, for instance, by Wilson and Ray) says there is a general factor that determines the whole cosmos of social attitudes. Attitudes and persons can be ranged along a radical-conservative or left-right axis. The other (Eysenck, for instance) also accepts that our thinking is ordered according to the classic left-right axis, dealing mainly with questions of economic equality and state intervention, but claims that there exists another
axis as well, on which left and right-wing authoritarians contrast with the left and right-wing ‘tender-minded’. Another version of this second approach conceptualises the two relatively independent dimensions as the economic and the non-economic (or cultural) Left—Right, where the second dimension refers basically to the level of social tolerance. Although there are empirical arguments in favour of both versions, the one that attaches special importance to authoritarianism is the more widespread. It has become almost conventional to analyse the party systems and the electors’ attitudes in two dimensions: a political and cultural libertarian-authoritarian axis and a socio-economic left-right axis. Middendorp’s empirical study over several decades has proved (at least for the Netherlands) that the two organizing principles affect not only social attitudes, but political behaviour (Middendorp, 1991). However, it is still not clear whether authoritarianism is perpendicular to (i.e. independent of) the left-right axis, or whether authoritarianism and right-wing views correlate to some extent. The situation may differ from country to country, but it is less and less in dispute that reality cannot be modelled satisfactorily if the social attitudes are reduced to one dimension.

For a good many years, it seemed as if the post-materialism versus materialism axis would gain the honour of being the second axis. According to Ronald Inglehart, increasing affluence, the absence of war, and rising levels of education began to change people’s value priorities, inclining them towards non-material values. While the classic issues relating to redistribution of material goods still dominate official party politics, voters are tending to polarize over values rather than social status. Inglehart cites Adorno’s type of authoritarianism as a possible expression of the new conflict of values, but ultimately rejects it, on

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5 Of course in theory and practice, there are several other contrasts that can polarize the public’s thinking. But the authoritarian-libertarian axis is the second dimension most often identified, next to the classical left-right axis.
methodological and substantive grounds (Inglehart, 1977, pp. 66—9; 1990, pp. 70—71).

Inglehart’s scale of materialism and post-materialism does not really cover what is commonly meant by authoritarianism. For example, post-materialism applies to such anti-authoritarian values as rejection of militarism or recognition of minority rights. However, it also contains such disparate attitudes as the demand for an aesthetically pleasing, undisturbed environment or the rejection of material advancement. The confusion derives from the partial overlap between the two concepts and between the two scales. According to Flanagan’s critique (1987), Inglehart simply mixed up materialist and authoritarian values, which should be distinguished theoretically. Of the two components, recent research suggests that authoritarianism is the one more relevant to political action (Middendorp, 1992). While the material-non-material pair tends only to describe the contrast between the lower and the upper classes (Schweisguth, 1992), a discernible revolution has occurred along the authoritarianism-libertarianism axis in recent years. Members of the younger generation worldwide are taking increasingly permissive positions on social and moral concerns (Knutsen, 1990; Inglehart, 1990; Flanagan, 1987).

Whether the libertarian-authoritarian or the material-post-material dimension is examined, there arises a problem over relations with the real social authorities and powers. The situation seems simple at first sight. The authoritarians, by definition, should submit to authority. Inglehart links the post-materialist dimension to resistance to authority as well. In his model those who sympathize with alternative, protest movements are pitted against those who support the authorities (Inglehart, 1984, p. 60). The trouble comes when groups are found that oppose both the elite and the minorities. Inglehart, during research in Switzerland in the 1970s, discovered a conflict between cosmopolitan, pro-change elites and a radical, anti-authority right wing (Inglehart and Sidjanski, 1976), but even this did not lead him to change his model.
In the event, the Swiss case has fairly general validity. Almost all Western countries have an educated, ‘cognitively mobilized’, anti-authoritarian elite espousing cosmopolitan values. This elite is opposed by extreme right and left groups who are increasingly successful in basing their strategy on anti-establishment attitudes. The ‘multi-culturalism’ of the elites runs up against the ‘welfare chauvinism’ of the masses, anxious about their peace and prosperity. Of course this also means it is less and less possible to describe the latter’s feelings using the concepts of conventionalism and unconditional subordination to the authorities. In an environment where the powers in society (church, state, trade unions, media, science and scholarship, and so on) appear as pro-minority and tolerance is the official norm, those who adhere to authoritarian traditions find themselves in a difficult position. Eventually they have to choose between their values, which have come into conflict.

