Introduction: researching authoritarianism in old and new democracies

by Ferenc Erős and Zsolt Enyedi

Background
The present volume contains studies devoted to a problem that is familiar - unfortunately, too familiar - for many of us: the presence of various forms of prejudiced attitudes, such as antisemitism, xenophobia, racism, and hostility against Gypsies and other ethnic or “culturally different” minorities. This phenomenon is the subject of heated ideological and political discussions in both Eastern and Western Europe. Primarily, the political decision makers, the media and the general public must face these issues, but it is equally important that social sciences contribute to their explanation and interpretation. This book signals the fact that a considerable body of research had been already completed or is presently in process in relation to the most recent problems of prejudice; not only in Western Europe but in the Central and Eastern European countries, including the former Communist countries.

The original aim of the conference that formed the background of this book was to help to coordinate and mutually deepen the scholarly work done in Central and Eastern, and in Western Europe. The symposium organized at the Central European University, Budapest (June 1998), created an opportunity for scholars from different countries, dealing with similar topics, to exchange their research experiences, ideas and dilemmas raised by the interpretation of empirical results and theoretical considerations.

As the title of the original meeting - “Authoritarianism and prejudice in an international and intergenerational perspective” - as well as the title of the present volume suggest: one of our basic concern was authoritarianism, the infamous problem of the “authoritarian personality”. In other words, we concentrated on the role that authoritarianism plays in the social phenomena that we call prejudice, intolerance, hostility against outgroups and the like. Our concern with this particular approach is the consequence of a decision made almost a decade ago, when, at the eve of the great changes in Hungary, the editors of this book, together with Zoltán Fábián and Zoltán Fleck (also present among the authors of the present volume), decided to study
authoritarianism in Hungary, following the path of the classic work of Adorno et al. As the social and political transformation opened new avenues for social research, it was tempting to “seize the day” by introducing and experimenting with the concept of authoritarianism on the Hungarian social science scene. (see Enyedi, Erős, Fábián, 1997, Erős, 1986, Erős and Fábián, 1995, Fábián, 1999.)

This challenging endeavor has become even more urgent when it turned out that prejudice and outgroup hostility, first of all, antisemitism, one the closest correlates of the classical “authoritarian syndrome”, entered seriously into Hungarian politics after 1989. Extreme right and neo-Nazi propaganda has become visible, and skinheads, "national youth" and various political groupings repeatedly attempted to stir up antisemitic hysteria. Radical right extremism has proven to be a politically mobilizing force, as demonstrated by the fact that an openly antisemitic party could manoeuvre itself into parliament in 1998. Anti-Gypsy attitudes, although rarely featuring in the debates of political elites, constitute an even graver problem, penetrating all social segments and leading to a number violent ethnic conflicts.

Why exactly, then, Adorno et al.’s The Authoritarian Personality? It seemed to us that the conceptual and methodological tools offered by TAP can be productively applied to studying and interpreting the social psychological aspects of prejudiced attitudes and behaviors. As is well known, through the application of various methodological tools, like questionnaires, in-depth interviews, and projective techniques, the authors of TAP found that there exists a stable ideological orientation, consisting of antisemitism, ethnocentrism and conservatism, which strongly correlates with a certain pattern of personality structure and dynamics, named authoritarianism. Authoritarianism was operationalized by the famous F scale, which included various indicators that “were thought of as going together to form a single syndrome, a more or less enduring structure in the person that renders him receptive to antidemocratic propaganda” (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 228). According to Adorno et al., there exists an underlying psychological dynamic which determines the syndrome of authoritarianism and its main components, such as conventionalism, authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, anti-intraception, rigid thinking, superstition and stereotypy, the preference

\footnote{1 Referred as TAP throughout this book.}
of power and "toughness", destructiveness and cynicism, projectivity and overemphasized interest in sexual deviations.