The paradoxical figure of an anti-authority authoritarian produced by this contradictory situation is not a new one. Even The Authoritarian Personality features a ‘rebel’ who is antagonistic to the authorities but secretly ready to capitulate (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 762). This character was interpreted in another way by Michael Billig. Adorno and his colleagues saw the ‘rebel’ simply as a sub-type of the authoritarian syndrome. Billig’s model of a ‘man of violence’, on the other hand, forms a contrast with the traditional authoritarian figure, since he not only questions social authority, but is capable of the wildest aggression while also showing a high degree of tolerance (Billig, 1978).

This all goes to show that people of various characters may be drawn to fascist-type movements. Furthermore, their affiliation to them is backed by real, conscious choice, or at least to a greater extent than the classic theories of authoritarianism have suggested. The extreme right-wing movements are not just ‘unconventional’, for they show several signs of cultural and political inventiveness. The radical right wing, attacking the welfare state (the Italian League, the Scandinavian
Progress parties, etc.) and displaying racism (the Belgian Flemish Bloc, French National Front, etc.), scandalizes the older generations and captures the imagination of the young and those who have become alienated from the traditions of the churches and other corporative bodies. These movements are part of the New Politics not only as a reaction to the New Left, but because they show similar attitudes in many cases, not least towards the social establishment. This is not the first time that rejecting the logic of representative democracy or fighting against the bureaucratic structure of society has brought together movements from opposite ends of the political spectrum. However, when corruption (combating which is one of these movements prime purposes) leads to collapse of the party system in consolidated Western democracies, there is even more reason to turn from the centre right-centre left rivalry to the struggle between centrist groups and the anti-consensus forces on the left and right.

More striking even than the social correspondences are the similarities of style. Petty bourgeois tastes are insulted just as much by an extreme right-wing jamboree as by an anarchist happening. The daily newspapers report on how former punk-rock stars, skinheads, veterans, avant garde artists and priests come together at events run by István Csurka's extreme right-wing Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP). Once a left-wing slogan, 'Be realistic, demand the impossible!' is far more suitable for the political and cultural right these days. The traditional association of political and cultural conventionalism with the right is increasingly misleading, as the status quo tends to become linked with the left (Huber and Inglehart, 1995, p. 85). That still leaves the concepts of authoritarianism and the authoritarian personality with their uses, but the present-day support for the extreme right wing cannot be adequately explained by them. A typical authoritarian individual may become a good citizen under a dictatorial regime, but is unlikely to give support to extremist movements seeking to establish such regimes.
To be fair, it has to be recognized that the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality*, when writing about subordination to authority, referred to 'in-group authorities'. So members of the radical right wing can be fitted into the scheme of the book insofar as they do not regard the existing social authorities as 'theirs'. However, the points of reference for authoritarian thinking, in the Adorno research and in later surveys, are the norms and authorities of the average citizen. Altemeyer (1985; 1988), perhaps the most important scholar researching into authoritarianism today, explicitly emphasizes relations with, and even blind obedience to the existing authorities. However, considering what has been said earlier, it is the revolutionary, inventive and innovative character of the radical right wing that needs to be underlined.

Finally, it is necessary to turn to the relation between the left and authoritarianism. Although there are several convincing arguments for the existence of left-wing authoritarianism, there is an almost complete consensus among scholars that it has less social importance than right-wing authoritarianism (see Stone et al., 1993, for instance). Even the expressly ideology-free measures of authoritarianism devised by those who discern a bias in the F scale show that left-wing extremists are less authoritarian than their right-wing counterparts.6

Of course the frequent finding that Western radical left-wingers do not resemble the classic authoritarian figure still says nothing about the left wing in communist or 'transition' countries. Several authoritarianism scales have given similar scores to Russian advocates of a one-party system as to Western extreme right-wingers (McFarland et al., 1993). This seems to support the theories of totalitarianism that

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6 According to the famous explanation of Rockeath (1960, p. 126), this is because the dogmatic structure of communist convictions includes a humanist, anti-authoritarian element. Of course several researchers have found well-developed instances of authoritarianism on the left as well, notably Ray (1983; 1985).
see the logic of all modern dictatorships as identical, so that they attract to themselves people with similar personalities and attitudes.