The main appeal of the Adorno et al. approach to the present day researchers lies in its inter-disciplinary nature. From the point of view of the history of ideas, TAP can be perceived as the main connecting path between classical psychoanalysis, the social and political philosophy of the Frankfurt School and empirically oriented sociology and social psychology (namely, the empirical research of attitudes and stereotypes). In our volume several studies (e.g. Bojan Todosijević’s, Hilde Weiss’s, Zoltán Fleck’s and Zoltán Fábián’s contribution) deal with various aspects of TAP, its antecedents, main tenets and its subsequent transformations and modifications. The reader may also consult a great deal of parallel recent publications which attempt to re-evaluate the tradition of TAP and to delineate new paths for understanding its significance as well as its applicability to present-day social reality (see for example Stone, Lederer and Chistie [eds.], 1993; Worrel and Krier [eds.], 1998.)

In spite of the mushrooming studies in the field and in spite of the conceptual innovations of Milton Rokeach’s on cognitive styles (Rokeach, 1960), and of Bob Altemeyer’s on “right wing authoritarianism” (Altemeyer, 1985, 1988), it must be admitted that throughout the last decades the TAP was over and again declared a “dead horse”, and this manoeuvre was almost fully successful in mainstream social psychology (cf. Erős, 1986, Samelson, 1993). But authoritarianism research went on in a prolific way, leading to substantial modifications and revisions of the original theory. Even the historical and ideological problems implied in the controversial reception of TAP were seen by many sociologists and political scientists as an exciting intellectual puzzle worth playing with.

Not surprisingly, the measurement of authoritarianism in general, including “authoritarianism on the left”, was not an everyday habit of social scientists in the countries of “existing socialism”.

As McFarland, Ageyev, and Abalkina. (1993) put it:

    Marxist-Leninist ideology dictated the existence of “Homo Sovieticus”, and asserted the “unordinary” nature of Soviet man . . . As a result, the adoption of Western constructs and empirical cross-cultural comparisons with Western
countries were disparaged. Constructs such as authoritarianism, and its correlates ethnocentrism and anti-Semitism, were simply not considered, since these concepts could reveal negative traits in Soviet man. Soviet psychologists for several generations regarded *The Authoritarian Personality* and its correlates as descriptive only of Western social reality and assumed that they bore no relation to Soviet socialist society. (p. 199)

Opportunities for research gradually improved only after the beginning of *glasnost* in Russia and of the democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe. There were, however, quite a few exceptions to the rule. In Poland, and even more interestingly from today’s point of view, in Yugoslavia, for example, there were a number of attempts to study authoritarianism already in the 1970s and early 1980s (Koralewicz and Zebik, 1985, Stankov, 1977). In Stankov’s study the F scale items were classified in terms of predominantly cultural, political, and neutral items. The “cultural” subscale had the highest mean both in the Yugoslav and the Adorno sample, but the mean-value for the Yugoslav sample was considerably higher than for the original study. According to the author, “if this society tends toward authoritarianism then the F scale should measure adjustment to the prevailing conditions. A high mean for the ‘cultural’ subscale could indicate that possibility” (Stankov, 1977, p. 115). It is worth citing the final conclusion of the Yugoslav author: “it is important to study those personality traits which allowed and led to the terrible events before and during the Second World War. It is also important to study the impact of communism in a society which is more authoritarian, and construct the measuring instruments which would adequately tap it” (ibid., p. 121.).

**Dilemmas**

Among the numerous question marks attached to the work of Adorno and his colleagues, (1.) the question of political bias,