Hungarian conditions

The political construct of authoritarianism in the former communist societies that have already gone through much of their transition probably differs from both the Eastern and the Western 'equation'. So the survey taken in Hungary in 1994, in which the author cooperated, may reveal a lot about a specific stage of development, as well as about a particular country.\(^7\)

As a starting point for the research, authoritarianism and the ideological divisions had to be operationalized. There are several dozen authoritarianism scales in existence (devised, for instance, by Rokeach, by Ray or by Christie—see Robinson and Shaver, 1973.) The most commonly used are the Adorno team's F scale and Altemeyer's RWA (Right Wing Authoritarianism) scale. So the project also made use of shortened versions of these (see Supplement A). The usual way to measure ideological divisions is to place citizens on a left-right scale. That can be done according to the respondents' attitudes, their party sympathies and their self-identifications. We have gathered data on all these dimensions, for the latter one using a ten-point identification scale.

Although the data obtained do not allow all the hypotheses mentioned so far to be verified, they provided some notable findings on the question of left and right-wing authoritarianism.

As far as the classic concept of authoritarianism is concerned, the data seemed to justify their limited applicability to examining existing

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\(^7\) A questionnaire was sent out to a random route national sample of 1000. The research, which was also backed by the National Scientific Research Fund (OTKA) was conducted by Ferenc Er_s, Zoltán Fleck, Zoltán Fábián and Zsolt Enyedi. The basic data are available on the magnetic-disc supplements to Er_s et al. (1996) and to Replika, No. 15—16, 1995.
fascist-type movements. Respondents were asked to rank (among other groups) ‘right-wing extremists’ and ‘skinheads’ according to how congenial they found them. As was to be expected from the Adorno research, the authoritarianism scales correlated with sympathy for extreme right-wingers.\(^8\) On skinheads, however, there were negative, not positive correlations,\(^9\) so that the more authoritarian respondents were, the less they liked the youth sub-culture that provides the background to the only important Hungarian fascist movement. Traditional authoritarians seem to tolerate unconventional political attitudes, but distrust those who do not keep the rules of everyday conduct and dress. Although this correlation is not statistically significant,\(^10\) it adds to the likelihood of the researchers’ assumption that the conventionalism found in the traditional authoritarian concepts may sometimes act as a restraining force. There is further support for this in the fact that lower F and RWA-scale scores were gained from those who had voted for MIÉP, the most extreme right-wing party, than from sympathizers with right-wing parliamentary parties (Table 1).

Turning to the relationship of the left with authoritarianism, a distinction was first drawn between two types. (i) The ‘old left’ was taken to consist of members of the ruling communist party under the previous regime. (ii) The ‘new left’ was defined as those who had voted for left-wing parties, who declared themselves socialists or left-wingers, and who displayed typical left-wing attitudes.

When looking at the connections between authoritarianism (measured on the F and RWA scales) and the old left, two ostensibly plausible hypotheses were made. One hypothesis was that those who belong to the ‘spearhead’ of an authoritarian system will exhibit a higher

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\(^8\) The correlation was .24 for the F scale and .20 for the RWA.

\(^9\) -0.9 in both cases.

\(^10\) It is on a 0.05 level.
than average level of authoritarianism. There were obviously many other factors that motivated people to join the ruling party under the previous regime, apart from ideological preferences or sympathy for the regime’s aims and methods. At the same time, if those with cynical motives for joining are discounted, membership would have required at least a higher than average level of identification with the political system, if psychological and cognitive tensions were to be avoided. So former party membership can be taken as a practical, but not a perfect gauge of how far a respondent was integrated into the social and power structure of the previous regime.

The counter-hypothesis about the connections between authoritarianism and the old left took into account that the Kádár regime was a relatively mild dictatorship. Its avowed purpose had been to foster the modernization of Hungarian society, and conciliation and détente among the various opposing social and political forces. Entry into the politically privileged strata of such a regime would tend to lead to reinforce more enlightened, tolerant attitudes. The greater or lesser privileges that party members enjoyed (access to information on otherwise taboo subjects or greater opportunities for foreign travel) increased the likelihood of the hypothesis of an 'enlightened elite'.