(2.) the problem of the conceptual interpretation of the survey data, and

(3.) the ambiguity of the psychological foundations have presented the most serious dilemmas for us, and they seem to reappear in the research of our colleagues as well.
The first dilemma takes us to the core problem of the whole tradition of Frankfurt School-oriented research on authoritarianism. The aim of the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* was to discover the factors which make individuals susceptible to fascist propaganda. They hoped to achieve this by establishing links between political ideologies and a number of psychological variables. According to their logic, if we are able to connect specific psychological characteristics to political—ideological tendencies, we will also be able to understand why people join movements that jeopardise even their own interests, their own freedom and dignity. The authors were, of course, aware of the fact that different factors are at work at the level of the society on the one hand, and at that of individual psychology on the other; and that ideologies and, especially, political movements are determined by a number of socio-economic factors that cannot be captured by personality theories alone. The authors of *TAP* also emphasised that psychological traits do not determine one's political—ideological orientation; they only increase the “vulnerability” of people to particular belief systems. Nevertheless, they claimed that they had managed to find a clear connection — based on psychoanalytic theory — between prejudice directed against outgroups, a belief in hierarchy, and a need for discipline. Negative emotions aroused against punitive parents and the repression of these feelings tend to generate an unconditional admiration for authority, a rigid adherence to social conventions and norms, and contempt for groups of lower social standing, not to mention a readiness to engage in violence against such groups.

Ideology and personality appear in *TAP* as two distinct but systematically connected factors. The F-scale, the attitude scale measuring personality, was supposed to be politically neutral. However the construction and conceptualisation of this scale have been viewed by many as casting doubt on its ideological neutrality, and the results that showed high correlation between the F-scale, the antisemitism scale and the ethnocentrism scale, and moderate but significant correlation between the above scales and political-economic conservatism, were often rejected. Many scholars (e.g. Shils 1954) accused the authors of being blind to leftist authoritarianism, while others protested at what they saw as the insulting connections which Adorno et al. seemed to make between psychological disorders, hostile attitudes against outgroups, and conservative political beliefs (Stone et al., 1993, p. 5). The authors' stress on the
complexity of the ideological sphere, and their differentiation between a “genuine”, that is, non-racist, pro-market conservatism, and a prejudiced, statist “pseudo-conservatism” did not alter the imbalance between Left and Right in terms of ethnocentrism and authoritarianism. (cf. Stone and Lawrence, 1993).

Both the correlation of ideological and psychological factors and their independence present themselves as plausible hypotheses. Do conservatives not argue in favour of respect for authority? Should the harsh punishment of criminals, so much advocated by right-wingers, not appeal to authoritarian, punitive personalities? On the other hand, does everyday experience not confirm the existence of rigid, aggressive, and punitive-minded characters with a sado-masochistic personality in leftist movements? Did Communism not provide us with a great number of examples, that “progressive” ideological tenets can be combined with deeply authoritarian attitudes?

The link between authoritarianism and political affiliations appears in a special form in non-democratic settings. Symptoms of authoritarianism have formed part of the everyday experience of those living under various forms of dictatorship, including communist dictatorships, even if the consequences of such authoritarianism were extremely different in, let us say, Kádár's Hungary, Mao's China, Tito's Yugoslavia, and the former German Democratic Republic. Can we call it “authoritarianism on the left”? Or was it authoritarianism tout court, regardless of its ideological content?

In the light of these questions it was especially challenging to discover what the general pattern is in a post-Communist setting. In a huge comparative study of authoritarianism in the United States and the former Soviet Union (McFarland, Ageyev, and Abalkina, 1993) the researchers found that the “authoritarian syndrome is alive and well in the Soviet Union”. The old-fashioned communists of Eastern Europe seem to be well captured by the classic authoritarianism scales; in fact, they appear to be very similar to continental European right-wing conservatives. This result seems to do justice to theories of totalitarianism which state that modern dictatorships, independently of particular ideologies, follow a very similar logic and therefore attract people with similar personalities and attitude structures. At the same time, “authoritarianism in America led to an especially strong anti-communism, [while] the same authoritarianism in the Soviet Union led to an especially strong anti-capitalism”. In other words,
authoritarianism, “in whatever culture it is found, produces strong condemnation of the culturally defined enemies” (p. 212).

Our Hungarian studies, in which we have employed both short versions of F-scales and Altemeyer's RWA scale, have revealed a complex pattern. According to our data, current members of leftist groups (defined by a number of dimensions like vote, self-identification, and attitudes) stand between the anti-authoritarian liberals and the more authoritarian nationalist-conservatives. The relatively high F-score (but not RWA-score!) of extreme-Left groups was substantiated, but only for 1994 and increasingly less for the subsequent years.

II.

The relevance of sociological factors vis-a-vis psychological ones has emerged as particularly important in the context of our research. Despite the psychological foundations of the theory and of the original methods, the authors of TAP were often criticized for measuring simply the difference in reaction to certain questionnaire items of higher, more educated, and lower, less educated, strata. Being aware of this problem, our team has designed questionnaires in a way that the effect of the socio-economic background could be grasped and filtered out. The result of a large number of analyses done on our data (see also the studies by Enyedi and by Fleck and Fábián in this volume) were, however, assuring, in that the impact of authoritarianism on anti-Gypsy, antisemitic and xenophobic attitudes proved to be significant even after controlling for socio-demographic and political variables.

Obviously, the relevance of purely psychological factors can be still doubted, since our research tools (as opposed to Adorno et al.'s) were very limited. The attempts of the Frankfurt School, namely, to translate psychoanalytic insights into operationalized sociological or social psychological concepts and categories more recently was given new light by the work of the American neo-positivist philosopher Adolf Grünbaum's The Foundations of Psychoanalysis (Grünbaum, 1984), which, on purely theoretical basis, does not exclude the extra-clinical validation and application of psychoanalytic statements. But relying exclusively on questionnaires and lacking access to qualitative methods - for example life history interviews, focus groups etc. - we had to reconcile ourselves with the fact that we can obtain no more than uncertain guesses on the
psychological mechanisms behind the acceptance of authoritarianism items. The qualitative methods might have shed light on those *identity problems and crises* that seem - according to our experiences — to play an important role as the background of the increase of prejudiced attitudes among the youth. But even without these refined methods, we could use the traditional indicators of authoritarianism (first of all the F scale) as signaling the presence of a particular, well-defined cluster of social values and attitudes - which might, in their turn, reflect some genuinely psychological processes.

III.

Finally, our work in the field has convinced us that authoritarianism research has to be renewed from the side of its psychoanalytic basis as well. This task is even more challenging if we take into consideration that in contemporary psychoanalytic discourse on social and political phenomena, the Frankfurt School approach has been steadily replaced by a “postmodern” approach which, by “deconstructing” the concept of the ego and the subject, offers a very different conceptualization of all the psychological phenomena involved in our research. And if texts and contexts replace the subject, the status of concepts like “personality” become fundamentally shaken. (see Whitebook, 1995).

The notion of authoritarianism can be criticized also because it preserved - in a deep frozen form - the presuppositions of a fairly orthodox psychoanalysis - the oedipal model. As Christel Hopf (1993) put it.: “In modern psychoanalysis, approaches have gained in importance that give more attention to the primary social relationships within the family - the ‘object relation approach’ ... At the same time, the ‘attachment’ research approach, in which ethological and psychoanalytic research traditions are integrated ... provides a broad range of conceptual and theoretical instruments for the analysis of social relationships in the family. In my opinion, the closer attention being paid to the ‘pre-oedipal’ patterns and the more exact analysis of the consequences of disturbances in the mother - child relationship as a result of these developments are of great importance for the research on authoritarianism”.(p. 120).

Reformulation of the psychological aspects might help us in relating more properly the authoritarian personality to the political context as well. Can the presence of authoritarian orientations threaten the radical transformation that has been taking place
in the post-Communist societies - the transition from dictatorship to democracy - inasmuch as authoritarian characters may constitute socially organised forces and attempt to re-establish a strictly hierarchical order (in Erich Fromm's term, “escape from freedom”, or, with Herbert Marcuse's term, a “psychological Thermidor”)? Well, the stability/instability of these regimes is probably not to be framed in the classical terms of authoritarianism. Not because the psychoanalytically based “authoritarian personality” is as such “obsolete”, but because in modern politics there is probably less room for those robust mass psychological processes - identification with a leader, a Führer, a Vater-Ersatz (substitute father) - described by Sigmund Freud in his Mass Psychology and the Analysis of Ego - which are themselves symptoms of some kind of collective neurosis, being, at the same time, the sum total of and the breeding ground for individual neurosis. To put it in Lacan's terms: the Father of the totalitarian regimes is the primordial father, le père jouissance who prevents the subject's enjoyment, and who is the full embodiment of authority, while in democratic societies the father is the Master, the symbolic father, a “name”, which symbolizes the empty place of authority. According to the lacanian theory, the totalitarian leader as primordial father activates the fantasy structure of the subject (narcissistic and paranoid fantasies), while the symbolic father allows at least a minimum distance from these fantasies. The quasi-medical discourse applied by Adorno et al. which treats authoritarianism as a unitary syndrome has a heuristically important, but practically limited applicability for describing a psychological reality where the individual's choice of political and ideological attitudes are determined by a vast number of complex, though fragmented factors.