Plausible though they sounded, both hypotheses had to be rejected in the light of the findings. The scores of former party members were lower on the authoritarianism scale than the rest of the population’s.\textsuperscript{11} On the other hand, this stance was not produced by a socialization process connected with party membership. It can be explained entirely by the higher level of education among party members. Regression analysis of

\textsuperscript{11} The test on the RWA scale produced a significant difference: 2.37 for former party members and 2.54 for others. On the F scale, however, the difference between the two groups (2.91 and 3.01) was not significant on the 0.05 level.
the education level and party membership showed that the latter could not have affected attitudes towards authoritarianism.\textsuperscript{12}

As for the present political spectrum, authoritarianism may be expected to appear on both the left and on the right. The collapse of the previous regime was accompanied by economic problems, unemployment and partial dismantling of the social-security net. Indeed in many people's eyes the two processes were directly connected. Reservations about the market economy, rejection of inequalities and a desire for a safer world, even if it was short on democracy, provide a firm foundation for left-wing authoritarianism. Meanwhile the target of the discontent was a right-wing government associated with authoritarian (right-wing authoritarian) aims and techniques. Nationalist and collectivist traditions re-emerged in Hungary after the change of system, as they did in the other countries in the region. So there was good reason to enquire into the extent and character of both left and right-wing authoritarianism.

Affiliation to various political camps can be measured in several ways, one of which is obviously to examine voter support. There have been a number of mutually contradictory assessments made in the literature of the character of various parties' support. The inconsistencies can be explained by methodological problems and by extremely high levels of volatility. We were also interested in the authoritarianism scores of the supporters of various parties. However, the results, which appear in Table 1, must be treated with caution in the light of what was said earlier, including the below-average score for (potential) voters for the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP). There were only 13 supporters of the Workers' Party (Munkáspárt—communists) in the sample. So their

\textsuperscript{12} The standardized coefficients (beta weights) of the variable denoting the number of grades of education were -.50 (on the F scale) and -.47 (on the RWA scale). Both were significant on the .00 level, while the party-membership effects (-.01 and 0.4) were not significant.
conspicuously high score on the F scale is hardly decisive, although it may indicate that left-wing authoritarianism is not the myth that Kohn (1974), Stone (1980) and others have assumed.

Table 1 about here

An attempt was also made to locate respondents in the ideological field irrespective of their party affiliations. The main tool was a ten-grade left-right scale that respondents could use to define their own political identity.

There have been strong debates in the social sciences about what significance can be attached to self-placement. Some authors emphasize the traditional, constant meaning of left and right, while others argue that party affiliation determines the position in which people place themselves (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976). The most widely accepted view is that these categories are empty frameworks that aid communication, whose actual content is supplied by the specific conflicts in the society in question (Klingemann and Fuchs, 1989; Inglehart, 1977). If the last interpretation is correct, there is likely to be a connection between authoritarianism and ideological position. Just as religious and class conflicts were prominent in early periods, so political debates today are dominated by questions to do with post-materialist or authoritarian concerns. This change needs to be reflected in an altered meaning of left and right (Kitschelt and Hellemans, 1990; Knutsen, 1995). Factors tending to reinforce the association of the right with authoritarianism include the rising proportion of educated strata voting according to their values, the rising concern about immigration and crime, the reduced importance of class conflict, and the increasing similarity of the parties’ economic programmes (Schweisguth, 1992).

If most people interpret the categories left and right in terms of conflicts with a material basis, and if authoritarianism is independent of the traditional left-right continuum, there should not be a correlation
between the authoritarianism scales and the left-right scale. No correlation would indicate either that authoritarian attitudes had no political weight, or that left and right no longer played a key role in communication. The results actually showed a correlation between the authoritarianism scales and the left-right scale. So by choosing between the categories of left and right, people also express their attitude towards authoritarianism (at least in part). Here it is irrelevant exactly what mechanism lies behind this. Unless outside factors (e.g. parties) can determine both left-right identity and authoritarianism, the meaning of left and right must be assumed to include people’s relations to the authorities and marginal groups.

However, these correlations are not particularly high.\footnote{The F scale showed a correlation of .13 with the left-right scale and one of .20 with the RWA scale.} This is less surprising for the F scale, which was not derived from politicized questions. Table 2 shows which categories behave irregularly, disturbing the linear relations between the left-right scale and authoritarianism. Two features deserve special attention. One is the very high average F score of those choosing category 1, on the extreme left. This corroborates the finding that Workers’ Party supporters have high F scores, \emph{i.e.} the presence of a highly intolerant group on the far left.\footnote{This underlines how the F and RWA scales rest on two kinds of authoritarianism, one politicized and tied to the right wing, and the other linked more closely with the personality.} The other factor that depresses the correlation is the low level of authoritarianism of category 7 (the centre right).

| Table 2 about here |  |

Most researchers apply a threefold division to describe the Hungarian political and ideological sphere. This survey also set out to measure the conservative, liberal and socialist fields. Respondents were given
typically national-conservative, liberal and socialist goals to rank as most, second most and third most important, and least, second least and third least important. (For the goals, see Appendix B.) The ideological scores obtained matched party sympathies well. Supporters of left-wing parties scored high for socialism, Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) and Association of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) sympathizers for liberalism, and potential voters for the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKgP) and Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) for conservatism. It was found that those with high scores on the national-conservative and the liberal scales were at the extremes of the authoritarianism scale, with the socialists between the two. However, this indicator showed the socialists to be slightly closer to the conservatives (see Table 3).