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The above dilemmas that characterized our investigations between 1989 and 1998, were shared by many of the representatives of the 1998 Budapest Symposium. The call for papers referred to some distinct but related topics: “Measurement of authoritarianism, ethnocentrism and prejudices”, “Relationship between authoritarian attitudes, nationalism and political-ideological affiliations.”, “The impact of status, religion and education on authoritarian attitudes.”, “The process of socialization and the
‘generation gap’ in the field of prejudices” and “Extreme Right movements in the East and the West.” In spite of the difference in focus and in the studied countries (Hungary, Yugoslavia, Austria, Germany, Belgium and even “the globe”), the papers showed a high degree of convergence in the addressed questions and the methods used, considerably helping the work of the editors.

The selected papers could be grouped in four categories. The first category (Todosijevic and Weiss) consists of papers dealing with the very concept of authoritarianism. The second section (Bergmann, Enyedi, Kovács) focuses on antisemitism. The third group of studies (Sik, Postma and Fábian and Fleck) concentrates mainly on ethnocentric attitudes. Finally, the last section (Meloen and Farnen and Mudde) analyzes the political dimensions of authoritarianism and nationalism.

Weiss’s chapter summarizes those dilemmas that haunt today's researchers working in the field of authoritarianism. Her paper forcefully draws attention to the fact that inner-family relations, styles of upbringing, ideologies, sexual norms, beliefs in authority, etc., all have changed radically in the last decades. These changes obviously had an impact on the validity of the original concept of authoritarianism. Potentially even more damaging was the failure of some analyses to find links between the style of upbringing, the psychological features of individuals and their ideology. Weiss also underlines the fact that cultural factors substantially shape the level of relatedness of these concepts, and that the F scale might express primarily a specific cultural milieu.

The difficulties of capturing personality character with context bound scales apply not only to cultural-geographical but to social differences as well. The educated strata might interpret social inequalities as culturally and mentally conditioned ones, thus expressing a belief which would fit very well into the authoritarianism syndrome, but the very same people would reject the statements of the F scale, increasing further the social distance from lower, despised strata even by this symbolic gesture.

The largely negative observations concerning the notion of authoritarianism are somewhat counterbalanced by some empirical observations. The Austrian data, for example, show that while the traditional authoritarians are today in minority, the concept of authoritarianism is becoming more relevant for explaining the nationalist and antisemitic attitudes of certain youth groups. The disappearance of “official”
authoritarianism and antisemitism also makes the link between the two concept more meaningful.

Todosijevic conceives authoritarianism as a multi-dimensional concept, confirming that authoritarian submissiveness, aggressiveness and conventionalism (traditionalism) are the core components of the syndrome. His paper maps the links between these elements of authoritarianism to another, equally complex phenomenon, nationalism. He finds that nationalist attitudes in Yugoslavia tend to form one general ethno-nationalist dimension, consisting of two strongly related components, defined as ethnocentric and romantic nationalism. Dimensions of authoritarianism, especially which imply aggressiveness, are significantly correlated with nationalist attitudes. Ethnocentric nationalist attitudes are generally more related to (aggressive) authoritarianism than romantic nationalist attitudes. The relationship between nationalism and authoritarianism seems to depend on the position of the particular ethnic group in the polity: relationships between authoritarianism and nationalism are much stronger in the majority subsample than in the minority one, while the relationship is almost nonexistent in the sample of those who have a “Yugoslav” identity.

Bergmann investigates the level and the causes of antisemitism and xenophobia in Germany, directing attention at the differences between the Eastern and the Western part of the country. While antisemitism seems to have survived — though reduced — in its historical form in the West, in the East the taboos surrounding the topic and the lack of practical anti-racist socialisation have produced a particular, non-prejudiced form of racist discrimination. The Easterners seem to be resistant against the traditional variants of antisemitism, but that does not save them from having even more negative reactions than their Western compatriots against ethnically different outgroups, sometimes even including Jews.

Bergmann reports on a decreasing role of factors such as class position, age, education religious faith, regional background or profession in shaping German antisemitism. Antisemitism “as a purely ideological complex no longer needs social conflicts and political tensions which means that social determination can not be expected.” Political factors such as radical right-wing political orientation, conservative value orientation, patriotic pride and authoritarian readiness to submission have a more significant role. Ideologically motivated anti-democratic attitudes in the West and experience-driven
dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the East are responsible for higher levels of antisemitism and xenophobia.

Enyedi’s study confirms that antisemitism is less determined by social and political background variables than xenophobia or authoritarianism, yet Hungarian antisemitism seems to be more explainable by these factors than the German. Antisemitism was found related to social status: village dwellers, unskilled workers, the poor, the inactive, the uneducated, those who identified with the lower classes, who received a low score on the consumption scale, and were culturally inactive showed higher levels of antisemitism. Atheists, leftists, and liberals had a lower antisemitism score, while a conservative, rightist orientation increased the level of antisemitism. In a 1994 study, lower age was, in general, associated with a lower level of antisemitism, but the 1997 study has shown that this tendency does not continue with the sixteen-year-old age group. The same period effect that was observed by Bergmann in Germany seems to work in Hungary, too.

Dissatisfied, alienated and authoritarian people proved to be especially antisemitic. The shortened F scale was significantly related to antisemitism even after one controlled for socio-demographic factors, xenophobia and political orientation, indicating that the explanatory power of the F scale can not be reduced to these phenomena. Xenophobia was the strongest, socio-demographic variables the weakest, predictor of antisemitism, while the psychologically interpretable scales and the political variables were placed in between. Xenophobia proved to be more relevant in predicting the level of antisemitism than political orientation. The former was crucial in mediating the effect of personality, while the latter's role was to transmit the effect of religiosity.

While Bergmann treats antisemitism as composed of two, distinct dimensions, traditional prejudices and social distance, Kovács distinguishes three elements, prejudiced stereotyping, emotional saturation of prejudice and the inclination for discrimination. The paper investigates the determining factors of Hungarian antisemitism such as socio-demographic variables, level of resources, subjective deprivation, frustration, ideology, political orientation and xenophobia. The refined typology of antisemitism helps him to arrive at some unexpected findings. For example, he shows that highest status groups do nourish strong economic stereotypes, even though there are less extreme antisemites among them. Stereotypers are less religious,
less frustrated socially and less nationalistic. While the antisemites are not more or less religious than the population as a whole, traditional religiosity, as well as personal frustration, is more widespread among the extreme antisemites. Anomie and conservatism, although they are themselves negatively related, lead to extreme antisemitism when they coincide. While anomie is the second most powerful attitudinal cause of antisemitism next to xenophobia, political orientation (conservatism) might also lead to a different type of antisemitism. The most cosmopolitan Hungarian city, Budapest, seems to be an excellent breeding ground for both the ideologically motivated and frustration-driven prejudices.

The chapter authored by Endre Sik analyzes the level and the structure of xenophobia in Hungary. He draws attention to the fact that Hungarians are likely to identify immigrants with criminals and job-stealers, which is an especially worrisome result taking into consideration the low level of immigration into this country (here again Eastern Germany might be cited as a parallel case). He finds that half of those who are willing to discriminate against asylum seekers would do so on an ethnic basis and that open and covert xenophobes (that is those who are against immigrants in general and who are against non-Hungarian immigrants only) add up to three fifths of the population. In the case of one third of the respondents xenophobia proves to be a stronger force than nationalism. While being uneducated and uninformed may increase xenophobia, less involvement in mass-media can in fact contribute to a lower level of anti-foreigner sentiment. News consumption does have a negative effect on xenophobia, but only on its open, that is, non-nationalistic type.