Table 3 about here

Elsewhere in the questionnaire, respondents could choose or reject various political and ideological labels (two each out of the nine offered). Those who chose the labels 'left-wing' and 'socialist' were more authoritarian than those who chose 'democratic' and 'liberal', but less so than those who chose 'Christian', 'conservative', 'popular' or 'national', although the 'left-wingers' join the least authoritarian group on the RWA scale (Table 4). Applying regression analysis to the effect each ideological label has on authoritarianism scores, it emerged that a 'conservative', 'socialist', 'national', 'popular' and 'right-wing' group identity (and on the F scale a 'left-wing' one as well) had only an insignificant or undetectable bearing on authoritarianism (Table 5). Nevertheless, the plus or minus signs of the coefficients and an examination of the labels generally confirm the picture obtained from the ideological scores. 'Liberals' are on one side, 'conservatives' on the other, and 'socialists' in the middle, albeit nearer to the 'liberal' side.

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15 At the same time, MSZP sympathizers also scored very high for liberalism.
So left-wing authoritarianism is clearly present, but several indicators show it to be less significant in Hungary than right-wing authoritarianism. Authoritarian values are not especially typical of the average left-winger. Factor analysis was performed on the correlations between 17 political opinions and the authoritarianism scale, to confirm the authenticity of the findings and give a chance for left-wing authoritarianism to become apparent. Four 'factors' or attitude dimensions, formed by resentment against successful groups in society, a typically 'Kádárite' assessment of the change of regime, anti-Western and anti-inequality populism, and a right-wing disposition, were found to be distinguishable.\(^{16}\) The authoritarianism scales included in the

\[^{16}\text{The following were the political opinions that marked the factors, in other words, that featured in the factor concerned with a weight greater than }[0.32].\]

The 'frustration' factor: The rich generally look down on the others. Those with a little power at work or in politics generally look down on the others. Highly educated people look down on the others. Only dishonest people can get rich in this country. Privatization amounts to robbery of the country.

The 'Kádárite' factor: Leaders under the Kádár regime paid more attention to people's opinions. Under the socialist system, people had greater trust in the future. Agriculture should continue to be based on the well-run agricultural cooperatives. People have more opportunity since 1990 to influence the country's future. The proportion of private ownership should be raised as soon as possible at the expense of state ownership. (The last two opinions have negative values.)

The 'populist' factor: It is right that some people should be earning millions (negative value again). The state should reduce the income differences between the rich and the poor. The country should not strive to meet Western expectations, but go its own way. Only dishonest people can get rich in this country. Privatization amounts to robbery of the country. The
analysis showed a connection with the third and fourth ('populist' and 'right-wing') factors, and 'kept their distance' from the first and second ('frustration' and 'Kádárite'). Although the goals described here as 'populist' were able to find a place in the policies of both left and right-wing parties, the factor analysis as a whole suggests that Hungarian authoritarianism in 1994 tended to have a right-wing, nationalist face, rather than a frustration-driven, socialistic one.

It would go beyond the bounds of this study to attempt an explanation of the formula just given. It may be that the national conservative and liberal ideologies are the ones to which the issues and values covered by the authoritarianism scales are really important. In that case the middle position of the socialists implies indifference. It may also be that the common notion of the average left-winger is mistaken. Zoltán Fábián showed, in an unpublished analysis based on the same data, that the socialists' basis of support divides into two clearly distinguishable groups on authoritarianism. One is exceptionally authoritarian, while the other, rather larger group, tends to be tolerant. So there seem to be two readings of socialism current in Hungary today.

The weight of leftist authoritarianism differed according to the way we measured left-wing orientation, whether it was in terms of party affiliation, left—right self-placement, ideological identification, or more and less obviously politicised attitudes. That was to be expected, because completely congruent results would have assumed a high level of ideological and political crystallization, which is not, to put it mildly, characteristic of Hungary today. On the other hand, the results do not

state should provide jobs for all who want to work. The Western countries left the Hungarians in the lurch again after the change of system.