Postma's contribution investigates prejudiced attitudes in Hungary. According to his data, and contrary to the classical ethnocentrism theories, xenophobia might go together with a self-depreciating opinion. He finds that anti-Gypsy sentiment runs much higher than antisemitism in this country. The two attitudes seem to have different structures. While education lowers antisemitism, it has no similar effect on anti-Gypsy attitudes.

Most studies concentrate on status-related variables, but Postma's work also includes variables pertaining to personal contact between members of the majority and minorities. His findings confirm that contact with Gypsies has a positive effect on attitudes towards them, while the same relationship was not unequivocally shown in the case of Jews.
Fábián and Fleck's contribution tests the concept of authoritarianism as a predictor of racial attitudes in Hungary. The paper confirms that authoritarianism, measured by a shortened version of the original F-scale, is a significant predictor of different forms of prejudices: an anti-Gypsy attitude, and political and discriminative antisemitism. The effect of authoritarianism remained robust when basic socio-demographic variables such as per capita income, education and age, and different aspects of the socio-cultural context were controlled for. The authors set up a causal line from social resources (PC income, parent's education) through parent's attitudes to a child's authoritarianism and prejudices. Their results prove that parental modelling and a child's authoritarianism have an equally robust effect on prejudices. They also find that under certain specific conditions a greater level of social resources go together with a greater level of prejudiced attitudes. For example, more educated parents, and also their children, tend to more often be political antisemites, than less educated parents and their children, providing that the effect of the so-called communicational latency is controlled for.

Mudde gives a differentiated picture of the profile and the success of the Extreme Right in Europe, where the Central-Eastern European parties are discussed together with their Western sister-parties. Throughout Europe, immigrants are seen, and often feared and hated, both as parts and agents of the fast social changes that make large groups of citizens feel insecure and threatened. Mudde’s paper shows how nationalism, a political orientation also present in the moderate streams of the party spectrum, is complemented with xenophobic and welfare chauvinist programmes. The general fear of foreigners makes the latter much more profitable in electoral terms than traditionalist nationalism in itself could be. At the same time “the extreme right does not stand or fall with the issue of immigration.” As the analysis of the Flemish Block shows, nationalism and authoritarianism are the main pillars of Extreme Right politics, and they will guarantee the continuity of this political subculture even if the immigration issue will lose its relevance.

Meloen and Farnen extend the analysis of democratic and multicultural attitudes and authoritarianism to a global scale, providing the reader with an interesting example of large scale, cross-cultural academic co-operation. While the authors report on a growing support for democracy and freedom, they draw attention to the variations inside this world wide trend. The study shows that the different economic, social and institutional
traditions of the world regions (Latin America, Asia, West Europe, East Europe, North America, Africa, the Confederation of Independent States, and Australia) have a substantive impact on attitudes towards democracy. Based on their data, the political cultural conditions for a peaceful and efficient democratic development are hardly present in the Russian sphere. The authors also discover a rank order in the so called developed Western world, where the first place goes, contrary to what was expected, to Western Europe and not to Northern America. For Eastern Europe the only good news seems to be that the scepticism directed against democratic structures is coupled with a similarly negative attitude towards dictatorial regimes.

Authoritarianism, prejudice and xenophobia are orientations with wide-ranging social, political and psychological implications, many of which are not tackled in this volume. But this collection of essays signals the major directions followed by those who try to reveal the mechanism of these phenomena with the help of empirical investigations. The differences in findings are considerable, but there is a high level of consensus in the potential explanatory factors. The problems we face in the countries of the former Eastern and Western blocks are not the same, but at least we are able to the point out at what points they differ and at what points they are alike.

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