*The 'right-wing' factor:* The role of the church in the country's affairs should increase. Hungary should strive to alter the country's Trianon borders.
vary at random: the consciousness and institutionalization of the left-wing orientation appear to be reducing its authoritarianism.

To sum up, it can be concluded that the data for conditions in Hungary in 1994 do not support any of the following hypotheses: (i) Left and right are equally prone to authoritarianism. (ii) It falls steadily to the left. (iii) It falls steadily to the right. (iv) It increases towards the extremes of the political spectrum. (v) It increases towards the centre. Authoritarianism places the current Hungarian left between the liberals and the national conservatives. They show prejudice and intolerance, but to much less of an extent than the right.¹⁷

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¹⁷ The left-wing camp increased strongly and became diluted in 1994. Further research would be needed to say whether its subsequent shrinkage has affected the attitude structure as well.
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AUTHORITARIANISM AND POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS


[Tables to appear where indicated in the text]

Table 1. Average scores on the authoritarianism scales by supporters of the individual political parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party supported</th>
<th>F scale</th>
<th>RWA scale</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Young Democrats (FIDESZ)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallholders (FKgP)</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democrats (KDNP)</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Forum (MDF)</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice and Life (MIÉP)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialists (MSZP)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers' Party</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Democrats (SZDSZ)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample average</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Left-right identity and average scores on the authoritarianism scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Left-right scale</th>
<th>F scale</th>
<th>RWA scale</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (left)</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>72</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 (right)</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample average</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Correlations between ideological affiliation and the authoritarianism scales*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideological field</th>
<th>F scale</th>
<th>RWA scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socialism</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalism</td>
<td>-.36</td>
<td>-.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatism</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Correlation coefficients, significant in each case.

Table 4. Scores on the authoritarianism scales by those choosing certain political labels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political label</th>
<th>F scale</th>
<th>RWA scale</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left-wing</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample average</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5. The effect of political-label choice on authoritarianism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political label</th>
<th>F scale</th>
<th>RWA scale</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Beta coefficients)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-wing</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>-.13*</td>
<td>-.30***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>.21***</td>
<td>.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Significant at the 0.05 level.
** = Significant at the 0.01 level.
*** = Significant at the 0.00 level.

Regression analysis. The value of the beta coefficient shows the strength of the relation. In this case, a positive beta value signifies that choice of the label concerned is associated with a lower authoritarianism score.

Appendix A

The 11 items of the RWA scale (Cronbach’s alpha for closeness of the relations between the statements: .65)

It is always better to trust the competent political or religious leaders than to listen to those who doubt everything.

Homosexuality is not immoral and not reprehensible.

It is important that groups different from the others should be able to assert their rights in the same way.

It is the duty of every true patriot to act against those whom the country’s leaders condemn.
The greatest damage is caused in this country today by those who do not respect our leaders and the system of society.

The courts act correctly if they do not punish drug users; punishment is not effective anyway.

It is quite correct for there to be nudist beaches in Hungary as well.

The immoral relations are also due to the fact that parents and teachers have forgotten that corporal punishment is the best method of education.

There should be less emphasis placed on traditional religious values; instead we should be deciding for ourselves what is moral and what is not.

It would be better for everyone if the authorities concerned would censor the newspapers and films so as to keep filth away from young people.

We should lose as soon as possible the idea that the father is head of the family and that everyone owes him unconditional obedience.

*The 8 items of the F scale (Cronbach's alpha: .73)*

The most important virtues that children should learn are obedience and respect for authority.

Young people sometimes have rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they must reject these and conform.

This country does not need laws and political programmes so much as a few bold, untiring and dedicated leaders in whom the people trust.

Young people need strict rules and commitment so that they can strive for their families and their country.
Most social problems would be solved if we could be free of the immoral and deviant characters.

People can be divided into two groups: the strong and the weak.

It will certainly turn out one day that astrology is capable of explaining a great many things.

Most people are not aware that much of our life is influenced by secret conspiracies.

Appendix B

The indicators for the socialism field

Greater help with further education should be given to the poor.

The state should make sure that everyone can live respectably.

The trade unions should be given a greater say in questions affecting employees.

The indicators for the conservatism field

Religious instruction should be compulsory in every primary and secondary school.

Everything should be done to safeguard the rights of the Hungarians outside the country.

Those responsible for the previous system should be punished.

The indicators for the liberal field

We should ensure a neutrality of world view in education.

We should ensure freedom and independence of the press against government intervention.
We should ensure constitutionalism and the inviolability of human rights.